Nord Stream 2: The Value of German-Russian Cooperation
The two
countries have transformed their relationship from deadly adversaries to energy
partners
Weimin Chen
Sept. 7
After years of controversy surrounding Nord
Stream 2 the project is nearing its light at the end of the tunnel. The natural
gas pipeline will connect Germany directly to Russia by way of the Baltic Sea.
In an instance of the U.S. not interfering in foreign affairs, President Joe
Biden has decided against sanctions in favor of stabilizing
transatlantic relations. This cooperation shows how far German-Russian
relations have come and some of the challenges facing Europe in the future.
From World War to Energy Partnership
To say that Russia and Germany have had a
history would be a mild way to describe the intensity that has characterized
the fiery relationship between the nations over the years. This is especially
pertinent to the 20th century as the two countries inflicted two world wars and
traumatic occupations on one another with the backdrop of nuclear threats
hovering in the background throughout the second half of the century.
In the decades after the Second World War, they
developed ties whereby Germany increasingly purchased and consumed energy
resources, specifically natural gas, supplied by Russia. Other European countries
developed similar energy ties to Russia as well. Major East-West energy ties between Russia and Europe
began in the 1960s with the rising demands for natural gas in a newly recovered
Europe and a rising desire from the Soviet Union to export their supplies of
energy. This created the conditions for a high level of mutual dependence and
international economic cooperation through investments and contracts that
proved resilient throughout the geopolitical ups and downs of the Cold War. All
things considered, the Cold War ended in Europe without the bang of a major hot
war feared by many analysts. In post-Cold War Russia, the gas industry of the
former Soviet Union consolidated into the now state-owned corporation Gazprom,
which owns the operations of Nord Stream 2.
Countries that depend on one another with
mutual interests tend to favor peace over kinetic war. The threat of
hostilities could cut off Germany’s lights and heating and a significant chunk
out of Russia’s revenue. On paper at least, this disincentivizes conflict
between them. Any sane observer would call this type of cooperation between
Russia and Germany, at the very least, a stable situation that should be
nurtured considering the historic track record between the two nations. Leave
it to the U.S. to speak up against this otherwise amicable arrangement between
two sovereign countries on the opposite hemisphere.
Opposing Interests
In recent years, the U.S. has expressed displeasure
with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Along with voices from Poland and Ukraine,
opponents against the establishment of the natural gas link between Germany and
Russia points to the danger posed to European energy security and independence.
From a business perspective, there is a competitive edge to the U.S. opposition
to Nord Stream 2. American natural gas producing companies also have their eye
on the German energy market and the U.S. government took aim at Nord Stream 2
with this mind, specifically offering the delivery of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Still, the Russian
option is more cost-effective and Germany is projected to further cut costs in
transit through Eastern Europe.
Many Eastern European countries pointed out the
project’s lack of compliance with EU regulations. However, Germany has had
energy ties with Russia for decades and this project aims to modernize and
increase the efficiency of transporting the resource with updated
infrastructure with direct physical contact between the two countries. Nord
Stream 2 bypasses the Eastern European countries that have served as transit
points for Russian gas to Germany and other Central and Western European
countries. Thus, they have legitimate interests in maintaining energy transit authority
positions.
In particular, Ukraine sees a diminishing
economic position from Nord Stream 2 cutting into its revenue as a transit
country for Russian gas to Central Europe and also its political position as it
sees the completion of Nord Stream 2 as a betrayal by the West, going as deep
as its ambitions for NATO membership. From this perspective, the
pipeline drama appears to reveal the U.S. and Europe’s waning willingness to
cater to the complicated political position of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia.
Context of German Energy Politics
Neither the U.S. nor Eastern Europe’s political
objectives can obfuscate the value of German-Russian cooperation. Isn’t a state
of mutual interests between these countries more favorable to the bitter
conflicts that they experienced in the past? That’s not to downplay the risks
of Germany continuing to depend on Russia for roughly 35% of its natural gas imports. There is a non-zero
possibility of Russia using this dependence as political leverage at some
point, but Germany’s energy consumption, both imported and domestically
produced, is diversified across a number of renewable and traditional sources.
And if Russia really turns off the gas, then
the U.S. could just send the American-produced natural gas that it was
advocating for in the first place. After all, it wouldn’t be the first time
that the U.S. delivered supplies to a German population facing shortages
imposed by Russian-led policy. Hopefully, increased interdependence and
overlapping interests will help to shape a future of stability in Europe and
continue the precious absence of another major war on the continent.
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