Biden’s efforts to appease Israel on Iran have failed on all fronts
It’s not the nuclear deal that’s the problem for Tel
Aviv, but the very idea that Washington and Tehran would reach any detente at
all.
DECEMBER 12, 2021
Written by
Trita
Parsi
The New York Times Friday published an important analysis of
ongoing U.S.-Israeli tensions over Washington’s efforts to revive the 2015
nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which had
succeeded in curbing Tehran’s nuclear program. As helpful as it is in understanding
where things stand between Washington and Tel Aviv, however, the article misses
a more fundamental takeaway from recent developments: Biden’s immense efforts
to appease Israel in hopes of tempering the latter’s opposition to the JCPOA
have not only failed but were likely based on faulty assumptions and were thus
a mistake from the outset.
Diverging Israeli and American views on the JCPOA is
nothing new. But senior officials on the Biden team thought President Obama
could have handled the Israelis better by coordinating more closely with Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and actually heeding some of his hawkish advice.
This belief, however, is unfounded.
The fundamental question is this: Are Israel and
America’s views on a negotiated settlement with Iran ultimately reconcilable or
not? Was there— and is there now — a way to clinch a lasting deal with Iran on
its nuclear program that also satisfies Israel?
The answer lies in understanding that the details of
the deal are not the real problem. It’s rather the very idea of Washington and
Tehran reaching any agreement that not only prevents Iran from
developing a bomb but also reduces U.S.-Iran tensions and lifts sanctions that
have prevented Iran from enhancing its regional power.
Many of Washington’s partners in the Middle East worry
more about a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement and its geopolitical implications — a
likely tilt in the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor, especially given
the widespread perception the United States is eager to extricate itself from
the neighborhood — than Iran’s nuclear advances. “So long as the United States
works to contain Iran’s political influence and undermine its economy,” I wrote in Foreign Affairs in
February, “the balance of the region will artificially tilt in favor of these
states — a tilt that their own power cannot sustain.”
Indeed, Obama’s fruitless efforts to persuade
Washington’s regional partners and their allies in Washington to go along with
the JCPOA had demonstrated that no amount of deference or consultation could
change their categorical opposition to a deal with Iran. To the great
frustration of some former Obama officials who had gone through this
experience, the Biden team thought they could square this circle.
In December 2020, Obama’s deputy national security
adviser, Ben Rhodes publicly implored Biden not to repeat this mistake: “I
plead with [Biden],” he said on the PodSaveAmerica
podcast. “Do not think there is any ounce of good faith
that will be coming your way from Bibi Netanyahu, from MBS, and from the Tom
Cottons of this world. These people have no interest in a deal. They’ve never had
an interest in a deal,” he declared. “How many times do we have to go through
this play? This is in the hands of the Biden people to say: ‘We don’t need to
listen to these people.’”
But Biden chose to listen to them. Instead of
returning to the JCPOA in the first days and weeks of his administration,
critical time and effort were spent trying to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE to get onboard with diplomacy.
Netanyahu never budged an inch, although when Prime
Minister Naftali Bennett succeeded him, Biden was encouraged by scoring some
early wins. Bennett agreed, for example, to refrain from publicly attacking
Biden’s diplomacy and play to Republican anti-Iran foes, as Netanyahu had done,
thus making the U.S.-Israel relationship a partisan issue. (Bennett also agreed
to coordinate Israel’s attacks on Iran with Biden, but more on that later.)
As soon as negotiations entered a decisive phase
earlier this month, however, Bennett began to renege on the agreement and
didn’t hesitate to publicly voice his opposition to Biden’s
desire to revive the JCPOA. At this point, it should have been clear that
Bennett, like Netanyahu before him, was not about to give ground.
Yet, Biden has continued to try to appease Israel. The
Times reports that Biden began ramping up Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions
(which Biden officials had always insisted were counterproductive) and issued
military threats in an apparent effort to calm Israel.
This line in the Times’ piece nails the folly of
Biden’s efforts: “Despite the tougher American talk, Israeli officials left
worried that the diplomatic outreach to Iran would continue.” Indeed, Israel’s
greatest worry is that diplomacy succeeds, not that it fails.
“Israeli officials have not been reassured,” The
Times’ account continues. “They are increasingly concerned that the United
States will eventually reach a deal with Tehran and then seek to block Israeli
intelligence services from carrying out covert sabotage attacks.” The article
goes on to report that Israel now seeks a “guarantee” that Washington will not
seek to restrain their sabotage campaign, even if the JCPOA is restored.
So Israel wants to be able to continue to attack
Iran even after, in Washington’s eyes, Tehran’s path to a bomb has
been successfully blocked. (Given Biden’s refusal to provide Iran with
assurances that the United States will
keep its word and stay in the JCPOA beyond his own term, it will be interesting
to see if he offers Israel a guarantee that it can continue to attack Iran even
after the JCPOA is restored.)
But let’s return to Biden’s earlier deal with Bennett.
The Times discloses that Israel “consulted” with Washington before launching
two covert strikes against Iran in June and September. The piece doesn’t reveal
if the U.S. tried to stop Israel.
Regardless, in Tehran’s eyes, this will likely confirm
its view that Israeli sabotage is not acting contrary to U.S. strategy, but
rather, that these attacks are a component of America’s broader strategy on
Iran. Tehran presumably sees the Israeli attacks as Washington’s efforts to
pressure Iran as part of Biden’s continuation of Trump’s policies.
Similarly, Biden has viewed attacks by Iraqi militias
on U.S. troops as having been ordered or approved by Iran, even though U.S. officials have admitted that
Iran’s control over these same militias diminished sharply after the January
2020 assassinations of the IRGC’s Qods Force commander, Gen. Qassem Soleimani,
and Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, the head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces.
U.S. officials have told me that one reason Biden
chose not to return to the JCPOA quickly after his inauguration was due to
Iraqi militia attacks on U.S. troops in January of this year. While the U.S.
knew of no evidence that Iran had ordered the attacks, U.S. intelligence also saw no evidence that Iran had tried to prevent them. If the United States
interprets such attacks in this way despite the lack of evidence, it is fair to
ask how Iran will interpret Israeli attacks on Iran that, according to U.S.
media, followed “consultations” with Washington.
A final point: There is a curious passage in the Times
piece. “American officials believe that so long as Iran has not moved to
develop a bomb it does not have a nuclear military program, since it suspended
the existing one after 2003. Israeli officials, on the other hand, believe that
Iran has continued a clandestine effort to build a bomb since 2003.” If true,
has Israel shared that intelligence with Washington? If so, it has failed
to persuade the CIA
and the International Atomic Energy Agency. If it hasn’t been shared, why not?
And why did the Times choose to publish this rather inflammatory allegation
without investigating these very basic— not to say critical — questions?
The moral of the story is this: U.S. and Israeli
interests in Iran diplomacy are irreconcilable. Biden’s efforts to square the
circle have predictably failed. Biden must choose whether he will pursue
America’s interest or Israel. This should not be a difficult choice.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario