From Dallas to Gaza: How JFK’s Assassination Was Good for Zionist Israel
by Rick
Sterling Posted on December 15, 2023
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated sixty years
ago. If he had lived and won a
second term, the Israeli Palestinian conflict would have evolved differently.
Possibly the path toward Israeli apartheid and genocide in Gaza could have been
avoided.
In his short time in office, Kennedy changed US
foreign policy in significant ways. As documented in the book JFK and
the Unspeakable: Why he died and why it still matters, JFK resisted the CIA
and military industrial complex in the policies he set regarding the Third
World and Soviet Union. The Vietnam War, the overthrow of President Sukarno and
murder of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, and continued hostility to Cuba
and the Soviet Union would not have happened had Kennedy lived and won a second
term.
Less well known, Kennedy’s policies also challenged
and opposed the military and political ambitions of Zionist Israel. At the time, Israel had only
existed for thirteen years. It was still evolving, and the course was not
totally set. There was significant international resolve to find a compromise
solution regarding Palestinian refugees from the 1948 Nakba. When Israel
attacked Egypt and seized the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, the Eisenhower
administration demanded Israel withdraw from the captured territory. They
complied.
At this time, in the early 1960’s prominent
Jewish voices criticized the racism and discrimination of the Israeli
government. Israelis like Martin Buber assailed Ben-Gurion and noted that “At the inception of the state, complete
equality with the Jewish citizens was promised to the Arab population.” Many
influential Israelis realized their long-term security and well-being depended
on finding a just settlement with the indigenous Palestinian population.
In the United States, the Jewish community was divided,
and many were anti-Zionist. The American Council for Judaism was influential and anti-nationalist. The racist
and militaristic character of Israel was not yet set in stone. Nor was American
Jewish support for Israel. When Menachim Begin came to the United States in
1948 he was denounced by prominent Jewish leaders including Albert Einstein.
They said Begin, who later became Israeli Prime Minister, was a
“terrorist” who preached “an admixture of ultra-nationalism,
religious mysticism and racial superiority.” Many American Jews had mixed
feelings and did not identify with
Israel. Others supported Israel but based on there being peace with the
indigenous Palestinians.
There are four key areas where the Kennedy policy was
substantially different from what followed after his death.
Kennedy was not biased in favor of Israel
The Kennedy administration sought good relations with
both Israel and the Arab nations. Kennedy aimed to extend US influence
throughout the Middle East, including with nations friendly with the Soviet
Union and at odds with NATO partners.
JFK personally supported Arab and African nationalism.
As a senator in 1957, he criticized the Eisenhower administration for
supporting and sending weapons to France in their war against the Algerian
independence movement. In a 9,000 word presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he
criticized “western imperialism” and called for the US to support Algerian
independence. Algerian President Ben Bella, who France had tried to assassinate
and considered far too radical by many in NATO, was given a huge and impressive welcome to the White House.
Kennedy changed the previous frosty relations with the
United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. For the first
time, the US approved loans to them. Kennedy wrote respectful letters to the
Arab presidents before he welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion to
Washington. The Arab leaders could see the difference and responded with
appreciation. Those who claim there was no difference with Kennedy ignore the
fact that Egypt’s Nasser, Algeria’s Ben Bella and other nationalist leaders saw
a big difference.
In 1960, when Kennedy was campaigning for the
presidency, he spoke at the Zionists of America Convention. He made
complimentary remarks about Israel but also expressed the need for friendship
with all the people of the Middle East. He said the US
should “act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle
East which attacks its neighbor” and “The Middle East needs
water, not war; tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs.”
Kennedy frankly told the Zionists, “I cannot
believe that Israel has any real desire to remain indefinitely a garrison state
surrounded by fear and hate.” By maintaining objectivity and
neutrality on the Israeli Arab conflict, Kennedy wanted to steer the Jewish
Zionists away from the racist, militaristic and ultra-nationalistic impulses
which have led to where we are today.
