This Isn’t Just Trump’s War on Iran. Both Parties Paved the Way for Disaster.

We must recognize Democrats share responsibility with the GOP for creating the climate that made such a war possible.

By

 Stephen Zunes , Truthout

Published

April 17, 2026

https://truthout.org/articles/this-isnt-just-trumps-war-on-iran-both-parties-paved-the-way-for-disaster/

Unlike the invasion of Iraq, which received the support of a sizable minority of congressional Democrats, Donald Trump’s war on Iran has received near-universal criticism. Still, the party has focused primarily on process-style critiques — such as the legality of declaring war under the Constitution and the war’s economic impact — rather than the humanitarian consequences and flagrant violations of international law.

That should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the U.S. bipartisan consensus on Iran: For over 20 years, a number of prominent Democratic leaders — and in some cases, large majorities of congressional Democrats overall — have helped pave the groundwork for Trump’s war by issuing exaggerated and alarmist statements about Iran’s supposed danger to the region, threatening the use of military force, and undermining diplomatic initiatives, sometimes even criticizing Republicans from the right.

In 2024, the Democratic Party platform criticized “Trump’s fecklessness and weakness in the face of Iranian aggression during his presidency” by not responding militarily to attacks by Iran and groups in Iraq and elsewhere that share Iran’s strategic objectives. The platform cited four separate incidents that took place under his first administration, failing to acknowledge that each was a direct result of Trump’s aggressive policies against Iran, including the assassination of Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian general.

By contrast, the party’s platform praised President Joe Biden for having “authorized precision airstrikes on key Iranian-linked targets,” which it claimed would “deter further aggression by Iran.” It praised “America’s ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and our unrivaled ability to leverage growing regional integration among U.S. partners to counter Iranian aggression.” Though eager to stress military means to counter Iran, the platform failed to directly call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal under the Obama administration, which considerably reduced regional tensions — a deal that Biden campaigned on reinstating but failed to do.

The month after the release of the party platform, Democratic nominee Kamala Harris attacked Trump in a presidential debate, declaring that her administration “will always give Israel the ability to defend itself, in particular as it relates to Iran and any threat that Iran and its proxies pose to Israel.”

In an interview with CBS, when she was asked who she considered to be the greatest enemy of the United States, Harris said it was “obvious” that Iran — not nuclear-armed states such as Russia, China, or North Korea — was the “greatest adversary.” She explicitly said that she would not rule out going to war against that country.

This framing from the right continued into Trump’s presidency, even as the president began pushing more toward sustained military conflict. During Israel’s unprovoked bombing of Iran in June 2025, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer insisted that “Israel has a right to defend itself,” despite the fact that Israel had started the war. Just over a week before, he criticized Trump for even engaging in negotiations with Iran — negotiations that provided cover for the U.S.’s own bombing of multiple Iranian nuclear sites. Just prior to the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites during Israel’s war, Schumer posted a video to social media accusing Trump of “folding on Iran” by attempting to negotiate a deal, bemoaning about how “Trump always chickens out” regarding the use of military force.

Similarly, House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries refused to criticize the Israeli attack or call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal. Although Iran has no capability of striking anywhere outside of the Middle East, Jeffries claimed “the Iranian regime poses a grave threat to the entire free world.”

Such hyperbole is not new. As far back as 20 years ago, Democratic leaders like then-Sen. Evan Bayh were claiming that Iran “may be only months away from having the capacity to build a nuclear bomb” and insisting military options should be considered. Similarly, then-Sen. Hillary Clinton argued during the Bush years that his administration was not taking the threat of a nuclear Iran seriously enough, criticizing it for allowing European nations to take the lead in pursuing a diplomatic solution, and insisting that the administration should make it clear that military options were being actively considered. These proclamations came even as the U.S. was struggling to maintain control of Iraq at the height of its occupation.

