US-Iran deal leaves Israel isolated and Netanyahu exposed

The deal could weaken Israel's regional influence and accelerate the political decline of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

By Meron Rapoport in Tel Aviv

Published date: 18 June 2026

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-iran-deal-leaves-israel-isolated-and-netanyahu-exposed

Israelis are viewing the emerging US-Iran deal as more than just a diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Tehran.

For many in the country's political and military elite, the agreement to end the war represents a strategic turning point that could weaken Israel's regional influence, strain its most important alliance and accelerate the political decline of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Although an agreement between the US and Iran had been widely anticipated since April, Pakistan's announcement on Sunday that a deal had been reached sent shockwaves through the country.

There's still a lot of questions about the terms of the agreement that are yet to be answered, but Israel's political and military establishment did not expect the joint US-Israeli campaign against Iran to end this way.

When Netanyahu initiated the war against Iran on 28 February, Israel's objectives appeared clear: dismantling Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and bringing about the collapse of the Iranian government.

Almost four months later, none of those goals have been achieved. Instead, Iran appears to be in a stronger position than it was in February.

The country still retains its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, while its leadership appears to have emerged strengthened despite the blows Israel inflicted, including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran also increasingly appears to be emerging as a regional power, with Arab Gulf states aligning themselves more closely with Tehran than with Israel.

Israel, meanwhile, finds itself in a position it has not experienced in decades, with many Israelis feeling more isolated than ever before.

A sense of isolation had already been growing over the past two and a half years as Israel's campaign in Gaza led to boycotts of Israelis around the world. 

But the situation now appears different.

Following Pakistan's announcement of the deal, Israel increasingly seems isolated even from the US, with reports pointing to a growing rift between Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump.

For many Israelis, any fracture in the country's relationship with Washington is viewed as an existential threat. Israel's security doctrine has long rested on its alliance with the US.

Members of the government and senior military officials alike appear uncertain about the implications of the emerging US-Iran agreement, scrambling to adapt to a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

Netanyahu's growing isolation

With elections expected in Israel in the coming months, the agreement could also carry significant domestic political consequences for Netanyahu, whose coalition continues to trail in opinion polls.

Speaking at a news conference on Monday, Netanyahu claimed that Israel had prevailed in all of its recent conflicts, pointing to what he described as major achievements in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.

He also maintained that, had Israel not acted against Iran in June 2025 and again in February, Tehran would have obtained a nuclear weapon.

"All of you were in grave danger of mass death," Netanyahu told Israelis watching on television, adding that "we saved the State of Israel from annihilation."

According to Netanyahu he was not really in danger, only Israelis faced annihilation.

Such rhetoric only deepened the prime minister's disconnect from the public. 

Netanyahu presented himself as a legendary leader standing above events, rather than as a politician accountable to voters. 

The emerging agreement, however, could have profound consequences for his political future.

While Netanyahu's coalition currently polls between 50 and 53 seats in the Knesset, the impact of the agreement has yet to be fully reflected in public opinion. 

Even so, if current polling trends are borne out at the ballot box, Netanyahu would be far from securing the parliamentary majority needed to form a government.

It remains unclear whether the agreement will include provisions requiring Israel to end its military presence in southern Lebanon, or whether Trump could pressure Israel to withdraw without such a clause.

For Netanyahu, however, Lebanon already represents a political vulnerability. Opposition parties have seized on the emerging US-Iran deal to attack him, focusing not on the decision to wage war itself but on the way the conflict has been conducted.

An Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon could mark the beginning of the end of Netanyahu's tenure as Israel's longest-serving prime minister. Former army chief Gadi Eisenkot has been gaining momentum in opinion polls and increasingly appears to be a leading contender to replace him.

This week may prove to be a turning point in the race to become Israel's next prime minister.

Netanyahu is increasingly portrayed as a leader engaged in multiple open-ended conflicts without a clear strategy or end goal. His apparent disputes with Washington have reinforced an image of growing isolation.

Eisenkot, on the other hand, is increasingly viewed as a more measured and responsible figure capable of making decisive choices about Israel's wars.

That contrast could prove decisive in the next election.

A deeper challenge?

