Trump ended his idiotic Iran war. Good.

Was it worth it? Of course not. But comparing his Iran deal with Obama's or decrying the terms risks falling into the same traps as previous presidents

Trita Parsi

Jun 18, 2026

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ends-war-critics/?mc_cid=6c4f189709&mc_eid=944feb3e1c

I have spent years fighting against Trump’s push toward war with Iran, and I have the scars to prove it. When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, I warned that it would eventually bring us to this moment. Ever since, I have consistently argued against the confrontational path he set the United States on. That record speaks for itself, which is why I can say what follows without any throat-clearing.

Given the circumstances, President Trump’s decision to strike a deal with Tehran and bring this costly, unnecessary war to an end is the right one. It deserves support, not partisan second-guessing. As Rob Malley — a key member of Barack Obama’s team that negotiated the nuclear deal and later Joe Biden’s lead negotiator with Iran — noted on X, comparing Trump’s memorandum of understanding to Obama’s JCPOA misses the point. What matters is not how the agreement stacks up against past diplomatic achievements, but how it compares to the alternatives before us. And on that score, Malley argued, the MOU is “far preferable to any of the alternatives on offer. Period.”

I would go further. To examine the Memorandum of Understanding and ask, “Was the war worth it?” is nonsensical.

Of course it wasn’t. How could it have been? The premise itself is deeply flawed: that a failed war of choice would somehow strengthen Washington’s hand at the negotiating table and produce more favorable terms. History offers little support for such a proposition.

The question is also flawed in another, more consequential way. It implies that a war should not be brought to an end until it has produced better terms — even when the war itself is failing.

Taken seriously, that logic leads to a dangerous conclusion: that a failed war must continue until the battlefield fortunes somehow improve and a more favorable outcome becomes attainable. Perhaps that day will come. Perhaps it never will. In the meantime, the costs — in lives, treasure, regional stability, and strategic credibility — are treated as secondary considerations.

This is how endless wars are born.

Wars become interminable when leaders convince themselves that ending them without victory is politically more costly than continuing them without hope. Once that trap is sprung, every setback becomes an argument for one more deployment, one more escalation, one more year. The objective shifts from achieving a realistic political outcome to avoiding the admission that the original objectives were unattainable.

American history offers more than a few examples. Presidents inherit wars they did not start, recognize they cannot be won on the promised terms, yet lack the political space to end them. So they postpone the reckoning. They kick the can down the road, handing the burden to their successor, who does the same. The result is a cycle of strategic drift in which the costs accumulate while the prospects for success steadily recede.

When victory is nowhere in sight, prolonging a conflict in the hope that reality will eventually conform to political rhetoric is not resolve. It is denial.

Remember Afghanistan. For years, American officials lied to the public that victory was just around the corner — six months away, perhaps a year at most. Yet the Afghanistan Papers later revealed that these officials privately understood that victory was nowhere in sight. They knew the war was adrift, but feared the political consequences of admitting it.

So, the war continued. By the time the United States finally withdrew, nearly two decades had passed, and more than $2 trillion had been spent.

And what was the end result? After twenty years of war, thousands of American and allied lives lost, and hundreds of thousands of Afghan casualties, the United States arrived back where it had begun: it had replaced the Taliban with the Taliban.

That is the curse of endless war. The refusal to accept an unfavorable reality today merely guarantees a higher bill tomorrow.

Some credit must be given to Trump for breaking this pattern, even as he should be blamed for having started this war in the first place. Political leaders should be judged not only for the mistakes they make, but also for whether they have the courage to correct them.

Trump could have followed the well-worn path of his predecessors. He could have prolonged the conflict, spent more money, sacrificed more lives, destabilized more economies, and further depleted American power — all while insisting that victory remained just over the horizon. Recall the countless times he declared that the war had been won.

Indeed, the political costs of continuing the war would likely have been lower than the costs he is paying today for ending it. In American politics, there is often greater punishment for acknowledging failure than for perpetuating it.

That perverse incentive has trapped presidents for decades. In his testimony on the Vietnam War before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, George Kennan stated the following: “There is more respect to be won in the opinion of the world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound policies than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives.”

The criticism coming from some Democrats is particularly disappointing because it echoes the same bad-faith tactics Republicans deployed against the JCPOA in 2015. To be sure, Trump has invited some of this treatment. He spent years attacking Obama’s agreement with a barrage of misleading arguments and exaggerated claims.

