Israel’s West Bank annexation moves raise security alarm in Jordan

Amman fears a ‘soft transfer’ of Palestinians from the occupied territory, with experts warning it could trigger a ‘regional earthquake’

By Mohammad Ersan in Amman

Published date: 15 February 2026

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-jordan-fears-soft-transfer-west-bank-after-israeli-annexation-steps

When Israel announced sweeping changes to the occupied West Bank, measures widely seen as accelerating annexation, Jordan was among the first to condemn the move.

For decades, Amman has feared the mass displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank. But analysts say its concern is no longer limited to “creeping annexation” or gradual land seizures.

Instead, the latest measures - which Jordan has described as null and void - are seen as the start of a “total annexation” phase, threatening not just the geography of the West Bank but the very core of Jordan’s national security.

“This measure represents a leap across strategic stages,” Omar al-Ayasrah, a member of Jordan’s Senate, the upper house appointed by the king, told Middle East Eye.

“They aim to completely remove Jordan’s influence on the Palestinian cause and the legal protections for Arab landowners, opening the door to ‘legalise’ their transfer to the occupation,” he added.

The Israeli changes, announced last week, include a wide range of measures - one of which is particularly sensitive for Jordan.

That is the revocation of the 1953 law introduced when Jordan administered the West Bank, which banned the sale of property in the Palestinian territory to non-Arabs.

The law was intended to prevent land purchases by Israelis that could accelerate settlement expansion.

Another measure involves the declassification of land registers in the West Bank. Keeping those records classified had been intended to protect property from being transferred through intermediaries or through forged claims to settlers.

The changes will also enable Israel to legalise the confiscation of unregistered or abandoned lands by reclassifying them as “state lands”.

The measures are seen as a radical shift in the legal and civil reality of the occupied West Bank, stripping the Palestinian Authority (PA) of the limited self-rule it gained under the 1993 Oslo Accords and entrenching de facto annexation.

“The revocation of the Jordanian law is not merely a symbolic change,” Ayasrah warned.

“It is a transition to a phase of accelerated, incremental annexation of the West Bank.”

‘Soft transfer’

Historically, Jordan maintained deep ties with the West Bank, administering it from 1950 until its administrative and legal disengagement in 1988.

Despite that disengagement, the West Bank has remained central to Jordan’s national security because of profound demographic, economic and geographic links.

Jordan, already home to a large Palestinian refugee population, now fears fresh waves of displacement that could destabilise its internal security and impose severe economic and social strain.

That is why, according to Ayasrah, the real battle is demographic.

“Suffocating the Palestinians’ geographic space and crippling their economy by seizing land and farms is a prelude to what we call ‘soft transfer’,” he said.

“This systematic pressure, coupled with the absence of a political horizon and soaring unemployment, is designed to push Palestinians towards emigration - a scenario Amman views as a nightmare striking at its national security.” 

In response to the Israeli moves, some in Jordan have called for escalation, with options ranging from revoking the 1994 peace treaty to military confrontation.

For now, however, Ayasrah says the government is exhausting diplomatic and legal avenues.

That includes maintaining diplomatic pressure on Israel and supporting the PA and the West Bank economy to help Palestinians remain on their land.

“Jordan has only the ‘hammer of diplomacy’,” Ayasrah said, describing revoking the peace treaty as “political suicide”.

At the same time, the Royal Hashemite Documentation Centre (RHDC), an arm of the Jordanian royal court, is intensifying efforts to restore thousands of historical documents and deeds proving Palestinian land ownership, some dating back to the Ottoman era and earlier.

According to its director, Muhannad Mubaidin, the documents could be used in a legal challenge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the decisions taken by Israel.

"The centre’s work on Palestinian land documents is not new; it has been ongoing for 18 years," Mubaidin told MEE. "We have restored records pertaining to land registers from the 1858 Ottoman Land Code, and subsequently, registers from the British Mandate period."

"Today, this archival work is of paramount importance," he added. "Even if Israel disregards international law, these records are vital for memory, and the 'memory wars' Israel employs to depict Palestinian lands as having no owners, residents, or history."

