The Iran War and the Future of American Empire

The choice is between controlled retrenchment now and forced retrenchment later.

Jennifer Kavanagh

Jun 8, 2026

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-iran-war-and-the-future-of-american-empire/

Wars often go wrong in unexpected ways. Even well-planned operations can be derailed by surprise events, equipment failures, bad weather, or bad luck. But the disaster that followed President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Iran on February 28 was not a surprise. War-gamed and red-teamed dozens of times over decades, the risks of the campaign were well-known and obvious. 

Still, the war’s outcome has been worse than the most pessimistic predictions. Three months into what the Trump administration has called an “excursion,” the initial assessment that Operation Epic Fury was a “tactical success but strategic failure” appears too generous. After all, neither strategic nor tactical goals were achieved. The United States did not replace the Iranian regime with new, moderate leaders. It failed to seize Iran’s highly enriched uranium or eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. Worse, most reports suggest Iran has retained much of its military capacity, including access to large portions of its missile and drone stockpiles. Finally, the war has created a new, bedeviling problem. The Strait of Hormuz, once the passageway for 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas, remains effectively closed.

No matter how the war ends, the costs of the latest U.S. military adventure in the Middle East will be steep and the geopolitical consequences irreversible. The next generation of U.S. leaders will face a stark reality. The United States, which for decades has made decisions based on what policymakers thought America should do, will be forced to consider what the United States can do. The change will have major implications for the United States, but also for U.S. allies who have come to depend on American security guarantees and for the international community that relies on the United States for provision of global security goods, like freedom of navigation. 

It will take time for the American imperial project to disappear for good, but from this point, U.S. retrenchment is inevitable. In 20 years, the world will look back on this moment as a turning point: the beginning of the end of American empire.

President Trump has declared victory in the Middle East. But to anyone with eyes, his rosy prognosis does not match the reality. The most obvious evidence of the American failure is the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz (which was open before the war), despite several attempts by the U.S. Navy to get traffic moving again through the narrow chokepoint. Although a small number of tanker and cargo ships have successfully transited the strait in recent weeks, most of the traffic remains stalled due to the security concerns of ship owners, captains, and their crews.

Away from Hormuz, the inability of the United States and Israel to suppress Iranian missile and drone attacks is perhaps the war’s biggest disappointment. Ambitious U.S. goals like regime change and eliminating Iran’s nuclear program were never achievable using military force alone, but destroying Iran’s ability to produce and launch missiles and drones that could be fired at regional neighbors seemed attainable. Recent reporting, however, suggests that even this objective has slipped through the U.S. military’s fingers; Iran appears to retain as much as 70 percent of its pre-war missiles and launchers and access to 30 of its 33 missile sites. Iran’s ability to manufacture drones also seems robust. That Iran was able to sustain a consistent rate of fire after the war’s opening days is further evidence that the damage inflicted by the U.S. military was somewhat less devastating than suggested by the Pentagon and the White House.

The results of the war, then, are dismal. The costs of the military failure, on the other hand, are significant—and not only in monetary terms. 

The Pentagon has told Congress that the first 40 days of war, up until the April ceasefire, cost $29 billion, but this is almost certainly a vast underestimate. The Department of Defense (DoD) has been ambiguous about what is included in this estimate, but at the very least it does not account for the massive damage to U.S. military infrastructure or the full costs of replacing U.S. military aircraft and other equipment lost in the conflict. The full price tag is likely to be twice as high as DoD’s early tally. 

Most up-to-date assessments suggest that at least 16 U.S. military installations across eight countries—most of the U.S. military positions in the region—suffered severe damage. For many of these sites, the damage incurred was so extensive as to render the facility effectively unusable for military operations. The cost of reconstituting these bases and hardening infrastructure across the region against renewed conflict will be high, but the total is difficult to estimate since the U.S. government is still limiting access to open-source satellite data in the region. Iranian missile and drone strikes also successfully targeted dozens of U.S. sensors and radars across the Middle East, including those underlying U.S. regional air defense and early warning networks. Forty-two military aircraft, including an E-3 AWACS, four F-15s, and seven air tankers, were also damaged or destroyed. Replacing these assets will require tens of billions in additional spending.

Costs to long-term military readiness are hard to measure and surely not counted in the Pentagon’s estimate, but they are worth considering anyway. In addition to wear and tear to equipment and personnel caused by the war, the loss of aircraft and air defense platforms and the depletion of U.S. missiles and air defense interceptor stockpiles will affect U.S. preparedness for future military operations. Some estimates suggest the United States has burned through 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, nearly 50 percent of its Patriot and THAAD stockpiles, and significant portions of advanced stand-off weapons like PRSM and JASSM missiles. 