But that does not make it wise for Democrats to return the favor.

Trump currently owns this failed war, but if the Democrats help torpedo the MOU and war resumes, then they will co-own the next war. Trump’s disaster will become theirs as well.

This isn’t rocket science. Several Democratic lawmakers have managed to criticize the war, hold Trump accountable for it, yet avoid attack lines that could sabotage the MOU. Their criticisms are primarily over Trump having started this war in the first place, rather than the terms for ending it.

Rather than attacking the terms of the MOU, Democrats should pressure the administration to protect it from those who are determined to see it fail. The main external threat is the Israeli government and Benjamin Netanyahu’s obsession with sabotaging any opportunity for Iran and the United States to bury the hatchet.

Instead of relying solely on angry phone calls and public rebukes of Netanyahu, supporters of ending the war should press Trump to act now: suspend military aid to Israel and curtail military and intelligence cooperation. Such measures would limit Israel’s ability to reignite the conflict and dispel any notion in Tel Aviv that Washington will automatically follow Israel into another war. If Israeli leaders understand that the United States will not be drawn into a future conflict on their behalf, their incentive to start one in the first place will be significantly reduced.

The task now is not to reward Trump politically, nor to excuse the recklessness that produced this war. It is to prevent the war from returning. Democrats can condemn the decision to start it without sabotaging the agreement that ends it. They can hold Trump accountable without helping Netanyahu drag the United States back into conflict. The choice before them is not between opposing Trump and supporting peace. It is between learning from America’s endless wars and repeating them.

Israel Sets ‘Red Lines’ for Lebanon Ceasefire: No Withdrawal and No Ceasing of Fire

Israeli officials reiterate that troops will remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely

by Jason Ditz | June 21, 2026

https://news.antiwar.com/2026/06/21/israel-sets-red-lines-for-lebanon-ceasefire-no-withdrawal-and-no-ceasing-of-fire/

Massive Israeli attacks against Lebanon over the weekend managed to derail the US-Iran peace deal, and the ceasefire announced on Friday went so predictably poorly that US officials are organizing another round of Israel-Lebanon talks to try to come up with another deal.

While most aren’t getting their hopes up for the next round doing any more than the last several rounds, Israel has a growing image problem, with even historically war-supportive outlets like the Jerusalem Post running editorials questioning the Israeli strategy, particularly the lack of an obvious endgame strategy.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to be going into the talks with little sign of doing anything different, setting “red lines” for the future ceasefire that include Israel not being willing to withdraw from Lebanon, and wanting US guarantees that they’ll continue to be allowed to attack Lebanon.

Many will quickly notice that looks pretty much like the status quo. Indeed, it seems to not be materially different from the last several ceasefires the US has brokered, and similarly doesn’t offer any timetable for Israel ever withdrawing troops from Lebanon.

Netanyahu insists Israel will remain in Lebanon “as long as necessary,” and Defense Minister Israel Katz similarly said that not only will IDF troops remain within the ever-expanding “security zone” in Lebanon, but that they will have no restrictions on their operations, to preserve “all of the IDF’s achievements in the campaign in Lebanon.”

What those achievements are remains unspoken. The IDF has killed over 4,000 people and wounded some 12,000 others, and has occupied Lebanon up to the Litani River, and in some places beyond that. The UN estimates some 1.4 million Lebanese have been displaced by the war, and Amnesty International says it amounts to an illegal forced population transfer.

Within the Israeli polity, the stances are either to maintain an open-ended war and occupation, or to escalate dramatically, with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir leading a call to “burn” the entirety of Lebanon, leading to international condemnation. As ever, the chances of Israel agreeing to end the war in the near-term in any meaningful way seem remote.

US-Iran deal leaves Israel isolated and Netanyahu exposed

The deal could weaken Israel's regional influence and accelerate the political decline of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

By Meron Rapoport in Tel Aviv

Published date: 18 June 2026

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-iran-deal-leaves-israel-isolated-and-netanyahu-exposed

Israelis are viewing the emerging US-Iran deal as more than just a diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Tehran.

