Is the next US aggression on Syria already scheduled?

August 31, 2018

https://thesaker.is/is-the-next-us-aggression-on-syria-already-scheduled/

It appears that we are coming back full circle: the AngloZionists are again, apparently, preparing to use the very same White Helmets (aka “good terrorists”) to execute yet another chemical false flag attack in Syria and again blame the government forces for it. The Russians are, again, warning the world in advance and, just as last time, (almost) nobody gives a damn.  And there are even reports that the US is, yet again, considering imposing a (totally illegal) no-fly zone over Syria (I have not heard this once since Hillary’s presidential campaign).  And just like last time, it appears that the goal of the US is to save the “good terrorists” from a major governmental victory.

It appears that my prediction that each “click” brings us one step closer to the “bang!” is, unfortunately, coming true and while the Empire seems to have given up on the notion of a full-scale reconquest of Syria, the Neocons are clearly pushing for what might turn out to be a major missile strike on Syria.  The fact that firing a large number of missiles near/over/at Russian forces might result in Russian counter-attack which, in turn, could lead to a major, possibly nuclear, war does not seem to factor at all in the calculations of the Neocons.  True, the Neocons are mostly rather stupid (as in “short-term focused”) people, with a strong sense of superiority and a messianic outlook on our world.  However, it baffles me that so few people in the USA and the EU are worried about this.  Somehow, a nuclear war has become so unthinkable that many have concluded that it can never happen.

The other thing which the Neocons seem to be oblivious to is that the situation on the ground in Syria cannot be changed by means of missile strikes or bombs.  For one thing, the last US attack has conclusively shown that US Tomahawks are an easy target for the Syrian (mostly antiquated) air defenses.  Of course, the US could rely on more AGM-158 JASSM which are much harder to intercept, but no matter what missiles are used, they will not effectively degrade the Syrian military capabilities simply because there are so few lucrative targets for cruise missile strikes in Syria, to begin with.  Considering that the US knows full well that no chemical attack will take place (or even could take place, for that matter, since even the USA have declared Syria chemical weapons free in 2013) the White House might decide to blow up a few empty buildings and declare that “the animal Assad” has been punished I suppose.  But even if completely unopposed a US missile attack will make no military sense whatsoever.  So this begs the question of what would be the point of any attack on Syria?  Sadly, the rather evident answer to that is that the upcoming missile strike has less to do with the war in Syria and much more to do with internal US politics.

Russian and Syrian options

There are a few differences too.  The biggest difference is that this time around the Russian naval task force in the eastern Mediterranean is much bigger than last time: 15 ships including two advanced frigates, the Admiral Grigorovich and Admiral Essen (see a detailed report here: https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russia-sends-largest-naval-fleet-ever-to-syrian-waters/) and two 636.3-class advanced diesel-attack submarines.  That is a lot of anti-ship, anti-air and anti-submarine firepower and, even more crucially, a lot of advanced early warning capabilities.  Since the Russian and Syria air defense networks have been integrated by single automated fire system this means that the Syrians will very accurately “see” what is taking place in and around the Syrian airspace (this is especially true with the Russians keeping their A-50U AWACs on 24/7 patrol).

What has me most worried are the various reports (such as this one) which say that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week that “Moscow would be held responsible” if any chemical attack occurs.  If by “Moscow will be responsible” the crazies in Washington DC mean “morally responsible”, then this is just the usual nonsense.  But I am afraid that with certified nutcases like Bolton and Pompeo in charge, the US might be considering attacking Russian personnel in Syria (not necessarily at the well-defended Khmeimin or Tartus bases).  These guys could easily target various installations or Syrian military units where Russian personnel are known to be deployed and declare that they were not deliberately targeting Russians and that the Russians hit were “clearly involved” with the Syrian chemical weapon forces.  The US has already targeted Russian nationals for kidnapping and detention, they might start killing Russian nationals next and then place the responsibility for these deaths on the Kremlin.  You don’t think so? Just think “Skripal” and you will see that this notion is not so far-fetched.

The Russians do have options, by the way.  One thing they could do is place 6 (modernized) MiG-31s on quick alert in southern Russia (or, even better, in Iran) and keep a pair of them on combat air patrol over Syria (or over Iran).  Combined with the “eyes” of the A-50U, these MiG-31s could provide the Russians with a formidable capability, especially against the US B-1B deployed in Qatar or Diego Garcia.  So far, the MiG-31s have not seen action in Syria, but if intercepting a large number of cruise missiles becomes the mission then they would offer a much more flexible and capable force than the very small amount of Su-35 and Su-30 currently based in Khmeimim.

But the key to protecting Syria is to beef-up the Syrian air defenses and early warning capabilities, especially with advanced mobile air defense systems, especially many short-to-medium range systems like the Tor-M2 and the Pantsir-S2.  Until this goal is achieved, the USA and Russia will remain in a most dangerous “Mexican standoff” in which both parties are engaged in what I call a “nuclear game of chicken” with each party threatening the other side while counting on its own nuclear capability to deter a meaningful counter-attack or retaliation.  This is extremely dangerous but there is very little Russia can do to stop the US leaders from coming back to that same strategy over and over again.  So far the Russians have shown a truly remarkable level of restraint, but if pushed too far, the next step for them will be to retaliate against the US in a manner which would provide them with what the CIA calls “plausible deniability” (I discussed this option over a year ago in this article).  If attacked directly and openly the Russians will, of course, have no other option left than to hit back.  And while it is true that the Russian forces in and near Syria are vastly outnumbered by US/NATO/CENTCOM forces, the Russians have a massive advantage over the USA in terms of long-range cruise missiles (see Andrei Martyanov’s analysis “Russia’s Stand-Off Capability: The 800 Pound Gorilla in Syria” for a detailed discussion of this topic).