Regardless of the impact on Netanyahu's political future, the emerging US-Iran agreement presents a far more significant challenge for Israel itself.

The deal calls into question Israel's reliance on overwhelming military force as its primary means of addressing regional challenges, often at the expense of diplomatic initiatives.

Israel's military establishment, which under Netanyahu has played a central role in implementing this approach, is at great shock from the deal.

Solving problems through power is not a new feature of Israeli policies, but since it launched its genocidal campaign in Gaza, military power has increasingly become the dominant tool through which Israel has sought to achieve its objectives.

Before October 2023, Israeli military leaders generally maintained a broader strategic outlook. Since then, the army - particularly under Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir - has increasingly abandoned this way of thinking and has nothing to offer to the government and the Israeli public other than complete destruction in order to boost deterrence.

While senior officers reportedly continue to advocate for further military operations across the region, recent actions such as Israel's attack in Beirut's Dahieh district may ultimately carry strategic costs.

If Israel is compelled to withdraw from Lebanon, it would deal a significant blow to the prestige of an army that has become a major political actor that constantly pushes for war.

Although Netanyahu and his far-right allies, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, are often portrayed as driving Israel toward prolonged conflict, the military's role in shaping these policies receives far less attention.

The emerging deal could challenge not only the military's approach but also Israel's broader method of managing its affairs throughout the Middle East.

Netanyahu, perhaps more than many of his political rivals, appears to understand the potential implications.

If the agreement ultimately leads to an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon under Iranian pressure, while a new regional alignment involving Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey takes shape, the consequences could extend well beyond Lebanon.

Such changes could also affect developments in Gaza.

At a moment when Israel appears weakened and increasingly isolated from Washington, Iran and its regional partners may seek to push for changes in the enclave similar to those they are demanding in Lebanon.

States such as Qatar and Turkey could also seek concessions from Washington in return for maintaining close ties with the Trump administration rather than moving further towards Iran and China. Such concessions could involve changes to Israeli control over Gaza.

It happened in 1991 when the US "rewarded" Arab and Muslim states for participating in the Gulf War by supporting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at the Madrid Conference.

An isolated Israel

A similar dynamic could emerge again, even if it takes a different form. 

Both Gaza and the occupied West Bank could become central issues in the near future.

While opposition figures accuse Netanyahu of damaging Israel's special relationship with the US, repairing that relationship may prove more difficult than many assume. 

A trip to the White House alone may not be enough to reverse Israel's changing strategic position.

For that reason, it's entirely possible that Israel will refuse to withdraw from Lebanon - even if Trump demands it, risking a deeper rupture with Washington.

On Wednesday, Yinon Magal, a leading journalist with Channel 14 News who is widely regarded as close to Netanyahu, suggested a possible name for Israel's next military operation against Iran: "A people dwelling alone."

Like the story of the Jewish rebels at Masada, the phrase reflects a vision of Israel fighting its battles independently, even without the support of its most important ally.

Israel possesses formidable military capabilities, including a powerful air force and a nuclear arsenal. For the foreseeable future, it is capable of enduring regional isolation because of its military superiority.

Standing alone and defying even the US president could become a central theme of Netanyahu's election campaign. 

He may seek to present himself as the only leader willing to resist international pressure and defend Israelis from external threats.

But if Israel does not follow the path of isolation that Netanyahu appears to be advocating, this week could ultimately be remembered as a watershed moment.

Israel could find itself forced to accept foreign dictates, not only in Lebanon, but also in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Israel violently bombs Lebanon minutes after US officials declare 'new ceasefire'

At least 47 people have been killed and nearly 100 others wounded by Tel Aviv since a resistance operation killed four Israeli occupation soldiers overnight

News Desk

JUN 19, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-violently-bombs-lebanon-minutes-after-us-officials-declare-new-ceasefire

Israel continued to brutally bombard south Lebanon on the afternoon of 19 June, following the announcement of a ceasefire which was supposed to begin at 4:00 pm. 

Strikes continued on Nabatieh and several other areas after the so-called truce was meant to have started.

At least 11 towns and villages were hit, with some being struck by Israeli aerial attacks multiple times.

Earlier, a Gulf diplomat told AFP that Hezbollah and Israel agreed to a ceasefire.