Red lines

Political analyst Lamis Andoni believes Jordan cannot continue with a policy of “waiting out the storm” or relying solely on security arrangements.

The latest Israeli measures are a “moment of truth” that no previous Israeli government has dared to reach, she said.

Amman has leverage it could use, she added, including the gas deal with Israel and the United States’ reliance on Jordan’s strategic location, especially amid rising tensions with Iran.

“The current strategy, which hesitates to use real leverage such as cancelling the gas deal or halting normalisation tracks, may be interpreted in Israel as a green light to proceed with the liquidation of the Palestinian cause at the expense of Jordanian territory,” Andoni told MEE.

Retired Jordanian major general and military expert Mamoun Abu Nuwar said the land confiscation moves in the West Bank amount to an “undeclared war” on Jordan.

He explained that Amman relies on “preventive diplomacy backed by force”, with clear red lines focused on the custodianship of holy sites, including Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied East Jerusalem.

“Jordan’s options, should diplomacy fail, could include suspending agreements, downgrading diplomatic ties, or even halting security coordination,” Abu Nuwar said.

“Jordan could even be forced to declare the border with the West Bank a military zone to prevent displacement,” he added.

He stressed that the military was prepared to handle such Israeli threats and warned that the forced displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank would shatter Jordan’s demographic balance.

“Jordan will not allow this project to pass,” he said.

“Israeli overreach could spark a violent conflict across the region, and Israel would not succeed in such a confrontation with Jordan, given the kingdom’s strategic geopolitical position - which could trigger a regional earthquake.”

The UAE: One state or seven competing emirates under one flag?

Behind the skyscrapers lies a fragile federal bargain shifting toward Abu Dhabi and tested by the Emirates’ ties to Washington and Israel.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

FEB 13, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/the-uae-one-state-or-seven-competing-emirates-under-one-flag

In December 1971, seven rulers sealed a pact that fused their territories into a federation. There was no uprising in the streets, no grand constitutional rupture shaped by popular will. 

What emerged was a calculated bargain among hereditary rulers who understood both their fragility and their ambition, as British power receded from the Persian Gulf and Washington’s shadow stretched steadily across the region.

That bargain still holds. But it has never been equal.

Seven Emirates, one destiny? 

The UAE is routinely portrayed as a unified, stable, forward-looking state – a Gulf success story that leveraged oil wealth, global trade, and strategic alignment with the US to project power well beyond its size. 

In recent years, it has added normalization with Israel and deepening security integration with Washington to that formula. Yet what is rarely acknowledged is that the UAE is not a monolithic state in the classical sense. It is a federation of seven hereditary emirates, each with distinct economic models, political cultures, and varying levels of wealth and influence.

The question, then, is not whether the UAE is stable today. It is whether the structural imbalances built into its formation can endure the mounting internal and external pressures of the coming years.

A federation built on asymmetry

The UAE was not created by a single ruling family consolidating power. It was born of negotiation. In December 1971, six emirates formed the federation. Ras al-Khaimah joined in February 1972, bringing the total to seven. From the outset, the union brought together territories that were unequal in resources, demography, and geopolitical weight.

Before British protection agreements carved out the Trucial Coast, large swaths of today’s UAE lay within Oman’s sphere of influence, where tribal confederations and maritime rulers operated under shifting Omani suzerainty. The federation is thus a recent political settlement, not the continuation of a historical state.

Abu Dhabi controls the commanding heights of the federation, overseeing roughly 96 percent of oil and gas production capacity – giving it not only the largest share of hydrocarbon reserves, but also decisive control over how and when that wealth enters global markets.

Dubai charted a different course. With limited oil, it built its identity on economic openness – ports, aviation, re-export, finance – turning geography into leverage. It compensated for resource scarcity through hyper-connectivity and risk-taking.

According to the Central Bank of the UAE, Dubai received 9.9 million international visitors who spent at least one night in the first half of 2025, and Dubai Airport handled about 46 million passengers during the same period.