None of the above is new, the world has been stuck in this situation for well over a year now and there still appears to be no end in sight.  Unfortunately, I can only agree with Ruslan Ostashko: only a massive military defeat or a no less massive economic collapse will stop the folks who “who confuse Austria and Australia” to give up their insane quest for world hegemony by violence.

The Saker

Ingresos de los 10 mexicanos más ricos, iguales a los de 50% de los más pobres

Arturo Sánchez Jiménez

Periódico La Jornada
Jueves 30 de agosto de 2018, p. 34

En 2017, los recursos de los 10 mexicanos más ricos equivalían al total de ingresos de 50 por ciento de los más pobres, es decir, de casi 60 millones de personas, de acuerdo con el informe La ineficacia de la desigualdad, presentado ayer en la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).

El rector Enrique Graue Wiechers explicó que mientras en 2002 la fortuna de los cuatro mexicanos más ricos representaba 2 por ciento del producto interno bruto (PIB), para 2014 ascendió a 9 por ciento.

En el documento, elaborado por la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Cepal), se analizan y miden los efectos de la falta de acceso a la salud, la educación y los ingresos, así como por la discriminación por género o condición étnico-racial, en una de las regiones más desiguales del mundo.

Graue aseveró que el informe refleja la lacerante inequidad, que es como un monstruo que se alimenta a sí mismo, y si no la combatimos, nos destruirá por su propia ineficiencia.

En el auditorio de posgrado Maestro Jesús Silva Herzog, en la Facultad de Economía (FE), la secretaria ejecutiva de la Cepal, Alicia Bárcena, explicó que el documento propone una nueva generación de políticas fiscales con énfasis en el gasto público, pero sobre todo en el combate a la evasión fiscal y los fondos ilícitos. Además, señala que la igualdad es un valor fundamental, un principio ético irreductible y condición esencial para un modelo de desarrollo centrado en el cierre de brechas.

Se trata de igualar para crecer, porque la desigualdad es injusta, ineficiente e insostenible y genera instituciones que no promueven la productividad y la innovación, porque castiga la pertenencia de clase, etnia y género y lleva a su máxima consecuencia la cultura del privilegio que naturaliza las desigualdades, lo que es inaceptable, añadió.

Gerardo Esquivel, académico de la FE, expuso que el documento esboza una nueva visión macroeconómica, la construcción paulatina de un Estado de bienestar y economía sostenible, así como instrumentos para lograrlo. Esto, prosiguió, es importante en el momento que atraviesa el país, en el que una nueva administración construye sus políticas públicas.

Eduardo Vega López, director de la FE, opinó que el informe analiza las diferentes expresiones sociales, fiscales, financieras, territoriales e institucionales de la ineficiencia de la desigualdad.

Asimismo, propone una macroeconomía que, sin despreocuparse del control de la inflación y la gestión cautelosa de las finanzas públicas, se base en fiscalidad progresiva, gasto con prioridad en la provisión de bienes públicos, aprovechamiento productivo de las capacidades laborales, fomento de una política industrial para la innovación y el equipamiento y la construcción de infraestructura ambientalmente conveniente.

Five years on, BRI tastes success on several fronts

By Zhao Minghao Source: Global Times Published: 2018/8/28

Five years after the Belt and Road initiative was proposed, the Chinese government emphasizes the need to realize the high-quality development of the initiative and create more tangible benefits. 

Addressing a symposium marking the fifth anniversary of the Belt and Road initiative in Beijing on Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed that the initiative has offered a new solution to improve global governance, met the demand for change in the system of global governance and demonstrates a community with a shared future.

Since the financial crisis of 2008, globalization has been in decline and cross-border trade and investment have dropped significantly. Against such a backdrop, the Belt and Road cooperation provide an important opportunity and an effective platform out of the quagmire the world has found itself in. As Andrew Elek, a research associate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, pointed out, the Belt and Road initiative responds to the demands of reducing traditional trade barriers and narrowing the gaps in transport and communications infrastructure. "Cooperation on capacity-building and adding vital economic infrastructure is a positive-sum game," and the initiative can push relevant countries to "promote a creative new approach to global economic integration," Elek wrote. 

As shown by Xi's speech, China has firm confidence in continuing to advance the Belt and Road construction. This confidence has been bolstered by the universal popularity the initiative has gained among the international community over the past five years. So far a total number of 103 countries, regions and international organizations have signed cooperation agreements with China on the Belt and Road. 

The results yielded by the initiative have gone beyond expectation. For instance, construction of the China-Laos railway and the Hungary-Serbia railway has been underway. The Yaji Railway - Africa's first electrified railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti, has been completed and put into operation. China has invested more than $70 billion in countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road initiative over the past few years and set up 82 overseas economic and trade cooperation zones, which have yielded over $1 billion in tax revenues and created nearly 250,000 jobs in those nations.

