The un-submersible US-Iran stalemate
July 04, 2019
by Pepe Escobar
A thick veil of mystery surrounds the
fire that broke out in a state of the art Russian submersible in the Barents
Sea, leading to the death of 14 crew members poisoned by toxic fumes.
According to the Russian Defense
Ministry, the submersible was conducting bathymetric measurements, as in
examining and mapping deep-sea conditions. The crew on board was composed
of “unique naval specialists, high-class professionals, who conducted important
research of the Earth’s hydrosphere.” Now the – so far unnamed –
nuclear-powered vessel is at the Arctic port of Severomorsk, the main base of
Russia’s Northern Fleet.
A serious, comprehensive military
investigation is in progress. According to the
Kremlin, “the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief has all the information, but this data cannot be made
public, because this refers to the category of absolutely classified data.”
The submersible is a Losharik. Its Russian code is AS-12 (for “Atomnaya
Stantsiya” or “Nuclear Station“). NATO
calls it Norsub-5. It’s been in service since 2003. Giant Delta III nuclear
submarines, also able to launch ICBMs, have been modified to transport the
submersible across the seas.
NATO’s spin is that the AS-12/Norsub-5
is a “spy” sub, and a major “threat” to undersea telecommunication cables,
mostly installed by the West. The submersible’s operating depth is one thousand
meters and it may have operated as deep as 2,500 meters in the Arctic Ocean. It
may be comparable to, or be something of an advanced version of, the US deep
submergence vessel NR-1 (operating depth 910m) famous for being used to search
for and recover critical parts of the space shuttle Challenger, lost in 1986.
It’s quite enlightening to place the
Losharik within the scope of the latest Pentagon report about Russian strategic intentions. Amid the
proverbial demonization terminology – “Russia’s gray zone tactics,” “Russian
aggression.” Russian “deep-seated sense of geopolitical insecurity” – the
report claims that “Russia is adopting coercive strategies that involve the
orchestrated employment of military and nonmilitary means to deter and compel
the US, its allies and partners prior to and after the outbreak of hostilities.
These strategies must be proactively confronted, or the threat of significant
armed conflict may increase.”
It’s no wonder that, considering the
incandescence of US-Russia relations on the geopolitical chessboard, what
happened to the Losharik fueled frenetic speculation including totally
unsubstantiated rumors it had been torpedoed by a US submarine in a firefight –
on top of it, in Russian territorial waters.
Connections were made between the US
Vice-President Mike Pence’s suddenly being ordered to return to the White House
while the Europeans were also huddled in Brussels, as President Putin had an
emergency meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
In the end, it was nothing but mere
speculation.
Submersible incident
The submersible incident – complete with the
speculative plot line of a US-Russia firefight in the Arctic – did drown, at
least for a while, the prime, current geopolitical incandescence: the US
economic war on Iran.
Expanding on serious discussions at the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek – which included Iran’s President
Rouhani – and the Putin-Xi meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg and at the G20
in Osaka, both Russia and China are fully invested in keeping Iran stable and
protected from the Trump administration’s strategy of chaos.
Both Moscow and Beijing are fully aware
Washington’s divide-and-rule tactics are geared towards stopping the momentum
of Eurasia integration – which includes everything from bilateral trade in
local currencies and bypassing the US dollar to further interconnection of the
New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU)
and the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC).
Beijing plays a shadow game, keeping very quiet on
the de facto US economic blockade against one of its key Belt and Road allies.
Yet the fact is China continues to buy Iranian crude, and bilateral trade is
being settled in yuan and rial.
The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges
(INSTEX), the mechanism set up by the EU-3 (France, UK, and Germany) to bypass
the US dollar for trade between Iran and the EU after the US unilaterally
abandoned the nuclear deal, or JCPOA, may finally be in place. But there’s no
evidence INSTEX will be adopted by myriad European companies, as it essentially
covers Iranian purchases of food and medicine.
Plan B would be for the Russian Central Bank to
extend access to Iran as one the nations possibly adopting SPFS (System for
Transfer of Financial Messages), the Russian mechanism for trade sanctioned by
the US that bypasses SWIFT. Moscow has been working on the SPFS since 2014,
when the threat to expel Russia from SWIFT became a distinct possibility.
As for Iran being accused – by the US – of
“breaching” the JCPOA, that’s absolute nonsense. To start with, Tehran cannot
possibly “breach” a multinational deal that was declared null and void by one
of the signatories, the US.
In fact, the alleged “breach” is due to the fact the
EU-3 were not buying Iran’s low-enriched uranium, as promised, because of the
US embargo. Washington has de facto forced the EU-3 not to buy it. Tehran duly
notified all JCPOA parties that, as they are not buying it, Iran will have to
store more low enriched uranium than the JCPOA allows for. If the EU-3
resumes buying it that automatically means Iran is not “breaching” anything.
Cliffhanger
Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif is correct;
INSTEX, already too little too late, is not even enough, as the
mechanism does not allow Tehran to continue to export oil, which is the
nation’s right. As for the “breach,” Zarif says it’s easily “reversible” – as
long as the EU-3 abide by their commitments.
Russian energy minister Alexander Novak concurs:
“As regards restrictions on Iranian exports, we support Iran and we believe
that the sanctions are unlawful; they have not been approved by the UN.”
Still, Iran continues to export crude, by all means
available, especially to Asia, with the National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC)
predictably shutting off satellite tracking on its fleet. But, ominously, the
deadline set by Tehran for the EU-3 to actively support the sale of Iranian
crude expires this
coming Sunday. That’s a major cliffhanger. After that, the stalemate won’t be
submersible anymore.
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