For many in the country's political and military elite, the agreement to end the war represents a strategic turning point that could weaken Israel's regional influence, strain its most important alliance and accelerate the political decline of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Although an agreement between the US and Iran had been widely anticipated since April, Pakistan's announcement on Sunday that a deal had been reached sent shockwaves through the country.

There's still a lot of questions about the terms of the agreement that are yet to be answered, but Israel's political and military establishment did not expect the joint US-Israeli campaign against Iran to end this way.

When Netanyahu initiated the war against Iran on 28 February, Israel's objectives appeared clear: dismantling Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and bringing about the collapse of the Iranian government.

Almost four months later, none of those goals have been achieved. Instead, Iran appears to be in a stronger position than it was in February.

The country still retains its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, while its leadership appears to have emerged strengthened despite the blows Israel inflicted, including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran also increasingly appears to be emerging as a regional power, with Arab Gulf states aligning themselves more closely with Tehran than with Israel.

Israel, meanwhile, finds itself in a position it has not experienced in decades, with many Israelis feeling more isolated than ever before.

A sense of isolation had already been growing over the past two and a half years as Israel's campaign in Gaza led to boycotts of Israelis around the world. 

But the situation now appears different.

Following Pakistan's announcement of the deal, Israel increasingly seems isolated even from the US, with reports pointing to a growing rift between Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump.

For many Israelis, any fracture in the country's relationship with Washington is viewed as an existential threat. Israel's security doctrine has long rested on its alliance with the US.

Members of the government and senior military officials alike appear uncertain about the implications of the emerging US-Iran agreement, scrambling to adapt to a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

Netanyahu's growing isolation

With elections expected in Israel in the coming months, the agreement could also carry significant domestic political consequences for Netanyahu, whose coalition continues to trail in opinion polls.

Speaking at a news conference on Monday, Netanyahu claimed that Israel had prevailed in all of its recent conflicts, pointing to what he described as major achievements in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.

He also maintained that, had Israel not acted against Iran in June 2025 and again in February, Tehran would have obtained a nuclear weapon.

"All of you were in grave danger of mass death," Netanyahu told Israelis watching on television, adding that "we saved the State of Israel from annihilation."

According to Netanyahu he was not really in danger, only Israelis faced annihilation.

Such rhetoric only deepened the prime minister's disconnect from the public. 

Netanyahu presented himself as a legendary leader standing above events, rather than as a politician accountable to voters. 

The emerging agreement, however, could have profound consequences for his political future.

While Netanyahu's coalition currently polls between 50 and 53 seats in the Knesset, the impact of the agreement has yet to be fully reflected in public opinion. 

Even so, if current polling trends are borne out at the ballot box, Netanyahu would be far from securing the parliamentary majority needed to form a government.

It remains unclear whether the agreement will include provisions requiring Israel to end its military presence in southern Lebanon, or whether Trump could pressure Israel to withdraw without such a clause.

For Netanyahu, however, Lebanon already represents a political vulnerability. Opposition parties have seized on the emerging US-Iran deal to attack him, focusing not on the decision to wage war itself but on the way the conflict has been conducted.

An Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon could mark the beginning of the end of Netanyahu's tenure as Israel's longest-serving prime minister. Former army chief Gadi Eisenkot has been gaining momentum in opinion polls and increasingly appears to be a leading contender to replace him.

This week may prove to be a turning point in the race to become Israel's next prime minister.

Netanyahu is increasingly portrayed as a leader engaged in multiple open-ended conflicts without a clear strategy or end goal. His apparent disputes with Washington have reinforced an image of growing isolation.

Eisenkot, on the other hand, is increasingly viewed as a more measured and responsible figure capable of making decisive choices about Israel's wars.

That contrast could prove decisive in the next election.

A deeper challenge?

Regardless of the impact on Netanyahu's political future, the emerging US-Iran agreement presents a far more significant challenge for Israel itself.

The deal calls into question Israel's reliance on overwhelming military force as its primary means of addressing regional challenges, often at the expense of diplomatic initiatives.

Israel's military establishment, which under Netanyahu has played a central role in implementing this approach, is at great shock from the deal.

Solving problems through power is not a new feature of Israeli policies, but since it launched its genocidal campaign in Gaza, military power has increasingly become the dominant tool through which Israel has sought to achieve its objectives.