“Hezbollah and Israel have agreed to halt hostilities in a deal mediated by Qatar, the US, and Iran,” the diplomat said. US officials cited by Reuters and other outlets said the same thing.

Hezbollah has yet to officially comment on the truce. 

According to Lebanese media outlet Al Jadeed, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has insisted on the need for a clear US statement that includes an Israeli commitment to a ceasefire before Hezbollah announces its position.

Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported, citing an Israeli official, that Israel is “currently committed” to the ceasefire. 

However, it said the army will maintain its occupation of south Lebanon. It added that Tel Aviv will respond if its occupation forces are targeted by Hezbollah.

"Any Israeli move outside the framework of a comprehensive ceasefire will be met with a response,” a Hezbollah leadership source was cited as saying by Al Jazeera.

As south Lebanon remained under heavy bombardment past 4:00 pm, drone sirens sounded in Zarit, in the Upper Galilee.

A US official cited by Reuters had said Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to a ceasefire starting at 4:00 pm local time.

Lebanon has been under intensified Israeli bombardment over the last 24 hours. 

Tel Aviv has expressed major concerns over the new US–Iran agreement and its clause on Lebanon. It is demanding continued freedom of action to strike at will and maintain a presence of occupation forces in the country. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war minister have vowed that troops will remain in Lebanon. 

The intensification of strikes in recent hours follows a Hezbollah resistance operation which killed four Israeli troops in south Lebanon overnight. 

At least 47 people in Lebanon have been killed since Thursday evening. Nearly 100 others have been injured.

At least 3,980 people have been killed and 12,011 injured in Israeli attacks on Lebanon since 2 March, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health.

Due to the latest brutal strikes on Lebanon, Iran–US technical negotiations scheduled for Friday in Geneva were postponed. 

Iran has repeatedly warned that continued Israeli violations in Lebanon will be met with harsh retaliation. 

Earlier this month, Tehran launched a ballistic missile attack on Israel in response to a strike on Beirut.

The End of the U.S.-Israel Alliance

A joint war against Iran might be its apex.

June 15, 2026

By Joshua Leifer, a columnist for Haaretz.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/15/israel-united-states-special-relationship-palestine-netanyahu-trump

It would seem that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accomplished what his predecessors could only have dreamed of: U.S. and Israeli fighter jets flying tandem over Tehran, Israeli officers ensconced in U.S. Central Command’s Florida headquarters. Since the days of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s leaders have sought backing from the world’s preeminent superpower, which they hoped would guarantee their state’s survival into perpetuity. None could have imagined the level of cooperation currently on display. If one were to wake up the Old Man, as Ben-Gurion was known, from his otherworldly slumber in the sands of Sde Boker, he would surely delight in the news.

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. In one sense, the U.S.-Israel relationship is at its apogee. Viewed from another angle, it has already entered a period of terminal decline. The political, ideological, and sociological pillars on which the so-called special alliance rested for most of the last half-century have begun to collapse. The Israel-advocacy complex—the network of lobbying groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Jewish communal organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League, and Christian Zionist groups such as Christians United for Israel—was once a juggernaut on Capitol Hill. In today’s climate of hyperpolarization, it has started to falter, challenged first by the progressive flank of the Democratic Party and now increasingly by the neoisolationist faction of the MAGA coalition.

Public opinion has shifted dramatically. Less than half of Americans now say U.S. support for Israel is in the national interest; for the first time, Americans also view Palestinians more sympathetically than they do Israelis. Nor is it any longer a given that Americans and Israelis hold a common set of cultural and religious values. As the United States has become less Christian and more diverse, Israeli society has become more traditionalist, its public culture more insular. On both the U.S. right and left, antisemitism has also begun to seep from the margins into the political mainstream, seen by growing numbers of people, especially among the young and disaffected, as a marker of anti-establishment bona fides in populist times.

These shifts were well underway before the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023. But Israel’s subsequent destruction of Gaza, its blockade and starvation of the devastated territory, and spiraling settler violence in the occupied West Bank—all livestreamed over social media for more than two years—greatly accelerated them, generating an anti-Israel backlash that has become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary U.S. politics. If indeed the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran constitutes the apex of the special alliance, what follows will be the fall.

