How the Past 4 American Presidents Helped Escalate Tensions in Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin is singularly
responsible for the war that began this week. But the past four presidential
administrations missed opportunities to deescalate.
ERIC BOEHM | 2.25.2022
The war in Ukraine is solely the responsibility of
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has shamefully ordered an attack on a
non-threatening neighbor.
But the exploding conflict is also a warning about how
missteps in American foreign policy can unnecessarily escalate tensions in ways
that make war more likely. Some of those decisions heightened the acute risk of
conflict in Ukraine itself, while others undermined the post-war norms that are
now at risk of being fully torched by Putin's invasion. Through hubris and
misguided attempts at projecting American power around the globe, four
successive presidential administrations helped create the conditions that led
to Putin's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.
That doesn't excuse Russia's actions, but it does help
to explain them.
That history begins with the Clinton administration,
which inherited a world that for the first time in decades did not include the
Soviet Union. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe meant that there was
an opportunity for the United States and its NATO allies to reassess the
purposes of the strategic partnership that had been formed in 1949 to oppose
the Soviets.
Instead of reorganizing what had always been a defensive
alliance, NATO during the 1990s went on the offensive. First, it admitted new member states that
had previously been part of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, like Poland and
Bulgaria. Then, with the backing of the Clinton administration, NATO launched
into the Yugoslav Wars, most aggressively intervening in Kosovo.
The parallels between the 1999 war in Kosovo and
Putin's attack on Ukraine are not perfect, but they are eerily similar in some
ways. Both involved the direct military intervention of a superpower, were
motivated (or at least justified) by claims of needing to protect an ethnic
enclave within a larger country, ignored the post-WWII norm that great powers
do not use force to redraw national borders, and created a huge refugee crisis.
The "war [in Kosovo] was waged without U.N.
authorization, and was a rank violation of international law," writes Sarang
Shidore, director of studies at the Quincy Institute for Responsible
Statecraft, a realist foreign policy think tank. "It was conducted based
on a new principle conjured up by the United States and some of its partners
called the Responsibility to Protect or R2P—the idea that major human rights
violations justify the 'international community' intervening militarily in any
part of the world. While persecution of human beings is not acceptable
anywhere, the highly arbitrary use (and non-use) of the principle by a set of
powerful states against those less able reeked of opportunism even back
then."
President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq (and, to a
lesser extent, the long misadventure in Afghanistan) further undercut the
principle that superpowers should not violate smaller states' sovereignty or
engage in wars to topple unfriendly regimes. It is that same principle that the
U.S. and NATO are now seeking to use to condemn Russia's invasion of
Ukraine—indeed, none other than Bush himself has issued a statement articulating
that same principle.
Bush also pushed to heighten the stakes in Ukraine. At
a 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania, the Bush administration (against the
wishes of Germany and France) successfully negotiated for NATO to issue a
statement offering future membership to Ukraine and Georgia. The so-called
Bucharest Declaration triggered an immediate, aggressive
response from the Russian government, which
announced plans to provide military support to pro-Russia militias in Georgia
and later invaded part of the country. Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to
NATO, has called the declaration NATO's "cardinal sin."
"Many leading strategists warned that NATO
expansion was a mistake," Chris Preble, co-director of the Atlantic
Council's New American Engagement Initiative, tells Reason. "But
there was a bipartisan consensus among foreign policy elites that dismissed
Russian security concerns. NATO expansion advocates explained that NATO was a
pure defense alliance and thus no threat to Russia. This was a key untested
assumption underlying NATO expansion, a real blind spot, that was never
seriously scrutinized."
President Barack Obama's promise to avoid doing "stupid shit" in
foreign policy and his administration's attempt to "reset"
relations with Russia might have offered some hope of reducing those tensions.
But much of that went out the window when America plainly attempted to
influence the outcome of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution that ousted President
Viktor Yanukovych, who had refused to sign a free trade agreement with the
European Union.
Victoria Nuland, Obama's assistant secretary of state,
in a leaked phone call to American ambassadors, expressed a clear preference for
a successor in Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who would become the new
president of Ukraine after the revolution. Sens. John McCain (R–Ariz.) and Chris
Murphy (D–Conn.) visited Yatsenyuk during the protests and openly indicated American support for
him—the kind of behavior that would be loudly denounced if it were Russian
politicians attempting to pick favorites in a Mexican or Canadian election.
Putin responded by annexing Crimea—and Obama,
wisely, decided against escalation.
As he was leaving office in 2016, Obama gave about as
realistic of an assessment of the situation in Ukraine as an American president
could. "The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is
going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we
do," he told The
Atlantic, adding that "This is an example of where we have to be very
clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war
for."
The lesson did not stick. President Donald Trump broke
with his predecessors by openly calling for a reassessment of America's role in
NATO and NATO's role in the world, but those efforts were driven by domestic
populist politics rather than a serious attempt at diplomatic realignment.
Trump was neither the Russian stooge that many liberals claimed nor the tough
guy that many conservatives imagined, but his administration remained committed to
the 2008 Bucharest Declaration—a position that's in tension with Trump's loud
criticisms of NATO and personal fondness for Putin—and, like Obama,
Trump sold billions of dollars of weapons
to Ukraine.
In each administration since the end of the Cold War,
American presidents have made choices that echo in the current crisis. Whether
directly related to Ukraine or as broader expressions of the de facto realities
of foreign policy, those decisions have colored the contours of what is now
unfolding. Principles like respect for national sovereignty cannot be discarded
in some circumstances and held as insoluble in others, and even
well-intentioned security commitments like the Bucharest Declaration can serve
to escalate tensions in dangerous ways.
But the bipartisan foreign policy consensus in
Washington has refused to acknowledge that "blindspot," as Preble
puts it. Indeed, the Biden administration has continued this trend. During his
confirmation hearing in January 2020, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said
the Biden administration would continue to support eventually extending NATO membership to Ukraine
and Georgia.
"If you are successful," interjected Sen.
Rand Paul (R–Ky.), "then we will be at war with Russia now."
Avoiding a direct military confrontation between the
U.S. and Russia must be the top priority for American officials—now more than ever.
All this history means nothing compared to the importance of what happens next.
While the actions of American presidents over the past
30 years do not excuse Putin's belligerence, today's choices are built atop
those made in the past. And the truth is that multiple American presidential
administrations spanning three decades engaged in foreign policy decisions that
have helped shape the potentially cataclysmic choices Putin, Biden, and other
world leaders now face.
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