The Belt and Road construction has achieved a good start. With the initiative expanding, it has garnered more attention. In his speech, Xi outlined the vision for the Belt and Road construction in the next stage without shying away from the complex problems, risks and challenges it would face. 

In the future, more efforts will be made to push for progress in projects that would deliver real benefits to local people and attract more social capital. China will pay more attention to develop balanced trade relations, substantially increasing imports from countries along the Belt and Road route. Currently, the China-Europe freight rail service network has reached 10,000 trips, boosting the export volume of the continent to China. 

China will carry out more cooperation projects in the fields of education, healthcare, culture and environment protection to promote the development of soft infrastructure in relevant countries, especially helping them train more talent. The investment and operation of Chinese companies will be subject to stricter regulations so that they can better fulfill their social responsibilities.  

Besides, China will further expand the third party market cooperation with developed countries and large multinational corporations. The Chinese and Japanese governments are now negotiating cooperation on Thailand's Eastern Economic Corridor projects. China's Silk Road Fund and General Electric plan to invest together in the energy infrastructure in Belt and Road countries.  

Beijing believes the Belt and Road initiative not only provides development opportunities to countries at a disadvantage in the globalization process, helping them shake off poverty and achieve modernization, but also adds impetus to further progress in developed countries. Xi emphasized that the Belt and Road initiative is an initiative for economic cooperation, instead of a geopolitical alliance or military league. He noted that it is an open and inclusive process rather than an exclusive bloc or "China club." 

Through the Belt and Road initiative, China is trying to find a new path for national advancement without becoming hegemonic. Forming a community with a shared future for humanity is not an empty slogan. The US-launched trade war has upset many countries, but the general trend of globalization is difficult to reverse. Protectionism and unilateralism will come to a dead end. Belt and Road construction will become broader and more perspective. 

The author is a senior research fellow with The Charhar Institute and an adjunct fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

What Does a Chinese Superpower Look Like? Nothing Like the U.S.

China aims to expand its influence from one polar cap to the other. Debt, demographics and a middle-income trap stand in the way.

By Marc Champion

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-27/what-does-a-chinese-superpower-look-like-nothing-like-the-u-s?cmpid=BBD082818_MKT&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=180828&utm_campaign=markets

What struck Wang Wen about Antarctica, beyond the brutality of the December cold, was the scale of U.S. operations in such an inhospitable environment and the American flag fluttering by the sign that marks the geographic South Pole. Observing the academic mission of hundreds of U.S. scientists in a region rich in resource potential, he was determined that China must catch up.

The report Wang wrote this summer for the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, where he’s executive dean, reflects China’s growing dilemma as it muscles its way into an international system it didn’t create.

For the first time in its long history, China has in President Xi Jinping a leader with a truly global vision. So, inevitably, Beijing looks to the U.S., the sole superpower, for a yardstick as to what that requires—be it a blue water navy or more research stations in Antarctica.

Yet Communist Party leaders also recoil at being seen as the next global hegemon and are reluctant to shoulder the expense that goes with it. They studiously avoid the word “superpower” and see the American version of it as ideologically unacceptable and spent.

Whether China does become a superpower and whether it could sustain the costs involved are questions that will impact the world for decades. They will shape terms of trade, a changing global order, and issues of war and peace. “We don’t know,” Wang said over dinner a few floors below his institute, when asked what Chinese great power will look like. “Anything but America.”

Yet to misquote Leon Trotsky, even if China isn’t interested in becoming a superpower, superpower may be interested in it. The U.S., too, began its journey on the world stage determined not to replicate earlier colonial empires. Today, 11 carrier groups and a network of military bases span the globe to protect its interests.

China may be heading down a similar path. An aircraft carrier construction program is underway. Its first overseas military base opened last year, in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Spending for diplomatic service is up sharply. Xi’s “Made in China 2025” economic project aims to displace the U.S. as the world’s technological power, while another plan calls for dominance in Artificial Intelligence by 2030.

The country raised defense spending from $21 billion in 1990 to $228 billion last year, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, more than three times Russia’s budget. The ease with which it did so—the military’s share of overall government spending actually fell—suggests China can be any kind of power it wants.

Already there are signs a Chinese model for development, based on an authoritarian political system and state-directed market economy, could gain traction against the more liberal ideals long promoted by the U.S. and post-war institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Some countries, including Cambodia, now follow Beijing’s direction, attracted by China’s deep pockets.

Still, Beijing’s crackdown on free speech and other social liberties doesn’t suggest a self-confident regime. A budding trade war with the U.S. has helped shave about 20 percent off Chinese equities since January, triggering a domestic debate over whether Xi has already overreached by bidding so openly to challenge the U.S.

Consider, too, that the average Chinese remains less wealthy than the average Mexican at a time when the population is already starting to age. Some investors wonder about the health of big Chinese banks, whose lending for decades provided the investment-led growth on which the party relies for its legitimacy. If this is a superpower in the making, it may be a fragile one.

To Paul Dibb, a former deputy secretary for intelligence in Australia’s defense department, it’s telling that Beijing spends more on internal security than defense. “China will have to choose not between guns and butter,” he said, “but between guns and elderly care.”

Wang, 32, is among the loyalists who’ve come to prominence since Xi took power in 2013. Like his boss (Wang is also the Chongyang Institute’s party secretary), he exudes limitless confidence in China’s future.