The constraints on U.S. military power created by these shortages will be consequential and enduring. In congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth admitted that it would take years to replenish the missiles expended in Iran. During this time, American strategic flexibility will be limited. For example, leading experts now assess that the U.S. military arsenal is not sufficient to support a defense of Taiwan, long considered the highest priority contingency for American military planners. To put this more bluntly, if China were to attack Taiwan tomorrow, the United States might be forced to watch on the sidelines. The same is probably true of a major conflict in Europe.

As seriously, the problems facing a diminished U.S. military will be contagious, affecting the rearmament efforts of U.S. allies across regions. As our stockpiles are rebuilt, the United States will have to divert most defense production to its own military, reducing what is available for sales to U.S. allies and partners who have based their rearmament plans on such weapons purchases. Already, European NATO members are hearing that shipments of much-needed missiles and other weapons are being delayed indefinitely. Allies in Asia have been similarly warned. Japan’s shipments of Tomahawk missiles, for instance, are likely to arrive late, as are most weapons in recent Taiwan arms packages. 

For many of these allies, such delays are unsustainable. In Europe, for instance, there is talk of focusing more heavily on indigenous production or shifting orders to other suppliers such as Israel, Turkey, or South Korea. In some ways, allied assessments that the United States is an unreliable partner are a good thing, pushing countries that have long been dependent on the United States firmly and finally in the direction of independence and self-sufficiency. But, for the United States, it will be a dramatic change that contributes to a gradual erosion of its position of global military dominance.

Beyond military costs, there is the economic damage caused by the conflict, which is outside the Pentagon’s purview but real and serious nonetheless. The economic losses caused by disrupted trade are likely to be massive, measured in slowed economic growth and lost corporate profits and national income. For the United States, the effects of higher oil prices and inflation for American consumers are the biggest concerns. And of course there are also the opportunity costs, that is, the U.S. government investment in domestic programs that will now be delayed and foregone to support higher military budgets. 

The bottom line is this: The war has not made Americans safer, but they will be paying for it for decades anyway.

The U.S. failure in Iran is unprecedented in its effect on American geopolitical standing, but the military mistakes made in Iran are themselves not unique for the United States. Like previous ill-fated U.S. military campaigns, the Iran War began with unclear, broad goals that could never have been achieved using military force alone. Also as in previous wars, the stakes for the United States were considerably lower than they were for the adversary, a fact that set the United States up for failure from the start. For Iran, the stakes of the current conflict are existential and willingness to endure pain seemingly infinite, while for the United States, the interests at stake are limited at best. Iran was never close to having a nuclear weapon, and, despite its aggressive rhetoric, Tehran posed no real threat to U.S. national security. Finally, American political and military leaders once again made the error of believing their goals in Iran could be accomplished quickly, and then failed to develop a strategy or theory of victory for an extended campaign.

In the past, America’s overwhelming military and economic advantages have offered Washington a generous margin of error to absorb these repeated military disappointments. Today, this cushion has evaporated. Combined with the cumulative effect of decades of U.S. overextension, China’s rapid military development, and the democratization of military power to weak states and non-state groups, the war in Iran has erased much of the remaining U.S. military edge. Forty days of fighting plus six weeks of blockade have not only drained stockpiles but revealed systemic weaknesses in the American way of war and clear limits on American military power. For the first time in decades, the U.S. military looks beatable—and is.

First, the vulnerability of U.S. bases, ground-based air defense, and military aircraft during the war has significant implications for the sustainability of U.S. military commitments. U.S. operations in any sort of Indo-Pacific contingency would depend heavily on forward bases to project airpower, to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and to manage logistics and combat support. Pentagon plans also place faith in the ability of ground-based air defense to protect U.S. military infrastructure, personnel, and aircraft. If U.S. bases in the Middle East cannot withstand attacks from Iran, could those in Asia survive in a conflict with the much more militarily capable Chinese military? Would U.S. air defense networks, which were degraded so quickly by Iranian drones, remain viable in a contingency in Asia? The answer to both questions is probably no. 

At the same time, the war has underscored the limits of what can be accomplished with “stand-off” attacks (those executed from a distance). American air and naval strikes achieved only narrow success against Iranian military targets, despite Iran’s limited defenses. Iran was able to protect much of its military infrastructure and capabilities and to innovate in areas like air defense throughout the conflict. Similar attacks on Chinese infrastructure are likely to be even less effective, especially if U.S. air and naval forces must operate from beyond the second island chain to avoid Chinese missiles. 

U.S. failures in other areas are also revealing. The United States has been unable to reopen the Strait of Hormuz using military force, though some might contend that it could if it were willing to accept the high escalation risks and costs of such a maneuver. And the sieve-like nature of the U.S. counter-blockade should raise a red flag for those who argue that the United States could cut off access to the Strait of Malacca or impose embargos on Chinese ports in case of a war in Asia. Finally, U.S. ground forces have largely failed to counter Iran’s drone threat and are unable to match it with capabilities of their own. Together with observations from the war in Ukraine, U.S. Army leaders have already acknowledged that they will have to radically change how they think about maneuver warfare as they plan for future contingencies, including those to support NATO allies in a ground war in Europe.

The key takeaway is that U.S. military power simply doesn’t reach as far or have the staying power that it used to. Just as seriously, the war in Iran suggests that the insolvency of the current U.S. military position is systemic and strategic, not simply a question of lack of funds or insufficient magazine depth. A $1.5 trillion defense budget or investment in the defense industrial base cannot solve these problems. Instead, the United States will be forced to reevaluate and reduce its global commitments in a way that it has not in the past.

Writing in Foreign Affairs earlier this year, A. Wess Mitchell, an alumnus of the first Trump administration, acknowledged that the United States is overextended. He calls for a strategy of consolidation, in which the United States would shed burdens in peripheral theaters—namely the Middle East and Europe—and revitalize the engines of American military and economic power by investing in its defense industrial base and rebalancing trade relationships with major partners like China. He suggests that consolidation is an alternative to retrenchment, on the assumed premise that the foundations of American military power remain solid, needing only a reset.

Unfortunately, after the war with Iran, this option no longer appears realistic. The gap between U.S. means and its currently articulated ends is simply too vast and structural to be addressed with industrial investments or new trade deals. The fundamental assumption of consolidation, that the engines of American military power are still viable, is now in doubt. U.S. manufacturing capacity has failed to rebound despite significant investment, and with a national debt that exceeds 100 percent of GDP and rising energy prices, American economic endurance is sputtering. There is little chance the United States can produce enough missiles fast enough or reboot its shipbuilding capacity sufficiently to sustain even a fraction of its current portfolio of global commitments. Moreover, after expending so much military power on the war in the Middle East, it is not clear that there is much left for the United States to consolidate and redirect to the theaters that Mitchell defines as higher priorities, including Asia and the Western Hemisphere. 

Now retrenchment is the only choice for the United States. But the news is not all bad. America’s military dominance is waning, but the country continues to have notable advantages in most theaters over any possible rival. Even in Asia, where Washington faces a peer challenger, China’s military is not capable of driving the United States out of the region entirely. Decisionmakers, therefore, have a degree of flexibility in terms of what commitments to keep and which to surrender. Retrenchment, in other words, can be managed.

In making tough choices, U.S. policymakers should adopt a narrow definition of national interests—just two, in fact: defending the homeland and ensuring access to key economic markets. Such a definition would allow for a substantial reduction of U.S. military forces based abroad. The United States does not need military bases and deployments in Europe or the Middle East to protect these interests. There is no true hegemonic challenger in either theater, and the threats that exist to the United States can be addressed with periodic deployments of air and naval power, better missile defense of the homeland, and a more robust global economic strategy. Managed retrenchment would also demand a narrowing of U.S. security guarantees. Even if the United States remains in NATO, it should return to a literal interpretation of Article 5 that reduces U.S. obligations and should give up all security commitments in the Middle East—a region that has brought only headaches. 

In Asia, a managed retrenchment strategy would similarly reduce American posture and security guarantees, though perhaps initially to a lesser extent. Unsustainable positions, like the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, should be dropped. Washington should state clearly that it will not defend Taiwan, a move that would reduce the risk of a war with China that at this point the United States is unprepared to fight. The United States should drop other necessary alliance commitments, including those to Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea, while narrowing its commitment to Japan. This would allow for a repositioning of U.S. military forces in Asia away from China’s coast toward northern Japan and the second island chain—sufficient to defend U.S. access to markets and trade routes. 

These changes in posture and alliance commitments would amount to a massive transformation of American foreign policy, but the result would be a sustainable military position, consistent with U.S. capabilities and resources and tailored to protecting U.S. interests. 

Those hoping to cling to U.S. dominance—many of the same people who see the Iran War as a success that requires just a few more weeks of bombing—will abhor these recommendations, pushing efforts to sustain the status quo. But such a delay will close the opportunity for managed retrenchment and thrust the United States into a reality in which retrenchment will be mandatory and required, forced on the United States.

Forced retrenchment could occur in many ways, but they will all feel like a retreat. Resource constraints could require the United States to reduce commitments, close bases, and shrink force structure. Defeat in a military conflict, provoked by unsustainable deployments, vulnerable bases, and chronic overextension, could also force U.S. pullback. In any of these scenarios, involuntary reductions in U.S. military posture could compromise U.S. interests. Under duress, policymakers will lose the ability to control the pace or location of changes in U.S. military footprint. Instead, these decisions might be made by U.S. adversaries, fiscal pressures, or external constraints that leave Americans less safe and less well-off over the long run.

Today, the U.S. foreign policy debate is driven by the aftermath of the war with Iran. An agreement to end the root causes of the conflict has yet to be signed, but policymakers now need to start talking about what comes next. The war has revealed the fragility of U.S. military power and the clear limits on what it can accomplish in the modern era. Instead of maintaining the fiction that after the war U.S. foreign policy can return to normal, policymakers should face reality: The period of U.S. military dominance—and of American empire—is over. The resulting future will be less comfortable for the United States, but its changes are overdue and its challenges manageable. With the right moves today, American retrenchment can leave the United States, and the world, better off. 

 

Thomas Massie Slams Israel For 1967 Strike On USS Liberty That Claimed 34 Lives

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7bRtT1xjJI

Pro-Israel voices win out, kill bill to stop US-Israel military integration

Rep. Khanna took the 'America First' approach against Section 224, but he was outnumbered by those who played down its dangers and implications

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos

Jun 04, 2026

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-israel-military-congress/?mc_cid=0b390e72a4&mc_eid=944feb3e1c

A House committee summarily struck down an amendment to strip a measure from the massive annual defense policy bill that would provide Israel “a higher level of military-industrial integration" with the U.S. than Washington has "with any other country in the world.”

Pro-Israel voices on the House Armed Services Committee argued that reports about Section 224 — that Congress was trying to integrate U.S. and Israeli military systems as a way to entrench aid without proper oversight — were disingenuous and wrong.

In fact, members claimed that these were “existing initiatives” and that Section 224 “actually improves oversight and accountability of these programs by designating a single official responsible for them,” according to Chairman Mike Rogers, (R-Ala.)

Not quite true, said the Quincy Institute’s Ben Freeman, who broke the initial story of Section 224 for RS last week. “Members of Congress supporting the proposal laid out caricatures of critiques against Section 224. And when they did actually talk about the provision itself they spread half-truths and outright inaccuracies about how far this provision will go to integrate the U.S. and Israeli defense sectors.”

According to Freeman, as reported in these pages, Section 224 would lay the groundwork for:

…bilateral research and development, co-production of weapons, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and seemingly every manner of U.S.-Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation. The U.S. and Israel already work together heavily on missile defense, but this provision would greatly expand coordination to seemingly every area of defense tech, including AI, quantum, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber, biotech, and many more. It also proposes “network integration” and “data fusion.” In other words, the U.S. military’s data could soon be the Israeli military’s data.

Critically, it would shift the annual $3.8 billion the U.S. now gives Israel (a 10-year memorandum of understanding soon up for renewal) to these programs and partnerships, i.e. “co-production” and other “fusion” deep inside Pentagon procurement and acquisitions process, where sunlight is rare and often fleeting. A perfect solution — which is, by the way, endorsed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — given the dwindling American support for Israel’s wars and U.S. military assistance for them.

In his remarks on Section 224, Khanna spoke vociferously against what he saw as a blank check at a time when a majority of Americans say they do not want to send more military aid to Israel.

“The American people are tired of the arrogance and insolence of Prime Minister Netanyahu telling America what we should do. The entire country of Israel has a GDP that is less than a single town in my district, yet somehow Netanyahu thinks he could tell the American people what we should do,” he charged.

“I am for Team America. I am for the interests of this country, and I believe that's what Donald Trump ran on. That includes American interests against any foreign country,” Khanna said. “We should have American sovereignty and make it clear that we strike 224. If we want to give aid to Israel, if we want to sell them weapons, that should be a vote for the entire Congress.”

Unfortunately for Khanna, the majority on the committee did not agree. According to several members, not only is Israel the only friend we have in the region, it helped us create new technologies and capabilities, and we would only benefit from the deeper military ties.