During the 2008 Democratic primaries, Clinton accused Barack Obama of being “naive” and “irresponsible” for wanting to diplomatically engage with Iran and other nations that U.S. policy has often antagonized. Despite these accusations, Obama selected her as his secretary of state, through which, according to a story in Time magazine, Obama administration officials noted she was “skeptical of diplomacy with Iran, and firmly opposed to talk of a ‘containment’ policy that would be an alternative to military action should negotiations with Tehran fail.”

Clinton was far from the only Democrat pushing back against the Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts. In 2011, in an effort to sabotage any potential diplomatic contact with Iran, an overwhelming majority of House Democrats voted for a Republican bill declaring “No person employed with the United States Government may contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that … is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran.” Administration pressure and constitutional questions prevented the bill from passing the Senate, but it underscored that over 90 percent of House Democrats were intent on undermining Obama’s efforts for a non-military resolution to the conflict with Iran.

The following year, a similarly large majority of House Democrats voted for a resolution urging the president to oppose any policy toward Iran “that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” While Obama had already stated a willingness to consider taking military action against Iran if the regime procured nuclear weapons, this resolution significantly lowered the bar for war by declaring it unacceptable for Iran simply to have “nuclear weapons capability” — not necessarily any actual weapons or an active nuclear weapons program.

In 2013, after Clinton was replaced by the more liberal John Kerry as secretary of state and Iranians elected the reformist President Hassan Rouhani, yet another overwhelming majority of House Democrats joined Republicans in voting, over the objections of the White House, to impose punitive new sanctions on Iran. It was widely interpreted as a bipartisan rejection of the new Iranian president’s offer to enhance nuclear transparency and pursue “peace and reconciliation” with the West.

Additionally, in an apparent effort to poison the atmosphere on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, over two dozen Democratic senators signed a letter to President Obama demanding a “toughening of sanctions” and “a convincing threat of the use of force.”

In May of that year, every Democratic senator joined their Republican colleagues in supporting a resolution which “urges that, if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel.” The wording is significant in that it put Senate Democrats on record that the United States should support an Israeli war on Iran not only if Israel was attacked, but even if Israel attacked first. By giving Benjamin Netanyahu the authority to determine what might “compel” Israel to act in “self-defense,” this near-unanimous decision helped pave the way for Israel to make such claims in its U.S.-backed war in June 2025 and the joint U.S.-Israeli war this year.

Fortunately, by 2015, the Obama administration — along with Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China, and with the backing of the European Union and the United Nations — was able to negotiate an agreement whereby, in return for sanctions relief, Iran drastically curtailed its nuclear program to the degree that it was physically impossible to build a nuclear weapon, while also agreeing to strict monitoring to ensure compliance. It took perhaps the most intense lobbying efforts of the Obama presidency to get congressional Democrats on board. In the end, only two Democratic senators, Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer, opposed the agreement, but their colleagues nevertheless elected them to senior positions — Menendez as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and Schumer as their Senate leader.

The 2016 Democratic platform endorsed the nuclear deal — but declared that, if Iran violated the agreement, rather than allow for the automatic reimposition of strict international sanctions to pressure Iran to come back into compliance as the deal outlined, a Democratic president “will not hesitate to take military action.” Since it would take Iranians at least a few years to rebuild their dramatically circumscribed nuclear program to the point where they could develop even a single nuclear weapon, there would be plenty of time, as well as serious punitive economic mechanisms, to push Iran to resume its compliance. Immediately launching a war, as the platform called for, would therefore not only be a direct violation of the United Nations Charter, it would be completely unnecessary.

This is only a partial list of ways in which Democrats have pushed for a military confrontation with Iran over the past couple of decades. Even today, the fact that Democratic leaders still support unconditional military aid to Israel and Netanyahu, Trump’s partner in the illegal attacks on Iran, raises questions about their sincerity in opposing the war.

It is highly unlikely the United States would have launched a full-scale war under a Democratic administration as it has under Trump. However hawkish many in the Democratic leadership have proven to be, they would have been far more likely to listen to allied governments, as well as the broad consensus of strategic analysts, intelligence officials, and military leaders that make up the foreign policy elite, many of whom have long warned of the serious consequences of going to war.