Kennedy wanted the Zionist Lobby to follow the
rules
The second difference in Kennedy’s policy is regarding
Zionist lobbying on behalf of Israel. Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA), organizations that promote or lobby on behalf of a foreign
government are required to register and account for their finances and
activities. Under Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) instructed the American Zionist Council (AZC) to register as agents
of a foreign country. AZC is the parent organization of the American Israel
Public Affairs Council (AIPAC).
As documented in detail here, on
21 November 1962, the Assistant Attorney General wrote to them “the
receipt of such funds from the American sections of the Jewish Agency for
Israel constitutes the (American Zionist) Council an agent of a foreign
principal…. the Council’s registration is requested.”
The emergence of Israeli political influence was
also scrutinized in the Senate. Under Senator William Fulbright, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in May and August 1963. They revealed that tax
free donations to the United Jewish Appeal, supposedly for humanitarian relief
in Israel, were being channeled back to the US where the money was used for
lobbying and Israeli public relations.
Attorneys for AZC stalled for time. On August 16,
1963, a DOJ analyst reviewed the case and concluded, “Department
should insist on the immediate registration of the American Zionist Council
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.”
On October 11 the DOJ demanded that AZC register and “Department expects
a response from you within 72 hours.”
On October 17, a DOJ memorandum reports that attorneys for AZC pleaded for not
being required to register as foreign agents. They offered to provide the
required financial disclosures but that registering as a foreign agent “would
be so publicized by the American Council on Judaism that it would eventually
destroy the Zionist movement.” As indicated in this discussion, political
zionism was not yet dominant in the American Jewish community and was actively
opposed by the American Council on Judaism.and other Jewish groups.
Kennedy supported Palestinian Rights
A third difference is regarding Palestinian rights.
Although he was only 44 when he became president, Kennedy had more
international experience than most US presidents. In 1939 he spent two weeks in
Palestine. In a lengthy letter to his father, he described the situation and
difficulties. He wrote, “The sympathy of the people on the spot seems
to be with the Arabs. This is not only because the Jews have had, at least some
of their leaders, an unfortunately arrogant, uncompromising attitude, but they
feel that after all, the country has been Arabic for the last few hundred years
…. Palestine was hardly Britain’s to give away.”
In comments that are still true, Kennedy remarks how
the Jewish residents are divided between “strongly Orthodox Jewish
group, unwilling to make any compromise” and a “liberal Jewish
element composed of the younger group who fear these reactionaries”.
His analysis is sympathetic to both Jewish and Arab peoples and addresses the
difficulty but necessity to find a compromise solution.
In the early 1960’s, the US State Department was not
locked into a biased acceptance or approval of Israeli policies. The US
supported UN Resolution 194 resolving (in paragraph 11) that “refugees
wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of
or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity,
should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.” This
has become known as the “right of return”.
On November 21, 1963, the day before Kennedy’s
assassination, the New York Times has two news stories which exemplify the discord between
Washington and Tel Aviv. A report from the United Nations is titled
“Israel Dissents as U.N. Group Backs U.S. on Arab Refugees”. It
begins, “A United States resolution calling for continued efforts to resolve
the predicament of the Palestinian Arab refugees was approved tonight 83 to 1…
Israel cast the single negative vote…. The issue centers on a 1948 resolution
whose key section, paragraph 11, concerns the future of the Arabs who were
displaced from their homes by the Palestine conflict. They have been living in
the lands bordering Israel …. The revised United States text calls on the
Palestine Conciliation Commission to ‘continue its efforts for the
implementation of Paragraph 11’.”
The second New York Times story is
titled “U.S. Stand Angers Israel”. It reports from Jerusalem that “Premier Levi
Eshkol expressed extreme distaste today for the United States’ position in the
Palestine refugee debate…. Israel’s anger was conveyed ‘in the strongest terms’
to the US Ambassador …. The Israeli Government is upset about the American
resolution before the UN Political Committee and by American maneuvers over the
issue.” Israel was angered and objecting because the Kennedy administration was
trying to resolve the Palestinian refugee situation including the right of
return.