Before October 2023, Israeli military leaders generally maintained a broader strategic outlook. Since then, the army - particularly under Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir - has increasingly abandoned this way of thinking and has nothing to offer to the government and the Israeli public other than complete destruction in order to boost deterrence.

While senior officers reportedly continue to advocate for further military operations across the region, recent actions such as Israel's attack in Beirut's Dahieh district may ultimately carry strategic costs.

If Israel is compelled to withdraw from Lebanon, it would deal a significant blow to the prestige of an army that has become a major political actor that constantly pushes for war.

Although Netanyahu and his far-right allies, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, are often portrayed as driving Israel toward prolonged conflict, the military's role in shaping these policies receives far less attention.

The emerging deal could challenge not only the military's approach but also Israel's broader method of managing its affairs throughout the Middle East.

Netanyahu, perhaps more than many of his political rivals, appears to understand the potential implications.

If the agreement ultimately leads to an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon under Iranian pressure, while a new regional alignment involving Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey takes shape, the consequences could extend well beyond Lebanon.

Such changes could also affect developments in Gaza.

At a moment when Israel appears weakened and increasingly isolated from Washington, Iran and its regional partners may seek to push for changes in the enclave similar to those they are demanding in Lebanon.

States such as Qatar and Turkey could also seek concessions from Washington in return for maintaining close ties with the Trump administration rather than moving further towards Iran and China. Such concessions could involve changes to Israeli control over Gaza.

It happened in 1991 when the US "rewarded" Arab and Muslim states for participating in the Gulf War by supporting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at the Madrid Conference.

An isolated Israel

A similar dynamic could emerge again, even if it takes a different form. 

Both Gaza and the occupied West Bank could become central issues in the near future.

While opposition figures accuse Netanyahu of damaging Israel's special relationship with the US, repairing that relationship may prove more difficult than many assume. 

A trip to the White House alone may not be enough to reverse Israel's changing strategic position.

For that reason, it's entirely possible that Israel will refuse to withdraw from Lebanon - even if Trump demands it, risking a deeper rupture with Washington.

On Wednesday, Yinon Magal, a leading journalist with Channel 14 News who is widely regarded as close to Netanyahu, suggested a possible name for Israel's next military operation against Iran: "A people dwelling alone."

Like the story of the Jewish rebels at Masada, the phrase reflects a vision of Israel fighting its battles independently, even without the support of its most important ally.

Israel possesses formidable military capabilities, including a powerful air force and a nuclear arsenal. For the foreseeable future, it is capable of enduring regional isolation because of its military superiority.

Standing alone and defying even the US president could become a central theme of Netanyahu's election campaign. 

He may seek to present himself as the only leader willing to resist international pressure and defend Israelis from external threats.

But if Israel does not follow the path of isolation that Netanyahu appears to be advocating, this week could ultimately be remembered as a watershed moment.

Israel could find itself forced to accept foreign dictates, not only in Lebanon, but also in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Israel violently bombs Lebanon minutes after US officials declare 'new ceasefire'

At least 47 people have been killed and nearly 100 others wounded by Tel Aviv since a resistance operation killed four Israeli occupation soldiers overnight

News Desk

JUN 19, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-violently-bombs-lebanon-minutes-after-us-officials-declare-new-ceasefire

Israel continued to brutally bombard south Lebanon on the afternoon of 19 June, following the announcement of a ceasefire which was supposed to begin at 4:00 pm. 

Strikes continued on Nabatieh and several other areas after the so-called truce was meant to have started.

At least 11 towns and villages were hit, with some being struck by Israeli aerial attacks multiple times.

Earlier, a Gulf diplomat told AFP that Hezbollah and Israel agreed to a ceasefire.

“Hezbollah and Israel have agreed to halt hostilities in a deal mediated by Qatar, the US, and Iran,” the diplomat said. US officials cited by Reuters and other outlets said the same thing.

Hezbollah has yet to officially comment on the truce. 

According to Lebanese media outlet Al Jadeed, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has insisted on the need for a clear US statement that includes an Israeli commitment to a ceasefire before Hezbollah announces its position.

Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported, citing an Israeli official, that Israel is “currently committed” to the ceasefire. 

However, it said the army will maintain its occupation of south Lebanon. It added that Tel Aviv will respond if its occupation forces are targeted by Hezbollah.