At the same time, it is important to recognize how Democrats share responsibility with Republicans for creating the climate that made such a war possible.

Trump: When the only friends you have left are Bushies and neocons

The warmaking president is shedding his base. But the last ones on the MAGA bus may be the first to leap off at any sign of political trouble.

Jack Hunter

Apr 27, 2026

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-base-iran-war/

In May 2025, President Donald Trump declared that the neoconservative era was over. This was of course not new rhetoric. He didn’t always live up to it, but Trump always made sure that bashing neocons and the Bush era and their endless wars were a staple in his long list of political excoriations.

After all, Trump began his meteoric rise during the 2016 Republican debates when he said to Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, brother of George W., that “obviously, the war in Iraq was a big, fat mistake, all right?”

“They lied,” he added, referring to the Bush administration’s insistence that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction. “They said there were weapons of mass destruction,” Trump blasted. “There were none, and they knew there were none.”

Presidential nominee Trump would later tell the 2016 Republican National Convention, “We must abandon the failed policy of nation-building and regime change that Hillary Clinton pushed in Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Syria.”

Yet today, this American president is knee-deep in a seemingly endless regime change war with Iran over that country’s alleged and illusive weapons of mass destruction. The conflict, which has even earned praise from his former nemesis Jeb Bush, could arguably become even more disastrous than Iraq in the long term.

What made Trump go full neocon? Could it be that they are the only political faction left that still embraces his foreign policy?

It might be. Because increasingly, conservatives who aren’t reflexively hawkish are turning away. And polls keep showing that most Americans are not with him.

Three new surveys released this week now place Trump’s approval rating in the mid-30s. A Reuters-Ipsos poll shows it at 36%. A Strength in Numbers-Verasight poll has him at 35%. An AP-NORC survey says only 33% of Americans approve of Trump right now.

These numbers are all going down, not up, from surveys last week.

This poor standing mirrors George W. Bush’s slide during the Iraq war. “It was almost exactly this time 20 years ago that the bottom began to fall out on George W. Bush’s approval ratings,” CNN analyst Aaron Blake noted. “And as Bush’s numbers in most polls fell into the 30s for the first time in late winter and early spring, the culprit was clear: the Iraq war.”

“History could be repeating itself with President Donald Trump in 2026,” he wrote. “Just swap Iraq with Iran.”

Interestingly Trump appears to be more neoconservative. While 2003 wasn’t the first time the U.S. attacked Iraq, the warhawks had been begging for war with Iran for decades. Trump chose to fight a battle that his predecessors rejected, and in so doing he gave Netanyahu’s Likud government, which had been arguing for direct U.S. intervention non-stop since Trump won office in 2016, exactly what it wanted.

President Barack Obama’s former Secretary of State John Kerry told CBS’s Stephen Colbert in an interview Tuesday, “I think it was about two weeks ago, the New York Times reported that Netanyahu personally went into the Situation Room and presented the case, why this was the right thing to do. It was reported that he had attempted this with previous administrations.”

Colbert asked, “During the Obama administration, where you're secretary of state, did he make the same case?” Kerry replied, “yes.”

Colbert then asked, “And what was the response at the time?”

“No,” Kerry said emphatically.

“I mean, I was part of those conversations,” he added. “I remember them well.”

Trump’s former debate opponent Jeb Bush is now pleased with Trump’s decision to attack Iran, saying in late February, “This is their time to take their country back.” Bush serves as chairman of United Against Nuclear Iran, a group that lobbies for regime change in that country. Bush even made a special video praising the war in early March.

Independent journalist Glenn Greenwald said Thursday that Trump seems to have morphed into the very thing he campaigned against: the government officials who lied and scaremongered over “mushroom clouds” and “yellowcake” uranium.

“Trump is now completely reliant for every answer on the same exact claim used to sell the Iraq War: They're getting nukes; they'll give them to terrorist groups; they'll take out our cities; be afraid; we have to bear whatever cost to stop their WMD program,” Greenwald wrote.

A reporter asked Trump Thursday what might happen if oil prices reach $200 per barrel.