The special alliance was not always so special. While it was U.S. President Harry Truman who recognized Israel, his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower was notably chilly toward the state, wary of upsetting the U.S. strategic calculus in the early Cold War. John F. Kennedy broke with Ike’s arms embargo and was the first to supply Israel with U.S. arms; Richard Nixon, or rather his advisor Henry Kissinger, rescued Israel in 1973, engineering the crucial airlift of military aid that staved off defeat in the Arab-Israeli war. Still, the relationship had its limits. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush all knew how to say no to Israel’s leaders—sometimes forcefully in terms that today would shock, sometimes with the threat of material consequences—and little feared the Israel-advocacy complex, which was a relative welterweight compared with the heft it would throw around by the mid-1990s.

The end of the Cold War brought the United States and Israel into closer alignment. The relationship was no longer tempered by broader U.S. considerations of global great-power equilibrium. There developed what international relations scholars call a “community of strategic interests.” Israel assumed the role of enforcer of the new U.S.-led international order in the Middle East. With the launch of the global war on terrorism, U.S. and Israeli interests seemed to converge even further. In terms the pliant U.S. media reflexively echoed, U.S. and Israeli leaders framed their countries’ interests as identical and their foes, whether Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or Yasser Arafat and the PLO, two sides of the same radical, terrorist coin.

That overlap of strategic interests was, in turn, bolstered by a widespread sense of shared values. At the very moment the United States embarked on democracy promotion abroad, Israeli leaders boasted of the country’s uniqueness as the region’s sole democratic state. For those who saw the war on terrorism in civilizationist terms, Israel was the front-line defender in the struggle between the Judeo-Christian West and its Islamist enemies. American liberals, meanwhile, were inclined to see in Israel an exemplary open society amid a black sea of authoritarian Arab regimes, conservative theocracies, and Islamist militants. From Bill Clinton through George W. Bush, U.S. policy in the Middle East was dominated alternately by Atlanticist liberal interventionists and their more sharp-elbowed cousins, the neoconservatives.

For the growing Israel-advocacy complex, this was favorable ground for maneuvering. AIPAC could marshal near-unanimous support for Israel across both parties, while its aligned think tanks maintained a revolving door between Republican and Democratic administrations. Advocates for Palestinian rights, for their part, lacked any comparable apparatus, and few Palestinian writers were being published in mainstream outlets, unlike today. Meanwhile, complaints about the Israel lobby’s power were, for the most part, relegated to the conspiratorial fringes where the boundaries of the far left blurred with the far right. And with Holocaust memorial culture at its peak—the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum opened in 1993—an accusation of antisemitism still carried its career-ending severity.

It was the pro-Israel right, not the pro-Palestinian left, that shattered the bipartisan consensus in Washington. The pivotal year was 2015. Then, as now, the issue was Iran. As the Obama administration pushed for a nuclear deal, the Israel-advocacy complex went to war against the widely popular Democratic president. AIPAC dumped roughly $40 million into lobbying against the nuclear deal. Republican House Speaker John Boehner invited Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress without first notifying the president, a move widely seen as a politicized breach of procedure and basic decorum. Behind the lectern, Netanyahu lambasted the Obama administration’s deal-in-the-making that would “only change the Middle East for the worse.”

The Israel-advocacy complex’s blitz failed to stop the nuclear deal. Instead, it demolished its own vestigial facade of bipartisanship. Pro-Israel groups soon began to function openly as a wing of the Republican Party, especially as Jewish communal organizations shed the pretense of representing the views of most American Jews in favor of the priorities of right-wing megadonors. Trump’s first term deepened this process of partisan polarization on Israel even further. He embraced a hawkish pro-Israel line far to the right of any previous administration: shuttering the PLO’s office in Washington, moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Trump has arguably done more to push rank-and-file Democrats away from Israel than any pro-Palestinian activist.

