Vostok military exercises indicate that Russia is far from isolated
Despite the West’s containment strategy, Moscow is
deepening its convergence with China and maintaining strong ties with India.
SEPTEMBER 1, 2022
Written by
Sarang Shidore
The next iteration of Russia’s quadrennial Vostok
exercise has just begun in its far east region, involving more
than 50,000 troops, 140 aircraft, and 60 warships. Vostok (which means “east” in
Russian) is one of four exercises Russia routinely conducts every four years,
the others being Zapad (west) Tsentr (center), and Kavkaz (south), the
directions corresponding to the locations of the drills within the country.
The previous iteration of Vostok (in 2018) included
China for the first time, as well as Mongolia; these were the first two states
outside the former Soviet Union to join these exercises. The 2018 exercise was
also much bigger.
The Ukraine war, which has utilized many units normally stationed in the east,
appears to have seriously crimped Russian
abilities to mount a large-scale drill.
But the true significance of Vostok 2022 is not its size,
but its participants. This year, the list of countries from outside the former
Soviet Union joining as participants or observers is much longer and, apart
from Mongolia, also includes Algeria,
Syria, Laos, Nicaragua, and India.
Of these, China is clearly the most significant. The
Russian-Chinese security convergence has garnered global headlines since
earlier this year when their two leaders issued a joint statement asserting
a “no limits” partnership just
prior to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. But in fact, Russia and China
have been strongly converging since the 2014-15 period, in the wake of the
first Ukraine war.
Their security partnership is not a formal alliance —
it lacks a mutual assistance agreement — but has steadily grown closer,
with increasingly sophisticated joint
exercises (including in distant regions such as the Indian Ocean and
the Mediterranean Sea),
sales of Russia’s most advanced weapons systems such as the S-400 and the Su-35
to Beijing, and co-development of
defense equipment.
Since 2018, Vostok has not simulated an invasion by
China, which was at least partly a focus of its previous versions. There is no
evidence, at least yet, that Moscow and Beijing have moved to the stage of
joint operational planning for wartime contingencies. Still, in many ways,
China and Russia can be said to be informal allies,
a development brought on in substantial measure by the simultaneous containment
strategies of Washington toward both.
Vostok will include major maritime exercises in
the Sea of Japan.
After an attempted rapprochement when Shinzo Abe was Japanese prime minister,
ties between Tokyo and Moscow have worsened significantly. Japan imposed major
sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, and the rhetoric between the
two is now much more adversarial.
Of the rest of the Vostok participants, Algeria, Laos,
Nicaragua, and Syria have either distant or adversarial relations with the
United States. However, their involvement in Vostok is more symbolic of the
gathering oppositional coalition than substantive, given their limited
geopolitical heft.
India’s involvement though has more significance. A
close U.S. partner and even a quasi-ally on China, India has nevertheless taken
a sharply
different view on the Ukraine conflict, not
condemning Russia by name, and greatly increasing its
oil purchases from Moscow.
Concerned by a further deepening of Russian-Chinese
ties since the Ukraine war began, India recently dispatched its
National Security Advisor to Moscow where he also reportedly assured Russia
that India was not in any camp. India is also a full member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, a grouping led by China and Russia, and takes part in
security dialogues and military exercises under its rubric. These include an
upcoming counter-terror exercise in
India in which Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Pakistani troops (among others)
will participate.
The upshot of all this is that more than six months
into a brutal war, the United States and its European allies have made almost
no headway in adding to their coalition range against Russia. Except for
Japan, and to an extent Singapore, the major Asian and Eurasian states are not
only not in, but some of them seem to be building even deeper ties with Russia.
Washington may wish to reflect on why its Russia strategy is failing to
excite most Asians.
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