Kennedy tried to stop the Israeli nuclear weapons
program
The fourth and biggest contention between Kennedy and
the Israeli leadership was regarding their developing nuclear weapons. This
issue was kept so secret that crucial documents and letters have only been
released in recent years.
President Kennedy was a strong advocate for stopping
nuclear proliferation. After the 1962 Cuba missile crisis, he
realized how easy it would be to trigger a catastrophic nuclear war
intentionally or accidentally. If nuclear weapons were allowed to spread to
more countries, the risks of global catastrophe would be all the greater. It
was also predicted that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons capability, they
would become more aggressive and less likely to reach a compromise
agreement regarding Palestinian refugees.
When intelligence indicated that Israel might be
trying to build a nuclear weapon at Dimona in 1962, Kennedy was determined to
find out if this was true, and if so to stop it. This caused an intense
diplomatic confrontation between JFK and Israeli Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion. The proof of this has recently been revealed in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion and his successor Levy Eshkol. They are all labeled
“Top Secret” or “Eyes Only”.
It is important to see the sequence and some details
to understand how intense this showdown was. These communications are all from
1963.
In March the US State Department instructed the US Ambassador to inform the government of
Israel (GOI) that for “compelling reasons” the “USG seeks GOI assent to semi-annual
repeat semi-annual visits to Dimona, perhaps May and November, with
full access to all parts and instruments in the facility, by qualified US
scientists.” (underline added)
On April 19 the State Department instructed the US
Ambassador to Israel to “press” for an “affirmative reply” to the earlier
request for semi-annual inspections of Dimona.
On April 26, Israeli PM Ben Gurion replied to President Kennedy. He evaded the issue
of nuclear facility inspections and instead expressed his concern
regarding a recent proclamation from Egypt, Syria and Iraq. He compared
Egyptian President Nasser to Germany’s Hitler.
On May 4 JFK responded to Ben Gurion’s concerns and underscored the US
commitment to Israel and peace in the Middle East. He told the Israeli leader
he is much less worried about an “early Arab attack” than the “successful
development of advanced offensive systems”.
On May 8 a Special National Intelligence
Estimate concluded,
“Israel intends at least to put itself in a position to be able to produce a
limited number of weapons” and that “unless deterred by outside pressure [the
Israelis] will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years.”
The analysis predicted that if Israelis had the bomb, it would
“encourage them to be bolder in their use of the conventional resources both
diplomatic and military in their confrontation with the Arabs.”
On May 10 US State Department sent an “Eyes Only Ambassador”
telegram to the
US Ambassador to Israel. The ambassador was instructed to remind the Israeli
leadership that they have previously agreed to the bi-annual inspections. The
telegram also says Israeli concerns about Arab development of a nuclear bomb
“are not valid” because there is nothing comparable to the “advanced Israeli
program.”
The tensions between the Kennedy administration and
Tel Aviv caused the Israel lobby to escalate pressure on the White House. This
is revealed in a May 11 TOP SECRET State Department memo regarding “White House Concern with Arab-Israeli
Matters”. It begins, “In recent weeks, as you are aware, it has become
increasingly clear that the White House is under steadily mounting domestic
political pressure to adopt a foreign policy in the Near East more consonant
with Israeli desires. The Israelis are determined to use the period between now
and the 1964 Presidential election to secure a closer, more public security
relationship with the Unites States, notably through a public security
guarantee and a cooler, more antagonistic relationship between the United
States and the UAR [United Arab Republic].” This is a highly interesting
memo showing Israeli influence in US foreign policy and electoral politics. It
further shows Kennedy’s effort to mitigate this influence while standing firm
on the goal to stop nuclear proliferation.
