The corridors remaking West Asia
Ports, railways, and data cables are reshaping
regional power as competing trade routes cut across the old alliance map.
AUG 18, 2026
https://thecradle.co/articles/the-corridors-remaking-west-asia
The alliance map stretching across West and South Asia
is no longer drawn by geography or sectarian alignment alone. In recent years,
a new regional order has begun to take shape in which security interests
are bound up with technology, energy, ports, supply chains,
and communications cables.
Control of cross-border infrastructure has become as
central to the contest for influence as military and political agreements.
At the heart of this shift is a web of partnerships
linking Israel, India, and the UAE, backed by direct US involvement through
the I2U2 framework. Alongside it are other routes where
the interests of Turkiye, Pakistan, Qatar, and the Persian Gulf states
converge, extending into projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) and Iraq’s Development Road.
The region has not split into two coherent blocs, nor
do the states involved share a position on every issue. The more important
development is the movement away from conventional military alliances toward
networks of economic, technological, and security influence built around
ports, railways, energy, and data.
The I2U2 framework
The I2U2 framework is one of the clearest expressions
of this shift. Bringing together India, Israel, the UAE, and the US, it began
as a vehicle for cooperation in food security, clean energy, technology, trade,
and investment. At the first summit of the four countries’ leaders in 2022,
they emphasized joint investment and initiatives in water, energy, transport,
space, health, and food security.
I2U2’s importance, however, lies beyond its announced
projects. It draws together Israeli technology, Indian industrial capacity and
markets, Emirati capital and logistics, and US political and strategic
power.
The framework connects West Asia to the Indian and
Pacific oceans and enables Israel, India, and the UAE to build partnerships
that reach beyond their traditional bilateral ties.
The grouping also grew out of the political opening
created by the Abraham Accords. Normalization between the UAE and Israel gave
Washington a platform through which Indian capital, labor, and industrial
capacity could be tied more closely to Israel’s technology sector and the
Gulf’s logistics hubs.
Yet its economic language does not erase the strategic purpose beneath it, with defense no longer confined to
borders and conventional armies. It increasingly includes supply-chain
resilience, ports, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and the protection of
energy and trade flows.
Ideology oils the machinery
Economic and security interests are accompanied by
some overlap in political outlook, particularly toward political Islam and
transnational armed groups, although the motives of each state differ
considerably.
In the Emirati case, confronting political Islam has
become a central part of Abu Dhabi’s view of national and regional security.
Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies has described an Emirati religious-political doctrine that presents peace as an Islamic value and a
component of national identity.
Abu Dhabi advances this state-directed doctrine
against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi currents, as part of a wider campaign
against political Islam across the region.
India approaches political Islam and armed groups from
a domestic and regional security perspective shaped largely by its conflict
with Pakistan and the dispute over Kashmir. That has supplied further ground
for cooperation with Israel and the UAE, particularly in intelligence,
cybersecurity, surveillance, and military technology.
Successive Israeli governments, especially those led
by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have used the confrontation with armed
groups and asymmetric threats to market Israel as a technological and security power on which regional states can
rely.
The wars and crises of recent years have added
pressure for closer defense and technological cooperation among Israel, India,
the UAE, and the US.
Yet ideology alone cannot explain these relationships.
India does not necessarily share Israel’s position on Iran, while Emirati
foreign policy does not simply follow New Delhi or Washington. Overlapping
interests allow practical partnerships to advance even where the participating
states diverge elsewhere.
India’s pivotal weight
India carries exceptional weight in this equation
because of its demographic, economic, and geographic reach. Its population of
more than 1.4 billion, expanding manufacturing and technology sectors, and vast
diaspora across the Persian Gulf make New Delhi difficult to exclude from any
effort to reorganize trade between Asia and Europe.
A Jerusalem Post analysis published
in 2022 described an emerging “Indo–Abrahamic alliance” linking Israel, the UAE, and India through maritime
security, missile defense, drones, data security, and opposition to Islamist
extremism.
India’s significance, however, is not limited to its
military role. Its presence in the Gulf and growing trade relations with the
UAE and Saudi Arabia give it the ability to redirect part of Asian trade toward
routes that do not necessarily pass through the traditional corridors where
Pakistan and Iran carry greater weight.
That position also gives India room to hedge. It
maintains energy and transport ties with Iran, including through Chabahar,
while pursuing the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) with Washington and its regional partners.
New Delhi can therefore participate in competing
systems without surrendering its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy,
even as its security relationship with Israel continues to deepen.
IMEC’s infrastructure front
Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, IMEC
is intended to connect India, the Persian Gulf, and Europe through ports,
railways, and energy and communications infrastructure.
The plans encompass a railway link, electricity
interconnection, clean hydrogen infrastructure, and high-speed data cables.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the corridor in 2023 as a way to accelerate
trade between India and Europe while opening new connections in energy and the
digital economy.