It took four days to travel from Beijing to Antarctica. On the final leg, flying low over the vast icy expanse, Wang and others sucked oxygen from masks in the plane’s decompressed cabin. He is repelled by stories of colonist-era explorers like Robert Scott, who raced to plant their flags and stake territorial claims. Yet he also admires their “fearless spirit” and willingness to sacrifice.

“Should we contemporary Chinese be ashamed?” he wrote on his return, in the Chinese language Global Times.

An ice sheet with a mean depth of 1.6 miles (2.6 kilometers) has protected Antarctica’s resources from exploration. Still, Wang’s report says that below the surface is an estimated 500 billion tons of coal, as much as 100 billion barrels of oil, and 5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Despite a 1959 treaty which freezes all territorial claims, at least for now, Wang sees a “fierce” geopolitical struggle underway. He fears that, without a stronger voice and presence, China will lose out.

“President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that China must participate more actively into rule-settings in new areas, including deep sea, polar regions, outer space and the Internet,” his report concludes.

In practice, that would mean building infrastructure to accommodate tourists and beefing up Beijing’s research presence, the key determinant of influence in Antarctica’s multinational administration.

The U.S. budget request for the Office of Polar Programs in 2019 is $534 million. From 2001 to 2016, according to Wang’s report, China invested 310 million yuan ($45 million) in its Antarctic program. Beijing could easily afford the difference, but Antarctica is just one challenge China faces as it asserts its interests around the globe.

In January, China published its first white paper on the other pole, the Arctic, outlining its ambition for a “Polar Silk Road.” It proposes building new-design icebreaker vessels and bases, essential tools in an area with fewer barriers to territorial claims than the southern polar cap.

Silk Road is another name for the Belt and Road Initiative, into which China has already sunk hundreds of billions of dollars. In Africa alone, China loaned about $86 billion between 2000 and 2014 to governments and state-owned enterprises, and in 2015 Xi pledged another $60 billion under the initiative. Meanwhile, to match the U.S. on defense spending, China would need to find another $400 billion a year. Even for China, these are large costs.

Xi grasps the core lesson of the former Soviet Union’s failure—its over-reliance on military strength, according to David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University and author of numerous books on China. Beyond weapons, superpowers require technology, strong economies, and soft power influence to sustain themselves. “China understands that,” he said.

China has modernized its army while spending a relatively small share of annual GDP—officially as little as 1.5 percent, or 1.9 percent according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Either figure would see China risk criticism from the U.S. for underspending if it were part of the NATO alliance. Even so, a scorecard run since 1996 by the Rand Corporation, a U.S. research institute, found that last year, for the first time, China would have air power parity with the U.S. in any conflict over Taiwan.

The latest budget increases spending on the diplomatic service at twice the rate of the military. More than 500 Confucius Institutes now teach Chinese language and culture across the globe.

For all that, China still has few real allies and remains at best a partial superpower, according to Shambaugh. Its soft power is undercut by its militarization of the South China Sea and concerns its offshore infrastructure loans are just debt traps that will bind smaller nations to its will. Its culture, while rich and deep, has a little equivalent to Hollywood, or the ideals of individual freedom.

“Their military is still regional, they have almost no power projection capability,” said Shambaugh, adding the same is true of diplomacy, where China has yet to take the lead on a major international agreement. “They are really a very self-interested power,” he said. “They’re not interested in shaping the global order.”

That isn’t quite right, according to Henry Wang, founder, and president of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing. True, China doesn’t want to destroy the world order that the U.S. shaped, as it has benefited from it. But it does want to create what he calls globalization 2.0, by adding new international structures including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

“People get scared” by China’s size, according to Wang. China just wants globalization that’s more inclusive, he says.

“There’s not a magnanimous bone in the Chinese body politic. It’s all about China,” counters Jim McGregor, chairman for greater China at the consulting firm APCO Worldwide. “Name a country that’s a true friend of China.”

More worrying for China’s global ambitions are signs its economic engine could stall. China would, for example, be the first superpower to start getting old before it got rich. According to United Nations projections, its 1.4 billion-strong population is likely to decline and age sharply from as soon as 2023. The number of working age Chinese has already begun to shrink.

“I can’t find a single example of a superpower growing when its population was falling,” said Zhang Jian, associate professor at Peking University’s School of Government. The British Empire and the U.S. rose to prominence when their populations were exploding. Xi “needs to take care of the domestic situation and worry less about being a great power,” said Zhang.

Nor is China as flush as commonly assumed. Adjusted for purchasing power parity, which accounts for the greater buying power of a dollar spent domestically, China has a larger gross domestic product than the U.S. But that’s a poor measure of international buying power, where dollars are just dollars, according to Tom Orlik, the chief economist at Bloomberg Economics.

 “One way to measure the additional money China has to spend around the world is to look at nominal GDP in U.S. dollar terms. In the five years before the financial crisis, that averaged close to 23 percent annual growth,” said Orlik. “In the last five years, it’s averaged 7 percent—including a year of zero growth in 2016.”

China’s GDP per capita is around $9,000 compared to $60,000 for the U.S. That could mean more room for catch-up growth, but to get there China will have to avoid the middle-income trap that keeps many emerging economies stuck below a GDP per capita of around $15,000. To date, no large economy has made the transition without liberalizing.