The northern emirates followed other paths. Ras al-Khaimah relied more heavily on manufacturing, quarrying, and mid-scale trade. Sharjah positioned itself around education, culture, and a more socially conservative public identity, even as it sought to expand industrial capacity and job creation. 

Fujairah capitalized on geography, sitting on the Gulf of Oman and serving as a critical energy and shipping outlet beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Ajman and Umm al-Quwain, smaller and more financially constrained, depended more directly on federal redistribution and shared sovereign infrastructure.

These differences remain embedded in the federation’s architecture.

The federal design itself acknowledges hierarchy. The Federal Supreme Council, composed of the seven rulers, holds ultimate authority over major national matters. Yet substantive decisions require the agreement of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 

In practice, this grants both emirates veto power on key federal issues. Rather than being merely two of seven; they are the twin pillars of the state. While that structure has ensured stability, it has also entrenched asymmetry. 

Abu Dhabi’s consolidation

The ruler of Abu Dhabi chairs the Supreme Council for Financial and Economic Affairs (SCFEA), established by law in December 2020. This body sets policy on financial, investment, economic, petroleum, and natural resource affairs, oversees relevant entities, and appoints members of strategic investment bodies.

For the other emirates, this council formalized what had already become reality, that decisive national economic authority increasingly emanates from Abu Dhabi.

On 30 January 2026, Abu Dhabi’s new sovereign wealth entity, Limad Holding, acquired Abu Dhabi Holding, consolidating hundreds of billions of dollars in state assets – airlines, utilities, and ports – under the direct leadership of the Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed. A Reuters report described the move as placing vast strategic assets under a tighter circle of control worth “hundreds of billions of dollars.”

Such consolidation reduces institutional fragmentation at the top. It also narrows the circle of decision-makers. In a federation built on negotiated balance, that has consequences. Fewer actors at the apex can mean greater efficiency. It can also raise the stakes of elite disputes during crises, particularly if other emirates feel sidelined.

The unease is rarely voiced publicly. It surfaces instead in subtle signals – commentary in Gulf media since 2019, warning of potential fragmentation; muted frustration among elites; and social media expressions that occasionally break through before being erased.

The episode involving Haitham bin Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi, deputy head of the Ruler’s Office in Kalba, who briefly posted a tweet attacking President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) before deleting it, offered a glimpse into tensions that rarely see daylight.

Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah: Pressure points

If fragmentation were ever to materialize, it would not resemble street protests or separatist parties. Political parties are banned, public dissent is tightly controlled, and internal mobility is regulated. The UAE is not structured for open contestation.

Instead, pressure appears in less visible domains such as elite cohesion, socio-economic bargains, and exposure to external financial shocks.

Glitzy Dubai illustrates the first line of vulnerability. Its model depends on credibility as a predictable, dynamic global hub. The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) emphasizes its independent legal and regulatory framework to attract global capital. Yet that openness makes Dubai sensitive to shifts in the global regulatory climate.

Corporate tax, introduced for the 2023 fiscal year, and a local supplementary minimum tax taking effect on 1 January 2025 have forced Dubai’s long-standing model of easy entry and differentiated zones to adapt to a more uniform federal tax environment.

At the same time, repeated western warnings about the use of UAE-based networks for sanctions evasion and financial opacity have heightened reputational risk. Dubai carries a disproportionate share of financial exposure. A sudden contraction in capital flows or a reputational shock tied to sanctions enforcement could reverberate quickly through its economy.

Dubai has drawn closer to the federal core. The appointment of the crown prince of Dubai as minister of defense in July 2024 tethered Dubai’s leadership directly to a central sovereign function. It was a strategic alignment move – one that reduces the likelihood of overt divergence.

Ras al-Khaimah presents a different test. The emirate has pursued differentiated growth projects, most notably the Wynn Al Marjan Island integrated resort. In September 2023, the UAE Commercial Gaming Regulatory Authority (GCGRA) was established as a federal body to develop a framework for commercial gaming and national lotteries. 

On 5 October 2024, Wynn Resorts received the UAE’s first commercial gambling license for Ras al-Khaimah. This marks a major policy shift in a federation that had long prohibited gambling.

