Gulf-Eurasian energy crunch pushes Europe to the edge of an inflationary crisis
Europe will be counting on luck as much as policy to
face a mounting energy crisis fueled by wars in Iran and Russia-Ukraine
Ilya
Roubanis and Eldaniz
Gusseinov
Published date: 18 September 2026
Europe’s oil and gas supply is now disrupted by
conflicts in both the Gulf and Eurasia. On Friday, Saudi Arabia told European refineries to not expect any crude oil
deliveries next month. The continent will need as much good fortune as
foresightful policy to withstand the evolving energy crisis.
Conflicts on the periphery of the European Union, the
Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Straits of Hormuz, the Black and
Caspian Seas have made it clear that Europe is not able to secure critical
energy value chains.
With shallow infrastructure in terms of strategic
reserves for oil and gas, a dependence on spot markets, and increasingly
volatile weather, Europe needs luck.
Houthi forces have advanced rapidly along Yemen’s
southwestern Red Sea coast, capturing the Port of Mokha on 10 September,
seizing Mayun/Perim Island inside the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on 11 September, and
reportedly taking Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands on 14 September.
These islands sit directly on tanker and LNG shipping
lanes entering the Red Sea, making even limited Houthi presence commercially
significant. The strait is not physically closed, but territorial control now
allows the Houthis to disrupt traffic.
“The Houthis do not need to physically close Bab
el-Mandeb to extract strategic value from their position,” Abdi Guled, editor
of Horn Briefs and a former AP and Reuters correspondent, told Middle East
Eye.
War-risk insurance premiums for Red Sea transits have surged, and even a perceived threat can make routine voyages
commercially unviable.
While it’s still early to tell, early indicators show
the transit of vessels has declined, with major insurance companies withdrawing
war-risk coverage for Bab el-Mandeb, and shipping companies diverting vessels
around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10-14 days to voyages and raising costs
across global supply chains.
These Red Sea disruptions come as global markets are
still absorbing the shock of the months-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz
earlier this year. The combined effect is visible in Europe’s inflation data:
reduced supply, higher shipping costs, and refinery outages feed directly into
diesel, electricity, and food prices.
The closure of Hormuz from February to early September
removed an estimated 17-19 million barrels per day from global markets, forcing
Europe to rely more heavily on Atlantic Basin and Caspian supply.
Saudi Arabia mitigated part of the shock by diverting
crude through its East–West Pipeline to the Yanbu export terminal on the Red
Sea, increasing flows – until recently – from roughly two million barrels per
day at the start of the year to around six million barrels per day.
The pipeline can technically carry up to seven million
barrels per day, though Yanbu’s loading capacity limits this to some
extent.
A drone attack on a pumping station on 11 September
prompted the immediate closure of the East-West line, and, at the time of
writing, it is not clear when it will reopen.
“The current energy crisis is morphing into a global
financial crisis with symptoms in Europe now evident as eurozone inflation is
accelerating at 3.3 percent and energy inflation jumping at 14.3 percent,”
Costantinos Stambolis, Chairman of the Institute of Energy for South-East
Europe, told MEE.
Four seas, two wars, one market
Europe’s quandary is that conflict is constraining
energy supplies from both Russia and the Gulf.
Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and export
terminals have created industrial constraints on Russian supply at a moment
when European sanctions limit alternative inflows.
US President Donald Trump claimed this week that the
two countries had agreed not to strike energy targets, but Kyiv said it was
conditional and there is no public confirmation from Moscow.
One of Europe’s hopes for diversifying supply beyond
the Middle East was Kazakhstan, a country that has quietly become one of the
few producers capable of easing Europe’s tightening oil balance.
However, Kazakhstan’s main export artery is the CPC
pipeline, which handles more than 80 percent of the country’s crude exports -
but which delivers the crude to a loading terminal at Russia’s Black Sea port
of Novorossiysk.
“There’s a difference between shortages and total
crisis,” says John Roberts, formerly an editor at Financial Times Energy and an
Atlantic Council Fellow, “but Europe is now exposed because several supply
routes are under strain at once”.
“Ukraine seems capable and indeed willing to attack
Novorossiysk,” Roberts said, leaving Kazakhstan unable to rely on its main
outlet at a moment when alternative routes are limited.
The Caspian is the logical alternative to the Black
Sea route, with energy transit via Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Through this route, tankers transit the Caspian Sea
and feed the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which can handle around 150,000 barrels per
day - far below Kazakhstan’s typical export volumes. Additional volumes can be
channelled through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, making Azerbaijan’s
infrastructure key for Europe’s energy security.
But the Caspian route is not safe either.
On July 25, a Ukrainian drone struck an Iranian vessel
in the Caspian. The strike proved that such attacks are possible and can happen
again. For the moment, an understanding between Kyiv and Tehran has eased major
concerns. There is little doubt that this is also an existential challenge for
Central Asian states.
If Kazakhstan cannot ship west, China becomes the
default buyer, reducing volumes available to Europe.
“They don’t want to be dependent on a monopsonist
customer (single dominant buyer),” Roberts said.
Regulation compounds volatility
Experts are now placing their hope for easing
inflation on “demand destruction” - poorer countries reducing consumption
because they can no longer afford high prices, diverting supply to
Europe.
Weather is a key factor: a mild winter would give
Europe breathing space. How weather will affect demand for fossil fuels is
anything but clear.
According to reports from Rystad Energy and ICIS, the
2026-2027 El Niño weather pattern will change how much energy Europe uses over
the next year.
In a July 2026 assessment, analysts warned that while
a milder start to the December 2026 to January 2027 winter could initially
lower heating demand, a sudden atmospheric shift could trigger severe cold
snaps in February 2027, causing a late-winter spike in gas and electricity
use.
Furthermore, historical data from ICIS shows that
strong El Niño events can cut European wind power generation by up to 9.8
percent during the winter months, forcing power plants to burn more natural gas
to keep the lights on.
However, regulation is reducing Europe’s scope to
address short-to-medium pressure.
EU methane rules taking effect in 2027 will require
gas and LNG importers to prove that overseas producers meet EU-level monitoring
and verification standards.
Analysts such as Ben Cahill at CSIS say this will
immediately split the market between compliant and non-compliant exporters.
Many producers lack the equipment and data systems needed to meet EU-level
monitoring standards, meaning compliant gas may become more expensive. This is
likely to affect suppliers from Central Asia.
Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan are studying ways to access the European market. But this requires
the placement of critical infrastructure to carry Kazakh oil or Turkmen gas
across the Caspian. This is hard, as the EU cannot offer investment capital or
long-term contracts for oil and gas projects due to environmental
regulations.
One proposal is for a short interconnector with a
capacity of around five billion cubic metres between Turkmenistan’s own
offshore platforms and those of Azerbaijan.
Advocates have put the cost of laying such a line at
around $500m - or closer to one billion if the line were eventually intended to
carry 10-12 bcm. Such a pipeline would pass through the territorial waters of
only two countries, which, under the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the
Caspian Sea, reduces Moscow and Tehran's ability to block the project.
Nonetheless, Moscow and Tehran can use environmental
impact assessments to exert pressure.
Europe’s energy crisis is turning into an industrial
and inflationary challenge that cannot be addressed with policy or regulatory
interventions. While in the long run Europe may come to rely on renewables
alone, in the short run, there is little that policymakers can say to dissuade
concerns. Luck matters more than policy.