Western economic laws don’t apply, according to Xi loyalists; the strategic smarts of the party will let China blow through the middle-income trap—even without the independent judiciary and property rights that fostered innovation elsewhere.

Xi has urged China’s scientists to trust a socialist system that stunned the world by producing nuclear and space programs during the 1960s. “By tightening our belts and gritting our teeth, we built ‘two bombs and one satellite!’” Xi said in an April speech. “The next step is to do the same with science and technology.”

Under Xi, the party has swallowed the more technocratic government, taking over many of its functions. Major companies have party cells within them. That’s a good thing, in the view of the president’s followers, because it ensures control by a 90 million-strong organization that has developed as a relatively efficient meritocracy.

Criticism of China’s heavy corporate debt burden at home—about two and a half times GDP last year—and potential defaults on white elephant infrastructure projects overseas are misplaced, the thinking goes. That’s because clever party officials choose the projects that get big loans. APCO’s McGregor points out the U.S. itself relied on central planning to supercharge its economy, in World War Two.

“We’re kind of full of ourselves,” he said of the West. “We talk all this stuff about the superiority of free markets, but how did the U.S. become an economic superpower?”

Xi’s consolidation of power has some worried that the scope for bad decisions that go unchallenged is growing. At the National Museum of China in Beijing, a permanent exhibit tells China’s history since the 1839-42 Opium War as a morality tale of colonial oppression, followed by uninterrupted party success. It skips over Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, which caused tens of millions of deaths and vast economic damage.

Joerg Wuttke, until last year president of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, notes that sycophancy tends to grow with one-man-rule. He worries also that the party is draining talent from the very bureaucracy on which China’s leaders are depending to deliver sustained prosperity.

“The party that was so successful for the last 30 years,” says Wuttke, “is the same party that left behind a trail of destruction for the previous 30 years.”

All of this, according to Wang Wen, is to fundamentally misunderstand China by trying to fit it into the western experience. He cites the doom-laden warnings of Chinese over-leverage and over-planning that have proved wrong for decades.

“Our country has entered a very interesting phase that the Western social sciences can’t explain,” said Wang, singling out conventional economics as especially inept. “If you use Western theory, you cannot understand China’s foreign policy.”

— With assistance by Dandan Li, and Peter Martin

¿MEXICO LOGRÓ UN MEJOR TRATADO COMERCIAL CON ESTADOS UNIDOS?

No lo sabemos. Lo que sí sabemos es que Trump estaba exultante. Manifestó que era un “muy buen acuerdo”, el logrado con México y dio por muerto al North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); incluso el nombre mismo desaparecerá, ahora se llamará, según Trump, Acuerdo Comercial México-Estados Unidos.

Todo parece indicar que con objeto de que Peña lograra un postrero “triunfo” antes de terminar su fracasada presidencia; de que López Obrador evite el desgaste de una negociación que se alargue hasta después de su toma de posesión y ello afecte la economía del país; y de que Trump pueda presumir un logro en materia de comercio internacional, además de desviar algo las malas noticias que ha tenido la última semana, respecto a las investigaciones de diversos presuntos delitos de colaboradores suyos, por parte del fiscal Mueller, que lo afectarían directamente a él; se decidió apresurar las negociaciones entre México y Estados Unidos, con objeto de firmar el nuevo tratado, antes de las elecciones intermedias en el vecino del Norte, que todo parece indicar pueden traer una mayoría demócrata en la Cámara de Representantes (se ve más difícil que suceda eso en el Senado).

Así también, Trump necesita enviar a la brevedad el tratado firmado al Congreso, el que tendrá 90 días para aprobarlo o rechazarlo en conjunto, sin enmiendas; y Trump prefiere que ese paso lo haga con un Congreso aún dominado por los republicanos.

El asunto es que no se sabe qué tanto tuvo que ceder Peña (y con él López Obrador), para que se terminara la negociación y si Trump cedió algo o no.

No queda aún claro qué quedó de las famosas “píldoras envenenadas” de Trump como la “cláusula sunset”[1], o sea la finalización del tratado cada 5 años y su renegociación; la estacionalidad en materia agrícola, lo que obligaba a México a aceptar restringir sus exportaciones a Estados Unidos en las temporadas en que la producción de ese país se considerara suficiente[2]; el contenido nacional en la industria automotriz, que se exigía que el 50% fuera para Estados Unidos; y la resolución de controversias, para cambiar de los paneles tripartitos a los tribunales nacionales.[3]

Además, estaba la diferencia en materia energética, por la oposición del nuevo presidente de México a que la reforma energética impulsada por Peña quedara incluida en el nuevo tratado (al parecer sí quedó).

Según lo muy poco que han detallado los negociadores mexicanos sobre lo concluido, los intereses estadounidenses quedaron bien resguardados, pero no queda claro que así haya sido en el caso mexicano.

Además, como quería Trump, en los hechos acabo siendo una negociación bilateral con Estados Unidos, en donde la asimetría de poder favoreció claramente a Washington; dejando fuera a Canadá por lo pronto, y que tendrá que negociar ahora por su lado tanto con Estados Unidos como con México. México acabó así dándole la espalda a Ottawa, en favor de Washington[4].