Trump replied, “There is nothing worse than a nuclear weapon that takes out one of your cities.” Vice President JD Vance said something similar in March, suggesting if we don’t fight Iran then terrorists could show up in American cities with nuclear weapons in backpacks.

While America First pundits, politicians, and formerly diehard Trump supporters like Tucker Carlson and ex- GOP Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene have become major critics of this president, today’s White House is much friendlier to neoconservatives like talk host Mark Levin and GOP Senator Lindsey Graham.

Carlson and Greene say they no longer recognize the man Trump has become. Levin, Graham and other Israel-friendly hawks have encouraged this significant shift in foreign policy by this president.

But how long do they stick around?

“It seems to me that Trump has three problems,” Washington Examiner magazine Executive Editor Jim Antle told RS.

“One is that his new friends were reluctant adopters of him at best and many were Never Trumpers in 2015 or 2016,” Antle said. “They will turn on him much faster than the podcasters did. Second, and relatedly, Trump is going to want to end the war before they are ready. They will cheerlead his bombing, but not his diplomacy. Finally, their audiences are primarily made up of people who are going to reliably turn out for Republicans in the midterms regardless.”

“These are dead-enders, not persuadables or new voters Trump brought into the coalition,” he added.

Curt Mills, Executive Director of the American Conservative, also believed Trump’s neocon fan club might not be around for long.

“George W. Bush once remarked on the subject of legacy: ‘History? We don't know. We'll all be dead,” Mills said in an email. “Increasingly, that seems to be how this president rolls, as well. He has disappointed ideological true believers and made a pact with neoconservatives, a group that will abandon him in posterity as swiftly as they opposed him during his ascent.”

Regardless, with Iran, Donald Trump is definitely losing support from the broader parts of his coalition. The war has sent him fleeing into the arms of those conservatives who he never purported to have anything in common with in the first place. It may be a fair-weather arrangement for both sides, but for the rest of us it is dark days ahead as long as these war pushers hold sway over the president’s foreign policy.

US mulls expelling Spain from Nato for failing to back war on Iran

Leaked Pentagon email suggests range of measures including recognizing Argentinian sovereignty over Falkland Islands

By Alex MacDonald

Published date: 24 April 2026

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-threatens-punish-nato-allies-failing-back-us-over-iran

The US has threatened to "punish" its Nato allies for their lack of support in the war on Iran, including ejecting Spain from the alliance.

An internal Pentagon email seen by Reuters outlined a range of possible options for the US to inflict consequences on its allies.

Among the other measures considered were recognising Argentina's claims over the Falkland Islands, which the South American country calls Las Malvinas, to punish the UK, and blocking "difficult" countries from important or prestigious positions within the alliance.

President Donald Trump, who has long criticised what he sees as a power imbalance between the US and other members of Nato, has made no secret of his frustration at Europe's opposition to the US-Israeli war on Iran.

In early April, he repeated his threat to pull the US out of the alliance, something that the Pentagon email does not suggest.

Spain has been the most prominent and forthright critic of the war on Iran, declaring it illegal from the outset and forbidding the US from using its bases or airspace for the conflict.

The Pentagon email described these two factors as "just the absolute baseline for Nato" in terms of members pulling their weight.

On Friday, Spain hit back at the reports, with Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez stating that his country was following all its obligations under the alliance.

"Spain is a reliable member within Nato" that is fulfilling all its obligations, Sanchez told reporters in Cyprus, where he was attending an EU summit.

"As a result, I am absolutely not worried," he said.

Falkland Islands threat

The UK's opposition to the war on Iran was less absolute than Spain's, still allowing US planes to use British bases, but Prime Minister Keir Starmer has still earned Trump's ire.

Argentina's far-right President Javier Millei, a close ally of Trump, has stated his support for the Falkland Islands coming under his country's control on a number of occasions.

The islands were invaded by Argentina in 1982, leading to a conflict between the two countries that resulted in the deaths of almost a thousand people. The territory remains under British control.