"Any Israeli move outside the framework of a comprehensive ceasefire will be met with a response,” a Hezbollah leadership source was cited as saying by Al Jazeera.

As south Lebanon remained under heavy bombardment past 4:00 pm, drone sirens sounded in Zarit, in the Upper Galilee.

A US official cited by Reuters had said Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to a ceasefire starting at 4:00 pm local time.

Lebanon has been under intensified Israeli bombardment over the last 24 hours. 

Tel Aviv has expressed major concerns over the new US–Iran agreement and its clause on Lebanon. It is demanding continued freedom of action to strike at will and maintain a presence of occupation forces in the country. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war minister have vowed that troops will remain in Lebanon. 

The intensification of strikes in recent hours follows a Hezbollah resistance operation which killed four Israeli troops in south Lebanon overnight. 

At least 47 people in Lebanon have been killed since Thursday evening. Nearly 100 others have been injured.

At least 3,980 people have been killed and 12,011 injured in Israeli attacks on Lebanon since 2 March, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health.

Due to the latest brutal strikes on Lebanon, Iran–US technical negotiations scheduled for Friday in Geneva were postponed. 

Iran has repeatedly warned that continued Israeli violations in Lebanon will be met with harsh retaliation. 

Earlier this month, Tehran launched a ballistic missile attack on Israel in response to a strike on Beirut.

The End of the U.S.-Israel Alliance

A joint war against Iran might be its apex.

June 15, 2026

By Joshua Leifer, a columnist for Haaretz.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/15/israel-united-states-special-relationship-palestine-netanyahu-trump

It would seem that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accomplished what his predecessors could only have dreamed of: U.S. and Israeli fighter jets flying tandem over Tehran, Israeli officers ensconced in U.S. Central Command’s Florida headquarters. Since the days of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s leaders have sought backing from the world’s preeminent superpower, which they hoped would guarantee their state’s survival into perpetuity. None could have imagined the level of cooperation currently on display. If one were to wake up the Old Man, as Ben-Gurion was known, from his otherworldly slumber in the sands of Sde Boker, he would surely delight in the news.

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. In one sense, the U.S.-Israel relationship is at its apogee. Viewed from another angle, it has already entered a period of terminal decline. The political, ideological, and sociological pillars on which the so-called special alliance rested for most of the last half-century have begun to collapse. The Israel-advocacy complex—the network of lobbying groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Jewish communal organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League, and Christian Zionist groups such as Christians United for Israel—was once a juggernaut on Capitol Hill. In today’s climate of hyperpolarization, it has started to falter, challenged first by the progressive flank of the Democratic Party and now increasingly by the neoisolationist faction of the MAGA coalition.

Public opinion has shifted dramatically. Less than half of Americans now say U.S. support for Israel is in the national interest; for the first time, Americans also view Palestinians more sympathetically than they do Israelis. Nor is it any longer a given that Americans and Israelis hold a common set of cultural and religious values. As the United States has become less Christian and more diverse, Israeli society has become more traditionalist, its public culture more insular. On both the U.S. right and left, antisemitism has also begun to seep from the margins into the political mainstream, seen by growing numbers of people, especially among the young and disaffected, as a marker of anti-establishment bona fides in populist times.

These shifts were well underway before the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023. But Israel’s subsequent destruction of Gaza, its blockade and starvation of the devastated territory, and spiraling settler violence in the occupied West Bank—all livestreamed over social media for more than two years—greatly accelerated them, generating an anti-Israel backlash that has become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary U.S. politics. If indeed the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran constitutes the apex of the special alliance, what follows will be the fall.

The special alliance was not always so special. While it was U.S. President Harry Truman who recognized Israel, his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower was notably chilly toward the state, wary of upsetting the U.S. strategic calculus in the early Cold War. John F. Kennedy broke with Ike’s arms embargo and was the first to supply Israel with U.S. arms; Richard Nixon, or rather his advisor Henry Kissinger, rescued Israel in 1973, engineering the crucial airlift of military aid that staved off defeat in the Arab-Israeli war. Still, the relationship had its limits. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush all knew how to say no to Israel’s leaders—sometimes forcefully in terms that today would shock, sometimes with the threat of material consequences—and little feared the Israel-advocacy complex, which was a relative welterweight compared with the heft it would throw around by the mid-1990s.