“This is a win-win relationship. We have Silicon Valley, Israel has Tel Aviv, and it's like Silicon Valley number two. We have gained so much technology advantages from our partnership with Israel, and vice versa,” declared Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb). “They gain as well, and this is what we're trying to do, is create that synergy. They support our foreign policy, they've been the most supportive of us in the U.N. They're the only democracy in Middle East, and so I'll oppose the amendment.”

Rep. Ronny Jackson (R-Texas) warned that American national security would be at risk if such synergy didn't occur. After “the bad actors” of the world go after Israel they will then “exercise their free will against us," he charged.

Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) took the line that the reports about Section 224 were overblown. “It's not a new framework at all. We have three existing programs right now where we do military cooperation with Israel to develop technologies. Those programs already exist," he said.

"This amendment ... suggests some other areas where maybe we should look at opportunities, and as the chairman noted, we had somebody now appointed to coordinate those programs.”

He said he, too, was “frustrated with Netanyahu’s leadership” and Israel's support for a “war with Iran that has strengthened Iran and weakened our position,” but he disagrees that Section 224 “is Congress just bowing to what Netanyahu wants — this is to our benefit.” In fact, such sharing should occur with Ukraine, too, he added.

Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) was the only other member who spoke out in favor of Khanna’s amendment, pointing out that current laws prohibit transfers of weapons to countries committing war crimes and violating international law, but Section 224 makes no such provisions, and takes oversight away, despite what some of her colleagues were arguing on Thursday.

She raised the issue of Israeli-owned Pegasus spyware, which was blacklisted for its use against Americans. “Two administrations from both parties left it on that list, and that same company is right now trying to buy its way into the American market, fusing our defense and technology sectors together permanently,” she said.

A proposal “with no conditions in the exact area where we have already been burned (Section 224) is reckless on its own terms, and it would do it through a must-pass bill with almost no oversight and with none of the human rights conditions that govern the rest of security assistance," Jacobs added.

Next steps: Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) says he will work with Khanna to strip the language from the final House NDAA. If the parade of voices that insist Israel must have this relationship with the U.S. military is any indication, it will be a hard road ahead.

Expanding the Abraham Accords Would Help Netanyahu, Not America

The agreements were flawed from the start.

Doug Bandow

Jun 4, 2026

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/expanding-the-abraham-accords-would-help-netanyahu-not-america/

Whether President Donald Trump believed his persistently fallacious claims about the Iran War, or simply expected his supporters to believe them, is unclear. In any case, most Americans recognize that his campaign—illegal aggression that misfired badly, failing to break the Tehran regime while disrupting global energy markets and destabilizing the Middle East—has been a disaster.

Indeed, Iran proved what many had long suspected, that it could block the Strait of Hormuz and thereby hold its U.S.-backed neighbors and much of the industrialized world hostage. The president’s maximalist demands exceed his minimalist achievements, frustrating his attempt to negotiate an end to the conflict. Unhelpful is his choice of chief negotiators, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, who are not only beholden to Israel, but also ignorant of Iran, nuclear issues, and diplomacy. Thus, despite Trump’s repeated claims that Tehran’s surrender is near, the conflict, and resulting economic damage, continue.

Yet rather than drop his demand that the new, more nationalistic and hardline Iranian leadership welcome him as a de facto conqueror, Trump has continued to issue maximalist demands, effectively sustaining the conflict. Last week he expanded his ambitions even further, suggesting that he would make peace only if a gaggle of Muslim states recognized Israel. “If they don’t sign to join Abraham Accords, I’m not sure we should make the deal,” he said. In addition to the Gulf kingdoms, which he had long pressured to legitimize Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extremist government, he named Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey (even though the latter three already recognize Israel). Nothing was expected of Israel, which would continue to receive U.S. arms and money to occupy Palestinian lands and kill Palestinian and other Arab civilians.

His latest expostulations were not well received. He believes that “those countries owe it to us,” but they feel very differently. Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argued that the Gulf states are disappointed in Washington and especially the administration: “While they’re careful not to say it explicitly, they feel the United States was very motivated to protect Israel and not very motivated to protect them.” Apparently, they only just noticed what has long been obvious. To some of them, Israel’s murderous campaign to dominate the region looks at least as dangerous as Iran’s ambitions.

In fact, the so-called Abraham Accords, long touted as a major achievement from Trump’s first term, are a pious fraud. Though depicted as a kind of peace deal, they have nothing to do with peace, since none of the participants—so far Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (Sudan signed on but fell into civil war before ratifying the agreement)—have been at war with Israel.