In 2025, the European Commission separately advanced
the EU–Africa–India Digital Corridor within the wider IMEC framework. The initiative
centers on an 11,700-kilometer subsea cable system linking Europe and India
through the Mediterranean, West Asia, and East Africa, with the stated aim of
providing secure, high-capacity data connections.
Corridors are increasingly becoming integrated systems
carrying goods, energy, and data. The states able to secure or influence these
networks acquire a form of strategic power once associated primarily with control of ports
and straits.
The project, however, remains exposed to politics and war. IMEC depends on an overland
passage through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel’s Haifa port. The Gaza
genocide and the absence of Saudi–Israeli normalization have left its political
foundations uncertain, prompting growing questions over its viability.
Gwadar and the Development Road
CPEC and Iraq’s Development Road should not be treated
as one project or as pieces of a unified alliance led by Turkiye, Pakistan, and
Saudi Arabia. They belong to different networks, but each helps prevent a
single route from monopolizing regional trade.
CPEC is the Pakistani arm of China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), connecting China with Pakistan and Gwadar Port on the Arabian
Sea. Pakistan’s CPEC Secretariat lists a network of port, free-zone, road, and
logistics projects around Gwadar. Among them is the Gwadar Eastbay Expressway, built to connect the port and its free zone to
Pakistan’s national highway network.
Iraq’s Development Road is a separate undertaking, but
Iraq’s location between the Persian Gulf, Turkiye, and Europe gives it
particular importance. In April 2024, Iraq, Turkiye, Qatar, and the UAE signed a memorandum on the project, which is designed to connect the
Grand Faw Port to the Turkish border through roughly 1,200 kilometers of roads
and railways across Iraq.
The planned investment is around $17 billion, with
implementation divided into three stages. Qatar’s Ministry of Transport says
the first is scheduled for completion in 2028, followed by phases in 2033 and
2050. Baghdad presents the Development Road as a competing east–west trade
corridor linking the Persian Gulf to Europe.
This participation complicates any attempt to divide
the contest into Israel, the UAE, and India on one side and Turkiye, Pakistan,
and Saudi Arabia on the other. The UAE is part of the Development Road
alongside Turkiye, Qatar, and Iraq.
Ankara and Riyadh hedge
Turkiye holds a particular place in this equation. It
is a NATO member with economic ties spanning Europe, Russia, the Persian Gulf,
and Central Asia, while its political and military reach extends from Syria and
Iraq to the Caucasus. For Ankara, the Development Road offers an opportunity to
reinforce its position as the overland bridge between the Persian Gulf and
Europe.
Saudi Arabia is harder to place within a fixed bloc.
Riyadh is an IMEC signatory but has also deepened relations with China,
Russia, Turkiye, and Pakistan. It shows little appetite for a closed regional
alignment, preferring to turn its geographic and economic position into
leverage across several centers of power.
Major regional states increasingly avoid choosing
between two camps. They seek a place in multiple networks, using one
partnership to strengthen their bargaining position in another.
This is less a stable balance than a permanent hedge.
A railway, port investment, defense agreement, or energy partnership may bind
two states on one file while leaving them opposed on another.
The Levant left outside
The competition is also reshaping the Eastern Mediterranean. The Syrian and Lebanese coastlines are more than
sites of military confrontation. They occupy ground where potential energy,
transport, and communications routes between the Persian Gulf, the
Mediterranean, and Europe could converge.
For Israel, stronger links with the Persian Gulf,
India, and Europe assign the eastern Mediterranean a new role within trade and
energy networks. For Turkiye, any corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to
Europe while bypassing Turkish territory would erode the value of its
location.
The Development Road instead offers Ankara the role of
terminal and gateway for traffic arriving from the Persian Gulf through Iraq.
Lebanon and Syria face the danger of moving from the
center of strategic geography to the margins of new transport and investment
networks. Ports, roads, railways, energy links, data networks, and political
stability are all required to turn geography into economic power.
Beirut has already shown interest in joining the Israel-centered IMEC route, despite the political and security contradictions
such a move would entail. Syria, meanwhile, remains constrained by war damage,
sanctions, and fragmented infrastructure, leaving both countries at risk of
being bypassed by corridors drawn around them.
Power flows through the network
The emerging map does not show two opposing blocs in
the old sense. It marks a transition from rigid alliances to overlapping
networks.
Israel, India, the UAE, and the US cooperate where
technology, security, and trade converge, while Turkiye, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and Iraq participate in other networks that repeatedly cross the first.
The next contest will therefore extend beyond borders
and political influence to control over the movement of trade, energy, and
information.
Ports and straits were among the principal instruments of power in the 20th century. In the 21st century, subsea
cables, data centers, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity systems, rail
networks, and hydrogen pipelines have joined them.
West Asia’s future will be shaped by military power,
but also by the states capable of making themselves indispensable nodes in
these new systems.