The test is twofold. Federal regulation means centralized oversight, largely from Abu Dhabi. Yet social and cultural norms vary across emirates. If gaming becomes a significant revenue source and tourism magnet, Ras al-Khaimah’s bargaining power within the federation will increase. It may draw tourist flows that would otherwise head to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, sharpening internal economic competition.

Sharjah, meanwhile, balances a conservative cultural identity with industrial and energy expansion. In November 2025, Sharjah’s Petroleum Council announced a new natural gas discovery at the Al-Hadiba field, reinforcing the emirate’s long-term push to strengthen its domestic energy position.

Yet Sharjah also carries a heavier debt burden relative to its size. In its May 2024 sovereign rating assessment, S&P Global Ratings underscored the emirate’s comparatively elevated debt burden, with gross government debt standing at roughly 52 percent of GDP in 2023.

Each of these emirates operates under the same flag. Each also pursues a distinct model of legitimacy and growth.

Security state and elite cohesion

The second axis of potential strain lies in how dissent is managed. In the UAE, opposition is treated primarily as a security issue. Over the past year, high-profile cases linked to what authorities describe as terrorism-related offenses have resurfaced.

Human rights groups have reported on the so-called UAE84 case, a mass trial involving 84 individuals. On 4 March 2025, Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that the State Security Division of the Federal Supreme Court rejected appeals and upheld convictions. Authorities accused the defendants of establishing or running a secret entity designated as terrorist under the Anti-Terrorism Law.

Such cases reinforce elite discipline. They also send a message about the boundaries of permissible discourse. In a federation dependent on negotiated power-sharing among ruling families, cohesion at the top matters more than public contestation below.

However, the absence of visible opposition does not automatically translate into the absence of tension. It means tension, if it exists, circulates within elite networks rather than in the streets.

External entanglements and internal cost

The UAE has deepened its integration with Washington’s security architecture and normalized relations with Israel, embedding itself further in US-led regional frameworks. These alignments deliver technological, military, and financial advantages. They also carry political and reputational costs across West Asia.

As the federation expands its involvement in Israeli-linked projects, it risks widening the gap between external strategy and internal social currents. For smaller or more conservative emirates, the calculus may not be identical to that of Abu Dhabi’s strategic planners.

The UAE remains far from collapse. Division is unlikely in the near term. But the federation’s durability rests on continuous management of asymmetry – economic, political, and cultural. As Abu Dhabi centralizes authority and external commitments deepen, the margin for error narrows.

The UAE is one country in law. In practice, it is seven emirates negotiating pow

Leading Papers Call for Destroying Iran to Save It

Gregory Shupak

February 10, 2026

https://fair.org/home/leading-papers-call-for-destroying-iran-to-save-it/

The United States has no right to wage war on Iran, or to have a say who governs the country. The opinion pages of the New York Times and Washington Post, however, are offering facile humanitarian arguments for the US to escalate its attacks on Iran. These are based on the nonsensical assumption that the US wants to help brighten Iranians’ futures.

In two editorials addressing the possibility of the US undertaking a bombing and shooting war on Iran, the Washington Post expressed no opposition to such policies and endorsed economic warfare as well.

Crediting Trump with “the wisdom of distinguishing between an authoritarian regime and the people who suffer under its rule,” the first Post editorial (1/2/26) approvingly quoted Trump’s Truth Social promise (1/2/26) to Iranian protesters that the US “will come to their rescue…. We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

For the Post, the problem was not that Trump was threatening to bomb a sovereign state, but that “airstrikes are, at best, a temporary solution”:

If the administration wants this time to be different, it will need to oversee a patient, sustained campaign of maximum pressure against the government…. The optimal strategy is to economically squeeze the regime as hard as possible at this moment of maximum vulnerability. More stringent enforcement of existing oil sanctions would go a long way…. Western financial controls are actually working quite well.

Thus, the paper offers advice on how to integrate bombing Iran into a broader effort to overthrow the country’s government in a hybrid war. Central to that project are the sanctions with which the Post is so thoroughly impressed. Such measures have “squeeze[d] the regime” by, for example, decimating “the government’s primary source of revenue, oil exports, limiting the state’s ability to provide for millions of impoverished Iranians through social safety nets” (CNN, 10/19/25).