Middle East Eye contacted the UK Foreign Office for comment on the Pentagon email and what the likely UK response would be if enacted.

The ministry pointed to an X post by Stephen Doughty, Minister of State for UK Overseas Territories, who said the "self-determination, sovereignty and defence of the Falkland Islands" was "resolute - and will always come first." 

They did not comment on how the government would respond to the US move, however.

Asked for comment on the email by Reuters, Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson responded: "As President Trump has said, despite everything that the United States has done for our Nato allies, they were not there for us.

"The War Department will ensure that the President has credible options to ensure that our allies are no longer a paper tiger and instead do their part. We have no further comment on any internal deliberations to that effect."

What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters

Iran’s response to the US-Israeli war is rooted in the legacy of the 1980s conflict, which defined the country’s political and military structure

By MEE correspondent

Published date: 23 April 2026 

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-iran-iraq-war-taught-todays-iranian-leaders-and-why-matters

In September 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered a full-scale ground and air attack on Iran, hoping for a quick victory. 

He told the Iraqi people he would reach Tehran within weeks. Instead, the war lasted nearly eight years and killed more than a million people.

Beyond the vast destruction, the war helped shape the Islamic Republic of Iran into the system it is today.

At the time, Iran was still grappling with the turmoil of the 1979 revolution, which had toppled the Shah, a key ally of the US and Israel in the Middle East. 

The post-revolutionary Iranian army was falling apart, while nationalist, leftist and even moderate religious groups were competing with the ultraconservative clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first supreme leader.

Saddam Hussein’s invasion not only failed to bring down Khomeini’s rule, but it also ended up helping entrench it. 

The war allowed the new leadership to tighten its grip, eliminate opposition groups, and consolidate power and institutions. 

During those years, a quote attributed to Khomeini appeared on walls across Iranian cities: “War is a blessing.”

It was, says Behrouz Farahani, an Iranian opposition figure based in Paris and critic of the US-Israeli war on Iran, cover for Khomeini’s ruthlessness.

“For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened.”

The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. A year later, Khomeini died and reconstruction began in full swing as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second supreme leader, grew stronger.

Over time, graffiti quoting Khomeini faded, replaced by statements from Khamenei.

But the lessons the ruling establishment drew from that war have shaped its response to political and military tensions ever since.

Many of the figures who have dominated Iran’s political and military landscape in past decades rose through the ranks during the Iran–Iraq War.

Among them was Qassem Soleimani, the slain commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, his successor Esmail Qaani, as well as Ali Larijani, a former senior security official assassinated by Israel on 17 March.

Even those now leading negotiations with the US are part of the same generation shaped by the war.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, served in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War before moving to diplomacy.

And parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the most influential men  in Iran today, remained in the military ranks for years after the war, later exchanging his uniform for civilian office.

Perhaps as these leaders and other members of the establishment entrench their rule in the face of the US-Israeli war launched on 28 February, they too will be repeating Khomeini’s mantra of war as a “blessing”.

No allies, no choice

One of the first lessons the Islamic Republic learnt from the Iran-Iraq war was that, in the post-revolutionary context, it had few real options on the international stage. 

The ideology that shaped Iran’s political system after 1979 left the new rulers with very few allies.

When the war began, not only did western powers back Saddam Hussein, but most Arab countries in the region, with the exception of Syria and, at times, Libya, sided against Iran. 

And with Iraq’s military quickly proving stronger, Iran lost parts of oil-rich Khuzestan province to the invading forces.

Despite its isolation, internal chaos and struggle to secure weapons, Iran managed to push Iraqi forces back after about a year.

That dynamic of steadfastness when confronted by a stronger adversary has been played out again in this latest war

Maziar Behrooz, a prominent researcher of contemporary Iranian history and author of Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia, says the country’s response to the US-Israeli assault reflects the lessons Iran’s leaders learnt from that conflict four decades ago.

“While Iran was under attack by Iraq, they [the Iranian establishment] realised they were not going to receive any help from the outside, so they had to rely on themselves,” he explains.