The end of the Cold War brought the United States and Israel into closer alignment. The relationship was no longer tempered by broader U.S. considerations of global great-power equilibrium. There developed what international relations scholars call a “community of strategic interests.” Israel assumed the role of enforcer of the new U.S.-led international order in the Middle East. With the launch of the global war on terrorism, U.S. and Israeli interests seemed to converge even further. In terms the pliant U.S. media reflexively echoed, U.S. and Israeli leaders framed their countries’ interests as identical and their foes, whether Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or Yasser Arafat and the PLO, two sides of the same radical, terrorist coin.

That overlap of strategic interests was, in turn, bolstered by a widespread sense of shared values. At the very moment the United States embarked on democracy promotion abroad, Israeli leaders boasted of the country’s uniqueness as the region’s sole democratic state. For those who saw the war on terrorism in civilizationist terms, Israel was the front-line defender in the struggle between the Judeo-Christian West and its Islamist enemies. American liberals, meanwhile, were inclined to see in Israel an exemplary open society amid a black sea of authoritarian Arab regimes, conservative theocracies, and Islamist militants. From Bill Clinton through George W. Bush, U.S. policy in the Middle East was dominated alternately by Atlanticist liberal interventionists and their more sharp-elbowed cousins, the neoconservatives.

For the growing Israel-advocacy complex, this was favorable ground for maneuvering. AIPAC could marshal near-unanimous support for Israel across both parties, while its aligned think tanks maintained a revolving door between Republican and Democratic administrations. Advocates for Palestinian rights, for their part, lacked any comparable apparatus, and few Palestinian writers were being published in mainstream outlets, unlike today. Meanwhile, complaints about the Israel lobby’s power were, for the most part, relegated to the conspiratorial fringes where the boundaries of the far left blurred with the far right. And with Holocaust memorial culture at its peak—the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum opened in 1993—an accusation of antisemitism still carried its career-ending severity.

It was the pro-Israel right, not the pro-Palestinian left, that shattered the bipartisan consensus in Washington. The pivotal year was 2015. Then, as now, the issue was Iran. As the Obama administration pushed for a nuclear deal, the Israel-advocacy complex went to war against the widely popular Democratic president. AIPAC dumped roughly $40 million into lobbying against the nuclear deal. Republican House Speaker John Boehner invited Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress without first notifying the president, a move widely seen as a politicized breach of procedure and basic decorum. Behind the lectern, Netanyahu lambasted the Obama administration’s deal-in-the-making that would “only change the Middle East for the worse.”

The Israel-advocacy complex’s blitz failed to stop the nuclear deal. Instead, it demolished its own vestigial facade of bipartisanship. Pro-Israel groups soon began to function openly as a wing of the Republican Party, especially as Jewish communal organizations shed the pretense of representing the views of most American Jews in favor of the priorities of right-wing megadonors. Trump’s first term deepened this process of partisan polarization on Israel even further. He embraced a hawkish pro-Israel line far to the right of any previous administration: shuttering the PLO’s office in Washington, moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Trump has arguably done more to push rank-and-file Democrats away from Israel than any pro-Palestinian activist.

2015 also marked a turning point in Israel’s trajectory. Over the course of a bruising election campaign, Netanyahu appeared to radicalize. He eschewed the image of the Israeli right’s responsible adult and embraced the style of authoritarian populism ascendant around the globe. Whereas Netanyahu had previously given lip service to a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians, he pivoted toward open territorial maximalism. After his 2019 indictment on corruption charges, Netanyahu grew ever more desperate in his attempts to remain in power. He forged electoral alliances with the most extreme forces in Israeli political life, not only normalizing the followers of the quasi-fascist rabbi Meir Kahane and hard-line messianic settlers but empowering them as ministers in his government.

Against the backdrop of democratic backsliding within Israel proper and the deepening occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza, vanishingly few American liberals could claim to share values with their Israeli counterparts. Meanwhile, a new generation of progressives came of age having known only the Israel of Netanyahu. That generational cohort was more diverse than any before it, comprising, to a significant degree, the children of immigrants from South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Many of them rejected the U.S. tradition of pro-Israel politics, were inclined to view Israel with antipathy, and felt no fealty to the Holocaust meta-narrative that had become an anchor of U.S. political culture. An increasing number of young American Jews also began to challenge support for Israel as a pillar of American Jewish identity; some would become prominent leaders of a resurgent anti-Zionist movement.