Nor has the lack of Israeli embassies across the Persian Gulf and North Africa prevented any nation from engaging in back-channel security cooperation. To the contrary, fear of Iran proved to be a powerful glue, linking nations publicly at odds. Several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, which has long been expected to join, have collaborated informally with Israel on the basis of a shared antagonism to the Islamic Republic. Kuwait and Qatar have also not been on the verge of conflict with Israel. Ironically, forcing relations into the open would likely increase domestic public opposition to Israeli ties within these Arab countries, given the Netanyahu government’s recent depredations.

Thus, Trump’s purposes were not peace, but something much more sinister. The first was to effectively force Arab states to drop their commitment to a Palestinian state. In 2002, members of the Arab League adopted the Arab Peace Initiative. Proposed by Riyadh, the measure offered recognition to Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The Abraham Accords require the former while dropping the latter demand, leaving Palestinians akin to Helots in ancient Sparta.

Of course, professed concern by Arab elites over Palestinians living under a violent and brutal occupation is often pro forma. However, public opinion forces even the most cynical authoritarians in such nations to act as if they care about the victims of Israel’s increasingly repressive policy. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who not only murders but dismembers his critics, explained that 95 percent of his people opposed accepting Israel. Trump expects Riyadh and other states to abandon even the pretense that Palestinians are human beings who deserve the same respect as others.

Moreover, expanding the Abraham Accords would act as a Hail Mary political pass to Netanyahu, who faces a difficult reelection campaign. It would both offer a dramatic success to the Israeli prime minister and act as a de facto endorsement by the American president. Indeed, Trump appears to believe his ability to shift votes is as great in Israel as in U.S. primary contests.

Even Arab governments that were willing to covertly cooperate with Israel in the past are reluctant to do so today, let alone publicly embrace the radical and violent ethno-religious coalition that controls Israel. The Netanyahu government is ostentatiously seeking regional hegemony, devastating Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, striking Hamas figures in Qatar, an American ally, and wrecking Iran. Joining the Abraham Accords would be seen as an endorsement of such activities or, even worse, submission to Israel.

The only good news is that Trump was bluffing. Despite his dictatorial tone, he apparently has moved on, presumably realizing that none of the governments will comply. They see little benefit in risking public unrest to fulfill Trump’s fantasies. Indeed, prolonging the war to pressure disparate Muslim states to embrace Israel could risk the survival of the Gulf states, which would almost certainly find their energy facilities and other civilian operations, such as desalination plants, under fire by Iran. Moreover, continued international instability and higher energy prices would fuel antagonism toward the administration. Despite his claim to be indifferent to the upcoming midterm elections, Trump presumably is more concerned about his future than that of Netanyahu.

Nevertheless, merely raising the issue increased uncertainty about his intentions, thereby undermining the administration’s efforts to end the war. His bizarre demand further erodes confidence in Washington, and especially the White House. Expanding the Abraham Accords provides no meaningful benefit to America. Instead of working to enhance Netanyahu’s prestige, Trump should focus on ending his disastrous war on Iran. Any America First policy should begin with disengaging politically and especially militarily from the Middle East.

Visual data reveals extent of systematic Israeli white phosphorus attacks on south Lebanon: Report

Lebanon's Ministry of Environment has formally accused the Israeli military of committing 'an act of ecocide,' resulting in an estimated $25 billion in damages

News Desk

JUN 7, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/visual-data-reveals-extent-of-systematic-israeli-white-phosphorus-attacks-on-south-lebanon-report

A report by The New York Times (NYT) published on 6 June gathers thorough documentation that the Israeli military has repeatedly deployed white phosphorus over populated areas in southern Lebanon during its ongoing war and invasion of the country.

Visual evidence collected by NYT, including verified social media footage and news coverage, shows distinctive smoke trails and airbursts over cities like Nabatieh and Tyre, as well as smaller towns like Qlayaa, Khiam, and Yohmor, with incidents documented as recently as May 2026. 

While the Israeli military maintains that its use of these munitions is intended for smoke screens and complies with international law, human rights experts assert that deploying such an indiscriminate incendiary substance in civilian-heavy areas violates the laws of war.

The body of evidence gathered by numerous international observers and human rights groups is extensive and corroborates these findings. 

Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have verified dozens of videos and photos showing the airbursting of US-made M825A1 artillery shells. 

These shells are designed to release 116 burning felt wedges that can be detonated high in the air and drift over a radius of up to 250 meters, causing widespread fires on the ground. 

In Yohmor, HRW geolocated eight images from March 2026 showing these munitions exploding over residential neighborhoods, directly resulting in fires in homes and vehicles. 