“The lesson from that war was missile technology, which they reverse-engineered and then improved. Today we see its result, both in Iran’s drone and missile technologies, which have inflicted substantial damage to those who have now attacked Iran.”

Behrooz also highlights another lesson learnt in the Iran-Iraq war: move key operations underground.

After the war ended in 1988, Iran began building missile and drone facilities deep inside the mountains and moved parts of its nuclear programme underground.

This shift was one of the reasons the US and Israel have failed to stop Iranian missiles from being launched at Israel and Gulf Arab states over the past few weeks.

But self-reliance was not limited to the military. It also became central to Iran’s political approach.

Peyman Jafari, an Iranian historian and professor at the College of William & Mary, Virginia, says the Iran-Iraq war pushed Tehran toward independence in all fields. 

Before 1979, the country had been heavily dependent on western powers, especially the US, in both military and civilian sectors. 

That fundamentally changed during and after the Iran-Iraq war.

“The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources,” Jafari explains.

“Reliance on their own initiatives and strategising their policies within this framework became of high importance for them in the military, industry, intelligence, and all other fields.”

Consolidating power

The war also defined how the new ruling establishment would deal with power at home.

Behrooz points to the overlap between the US embassy hostage crisis and Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980. 

The United States’ reputation among the Iranian public was low during the Islamic Revolution, due to the CIA’s involvement in the 1953 coup that removed the democratically elected prime minister and handed power back to the Shah.

When dozens of US diplomats and citizens were detained in the embassy in 1979, that anti-American sentiment only grew.

Soon after, Behrooz noted, Saddam Hussein invaded, “and then you have a war on your hands”.

“The regime used both issues to rally support for the cause and also to consolidate power,” he explained.

This consolidation was also driven by a widespread crackdown.

After 1981, the establishment moved faster to eliminate its main rivals, beginning with the key opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation. 

Pro-Khomeini factions continued their suppression by forcing out Abolhassan Banisadr, the country’s first post-revolution president, carrying out military operations against Kurdish organisations, and dismantling leftist and nationalist groups.

These moves also reshaped Iran’s post-revolutionary society. While many supported the new order, others stepped back and waited.

“There was substantial popular support for the regime, but there were also substantial bystanders: people who stepped back, watched what was going on, and waited to see who would win,” Behrooz said.

A similar dynamic can be seen following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. 

The government used the war to stoke nationalist sentiment and somewhat repair its image with the public, which had been rocked after the brutal suppression of nationwide anti-establishment protests in January.

Moreover, the war gave the ruling establishment an opportunity to tighten control.

Executions of imprisoned dissidents increased, stricter laws on “espionage” and “contact with foreign media” were introduced, and arrests on these charges became more widespread.

Building the system

Beyond providing cover to eliminate opposition groups, the Iran-Iraq War also played a key role in shaping Iran’s system of governance. 

When the war ended, many senior and mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) commanders moved into politics, the economy, culture and even sports management.

According to Jafari, this shift had already begun during the conflict, but accelerated after the fighting stopped. 

As military operations ended, state institution-building picked up speed, while the large number of people who had spent years on the battlefield were redirected into other sectors.

Jafari describes this process as driven by a form of “army brotherhood”.

“We should not forget the human aspect of that war,” he stressed. 

“The Iran-Iraq war was the cultivation of army brotherhood among the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, that sense of ‘we went through the war’, which is seen among all who fought a war. But because that war lasted very long, that brotherhood was really forged in steel.”

When these fighters returned from the frontlines, the strong ties they had formed became a force behind the creation of new institutions and the expansion of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system.

The effects of this deep institutionalisation have become clear in the latest war. While the US and Israel expected that targeting Iran’s political and military leadership would bring down the entire system, the outcome was the opposite.

Explaining this miscalculation, Jafari said: “This is rooted in this slivery orientalist idea that these Iranians are kind of savages who cannot organise any modern state. This system is very organised, with layers of offices, a finance system, and planning for its own survival.”

An unresolved problem

If the Iran-Iraq war taught the Islamic Republic how to survive external threats, it did not resolve its internal tensions. 