During these same years, between the killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and George Floyd in Minneapolis, U.S. progressives underwent a “racial reckoning” that dramatically reshaped their understanding of identity and power—a shift that would have significant ramifications for the debate about Israel within the left wing of the Democratic Party. In 2016, long before Oct. 7, the Movement for Black Lives published its policy platform in which it labeled Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians a genocide.

More recently, a segment of the MAGA right has joined the progressive left in its rejection of the U.S.-Israel relationship. The terms of critique are different. Beyond the swamp of antisemitic conspiracism that has engulfed parts of the young and online right, those who identify with the “restraint”-oriented faction of the MAGA coalition have begun to call for a reevaluation of U.S. support for Israel. They charge that there is not, or no longer is, a community of interest between the two allies and that Israel and its advocates exert an outsized and undue influence on U.S. foreign-policy making. They advocate for slashing U.S. aid to erstwhile allies as part of what they hope will be Washington’s withdrawal from imperial management and see no reason why the relationship with Israel should remain an exception.

If the old bipartisan pro-Israel consensus has collapsed, a new anti-Israel consensus is taking shape on the edges of both the Democratic and Republican parties. For Democrats, the primaries ahead of the 2028 election will almost certainly be a referendum on Israel. Already, activists have made significant strides in pressuring candidates to distance themselves from AIPAC and other groups associated with the Israel-advocacy complex. Universal healthcare was the watchword of the 2020 primaries; conditioning, or ending, U.S. military aid to Israel will likely fill the same role in 2028. On the left, hostility to Israel—the more strident, the better—is fast becoming a litmus test as an indicator of reliability on other matters of progressive concern.

Among Republicans, much will depend on the aftermath of the Iran war. If the economic and diplomatic pain suffered by Americans sticks, Israel and its advocates will take the blame. That scenario will likely empower the neoisolationists and restrainers, whose champion, at least for the moment, is Vice President J.D. Vance. But if he is sullied by the Iran debacle, there are other figures waiting in the wings, including conservative pundit Tucker Carlson, whose presidential ambitions are only whispered for now. On the right, too, military aid to Israel will be on the chopping block regardless as a baseline position much of MAGA can embrace.

Where, then, does this all leave Netanyahu? The Israeli prime minister has already begun to spin the eventual reduction in U.S. military aid as his own proposal, rather than face a political fight over a new aid package that Israel is not in a position to win. Netanyahu has pledged to wean Israel off U.S. assistance entirely over the next decade. The Heritage Foundation has drafted a proposal that outlines how that might work, substituting the current model of providing discounts to Israel for buying U.S. materiel with joint weapons technology efforts—hardly a return to the U.S. arms embargo on Israel of the early Cold War years.

Yet Netanyahu may be too sanguine about a future for Israel after the end of the special alliance. Having taken it for granted, he is perhaps more responsible than anyone else for its precipitous decline. When he departs the scene, he will leave Israel worse off for it.

This article appears in the Summer 2026 print issue of Foreign Policy. 

The U.S.–Iran Deal Could Help Transform America’s Mideast Strategy

Washington doesn’t need to be the region’s micromanager.

Eldar Mamedov

Jun 17, 202

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-u-s-iran-deal-could-help-transform-americas-mideast-strategy/

Following intensive talks, we are pleased to announce that the Peace Deal between the United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran has been REACHED.”

The Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s statement this week confirms a cessation of hostilities between Washington and Tehran, to be formalized on June 19 in Geneva. Vice President J.D. Vance is expected to sign the deal alongside Iran’s Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—the man with whom he negotiated in Islamabad during the first U.S.–Iran talks at this level since 1979. Intriguingly, both Vance and President Donald Trump on Monday said a deal had already been signed. Military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, will terminate immediately and permanently; the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for the global oil trade, will reopen.

That, at least, is the idea, though the two sides will need to implement the agreement to get Israel’s war in Lebanon ended and the Strait of Hormuz truly open for shipping. Similarly, modalities will have to be found to implement the sanctions relief and unfreezing of Iranian assets reportedly in the agreement. And then comes the even harder part: Once it takes effect, the “memorandum of understanding” will kick off 60 days of discussions on thorny issues related to Iran’s nuclear program—enrichment levels, inspection regimes, and breakout timelines. 