Y, por supuesto, los trabajadores mexicanos quedaron totalmente olvidados, pues no se sabe de ninguna cláusula o capítulo que permita mejorar los sueldos de los trabajadores mexicanos y sus condiciones generales de trabajo, algo que las trasnacionales y los oligarcas mexicanos estuvieron obstaculizando continuamente durante las negociaciones, a pesar de la insistencia en ese sentido de los sindicatos canadienses y estadounidenses.

Claro que ahora las felicitaciones y los abrazos entre empresarios y funcionarios están a la orden del día. Pero cuando se analicen los detalles del acuerdo se verá si el gran ganador del mismo es Estados Unidos o no. El tiempo lo dirá.

---

[1] Al parecer se revisaría en los primeros 6 años; y si no hay necesidad de revisarlo, quedaría vigente por 16 años.

[2] Trump dijo que México se comprometió a hacer grandes compras a los agricultores estadounidenses.

[3] Parece que será un sistema híbrido entre ambas opciones.

[4] Por más que los negociadores mexicanos insisten en que quieren un tratado trilateral, pero si Canadá no llega a un acuerdo con Estados Unidos, México sí seguirá con el tratado por su parte.

¿CUÁL SERÁ LA POLÍTICA EXTERIOR DEL GOBIERNO DE LÓPEZ OBRADOR?

El presidente electo de México ha manifestado en varias ocasiones que su gobierno desea mantener buenas relaciones con todos los países del mundo y que se apegará a los principios de política exterior establecidos en la Constitución (Artículo 89, Fracc. X)[1].

Sin embargo, no es tan sencillo llevar a la práctica una política exterior que pretenda mantener buenas relaciones entre países que tienen serias diferencias entre ellos o incluso que se consideran enemigos.

Nuestro vecino del norte ha señalado claramente que considera a varios países como adversarios o incluso que constituyen un peligro para su seguridad, tales los casos de Rusia, China, Irán, Siria, Venezuela, Corea del Norte; o con los que mantiene diferencias importantes como Turquía, Cuba, Nicaragua o Bolivia.

Para López Obrador y para quien será su canciller, Marcelo Ebrard, la relación con Estados Unidos es fundamental, no sólo por la ya tradicional y cada vez más profunda dependencia mexicana respecto a los estadounidenses en todos los ámbitos (económico, político, de seguridad, científico-tecnológico y militar); sino debido a que pretenden comprometer al gobierno de Donald Trump en una estrategia amplia de desarrollo-seguridad para México y Centroamérica, la cual tiene por objetivo mejorar las condiciones socio-económicas de la población que normalmente intenta emigrar a los Estados Unidos.

Así, el nuevo gobierno mexicano, en vez de intentar distanciarse en alguna medida de Washington, para ganar algo de margen de maniobra en sus relaciones internacionales, la cual se ha perdido consistentemente desde que los gobiernos neoliberales de nuestro país engancharon el destino nacional al de Estados Unidos mediante un sinnúmero de instrumentos como el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (ahora a punto de completar su renegociación en los términos que más convienen al gobierno actual de Estados Unidos); la Iniciativa Mérida; la fracasada Alianza para la Seguridad y la Prosperidad para América del Norte (ASPAN); el Foro de Energía de América del Norte, para lograr la “integración energética” de la región; y la cooperación permanente de las fuerzas armadas mexicanas con el Comando Norte del Ejército de los Estados Unidos; ha decidido intensificar esa cooperación, con el objeto de comprometer a los estadounidenses en el proyecto de desarrollo de las regiones más atrasadas de México (y eventualmente de Centroamérica), con objeto de que la población de esas zonas ya no se vea obligada a emigrar.

El problema radica en que los tomadores de decisiones en Washington y especialmente los del actual gobierno de Donald Trump, no se van a comprometer con México en ninguna estrategia de desarrollo regional, a menos de que México mantenga su subordinación a Estados Unidos en tres temas fundamentales para ellos: migración, seguridad y política exterior.

En migración el gobierno de Trump está de acuerdo en invertir alguna cantidad de recursos para el desarrollo del Sureste de México y de Centroamérica, siempre y cuando la estrategia de contención de la migración centroamericana, por parte de México, se mantenga. Esto es, militarizar la frontera sur; mantener el fichaje de los migrantes centroamericanos por parte de autoridades estadounidenses en las estaciones migratorias mexicanas; y la continua deportación de centroamericanos desde México, hacia sus países de origen. Además de la posibilidad de que México acepte convertirse en la primera opción de asilo para los que buscan refugio en Estados Unidos, con lo que nuestro país se convertirá en la primera barrera para impedir la llegada de los que buscan asilo en la Unión Americana.

Sobre estos aspectos el gobierno de López Obrador aún no se ha pronunciado, pero cabe esperar que Washington presionará fuertemente para que se mantengan las políticas actuales (más la de asilo), antes de aceptar participar en la propuesta de desarrollo socio económico que ha propuesto López Obrador.

En seguridad, Estados Unidos no va a aceptar nada menos que mantener la actual “guerra contra las drogas” con la participación de las fuerzas armadas mexicanas (algo que ya confirmó López Obrador); el mantenimiento de la Iniciativa Mérida; el que sus funcionarios puedan seguir armados en territorio mexicano y la permanencia de sus “centros de fusión de información” en México, operados sólo por estadounidenses. Donde probablemente habrá un choque, es en la política de despenalización de la marihuana (y quizás del cultivo de la amapola) que pretende aplicar el nuevo gobierno en México; algo que no se compatibiliza con la tradicional estrategia prohibicionista hacia el exterior de los gobiernos estadounidenses, a pesar de que en su país varios estados ya han aplicado la política de permitir el libre consumo de marihuana, incluso con fines recreativos.

