The Danger of Worsening Relations With Both Russia and China
MAY 27, 2022
Q: “Are you willing to get involved militarily to
defend Taiwan if it comes to that?” (CBS News)
A: “Yes.” (President Joe Biden, May 23, 2022)
Q: “ You are?” (CBS)
A: “That’s the commitment we made.” (President Biden)
Once again, an unplanned and impromptu remark from
President Biden has generated controversy, although this represents his third
(incorrect) reference to a commitment to defend Taiwan. Each time,
Biden’s national security team has tried to walk back the president’s remarks,
but the fact of the matter is that the United States is pursuing a policy of
confrontation and containment with China. There has been no attempt to
pursue a diplomatic solution to our differences with China or to give Chinese
leader Xi Jinping reason to believe that Sino-American relations could be improved
through the pursuit of a serious diplomatic dialogue.
It wasn’t difficult to assess China in the past
because Beijing has had to deal with a hostile Soviet presence along a long
international border since WWII, which required extensive military deployments
and resources. This is no longer the case. While Biden
was in Japan last week, Russia and China conducted a major exercise in the
Pacific, flying strategic bombers over the Sea of Japan and the East China
Sea. The joint exercise demonstrates the success that Beijing and Moscow
are having in coordinating military policy against the interests of the United
States.
The United States was particularly fortunate that,
despite its full-scale warfare against North Vietnam in the 1960s, the
Sino-Soviet dispute provided the Johnson and Nixon administration with a free
hand in Southeast Asia. The dispute led to a bloody confrontation along the
Amur and Ussuri rivers in 1969. The Johnson administration was slow to
understand the nature and intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the Nixon
administration moved adroitly to ensure that Washington would have better
relations with both Beijing and Moscow than the two leading communist powers
had with each other.
The triangular diplomacy of President Richard Nixon
and national security adviser Henry Kissinger paid major dividends, including
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with
the Soviet Union as well as improved bilateral relations with China that led to
full-scale diplomatic recognition in the administration of Jimmy Carter.
The Watergate crisis, the Nixon resignation, the inexperience of Gerald Ford,
and the hubris of Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski kept
the United States from exploiting the initial successes of the strategic
triangle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.
The United States was similarly fortunate regarding
its bilateral relations with both the Soviet Union and China as a result of
leadership changes in Moscow and Beijing. In 1979, China radically
changed course under Deng Xiaoping, who pursued economic reform and a
non-ideological foreign policy. Deng wanted China to “hide its strength,
and bide its time.” In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the Soviet
leader, and he was determined to pursue economic reform (perestroika) and
greater scrutiny of previous Kremlin policy (glasnost). He wanted an
improved relationship with the United States and used arms control and
disarmament to ensure a durable detente. The Chernobyl crisis in 1986
afforded an opportunity to purge the military, and to create a national
security team oriented toward improved relations with the West. Now, the
United States must deal with the extreme nationalism and anti-Americanism of
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
We are eighteen months into the Biden administration,
and the flawed policy of Donald Trump toward China is still in place. The
policy of confrontation and containment risks the ratcheting up of military and
economic pressure on China. Editorial columns in the Washington
Post and the New York Times favor this hard-line
policy, calling for greater defense spending to enable a “faster modernization
and rearmament of the U.S. military.” Presumably, Pentagon strategists are
already preparing budget requests that are oriented to a “two-front war,” which
drove U.S. spending to record levels in the 1980s right up to the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. The notion that the United States could succeed
in battling both Russia and China at the same time is particularly ludicrous.
Last week, an op-ed in the Post argued
that “should China decide to wage war with the United States today, it would do
so with modern weaponry purchased with U.S. money and often built with
U.S.-designed technology.” The idea that China would “decide to wage war
with the United States” is particularly obtuse. The belief that the
policy of containment that worked against the weak Soviet Union will have
favorable results with a strengthened China is an illusion.
Biden’s declaration to defend Taiwan if China attacked
may have gone too far, but the formation of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,
a thirteen-nation pact that excluded China, didn’t go far enough. The
Framework is no substitute for the Trans-Pacific Partnership that was
negotiated by the Obama administration and abandoned by the Trump
administration. Unlike the Framework, the Partnership involved economic
engagement with East Asia, India, and Australia. The Framework is not a
trade deal; it doesn’t open new markets.
Biden’s decision to maintain tariffs on Chinese
imports has divided his national security team, with Secretary of the Treasury
Janet Yellen and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo arguing that removing some
of the tariffs would offset rising prices. Daleep Singh, a deputy
national security adviser, has argued that the Biden administration inherited
the tariffs from the Trump administration and that the tariffs “serve no
strategic purpose.” Thus far, the hardliners on China, particularly
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and U.S. trade representative Katherine
Tai, have convinced Biden that the tariffs provide leverage for the United
States vis-a-vis China. According to Harvard Professor Jason Furman,
“tariff reduction is the single biggest tool the administration has” in
fighting inflation.
Unfortunately, no one in the Biden administration
seems to be making the case that the policy of decoupling the United States
from ties to China and trying to take on both Russia and China will be hugely
expensive in terms of resources and appropriations. Biden’s approach will
require huge expenditures for both air and naval platforms, leaving inadequate
resources for domestic requirements, particularly for infrastructure and the
climate challenge. In his first months, Biden emphasized there would be a
review of our global military presence. But he gave this task to the
Pentagon, which recommended no withdrawal or reductions. Indeed, the most
substantial change was to improve airfields in the Asia-Pacific regions;
increase personnel in Germany, and bolster French counter-terrorism
efforts in Africa.
It is unfortunate that Biden has put together a
national security team that has nothing new to alter the stalemated situations
that Donald Trump left behind regarding policy toward China, Iran, and North
Korea. Defense spending continues to climb; new initiatives regarding
arms control and disarmament are nowhere to be found, and military deployments
continue to rise. Defense analysts are already arguing for an expanded
military presence in the Baltic States and key East European states such as
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Their call is for the permanent basing of U.S. units in order to institutionalize a front-line force
posture.
Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the
Center for International Policy and a professor of government at Johns Hopkins
University. A former CIA analyst, Goodman is the author of Failure of Intelligence: The Decline
and Fall of the CIA and National Insecurity: The Cost of
American Militarism. and A Whistleblower at the CIA. His
most recent books are “American Carnage: The Wars of Donald Trump”
(Opus Publishing, 2019) and “Containing the National Security
State” (Opus Publishing, 2021). Goodman is the national security columnist for counterpunch.org.
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