Please Tell The
Establishment That U.S. Hegemony Is Over
Our dominance in the world
is in the rearview, yet Trump and other pols refuse to get the message.
APRIL 23, 2020
More than 10 years ago, the columnist Charles
Krauthammer asserted that American “decline is a
choice,” and argued tendentiously that Barack Obama had chosen it. Yet looking
back over the last decade, it has become increasingly obvious that this decline
has occurred irrespective of what political leaders in Washington want.
The truth is that
decline was never a choice, but the U.S. can decide how it can respond to it.
We can continue chasing after the vanished, empty glory of the “unipolar
moment” with bromides of American exceptionalism. We can continue to delude
ourselves into thinking that the military might make up for all our other
weaknesses. Or we can choose to adapt to a changing world by prudently
husbanding our resources and putting them to uses more productive than policing
the world.
There was a brief
period during the 1990s and early 2000s when the U.S. could claim to be the
world’s hegemonic power. America had no near-peer rivals; it was at the height
of its influence across most of the globe. That status, however, was always a
transitory one and was lost quickly thanks to self-inflicted wounds in Iraq
and the natural growth of other powers that began to compete for influence.
While America remains the most powerful state in the world, it no longer
dominates as it did 20 years ago. And there can be no recapturing what was
lost.
Alexander Cooley and Dan Nexon explore these
matters in their new book, Exit From Hegemony: The
Unraveling of the American Global Order. They make a strong case for distinguishing
between the old hegemonic order and the larger international order of which it
is a part. As they put it, “global international order is not synonymous with
American hegemony.” They also make careful distinctions between the different
components of what is often simply called the “liberal international order”:
political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism.
The first involves the protection of rights, the second open economic exchange,
and the third the form of the international order that recognizes legally equal
sovereign states. Cooley and Nexon note that both critics and defenders of the
“liberal international order” tend to assume that all three come as a “package
deal,” but point out that these parts do not necessarily reinforce each other
and do not have to coexist.
While the authors are
quite critical of Trump’s foreign policy, they don’t pin the decline of the old
order solely on him. They argue that hegemonic unraveling takes place when the
hegemon loses its monopoly over patronage and “more states can compete when it
comes to providing economic, security, diplomatic, and other goods.” The U.S.
has been losing ground for the better part of the last 20 years, much of it
unavoidable as other states grew wealthier and sought to wield greater
influence. The authors make a persuasive case that the “exit” from hegemony is
already taking place and has been for some time.
Many defenders of
U.S. hegemony insists that the “liberal international order” depends on it. That
has never made much sense. For one, the continued maintenance of American
hegemony frequently conflicts with the rules of international order. The
hegemon reserves the right to interfere anywhere it wants and tramples on the
sovereignty and legal rights of other states as it sees fit. In practice, the
U.S. has frequently acted as more of a rogue in its efforts to “enforce” order
than many of the states it likes to condemn. The most vocal defenders of the U.S.
hegemony are unsurprisingly some of the biggest opponents of international
law—at least when it gets in their way. Cooley and Nexon make a very important
observation related to this in their discussion of the role of revisionist
powers in the world today:
But the key point is
that we need to be extremely careful that we don’t conflate “revisionism” with
opposition to the United States. The desire to undermine hegemony and replace
it with a multipolar system entails revisionism with respect to the
distribution of power, but it may or may not be revisionist with respect to
various elements of international architecture or infrastructure.
The core of the book
is a survey of three different sources for the unraveling of U.S. hegemony:
major powers, weaker states, and transnational “counter-order” movements.
Cooley and Nexon trace how Russia and China have become increasingly effective
at wielding influence over many smaller states through patronage and the
creation of parallel institutions and projects such as the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They discuss a number of weaker states that
have begun hedging their bets by seeking patronage from these major powers as
well as the U.S. Where once America had a “near monopoly” on such patronage,
this has ceased to be the case. They also track the role of “counter-order”
movements, especially nationalist and populist groups, in bringing pressure to
bear on their national governments and cooperating across borders to challenge
international institutions. Finally, they spell out how the U.S. itself has
contributed to the erosion of its own position through reckless policies dating
back at least to the invasion of Iraq.
The conventional response to the unraveling of
America’s hegemony here at home has been either a retreat into nostalgia with
simplistic paeans to the wonders of the “liberal international order” that
ignore the failures of that earlier era or an intensified commitment to
hard-power dominance in the form of ever-increasing military budgets (or some
combination of the two). Cooley and Nexon contend that the Trump administration
has opted for the second of these responses. Citing the president’s emphasis on
maintaining military dominance and his support for exorbitant military
spending, they say “it suggests an approach to hegemony more dependent upon
military instruments, and thus on the ability (and willingness) of the United
States to continue extremely high defense spending. It depends on the wager
that the United States both can and should substitute raw military power for
its hegemonic infrastructure.” That not only points to what Barry Posen has called “illiberal hegemony,” but also leads to a
foreign policy that is even more militarized and unchecked by international
law.
Cooley and Nexon make
a compelling observation about how Trump’s demand for more allied military
spending differs from normal calls for burden-sharing. Normally, burden-sharing
advocates call on allies to spend more so the U.S. can spend less.
But
that isn’t Trump’s position at all. His administration pressures allied
governments to increase their spending while showing no desire to curtail the
Pentagon budget:
Retrenchment entails
some combination of shedding international security commitments and shifting
defense burdens onto allies and partners. This allows the retrenching power, in
principle, to redirect military spending toward domestic priorities,
particularly those critical to long-term productivity and economic growth. In
the current American context, this means making long-overdue investments in
transportation infrastructure, increasing educational spending to develop human
capital, and ramping up support for research and development. This rationale
makes substantially less sense if retrenchment policies do not produce
reductions in defense spending–which is why Trump’s aggressive, public, and
coercive push for burden-sharing seems odd. Recall that Trump and his
supporters want, and have already implemented, increases in the military
budget. There is no indication that the Trump administration would change
defense spending if, for example, Germany or South Korea increased their own
military spending or more heavily subsidized American bases.
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed how
misguided our priorities as a nation have been. There is now a chance to change
course, but that will require our leaders to shift their thinking. The U.S.
hegemony is already on its way out; now Americans need to decide what our role
in the world will look like afterward. Warmed-over platitudes about
“leadership” won’t suffice and throwing more money at the Pentagon is a dead
end. The way forward is a strategy of retrenchment, restraint, and renewal.
Daniel Larison is a
senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo
blog. He has been published in
the New York Times Book Review,
Dallas Morning News,
World Politics Review,
Politico Magazine,
Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11,
and was a columnist for
The Week. He holds a Ph.D. in
history from the University of Chicago and resides in Lancaster, PA.
Follow him on Twitter