Those negotiations will face spoilers on both sides. In Washington, neoconservatives like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and its CEO Mark Dubowitz will oppose any outcome short of total Iranian capitulation. They have spent decades arguing that only maximum pressure, regime change, and war can suffice to address “the Iranian threat.” 

In Tehran, hardliners associated with the so-called Steadfast Front, who dream essentially of a North Korean model for Iran, view any compromise as a betrayal of the revolution’s principles. Lacking deep political support, they exert pressure on the negotiators through the media and the hardline-dominated parliament.

Then there is Israel, which still has levers to derail any final agreement by escalating violence in Lebanon, despite Trump’s clear preference for ending the war on all fronts.

Amid the intense activity of all these potential spoilers, the agreement could easily collapse before it reaches its second stage. That is the real danger of the coming months.

Yet the deal already agreed—pending its official public signing in Geneva—has far wider geopolitical ramifications than a transactional ceasefire. That is because it reveals the limits of American power and opens a path to a long-overdue U.S. strategic recalibration in the Middle East.

What did the war actually prove? The U.S. entered this conflict believing that conventional military superiority would quickly compel radical changes in the policies of the Iranian government, if not regime change. That was a costly error. Air campaigns, naval interdictions, and strikes against the IRGC and political leadership did not produce capitulation. They produced Iranian entrenchment. The regime remains in place, more emboldened than ever.

Here is the deeper irony: The threat of war had preserved American leverage, and the waging of war destroyed it. So long as the prospect of the use of force remained ambiguous, Iran had to hedge. Once force was actually applied and failed to produce decisive results, Tehran learned that the United States could not achieve its maximalist objectives militarily. That knowledge permanently shifted the bargaining dynamic.

But this outcome need not be seen as catastrophic. It can instead produce a realistic reassessment of American presence and partnerships in the Middle East.

The coalition that helped end the war diplomatically points the way forward. The Pakistani statement identifies the mediators: apart from Pakistan itself, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Some of these states were more involved than others, but all invested diplomatic capital to wind down a conflict that none of them initiated and all recognized as contrary to their interests. They understood that the U.S.–Iran war had destabilized the entire region, and that a widening of that war would devastate it.

Now contrast them with the states that pushed for escalation: Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Both view Iran as an existential threat. Both prefer that the United States bear the costs of containing it. But from a U.S. perspective, their advocacy was not friendly counsel. It was an attempt to outsource their security dilemmas to American forces. This is not to condemn Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. It simply notes that their interests and American interests are not aligned on the question of war with Iran. In fact, they are fundamentally incompatible.

The strategic opportunity is now visible. The deal allows the United States to do what it should have done a decade ago: recalibrate its regional posture downward while ensuring that no single power—Iranian, Saudi, Turkish, or Israeli—dominates the Gulf.

The framework is straightforward. If the final deal is reached, it would enable the U.S. to sharply reduce its military footprint in the Gulf. The primary responsibility for regional security would likely shift to an alignment of regional powers: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt. These states have the economic weight, military capacity, and diplomatic relationships with Tehran to manage the regional frameworks without direct American combat involvement.

This is not abandonment. The United States could become the offshore balancer it has long wanted to be, rather than the regional micromanager and onshore garrison it actually became.

Israel and its supporters in Washington would not like any of these developments. But ultimately, Israel’s long-term security depends less on American military guarantees than on its own deterrent capabilities and its eventual accommodation with its neighbors. The United States has demonstrated that it will not fight a major war to fulfill Israel’s maximalist goals. That fact is now evident to both parties. Israel’s best path forward is therefore to adjust its own force posture and pursue regional normalization on terms that do not require American combat power. And that starts with charting a credible path to a viable Palestinian state. That is a harder path, but a more reliable one.

Finally, the implications for American domestic politics are deep. By signing the deal in Geneva, J.D. Vance could become the visible face of America’s Middle East recalibration toward realism. His signature on June 19 would mark a strategic recognition: The U.S. is overextended, the war exposed that overextension, and now the administration is correcting course. Entering the 2028 election cycle, Vance could plausibly claim to have extracted the U.S. from a costly war that had no realistic path to victory. Given the polling data on Americans’ views of the Iran War, that sounds like a good position for the VP to be in.