On May 12, 1963 Ben Gurion wrote another long letter to President Kennedy. Again, evading the
US request, Ben Gurion gives a distorted history including the claim that
Palestinian refugees left Palestine “at the demand of Arab leaders”. He again
compares Nasser to Hitler and suggests the danger of a new Holocaust. He
says, “Mr, President, my people have the right to exist … and this existence is
in danger.”
On May 19 Kennedy responded to Ben Gurion emphasizing the importance he
placed on not allowing the spread of nuclear weapons. “We are concerned with
the disturbing effects on world stability which would accompany the development
of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel.” Kennedy underscores the “deep
commitment to the security of Israel” but says the commitment and support
“would be seriously jeopardized” if the US is unable to obtain reliable
information about “Israel’s efforts in the nuclear field.”
On May 27 Ben Gurion responded to Kennedy saying that the nuclear reactor at
Dimona “will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes”. He counters
Kennedy’s request for bi-annual visits starting in June by suggesting annual
visits “such as have already taken place” starting at the end of the year. The
condition is significant because the previous “visit” to Dimona was restricted
in time and space.
On June 15 Kennedy wrote to Ben Gurion after he had received a
scientific evaluation of the minimum requirements for a nuclear site
inspection, After welcoming Ben Gurion’s assurances that Dimona will only be
devoted to peaceful purposes, Kennedy issued a polite ultimatum. “If Israel’s
purposes are to be clear to world beyond reasonable doubt, I believe the
schedule which would best serve our common purpose would be a visit early this
summer, another visit in June 1964, thereafter at intervals of six
months.” He specifies that the “visit” must include access to all areas
and “sufficient time be allotted for thorough examination.”
On June 16, the US Embassy in Israel reported that Ben Gurion resigned as Israel’s Prime
Minister. This was a huge surprise; the explanation was that it was for
“personal reasons”. It is likely that Ben-Gurion knew the contents of the
forthcoming letter from Washington (received at the embassy the day before).
The impact of his resignation was to stall for time. US Ambassador Barbour
suggested waiting until the “cabinet problem is worked out” before sending JFKs
near ultimatum to the next Prime Minister.
Kennedy did not wait long. On July 4, he wrote to new Israeli Prime Minister Levy Eshkol. After
congratulating Eshkol on becoming new Prime Minister, he goes straight to the
point “concerning American visits to Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona.”
Kennedy says, “I regret having to add to your burdens to soon after your
assumption of office, but …” He then goes on to request inspections as was
requested in the letter to Ben-Gurion and that “support of Israel could be
seriously jeopardized” if this is not done.
On July 17, Eshkol wrote to Kennedy that he needed to study the issue
more before responding to Kennedy’s request for visits to Dimona. US
Ambassador Barbour added that Eshkol verbally conveyed that he was “surprised”
at Kennedy’s statement that US commitment to Israel might be jeopardized.
Indicating Israeli defiance, Eshkol told the US Ambassador “Israel would do
what it had to do for its national security and to safeguard its sovereign
rights.”
On August 19, Eshkol wrote to Kennedy re-iterating the “peaceful purpose”
of Dimona and ignoring the request for a summer inspection. He proposed
the inspection take place “toward the end of 1963”.
On August 26 Kennedy wrote to Eshkol accepting the visit at year end but
emphasizing it needs to be done “when the reactor’s core is being loaded and
before internal radiation hazards have developed.” Kennedy set these
conditions because they were essential for determining whether the facility
could be used for developing a nuclear weapon.
On September 16 State Department prepared a Memorandum of Conversation with a counselor from the British Embassy. There
was joint concern but agreement that Dimona would be visited and inspected
“prior to the activation of the reactor.”
After the Assassination of JFK on November 22
After Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) became president, US
Mideast policy changed significantly. From the start, LBJ told an Israeli diplomat, “You have lost a very
great friend. But you have found a better one.” The Israeli
publication Haaretz says, “Historians generally regard Johnson
as the president most uniformly friendly to Israel.” The Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs writes “Lyndon Johnson Was First to Align U.S. Policy
with Israel’s Policies” and “Up to Johnson’s presidency, no administration had
been as completely pro-Israel and anti-Arab as his.”
