The Israel Lobby’s Changing Fortunes
A follow-up to Mearsheimer and Walt shows a project in
flux.
Oct 17, 2026
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-israel-lobbys-changing-fortunes/
A natural question to ask about Eli Clifton and Ian
Lustick’s Israel’s Lobby is how it differs from the magisterial work of
similar name published by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt nearly 20 years
ago. Certainly its entry into the American debate is less dramatic: Mearsheimer
and Walt’s work had behind it the force of taboo-breaking, taking on a subject
which had been more whispered about than debated for two generations. Despite a
massive campaign to denigrate their work by the lobby’s many allies in the
mainstream media (I believe The American Conservative was the only
American print publication to give it a positive review), Mearsheimer and
Walt’s book became not only a best-seller but a genuine international
publishing sensation.
Though it wasn’t obvious at the time, Mearsheimer and
Walt’s book appeared at a moment when there was still a clear open path towards
a moderate future, sanctioned by a strong international consensus. This was
true both for the American-Israeli relationship (they urged that America treat
Israel like a normal country, while maintaining a moral commitment to defend
it) and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (they favored a two-state solution).
The Iraq War, pushed relentlessly by Benjamin Netanhayu and other Israeli
officials, and in great part the project of small group of passionately
pro-Israel neoconservatives in American journalism and government, was already
in the rearview mirror. The two authors cheered the birth of new liberal
Zionist institutions like J Street, created to encourage United States support
for a more moderate Israel at peace with its neighbors.
Clifton and Lustick’s impressive follow-up does not,
to say the least, arrive at such a propitious time. Lustick is an
accomplished Ivy-League political scientist who has produced important work on
how ethnically driven conflicts can be managed or resolved. Clifton is a Quincy
Institute co-founder and journalist who belongs to the cohort of American
millennials who grew up when it was no longer outlandish to question the moral
correctness of Zionism. Their book arrives as an erratic American president has
started, at Israel’s behest, a war against the largest and most highly educated
country in the Mideast, and oscillates between uttering threats of genocide and
claims that the war is already won. On the home front it has become almost
shockingly commonplace for entertainers and college students alike to shout
slogans that call implicitly or explicitly for the destruction of Israel,
something unimaginable 20 years ago. Meanwhile Israel, in response to the
Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, has conducted a brutal campaign against Gaza’s
defenseless civilians that is often described as a genocide and is indisputably
a project of ethnic cleansing. Israel’s lobby today is both similar and quite
different from the one Walt and Mearsheimer described. Is it stronger or
weaker? Some of both certainly, and while it may be weaker overall, it is
clearly dangerous the way all wounded creatures are.
Of the many elements which have changed since 2007,
three stand out. The main institutions of the lobby, always wealthy relative to
their opponents and competitors, are far richer. Israel itself has changed. Its
commitment to peace with the Palestinians, if in the past more advertised than
actual, has been completely submerged; no Israeli leader of consequence even
pretends to want a settlement with the people who inhabit the land Israel now
controls, and the country’s policy of seeking outright military domination of
its entire region, though challenged by many Israeli former officials and
scholars, faces no substantial political opposition. And finally, in a point
emphasized by Clifton and Lustick, its lobby has more or less abandoned efforts
to explain or justify Israeli policies, to convince Americans of their
necessity and appropriateness. Instead increasingly Israel’s supporters in the
United States seek to conflate any opposition to Israel and American support
for it with antisemitism.
That is to say, to challenge seriously
Washington’s special relationship with Israel is presented as a major moral
failing, the kind of mark which would place one beyond the pale of respectable
discourse. And while these three developments make Israel as influential as
ever in Washington and particularly within the Trump administration, its
actual popularity among voters, particularly among Democrats and the young of
both parties, has sunk like a stone.
In a key section, the authors document how in the last
generation America has seen the greater concentration of wealth in the
hands of the super-rich. The percentage share of national wealth held by the
top 0.1 percent rose by two-thirds. Meanwhile, two court decisions from 2010
have made it much easier for billionaires to buy national policies to their
liking.
As pro-Israel think tank and advocacy money rose, so
did Israel-related campaign and advocacy group contributions. When Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission was decided in 2010, no one
anticipated it would weigh critically on American Mideast policy. The decision
struck down limitations on campaign spending by unions and corporations, and in
conjunction with the consequences of the SpeechNow.org v. FEC decision,
opened the gates for increased spending by the super rich. Individual campaign
spending limitations, $1,000 until 2003, later raised to roughly $3,000,
suddenly became almost irrelevant as ultra wealthy individual donors began to
dispense virtually unlimited funds to support or oppose candidates
through so-called superPACs.
In principle this enhanced capacity of billionaires to
buy policies of their choosing was available to anyone; in practice those
passionate about supporting Israel used it the most effectively. Sheldon and
Miriam Adelson, virtually unknown before 2012, became the most important donors
in the Republican Party. They spent more than $100 million on mostly losing
candidates in 2012, but “forced the relatively niche issue of Israel into the
Republican primary and general election discourse and normalized the idea of
political megadonors across party lines, no longer restricted by campaign
finance laws, largely underwriting campaigns.”
It wasn’t just the Adelsons of course; scores of
Israel-First billionaires joined them with more power to shape American policy
than ever before. As Clifton and Lustick put it, “These donors form the
backbone of an Israel First movement which crosses party lines…. The donors are
funding both the election of politicians as well as shaping the world view of
these same elected officials, creating an echo chamber of pro-Israel talking
points and policy recommendations for politicians already indebted to pro-Israel
donors.” To give a sense of the rising volume of the echo chamber, the authors
track the exponential rise in the budgets of pro-Israel advocacy groups. AIPAC
had $19.5 million in assets in 2000, nine times that amount in 2023. Similar
advances were made by the Washington Institute for Mideast Policy and the
Jewish Institute for National Security of America. The Foundation for Defense
of Democracies, the most influential Beltway group pushing for war with Iran,
increased its revenues 16-fold from 2011 to 2022.