That the US continues to apply the sanctions, knowing that they have these effects, demonstrates that it has no interest in, as the Post put it, “free[ing]” Iranians “from bondage.”

‘Always more room for sanctions’

The second Washington Post editorial (1/23/26) expressed disappointment that, despite “mass killings” and the “most repressive crackdown in decades,” “Trump has ratcheted back his earlier rhetoric.” It emphasized that “the regime is now mocking Trump for backing down.” The paper offered advice for the president:

Airstrikes alone won’t bring down the regime—or make it behave like a normal country. But Israel and the US have shown in recent years that bombing can cause significant tactical setbacks. And there is always more room for sanctions pressure….

The president cannot maintain effective deterrence by turning the other cheek [in response to Iranians who have taunted him]. How he responds is just as important as how quickly he does it.

The implication is that, to deter Iran’s government from killing Iranians, the US needs to kill Iranians. After all, bombing campaigns come with “mass killings” of their own: The US/Israeli aggression against Iran last June killed more than 1,000 Iranians, most of them civilians.

Meanwhile, those sanctions the paper wants to use to deter the Iranian government from “harm[ing] its own people” do quite a bit of damage in their own right, often causing “low-income citizens’ food consumption” to “deteriorate due to sanctions”—a rather novel approach to harm reduction.

Bombing other countries, depriving them of food—is this what it means to “behave like a normal country”?

‘Too depraved’ for reform

Over its own pro–regime change piece, the New York Times editorial board headline (1/14/26) declared: “Iran’s Murderous Regime Is Irredeemable.”

“The Khamenei regime is too depraved to be reformed,” the editors wrote, spending the majority of the piece building its case to that effect before turning to solutions. For the Times, these start “with a unified expression of solidarity with the protesters,” and quickly move to punitive measures against the Iranian government:

The world can also extend the sanctions it has imposed on Iran. The Trump administration this week announced new tariffs on any countries that do business with Iran, and other democracies should impose their own economic penalties.

For the authors, “deprav[ity]” needs to be resisted by Washington and its partners, who have demonstrated their moral superiority with their presumably depravity-free sanctions. These have, as Germany’s DW (11/23/25) reported, “caused medical shortages that hit [Iran’s] most vulnerable citizens hardest,” preventing the country from being able “to purchase special medicines—like those required by cancer patients.”

The Times also supported US military violence against Iran—if with somewhat more restraint than the Post, asking Trump to “move much more judiciously than he typically does.” The Times wants him to seek “approval from Congress before any military operation,” and make “clear its limitations and goals.” The paper warned Trump not to attack “without adequate preparation and resources”:

Above all, he should avoid the lack of strategic discipline and illegal actions that have defined the Venezuela campaign. He should ask which policies have the best chance of undermining the regime’s violent repression and creating the conditions for a democratic transition.

One glaring problem with suggesting that a US “military operation” should be based on “policies [that] have the best chance of…creating the conditions for a democratic transition” is that very recent precedents show that US wars don’t bring about democracy and are not intended to do so; instead, such wars bring about social collapse.

Consider, for example, US interventions in Libya and Syria. In both cases, the US backed decidedly nondemocratic forces (Jacobin, 9/2/13; Harper’s, 1/16) and, as one might expect, neither war resulted in democracy. In Libya’s case, the outcome has been slavery and state collapse (In These Times, 8/18/20). In Syria, the new, unelected government is implicated in sectarian mass murder (FAIR.org, 6/2/25).

If DHS killed Pretti, why not bomb Iran?

There are no grounds for believing that the US would chart a different course if it bombs Iran again. But that hasn’t stopped other Times contributors from suggesting that the US should conduct a war in Iran—for the good of Iranians, of course.

Times columnist Bret Stephens (1/27/26) worried about the “risk” posed by “the example of a US president who urged protesters to go in the streets and said help was on the way, only to betray them through inaction.”