Y en política exterior, Washington pretende un “cambio de régimen” en Venezuela y ha usado como punta de lanza para esa política al llamado Grupo de Lima, en el cual el gobierno de Peña Nieto ha participado entusiastamente. Ya Ebrard confirmó que México seguirá participando en ese grupo, por lo que lo más probable es que el nuevo gobierno se verá obligado a sumarse a las propuestas intervencionistas de dicho grupo, con lo que se comenzará a separar de los principios a los que supuestamente se adherirá el nuevo gobierno, como la no intervención y la autodeterminación de los pueblos.

Así también, si Estados Unidos, Israel y Arabia Saudita, entre otros, inician hostilidades contra Irán, México deberá establecer cual será su postura ante una agresión totalmente injustificada desde el punto de vista del Derecho Internacional Público; con la posibilidad de que, si dicha postura no gusta a Washington, la cooperación para el desarrollo que pretende el gobierno de López Obrador con el de Trump, se vea afectada.

Y así podríamos sumar muchos otros temas y situaciones de política exterior, en los cuales el gobierno de Trump y en general, cualquier gobierno estadounidense, va a demandar apoyo del mexicano; de lo contrario, otros ámbitos de la relación bilateral podrían verse condicionados.

La propuesta de López Obrador de “llevarse bien” con todo el mundo, recuerda a la que se le denomina “aislacionismo”, que de acuerdo a Georg Schwarzenberger es: “Una política de aislacionismo, por parte de un Estado, consiste en evitar perjudicar a otros Estados y verse envuelto en alianzas políticas con, y contra otros Estados. En una guerra entre terceros Estados, esta política ha recibido la sanción de un status legal definido, bajo el nombre de neutralidad. El aislacionismo puede pretender constituir la más inofensiva forma de conducta que un Estado puede escoger en un medio que tiene los caracteres de una sociedad. Que un Estado pueda sostener esta actitud no depende sólo de él”[2].

Pues bien, México no tiene la posibilidad de mantenerse neutral en los conflictos que Estados Unidos tiene e inicia continuamente, dada su creciente dependencia; que por lo visto se profundizará con los acuerdos y los entendimientos que se están dando entre el equipo de presidente electo de México y el de Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

Schwarzenberger señala que “..el éxito en una política de aislacionismo y neutralidad por parte de Estados pequeños depende de que posean un mínimo de peligrosidad, de intereses correspondientes de las grandes potencias o de una situación en la que los Estados aislacionistas o neutrales puedan jugar entre sí por los intereses antagónicos entre las grandes potencias”.[3]

Esto es, si México deseara realmente jugar un papel independiente en las relaciones internacionales y no como subordinado de Washington, tendría que lanzar sus cartas en la lucha por la hegemonía mundial, como en su momento lo hizo Carranza, coqueteando con la Alemania de Guillermo II, lo que prendió los focos rojos en Washington; y si bien ese fue uno de los pretextos para la intervención estadounidense en la Primera Guerra Mundial (el famoso telegrama Zimmerman), también se dieron cuenta en Estados Unidos que mantener en territorio mexicano la infausta Expedición Punitiva que buscaba a Francisco Villa, podía provocar que México se aliara con Alemania, por lo que la retiró antes de entrar a la guerra.

De igual forma, Lázaro Cárdenas jugó la carta de un posible acercamiento a las potencias del Eje (Alemania, Japón e Italia), si las presiones económicas y el embargo petrolero continuaban de parte de Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y los Países Bajos; lo que convenció a Roosevelt de obligar a las empresas estadounidenses, a aceptar la expropiación y comenzar a negociar con Cárdenas los términos de las indemnizaciones correspondientes.

Así también, López Mateos, en medio de la “Guerra Fría”, mantuvo las relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba, a pesar de su expulsión de la OEA por presiones norteamericanas, aprovechando la bipolaridad URSS-Estados Unidos, lo que le permitió un mayor margen maniobra en la relación bilateral.

¿Podrá hacer algo similar López Obrador? ¿Utilizará la creciente multipolaridad del escenario internacional para mejorar su margen de maniobra ante Estados Unidos? ¿O se encerrará, una vez más, en la relación bilateral en la que la asimetría de poder le da la ventaja a Washington?

Los primeros meses y decisiones del próximo gobierno mexicano decidirán la suerte de la política exterior en la primera parte del sexenio. Ojalá que la decisión sea por el multilateralismo y no por insistir en “convencer” a una arrogante superpotencia de que debe respetar y cooperar de manera justa con su vecino del sur.

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[1] La autodeterminación de los pueblos; la no intervención; la solución pacífica de las controversias; la proscripción de la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza en las relaciones internacionales; la igualdad jurídica de los Estados; la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo; el respeto, la protección y promoción de los derechos humanos y la lucha por la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

[2] Schwarzenberger, Georg; La Política del Poder; México; FCE; traducción de Julieta Campos y Enrique González Pedrero; 1ª ed. En español; 1960. P. 147-148

[3] Ibidem.