Similar evidence from Dhayra in October 2023 includes testimony from residents and doctors who treated nine civilians for suffocation and respiratory damage caused by the "garlic-like" smoke.

Independent researchers have now documented over 200 uses of the substance in Lebanon since October 2023, which the Lebanese government reports have caused more than 600 fires.

This pattern of use extends far beyond recent events in Lebanon; Israel has a long history of deploying white phosphorus in the region, including during the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon, extensively in Gaza in 2009, and throughout its ongoing genocidal campaign since 2023.

Amnesty International documented the use of white phosphorus artillery shells in densely populated civilian areas in Gaza shortly after the launch of the war on 7 October, 2023; this deployment directly violated a 2013 pledge by the Israeli military to phase out the use of the incendiary substance in populated areas.

The humanitarian risks of these munitions are devastating because white phosphorus causes horrific, deep-tissue burns that can reach the bone and may reignite if exposed to oxygen after treatment. 

Beyond the immediate physical trauma, the substance poses long-term environmental hazards by contaminating soil and water, necessitating specialized cleanup operations before farmers can safely return to their land.

Due to the indiscriminate nature of these illegal weapons, rights groups continue to call for an immediate halt to their use in residential areas.

Lebanon's Ministry of Environment formally accused the Israeli military of committing “an act of ecocide,” back in April 2026, citing a National Council for Scientific Research report that details $25 billion in damages, including the destruction of thousands of hectares of forest and orchards alongside extreme phosphorus soil contamination in strikes conducted between 2023 and 2024. 

Negative views of Israel soar across 36 countries since Iran war, survey finds

Pew found a marked increase in unfavourable views of Israel, with nearly every country surveyed hosting majorities with negative views

By MEE staff

Published date: 5 June 2026

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/negative-views-israel-soar-across-36-countries-iran-war-survey-finds

Negative views of both Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have soared since last year across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, according to a new poll from Pew Research Center. 

Out of 36 countries, majorities in 32 of them have either a very unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable view of Israel, with only respondents in India, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya holding a favourable view of the country. 

The survey was conducted between 8 February and 13 May of this year. The US-Israel war on Iran started on 28 February and has had an impact on countries across the world, in part likely due to the economic impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where around 20 percent of the global oil supply passes through. 

Pew reported that across 36 countries, a median of 67 percent of adults held an unfavourable view of Israel, with just 25 percent holding a favourable view. 

Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem had the highest percentage of unfavourable views of Israel, with Turkey at 97 percent and Japan at 83 percent.

In the Anglophone world, specifically the US, Canada, Australia and the UK, all had majorities that held unfavourable views of Israel at 60, 65, 79, and 69 percent respectively.

All ten countries surveyed in Europe also held generally unfavourable views of Israel, with Sweden and Spain topping out at 78 percent each and Hungary with the most favourable views of Israel, but still carrying a majority, 54 percent, who held unfavourable views. 

Israel's war on Gaza and subsequent genocide has led to a global hardening of views against the country over the past three years. But the war on Iran appears to have triggered a strong response across the world, with significant year-on-year spikes in unfavourable views of Israel.

Israel's actions in Gaza, deemed a genocide by leading scholars, human rights organisations and political leaders, resulted in the death of at least 73,000 Palestinians since 7 October 2023. Its bombardment of the Gaza Strip has either destroyed or damaged 81 percent of structures in the enclave, with an estimated $18.5bn in damages according to the United Nations. 

Effects of war on Iran

Some of the fallout from the genocide was visible in Pew's survey last year, but since then there has been another spike, likely connected to the war in Iran. 

Nigeria, where 47 percent have favourable views of Israel, saw a nine percent increase in unfavourable views of Israel. South Korea had the largest jump in unfavourable views, marking a ten percent jump. 

Germany, Italy, Argentina, Poland, the UK,  and the US all recorded between a seven and nine percent jump in unfavourable views. 

Pew showed that people on the left of the political spectrum tended to hold more negative views of Israel than their counterparts on the right. The ideological gap was widest in the US, where 83 percent of liberals held negative views and just 37 percent of conservatives held negative views. 

That ideological gap is more prevalent in high-income countries but does not necessarily hold true in middle-income countries, according to the survey's authors.

Only two countries, the Philippines and Kenya, had confidence in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu "to do the right thing regarding world affairs". Majorities of respondents in every other country had no confidence at all or little confidence in Netanyahu.

The same leap in unfavourable views of Israel was reflected in respondents' views of Netanyahu, with prominent increases in people losing confidence in Netanyahu's leadership over the past year.