Whatever the outcome of this war, some of Iran’s internal problems remain unresolved.

Public dissatisfaction with Khomeini and his followers existed even during the Iran-Iraq war. 

But at that time, the establishment had broader support and faced fewer limits in suppressing dissent. 

Today, that balance has shifted, narrowing the circle of power and increasing the distance between the state and society.

Behrooz explains: “In any country, when you do not take care of your citizens, they will be unhappy with you. In democratic countries, they vote you out. In undemocratic countries, the ability to listen to the base diminishes over time, and as repression intensifies, understanding what the base demands becomes increasingly impossible.”

The lesson the Islamic Republic did not learn is that repression alone cannot resolve dissatisfaction, simply because it deepens it over time.

Jafari puts it more directly: “Because of the ideological, political and cultural restrictions, many citizens do not feel that they can be integrated in this system. Moreover, we have economic problems, poverty, mismanagement, and corruption, and that’s why the majority are fed up with the system.”

Islamabad’s post-war push: A new Gulf security order takes shape

The US security umbrella no longer looks untouchable, and regional powers are moving quickly to fill the vacuum before Washington can reassert control.

F.M. Shakil

APR 22, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/islamabads-post-war-push-a-new-gulf-security-order-takes-shape

US President Donald Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran at Pakistan’s request has given Islamabad more time to push for a broader settlement between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. Yet even as diplomacy inches forward, the war has already triggered a deeper shift across West Asia.

A Pakistan-brokered truce is now tied to a broader regional realignment. Persian Gulf states, long dependent on Washington’s military shield, are openly questioning whether that shield still works. In its place, a new conversation has emerged: one centered on regional defense cooperation led by Muslim-majority states rather than the US.

Iran signaled cautious optimism last week about joining a second round of talks in Islamabad. Reports had suggested Tehran might refuse to attend after a US naval assault on an Iranian vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, but Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire has bought negotiators more time.

That development reportedly pushed Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to press Washington for a ceasefire extension and an easing of the blockade. Trump’s decision to prolong the truce has partly addressed Iran’s conditions for rejoining negotiations, although the blockade remains in place.

Munir, who concluded a three-day visit to Tehran last week, has remained in direct contact with Trump while Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has carried out parallel diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkiye.

Yet another obstacle to an agreement is the status of the enriched uranium that Iran possesses. Latest updates reveal that both Russia and China have offered to store Iranian uranium to address a major US demand for a peace agreement. 

A regional order without Washington

Parallel to the peace effort, intense diplomacy is underway between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkiye, and Egypt over a possible “Muslim” replacement for the US-led Gulf security architecture.

A quadripartite meeting on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held from 17–19 April in Turkiye, reportedly focused on lowering tensions and building a new regional security structure. Sources speaking to The Cradle say there is now broad support for an “internal security apparatus” rooted in economic integration and defense coordination.

Ankara has proposed what it describes as an “organized regional security platform” built around the idea that regional states, not outside powers, should be responsible for defending West Asia.

The urgency behind those discussions is easy to understand.

Several Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, now believe that US bases in the Persian Gulf have become liabilities rather than assets. After Iranian strikes damaged or destroyed multiple US military facilities in the region, Gulf governments began to question whether the US presence protects them or simply turns them into targets.

Zahir Shah Sherazi, executive vice president of Bol News, tells The Cradle:

“Targeting the US bases and installations in the Gulf states, where American outposts were located, was a strategic and insightful military tactic of Iran that exposed the true nature of Washington. The Gulf nations came to understand that the US is unable to safeguard them, as its primary focus lies on the Zionist state and its expansionist ambitions.” 

Sherazi states that the concept of a Greater Israel stems from the expansionist designs of the Zionist state, which is working on it in the West Bank, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria under US protection. This situation, he argues, has worried the Gulf states, and even Turkiye is at risk of clashing with Israel in Syria and Lebanon. 

These apprehensions led to the formation of a NATO-like force in West Asia, not to counter Iran but Israel’s expansionist designs. He says Iran may join this force after its war, making it a strong military alliance against the US and Israel.

