The Real Saudi-Israeli
Relations
September 30, 2019
The authors assess a once-covert alliance between Israel and Arab
Gulf monarchies and the Trump administration’s election-year hope to normalize
it.
By Giorgio
Cafiero and Lorenzo
Carrieri
Special to Consortium News
Special to Consortium News
Over the past
two decades, Israel and Arab Gulf monarchies have forged a tacit partnership,
increasingly aligning their interests and agendas, while hiding behind a public
perception of being enemies.
Saudi-Israeli links are
not new. They’ve made covert contacts through back-channels since Sheikh Kamal
Adham’s time, when he ran the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate from 1965
to 1979. Though still having no official diplomatic relations, in recent years
the Kingdom and Israel have put far less effort into concealing their unspoken
strategic partnership.
Developments in the region
— from Iran’s geopolitical ascendancy in the region following Iraq’s Ba’athist
regime’s destruction in 2003, to Lebanon’s Hezbollah battlefield performance
during its war with Israel in 2006, and to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 —
have allowed Riyadh and Tel Aviv to be more overt about their connection. The
same can be said about the other Gulf Cooperation Council member-states and
Israel (with the notable exception of Kuwait.)
Turning Point in 2006
The Saudi-Israeli
partnership reached a turning point during the Hezbollah-Israel war of 2006, in
which Riyadh slammed the Lebanese Shi’a group for taking actions
against Israel that amounted to “illegitimate resistance” and a “miscalculated
adventure.” Twelve years later, in 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
(MBS), told The Atlantic that “there
are a lot of interests we share with Israel and if there is peace, there would
be a lot of interest between Israel and the [GCC] countries.”
Last year, an Israeli
journalist leaked MbS’s comments during a meeting with pro-Israeli leaders in
the U.S.: He reportedly said, “It’s about
time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations
table or shut up and stop complaining.” In early 2019, during the Warsaw
Mideast Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office leaked video footage of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states’ foreign
ministers supporting Israel’s right to defend itself while stating that
confronting Iran was a higher priority than addressing the Palestinian question.
If Saudi-Israeli relations
continue to strengthen, analysts should not be surprised. The two nations agree
about the region’s conflicts and Iran’s role, and perceive what they regard as
the same emerging threats; thus they have put religious and ideological
differences aside at a time of unabated hostilities in Iran’s relationship with
both Saudi Arabia and Israel.
As most other GCC states
join Riyadh in normalizing relations with Israel, with Egypt and Jordan having
established official diplomatic ties decades ago, it is increasingly clear
that, despite some Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians remaining militantly
opposed to Israel, it is no longer an “Arab-Israeli conflict.”
Opposition to Democratic Reform
Although many analysts
attribute the growth of Saudi-Israeli relations to the perceived Iranian
threat, broader concerns about the region’s instability also explain the deeper
tactical alliance. Put simply, neither country would welcome an “Arab Spring 2”
or any events that could strengthen Islamists or secular groups’ demands for
democratic reforms. For Saudi Arabia, such movements could lead to its
citizens’ challenging the rulers’ political, moral and religious legitimacy.
For Israel, it is far less risky to have pro-U.S. regimes in Arab states led by
strongmen such as Egypt’s Abdel Fateh el-Sisi, who keep their countries at
peace with the Jewish State, than to have Arab societies’ electing governments
that could adopt a fundamentally different approach to Israel and the
Palestinians.
Doubtless, if Saudi Arabia
(or any GCC state) and Israel officially normalize relations, it would mark a
major diplomatic victory for the Trump administration, which has been pushing
for them to move closer and unite against the perceived Iranian threat. If this
happens before the 2020 presidential election, Trump could claim a watershed
achievement on the international stage.
However, since overwhelming majorities in the Arab countries oppose
their governments’ normalizing relations with Israel, the Saudi leadership
would have to accept the risk of serious blowback. Indeed, for leaders in the
Arab/Islamic world, the memory of Anwar al-Sadat’s assassination by Khalid
Ahmed Showky al-Islambouli remains all too fresh after Sadat made peace with
Israel.
Occasional Condemnations
To mitigate such risks,
Saudi leaders will probably continue to occasionally condemn some Israeli
actions or rhetoric in relation to the Palestinians: A case in point was
Riyadh’s reaction to Netanyahu’s pre-election pledge to annex the Jordan Valley
and Dead Sea (roughly 30 percent of the West Bank). On Sept. 11, Riyadh condemned Netanyahu’s vow as a “dangerous escalation” and
“flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the principles of international law.”
As the Saudi Press Agency reported, officials also urged an “emergency meeting”
of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The next day, King
Salman spoke with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas by phone and
reiterated Riyadh’s stance against Netanyahu’s pledge to extend Israeli
sovereignty.
Regardless of these
occasional public disagreements, the odds are good that the Saudis will
pragmatically continue unofficial relations with Israel, as will most of the
GCC states. However, Riyadh would likely see official diplomatic ties with
Israel as a bit too much of a stretch for the Saudi Kingdom–despite Trump’s
desires.
Most likely, it would
rather wait for either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to establish
official diplomatic relations with Israel before Riyadh would make the move.
And because Bahrain lost much of its sovereignty to Riyadh in the post-2011
period, it is difficult to imagine how its diplomatic overtures to Israel
during the past few years could have occurred without Saudi authorization—if
not the Kingdom’s blessings.
Forecasting Saudi-Israeli
relations is difficult. Still, in a region where both states feel increasingly
threatened and most Arab officials only pay lip service to the Palestinians,
Saudi and Israeli overlapping interests will likely drive the governments ever
closer.
Giorgio Cafiero (@GiorgioCafiero) is the CEO of Gulf
State Analytics (@GulfStateAnalyt), a
Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy.
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