US-Israel integration is far from 'America First'

We cannot outsource components of our national security to nations that do not share our interests and that is exactly what this proposed scheme would do

Joe Kent

Jun 03, 2026

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-israel-integration/

The war against Iran may have resulted in some tactical victories for Israel and the United States on the battlefield, but Israel is not winning American public opinion and neither are those American leaders who ardently support it.

This dwindling popularity could put in jeopardy the $3.8 billion that Israel receives in U.S. military aid each year. And that $3.8 billion is not all we provide to Israel — we also offer invaluable diplomatic cover on the world stage, in addition to direct U.S. military support during specific crises. Separately, the war in Iran has mostly benefited Israel’s regional agenda and has cost the U.S. taxpayer more than an estimated $50 billion so far.

Because of these factors, most Americans are growing wary of the support we give to Israel.

To get ahead of the changing sentiments, Israel and their American allies, like U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, are attempting to rebrand the aid we give to Israel each year. Rather than the annual Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlays, anything we give Tel Aviv will be “based on trade," according to Huckabee. The goal of this shift is to undermine the notion that Israel is dependent on American hand-outs and that the U.S. taxpayer is footing the bill for the horrific scenes coming out of Gaza and Lebanon. There is, of course, a major catch.

The catch is Section 224, cleverly buried deep in the massive National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which is entitled “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative.” This initiative transitions the traditional aid relationship into a deeper partnership between the U.S. and Israel in many aspects of technological research and development and defense production, and would also give Israel unprecedented access to U.S. technology development and "data fusion."

Section 224, which has been literally endorsed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, essentially transforms Israel from a top U.S. aid recipient to a full member of the U.S. defense and intelligence apparatus.

When it comes to counterintelligence and strategic messaging, the Section 224 initiative is far more damaging to U.S. national security than the previous arrangement. By embedding Israel in the production of critical defense technologies, we are creating access and control mechanisms for a nation that has drastically different goals than America does.

We should instead keep the development of key technologies restricted to Americans only. The dangers of allowing any other nation to access our sensitive military technologies are obvious, including the fact that back doors and spyware can be installed that will most certainly be used by the Israelis to influence U.S. policy.

From a strategic messaging perspective, Section 224 is a nightmare for the Trump administration and any lawmaker who supports it. Sentiment in America is turning against Israel, and Section 224 will not help quell the prevailing narrative that Israel has too much influence on the American government.

A more troubling aspect of this scheme is that it allows Israeli manufacturers to operate production facilities in the U.S. with an American partner. This stands in contrast to the standard way America provides military support to nations; historically the weapons that the U.S. provides in arms packages are all made in the U.S. by American manufacturers. Section 224 will give Israel the ability to actually create jobs in America. This is a powerful talking point that will give Israel leverage with many members of congress and the American public.

Sure, Israeli defense companies and subcontractors currently operate in the U.S. — however they still must compete with American companies, and lack the access to the U.S. government that American defense companies enjoy. Section 224 would turn that on its head as US.-Israel would be co-producing weapons systems, giving Israeli companies an unprecedented edge inside the Pentagon.

The idea of Israel creating American jobs by manufacturing military technologies in the U.S. may sound positive on its face. After all, who doesn’t want more American jobs? But this argument is built on the same fallacy that is used to justify the $3.8 billion in military aid that we currently give to Israel: that the aid is mostly spent on American weapons systems, so it’s not actually aid but an investment in American industry, as the pro-Israel lobby claims.

First, the idea that we need to give billions to a foreign country to manufacture American weapons systems is ridiculous. Supporters of Israel like Ambassador Huckabee like to say that the $3.8 billion we give to Israel goes back into the American economy. This assumes that we need to give a foreign nation money to fund our defense industry. This is nonsense, We should instead invest the $3.8 billion directly on weapon systems for our own inventories or sell them to nations that don’t need to pay for it with American aid money.

Second, the majority of the profits from the defense sector don’t go into creating American jobs or back into American communities, they go to the CEO’s profits and stock buy backs. This has been an issue that President Trump himself has raised.

Moreover, how have Israel’s actions in Iran, Gaza, or Lebanon made America safer and more prosperous? Some of the intelligence we get from the Israelis can be useful, but our increasing over-reliance on it has caused our own capabilities to atrophy.

We are a sovereign nation. We cannot outsource components of our national security to nations that do not share our interests; they will put their own interests first every time. No other government prioritizes the needs of a different country before its own, because that would be foolish. Israel can still be a decent partner, so long as we are clear-eyed about the differences between our two countries and act accordingly.

We must put America’s needs first.