As its American lobby has grown richer, Israel too has
changed considerably. Until the last 15 years, most Israeli leaders at least
paid lip-service to making a durable peace with the Palestinians, and some
believed peace as necessary for Israel’s own flourishing. But no Israeli prime
minister since Ehud Olmert has breathed a word about trying to accommodate
Palestinian national aspirations. The authors consider this a profound shift;
Israel, they claim with a borrowed phrase from an Israeli political scientist,
has become a “crazy state,” increasingly dismissive of the legitimate interests
and opinions of other countries.
Along the way they provide an unexpected, quite
complimentary digression about Vladimir Jabotinsky, an early right-wing
Zionist leader and popularizer of the so-called Iron Wall strategy; its point
was to win battles so forcefully as make Arabs realize they had no hope of
destroying Israel and would have to accept it in the region. But such
acceptance by Arabs was actually a goal, and a corollary of the Iron Wall
doctrine was that Israel should not go out of its way to kill Arab civilians. Many
times ignored, such scruples did exist in principle.
Today they do not. Replacing them is a near hysteric
view of Palestinian resistance. As Clifton and Lustick put it, “Palestinian
resistance was understood as illegitimate, evidence of intransigence, and often
as akin to Nazi antisemitism.” This justified a ramp-up in the brutality of
Israeli tactics, as Palestinian enmity came to be understood as “pathological
and ineradicable” and such Israeli measures as mass imprisonment, breaking the
bones of protesting children, and torture of prisoners became commonplace.
This transformation in Israel had a parallel shift in
the lobby’s accelerating efforts to police Israel-related discourse in the
United States. In the early 2000s, the former Soviet dissident and right wing
Israeli politician Natan Sharansky began to push the idea of a “new
antisemitism” which would include any statement which “demonized” or
“delegitimized” Israel or held it to a “double standard.” Activists following
his lead soon persuaded a minor organization, the International Holocaust
Remembrance Alliance, to adopt a definition of antisemitism incorporating these
notions, and then pressed governments and institutions to embrace the “widely
accepted” IHRA working definition. In a campaign that unfolded over years,
Israel advocates eventually got the Obama State Department to incorporate the
definition in an annual report. By 2018 the Trump Department of Education had
adopted it, and would eventually use it as a weapon to punish pro-Palestinian
academics and students at American universities. The authors provide a detailed
account of the new definition’s rise and codification, a fascinating window
into the nuts and bolts and high stakes of what might at first glance have
seemed a somewhat niche academic debate.
Despite these efforts, the lobby has clearly become
less able to police the American discourse than it was 20 or 40 years ago.
Israel’s poll numbers are bad, particularly among younger Americans. The lobby
hopes that by gaining control of such internet platforms as TikTok, such
opinion shifts can be reversed. (Oracle’s CEO is quoted in a hacked email
telling an Israeli leader, “We have to embed the love and respect for Israel in
American culture.”) It is difficult to see that happening; a great part of pro-Israeli
argument now increasingly rests on such claims as “God Gave Us This Land,”
which is likely to be less persuasive to a diverse and fairly secular America
than snappy catchphrases popular in the 1950s like “a land without a people for
a people without a land.”
Meanwhile, in genuinely stunning political
developments, candidates far more anti-Zionist than Walt and Mearsheimer have
been able to win major elections in New York City and potentially in
Michigan.
At the same time, the last several months have been a
very cold shower for people who thought the Israel lobby was no longer an
extremely consequential voice when Washington decided matters of war and peace.
No one seriously expected that President Donald Trump would try to deliver a
peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, which he clearly had no
real interest in, and which relatively few Palestinians or Israelis seemed
ready for. But it was also assumed that assuring, with American military might,
Israel’s complete dominance of the Mideast was not part of an America
First agenda. Trump had displayed a great deal of bravado in 2015, mocking the
Adelsons’ lavish support of Marco Rubio while boasting that he didn’t need
their money. In 2024, it turned out that he did.
The man who had famously denounced the Iraq war in a
Republican debate and campaigned explicitly against more stupid wars would, in
office a second time, turn to Benjamin Netanyahu as his most consequential
foreign policy advisor and satisfy the yearnings for an American war against
Iran which Netanyahu—and all the voices in the Israel lobby echo chamber—had
sought for a generation. It is this unexpected and calamitous development, this
demonstration that even an America First candidate could be maneuvered into a
costly war by Israel and its lobby, that has rendered the more extreme slogans
of the anti-Israel left—“Free Palestine” etc.—less noxious than they seemed
a generation ago.
Clifton and Lustick have written an important,
extremely well-researched book, which tries to capture in motion a vast and
complex phenomenon which is very much in flux, and whose fortunes are changing
nearly month to month. They are to some degree men of the left, and some of
their formulations—putting “woke” in scare quotes or describing the AfD, the
German anti-immigration party that is one of the largest antiwar parties in
Europe, as “Nazi adjacent”—will seem lazy, at best, to most TAC readers.
And perhaps a less progressive treatment would have noted the irony of both the
lobby and the Trump administration borrowing heavily from tropes of the woke
era in their efforts to portray Jewish college students as made to “feel
uncomfortable” and “unsafe” by student protests against Israeli
brutalities.
But it cannot be denied that it is the American Left,
not the Right, that has taken the lead in trying to free the United States
from, as the authors call it in their book’s subtitle, “the grip of a foreign
power.” For that it, and the authors, deserve commendation.