Invoking the DHS’s killing of Minneapolis resident Alex Pretti, Stephens urged “thoughtful Americans” to encourage the same administration that killed him to exercise “the military option” in Iran:

But if Pretti’s death is a tragedy, what do we say or do in the face of the murder of thousands of Iranians? Are they, as Stalin might have said, just another statistic?

Stephens is citing people’s outrage against the US government killing a protester as a reason they should support the US government inflicting more violence against Iran. The logical corollary to that would be that if you’re opposed to Iran suppressing anti-government forces, you should therefore be in favor of Tehran launching armed attacks to defend protesters in the US.

Masih Alinejad, a US-government-funded Iranian-American journalist, wrote in the Times (1/27/26) that Trump

encouraged Iranians to intensify their mass protests, writing, “HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” That help never came, and many protesters now feel betrayed. Still, the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group has recently arrived in the Middle East. Mr. Trump has not said what he plans to do now that it is there, but it does give him the option of striking a blow against government repression.

Policy of pain

Both Stephens and Alinejad present their calls for the US to assault Iran in moral terms, suggesting that the US should demonstrate loyalty to Iranian protestors by “help[ing]” them through an armed attack on the country in which they live. Their premise is that the US is interested in enabling the Iranian population to flourish, an assertion contradicted by more than 70 years of Washington’s policy of inflicting pain on Iranians in an effort to dominate them.

That US policy has included overthrowing Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953 (NPR, 2/7/19), propping up the Shah’s brutal dictatorship for the next 26 years (BBC, 6/3/16; AP, 2/6/19), sponsoring Saddam Hussein’s invasion of the country and use of chemical weapons against it (Foreign Policy, 8/26/13), partnering with Israel in a years-long campaign of murdering Iranian scientists (Responsible Statecraft, 12/21/20), and currently maintaining—along with its allies—a sanctions regime that is associated with a substantial drop in Iranian life expectancy (Al Jazeera, 1/13/26).

If Stephens or Alinejad had evidence that the US is so radically re-orienting its conduct in the international arena, one imagines that they would want to share with their readers the proof that the Trump administration’s magnanimity is so profound that it overrides the UN Charter, and justifies America carrying out a war to “help” a country it has terrorized for decades.

Jeffrey Epstein and the Emirati tycoon

Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, one of the UAE's most powerful figures, shared messages about business and pleasure with the convicted sex offender for decades

By Rayhan Uddin

Published date: 12 February 2026 

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jeffrey-epstein-and-emirati-tycoon

“You are one of my most trusted friends in very [sic] sense of the word, you have never let me down, not once, not half of once.” 

Those were the words used in June 2013 by Jeffrey Epstein, the financier and convicted sex offender, to describe Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem. 

Sulayem is one of the most powerful business figures in the United Arab Emirates. Born in Dubai to a well-connected family, his father was an adviser to the city’s ruling Al Maktoum family. 

Sulayem played an important role in the growth of Dubai as a global economic force. He oversaw the expansion of the Jebel Ali free economic zone as its chair in the 1980s. 

In 2005, two Dubai ports entities merged to create DP World, which has since become one of the world's largest logistics companies. It handles a tenth of the globe’s container trade. 

Sulayem has been its chair since 2007, and its chief executive since 2016. The role has made him a leading Emirati business figure on the global stage. He frequently appears in international forums, often alongside UAE royalty.

Now, emails released by the US Department of Justice, as well as further emails seen by Bloomberg and Drop Site News, reveal that Sulayem had maintained a decades-long professional and personal relationship with Epstein.

The Emirati figure is mentioned thousands of times in the Epstein files. 

Middle East Eye asked DP World and Sulayem for comment, but did not receive a response by the time of publication.

The emails span from 2007 until weeks before Epstein’s death in a prison cell in August 2019. The majority of them were sent after the American financier’s 2008 conviction for soliciting prostitution from a minor.

The two men discussed visits to Epstein’s private island, introduced each other to powerful figures, and shared content about business, politics and religion. They also candidly – and sometimes degradingly – spoke about sex and women.