On the crucial issue of Dimona inspection, the
Israelis ignored JFK’s condition and the reactor went critical on December 26.
When the inspection occurred three weeks later, they could not inspect the
areas that had been irradiated. A handwritten comment on the report says, “We were supposed to see this
first!” We do not know what would have happened if JFK had been in the
White House but given the intensity of his effort, and deep convictions
regarding the dangers of nuclear proliferation, it would not have been ignored
as it was under LBJ.
Under LBJ, relations with Egypt deteriorated. The US
stopped providing direct assistance loans and grants to Egypt. The US became increasingly
antagonistic to President Nasser, as desired by the Israel lobby.
US support for a resolution to the Palestinian refugee
issue decreased and then stopped.
The Department of Justice efforts to require the
American Zionist Council to register as foreign agents became increasingly weak
until they were dropped under LBJ’s new Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach.
The sequence of exchanges includes:
On December 11, 1963, the AZC attorney wrote to the DOJ saying, “Our client is not prepared to
register as an agent of a foreign government.” Instead, he proposed to provide
“voluntarily” the required financial information.
In January and February 1964, there were more exchange
between AZC and the DOJ. AZC expressed concern because the American Council on
Judaism publicly said that AZC was acting as “propaganda agents for the state
of Israel and that the Jewish Agency was being used as a conduit for funds for
the Zionist organization in the United States.”
In summer 1964 Nicholas Katzenbach becomes Attorney
General. Negotiations continued. DOJ staff noted that AZC was “stalling”
and not providing acceptable information despite the increasingly special and
favorable treatment. In spring of 1965 the DOJ accepted that AZC was NOT required to register as foreign
agent. Their financial information was kept in a unique expandable folder. In November 1967 the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) applied for a federal tax exemption. The US Treasury
Department granted it, backdated to 1953.
Increasingly aggressive and uncompromising Zionist
Israel
The successful development of nuclear weapons added to
Israel’s aggressive actions and unwillingness to resolve the Palestinian
refugee crisis.
With intelligence information provided by Washington,
Israel made a surprise attack on Egypt,Syria and Jordan in June 1967. The “Six
Day war” was a crucial turning point in middle east history. Israel quickly
defeated the unprepared combined armies. In the West, public perception
of Israel changed overnight. The mythology of Israeli military (and
general) superiority was created. Among the American Jewish population,
doubts and concerns about Israel evaporated and support skyrocketed.
Israeli leaders’ arrogance and deceit is exemplified
by the attack on the USS Liberty during the Six Day War. The communications navy
vessel was monitoring the air waves in the eastern Mediterranean when it was
attacked by Israeli aircraft and boats. Thirty-four US sailors were killed and
172 injured. Amazingly, the ship managed to stay afloat. The plan was evidently
to sink the ship, blame it on Egypt and consolidate US support and hostility to
Egypt and the Soviet Union.
Lyndon Johnson over-ruled the calls for help from the
vessel, saying “I will not have my ally embarrassed.”
The deadly incident was covered up for decades.
We do not know for sure what might have happened had
JFK not been assassinated. It is possible that Israel would have been stopped
from acquiring the bomb. Without that, they may not have had the audacity
to launch the 1967 attacks on their neighbors, seizing the Golan, West Bank and
Gaza Strip. If the Zionist lobby had been required to register as foreign
agents, their influence would have been moderated. Perhaps Israel could have
found a reasonable accommodation with Palestinians in one or two states.
Instead, Israel hardened into an apartheid regime committing increasingly outrageous massacres. As
Kennedy warned in 1960, Israel has become a “garrison state” surrounded by
“hate and fear”. The assassination of John F. Kennedy insured Zionist
control of Israel, suffering for Palestinians and permanent instability.
Rick Sterling is an independent journalist based in
the San Francisco Bay Area of California. He can
be reached at rsterling1@protonmail.com.
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