Sunni alliance or regional deterrent?

Not everyone sees the proposed force in the same way.

Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), tells The Cradle that the project could end up functioning as a Sunni coalition rather than a genuinely regional defense structure.

In his view, the force may ultimately suit both Washington and the occupation state because it could be used to contain Iran while protecting the oil-rich Arab monarchies.

“This force is perceived as a facilitator of the Abraham Accords, as it is designed to fortify regional alliances and counteract Iranian influence in the Middle East. This coterie may emerge as an alternative security arrangement, specifically for Saudi Arabia, as the US military bases have become liabilities rather than functioning as a protective umbrella for the Gulf and Arab states.” 

Concerning the prospects of this force, Gul is not so optimistic. He is of the view that such an organization could not effectively assume the responsibility of regulating this region.

“It is a highly intricate issue that is both challenging and difficult to implement due to several internal differences and conflicting interests, such as the ongoing tensions between Iran and Turkiye, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which complicate any potential regulatory efforts.” 

US bases become a burden

Even as Trump signals a possible drawdown of US military operations in West Asia, Washington continues to expand its military footprint.

Trump has suggested that thousands of US troops could leave Iraq and Syria by September 2026. Yet his administration has also sent an additional 2,500 marines to the region.

That contradiction has reinforced Russian warnings that “the US and Israel can use the peace talks to prepare for a ground operation against Iran, as the Pentagon continues to increase US troop numbers in the region.”

Gul believes a large-scale US withdrawal from Gulf bases would leave the occupation state more isolated. Without those facilities, Tel Aviv would lose much of the logistical and intelligence infrastructure that underpins its military reach across the region.

He argues that Washington will maintain a military foothold in West Asia for as long as it sees Israel as vulnerable.

A recent report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) urged the Pentagon to reassess its Gulf basing strategy once the war with Iran ends. The report argued that Bahrain and the UAE should remain key hubs for US naval power, while other facilities may create more problems than advantages.

AEI suggested that Washington rely more heavily on Greece and Cyprus instead of accommodating Turkiye. It also argued that the US should deepen its presence in Somaliland rather than maintain extensive deployments in Saudi Arabia and Oman.

According to the Middle East Institute (MEI), US forces remain stationed in the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Roughly 50,000 troops are spread across 19 known sites.

“The US security umbrella became more of a liability, directly threatening the sovereignty of the host countries, especially since these bases were implicated in the attack on Iran. Although Iran is not a threat to the GCC's sovereignty, it is assaulting the US bases from which the US attacks Iran,” Gul says.

Sherazi said that given the losses the US sustained despite having an edge over Iran in military might, air superiority, and technology, it had already abandoned outposts in Saudi Arabia and Qatar due to Iranian resilience and intense retaliation.

Pakistan moves in as Gulf protector

Pakistan deployed 13,000 troops and a fleet of 10 to 18 fighter jets, including advanced platforms such as the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III and J-10CE fighters, at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

Sherazi goes further. He argues that despite its military superiority and technological edge, Washington has already been forced to abandon some positions in Saudi Arabia and Qatar because of Iranian retaliation.

“Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan have established strong connections in trade and defense collaboration. Qatar appears to be signaling its intention to join this Saudi–Pakistan defense mechanism. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also declared that their territories will not be used for actions against Iran.”

Pakistan has already started positioning itself as an alternative security guarantor for the Gulf monarchies.

Islamabad and Ankara are also deepening military cooperation. Pakistan is involved in the KAAN stealth fighter program, while Turkiye is providing support in drone technology, training, and military equipment.

There is also growing speculation that Iran may quietly support parts of this regional transition. One of Tehran’s key demands in recent negotiations with Washington was reportedly the closure of US military bases across the region.

“Almost all Middle Eastern nations, except for a few like the UAE, support an indigenous security mechanism in the region due to the US-Israel collusion that has caused significant bloodshed among Arab nations,” Sherazi says. 

“Now is the time for a robust force to end the barbarity of the Zionists and their supporters.”