Visits to the private island

Emails suggest Sulayem made visits to Little Saint James, the private Caribbean island once owned by Epstein. 

“I really had a very nice time at your island,” the Emirati wrote in June 2013, in one of scores of memos discussing visits to Little Saint James.

When Hurricane Irma devastated the Caribbean in September 2017, Sulayem assured Epstein that he had “engineers” and “resources” to help make the island “hurricane proof”. 

“My right hand man who worked with me on=all the island is a uae national an engineer he is ready he is the best an= has all the background and contacts to do the job,” he wrote. 

Epstein replied: “GREAT!!!”

Sulayem even sought to help Epstein in his efforts to add a private resort to his portfolio. 

“Mr Jeffry Epstein is very dear friend and a business associate of mine,” Sulayem wrote to an architecture firm in December 2016, according to emails reviewed by Drop Site News. 

“He owns two beautiful islands at US Virgin Islands… he wants to develop a private resort only for his , his customers and friends private use.” 

Great St James Cay, a larger island to the north of Epstein’s, was much coveted by the financier. But its owner, Christian Kjaer, did not want to sell it to Epstein, due to his sex offences convictions. 

According to the Miami Herald, to circumvent that, Epstein bought the island through a shell company whose beneficial owner was Sulayem. 

Epstein’s involvement only came to light, the newspaper reported, when his name later appeared on land use permits. 

An aide to Sulayem told the Herald that Epstein asked to use the Emirati’s name in an unspecified business deal, to which he was told no.

The 2016 email to the architect suggests that Sulayem knew that Epstein owned two islands. 

Epstein was arrested and charged with sex trafficking of minors in July 2019. Prosecutors allege that his private island was used as a base for sex trafficking.

There is no suggestion that Sulayem participated in any criminal activity. 

Powerful networks

Sulayem and Epstein frequently utilised each other’s vast networks. 

Epstein introduced the Emirati to Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister. 

“Ehud- sultan . sultan ehud,” the sex offender wrote in a June 2015 email sent to both Sulayem and Barak. 

In July 2018, Sulayem travelled to Tel Aviv for medical treatment for his daughter. In an email to Barak during his stay, he thanked the Israeli premier “for your help with our visa”. 

Barak replied that he would be happy to meet Sulayem during his visit. It’s not clear if the meeting took place. 

A spokesperson for Barak’s office told Bloomberg that the introduction was made in efforts to seek medical assistance for a member of Sulayem’s family in Israel, but no business activities took place between the two. 

Epstein also made introductions between Sulayem and Steve Bannon, the right-wing strategist and former Trump adviser. Emails between Sulayem and Bannon show that the Emirati tycoon organised a helicopter tour of Dubai for the conservative commentator. 

Epstein also helped Sulayem lobby Peter Mandelson – the former British ambassador to the US, who was sacked over his connections with the sex offender – in relation to a £1.8bn ($2.45bn) port project on the River Thames. 

Sulayem sent a brief about the project to Epstein, who forwarded it to Mandelson, then the UK business secretary. 

“I will call and talk to him,” Mandelson replied. 

Further correspondence showed that Sulayem lobbied the UK government to guarantee loans to fund the project. DP World went ahead with the scheme in 2010, and currently runs the London Gateway port. 

Sulayem regularly kept Epstein up to date with information about DP World’s dealings around the world.

In one email, he told the sex offender that he was waiting for approval to acquire a “sensitive” infrastructure asset which would happen following the signing of a bilateral deal between the UAE and Russia. 

“I also received an official invitation from Putin off=ce for a one on one meeting to get the green light directly from him,” he adds. 

Epstein then forwarded that correspondence to an unknown contact with the message “fo your eyes only”. 

In the past two days, firms in the UK and Canada have suspended future ties with DP World over Sulayem’s ties with Epstein. 

Quebec’s La Caisse pension fund – one of DP World’s largest financial partners, which holds a 45 percent stake in DP World Canada – said it had paused future investments until DP World took “necessary actions”.

British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance agency, also paused future capital over Sulayem’s links to Epstein. 

BII jointly owns Berbera port in Somaliland alongside DP World and the Somaliland government, as MEE reported last month.