Did Sheldon Adelson Just Capture The GOP?

AUGUST 21, 2018ELI CLIFTON  

https://lobelog.com/did-sheldon-adelson-just-capture-the-gop/

Billionaire Sheldon Adelson, President Donald Trump’s biggest donor, just secured his role as the GOP’s top 2018 funder with a $25 million contribution to Senate Republicans midterm election efforts. In all likelihood, he also bought himself a direct line to any Republican whose ear he wants to bend.

Adelson is outspoken about his priorities—a hawkish U.S. policy towards Iran and unwavering U.S. support for Israel’s right-wing Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his Likud Party—and House and Senate Republicans, as well as the Trump White House, have largely delivered on Adelson’s foreign policy wish list.

Adelson, alongside with his wife Miriam, already contributed $30 million to House Republican efforts to maintain a majority, bringing the casino magnate’s direct investment in the GOP’s 2018 House and Senate election efforts to over $55 million.

Politico did the math and found:

The Adelsons’ $25 million contributions constituted almost the entire haul of $26 million that the Senate Leadership Fund brought in last month and more than half of the $44 million it’s raised this year. The super PAC had $45.2 million in cash on hand on July 31, according to the most recent filing.

On the House side, the Adelsons’ dual $15 million donations ($30 million in total) count for nearly one-third of the total donations to the Congressional Leadership Fund and are by far the Fund’s largest individual contributions. Corporations, such as Chevron ($1.9 million), and 501c4s, like the American Action Network, comprise the majority of the Leadership Fund’s other seven-figure contributions. Timothy Mellon, chairman and majority owner of the Pan Am Systems, a New Hampshire-based transportation company, contributed $10 million, making him the Fund’s largest individual donor after the Adelsons. Hedge funder Ken Griffin was the Fund’s next largest individual donor, contributing $1.5 million.

Adelson and the recipients of his largesse are clear about why he is active politically and, presumably, why he is effectively making the Republican Party dependent on his campaign funds.

Newt Gingrich, a recipient of Adelson’s supporting during his failed 2012 campaign, described Adelson’s “central value” as Israel.

Donald Trump, before winning the GOP nomination and receiving $35 million in outside election spending from Adelson and his wife, described Adelson as seeking to “mold [Florida Senator Marco Rubio] into the perfect little puppet,” via campaign contributions.

After winning the election, Trump campaign CEO and future White House chief strategist Steve Bannon reportedly spoke explicitly about Adelson’s foreign policy agenda. Michael Wolff wrote as much in his book, Fire, and Fury:

Pivoting from Trump himself, Bannon plunged on with the Trump agenda. “Day one we’re moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s all-in. Sheldon”—Adelson, the casino billionaire and far-right Israel defender—“is all-in. We know where we’re heading on this … Let Jordan take the West Bank, let Egypt take Gaza. Let them deal with it. Or sink trying.”

“Where’s Donald on this?” asked Ailes, the clear implication being that Bannon was far out ahead of his benefactor.

“He’s totally onboard.”

Adelson reportedly pressured the administration to follow through on campaign promises about moving the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, to replace National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster with John Bolton (with whom Adelson enjoys a closer relationship), and to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal.

Indeed, Trump has brought the U.S. closer to a conflict with Iran via withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s apparent embrace of a de facto regime change agenda towards Tehran, and Trump’s threatening July 22^nd tweet at Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. Trump warned (his caps):

NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE ARE NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR DEMENTED WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!

With rhetoric like this coming out of the Oval Office, it is worth recalling that the President’s largest donor once suggested using nuclear weapons against Iran as a negotiating tactic.

Were Trump to back up his tweets with action, it’s safe to assume his benefactor wouldn’t be opposed. And if GOP members of the House and Senate were of a mind to criticize Trump’s aggressive posture towards Iran, they might have second thoughts if they’re concerned about their own campaign finances.

With the Adelsons’ latest contribution to Senate Republican election efforts, an octogenarian casino mogul and his Israeli born wife have effectively cemented their roles as the Republican Party’s most important donors in the 2018 election cycle.

Mainstream reporting consistently avoids discussing the Adelsons’ foreign policy motivations for their political giving, instead focusing on the corporate and estate tax aspects of the Republican agenda that might further enrich Adelson and his heirs. While that’s certainly a nice bonus, Adelson has made no secret of the fact that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is his primary concern, and has made no public comments about tax reform. 

In June, Adam Entous wrote in The New Yorker:

No Republican candidate can easily afford to ignore him. Adelson considered Obama an enemy of Israel, and, in the 2012 election, he and his wife, Miriam, contributed at least ninety-three million dollars to groups supporting the G.O.P. Officials in the U.S. and Israel said that they learned from American Jewish leaders that Adelson had vowed to spend “whatever it takes” to prevent Obama from securing a peace agreement while in office.

Adelson has clearly not stopped spending “whatever it takes.” But with the Obama administration in the rear-view mirror, it’s worth closely examining what Adelson is asking the Republican to do. Whatever it is, his wallet has surely bought him the ears of both the White House and Congressional Republicans.

ELI CLIFTON

Eli Clifton reports on money in politics and US foreign policy. Eli previously reported for the American Independent News Network, ThinkProgress, and Inter Press Service.