Discussions about sex and women 

While some of the emails were professional, many were personal too. On numerous occasions, Sulayem discussed women and sex, often using disparaging language. 

In an email from November 2013, he wrote: “By the way the Ukrainian and the Moldavian arrived… Big disappointment the Moldavian is not as attractive as the picture while the Ukrainian is very beautiful.” 

In another email, Sulayem discusses religion with Epstein, explaining an interpretation about a passage of the Quran relating to Muslim relations with Jews and Christians. 

In a follow-up email, he swiftly changes the subject. 

“Thank you my friend I am off the sample a fresh 100% female Russian at my yacht,” the Emirati says. 

In a 2015 email, Sulayem discusses a sexual encounter. 

“This girl is Russian father Cypriot mom I met her two years ago she goes to the American university in Dubai She got engaged but now she back with me,” he says. “The best sex I ever had amazing body.” 

In another email, as reported by Bloomberg, Sulayem tells Epstein about his efforts to meet a supermodel. 

“After several attemps for several months we managed to meet in NY. there is a missunderstanding she she wanted some BUSINESS! while i only wanted some PUSSYNESS!” he writes. 

Epstein replies: “Praise Allah, there are still people like you.”

In one memo, Sulayem describes a woman he “went with” in Paris, listing her age, weight, height, bra size and other details. 

A separate email shows Epstein sending Sulayem a link to escort services in Italy, to which the Emirati responds: “Wow.”

Emails suggest Sulayem mixed the personal with the professional. He told Epstein in June 2016 that he was bringing his “Irish girlfriend” to a meeting with Canadian tribespeople, where he was trying to secure the use of land for port operations. 

He also made jokes about infidelity. One email reads: “Every married man keeps wondering every evening should I go out and look at=what I cannot fuck or stay home and fuck what I don't want to look at!!”

In another email, he appears to acknowledge his own infidelity.

“Mohammed is not like me and when it comes to pussy he is dedicated to his wife,” Sulayem wrote, in an email to Epstein describing an acquaintance. 

The pair often shared lewd and insensitive jokes.

“A friend of mine went to the mosque in saudi,” the Emirati wrote. “He said with all these terrorists Frankly you can't tell wether the guy standing next to you is just scratching his balls or fiddling with the detonator button !!!”

US lawmakers who were allowed access to unredacted Epstein files this week said that a disturbing memo in which Epstein states “I loved the torture video” was sent to Sulayem, according to The Telegraph newspaper in the UK.

Religious greetings and favours 

The emails reveal a deep fondness between Epstein and Sulayem.

They often wished each other well on Muslim and Jewish religious holidays, including Eid and Rosh Hashanah.  

“I really hope this ramadan is peaceful for you. you have been a good friend, and deserve a rest,” Epstein said in August 2010.

They would also encourage and praise each other. After Epstein sent Sulayem a positive Huffington Post article about the financier’s philanthropy, the Emirati said: “Very nice I need to see more articles l=ke this to show the real Jeffery and by the way god bless you my friend.” 

They scratched each other’s backs – sometimes in the form of securing jobs for acquaintances.

“Can we find a job in logistics for s=etlana brother sergey, i sent you his resume?” Epstein asked in October 2016.

Sulayem appareaed to help secure a trainee job at a spa in Turkey for a Russian “masseuse” who worked in Epstein’s “private spa”. 

In another email, Epstein sends what appears to be a CV, with the message “can we find a position for her in any dubai hotel.?”

The two helped each other secure other favours, too.

In the summer of 2017, Sulayem ordered 30 ancestry DNA kits for Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, and had them delivered to Epstein’s mansion. 

One email shows Epstein telling his assistant to register the kits under the name “rashid epstein”. 

Elsewhere, Sulayem was pictured with Epstein in May 2014 looking at a piece of cloth which resembles the sacred Kiswa from Mecca in Saudi Arabia. It was an item which appeared to be much sought after by the sex offender, according to other emails.

Years later, pieces of the sacred cloth were shipped to Epstein through a number of intermediaries.