2015 also marked a turning point in Israel’s trajectory. Over the course of a bruising election campaign, Netanyahu appeared to radicalize. He eschewed the image of the Israeli right’s responsible adult and embraced the style of authoritarian populism ascendant around the globe. Whereas Netanyahu had previously given lip service to a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians, he pivoted toward open territorial maximalism. After his 2019 indictment on corruption charges, Netanyahu grew ever more desperate in his attempts to remain in power. He forged electoral alliances with the most extreme forces in Israeli political life, not only normalizing the followers of the quasi-fascist rabbi Meir Kahane and hard-line messianic settlers but empowering them as ministers in his government.

Against the backdrop of democratic backsliding within Israel proper and the deepening occupation of the West Bank and siege of Gaza, vanishingly few American liberals could claim to share values with their Israeli counterparts. Meanwhile, a new generation of progressives came of age having known only the Israel of Netanyahu. That generational cohort was more diverse than any before it, comprising, to a significant degree, the children of immigrants from South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Many of them rejected the U.S. tradition of pro-Israel politics, were inclined to view Israel with antipathy, and felt no fealty to the Holocaust meta-narrative that had become an anchor of U.S. political culture. An increasing number of young American Jews also began to challenge support for Israel as a pillar of American Jewish identity; some would become prominent leaders of a resurgent anti-Zionist movement.

During these same years, between the killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and George Floyd in Minneapolis, U.S. progressives underwent a “racial reckoning” that dramatically reshaped their understanding of identity and power—a shift that would have significant ramifications for the debate about Israel within the left wing of the Democratic Party. In 2016, long before Oct. 7, the Movement for Black Lives published its policy platform in which it labeled Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians a genocide.

More recently, a segment of the MAGA right has joined the progressive left in its rejection of the U.S.-Israel relationship. The terms of critique are different. Beyond the swamp of antisemitic conspiracism that has engulfed parts of the young and online right, those who identify with the “restraint”-oriented faction of the MAGA coalition have begun to call for a reevaluation of U.S. support for Israel. They charge that there is not, or no longer is, a community of interest between the two allies and that Israel and its advocates exert an outsized and undue influence on U.S. foreign-policy making. They advocate for slashing U.S. aid to erstwhile allies as part of what they hope will be Washington’s withdrawal from imperial management and see no reason why the relationship with Israel should remain an exception.

If the old bipartisan pro-Israel consensus has collapsed, a new anti-Israel consensus is taking shape on the edges of both the Democratic and Republican parties. For Democrats, the primaries ahead of the 2028 election will almost certainly be a referendum on Israel. Already, activists have made significant strides in pressuring candidates to distance themselves from AIPAC and other groups associated with the Israel-advocacy complex. Universal healthcare was the watchword of the 2020 primaries; conditioning, or ending, U.S. military aid to Israel will likely fill the same role in 2028. On the left, hostility to Israel—the more strident, the better—is fast becoming a litmus test as an indicator of reliability on other matters of progressive concern.

Among Republicans, much will depend on the aftermath of the Iran war. If the economic and diplomatic pain suffered by Americans sticks, Israel and its advocates will take the blame. That scenario will likely empower the neoisolationists and restrainers, whose champion, at least for the moment, is Vice President J.D. Vance. But if he is sullied by the Iran debacle, there are other figures waiting in the wings, including conservative pundit Tucker Carlson, whose presidential ambitions are only whispered for now. On the right, too, military aid to Israel will be on the chopping block regardless as a baseline position much of MAGA can embrace.

Where, then, does this all leave Netanyahu? The Israeli prime minister has already begun to spin the eventual reduction in U.S. military aid as his own proposal, rather than face a political fight over a new aid package that Israel is not in a position to win. Netanyahu has pledged to wean Israel off U.S. assistance entirely over the next decade. The Heritage Foundation has drafted a proposal that outlines how that might work, substituting the current model of providing discounts to Israel for buying U.S. materiel with joint weapons technology efforts—hardly a return to the U.S. arms embargo on Israel of the early Cold War years.

Yet Netanyahu may be too sanguine about a future for Israel after the end of the special alliance. Having taken it for granted, he is perhaps more responsible than anyone else for its precipitous decline. When he departs the scene, he will leave Israel worse off for it.

This article appears in the Summer 2026 print issue of Foreign Policy. 

The U.S.–Iran Deal Could Help Transform America’s Mideast Strategy

Washington doesn’t need to be the region’s micromanager.

Eldar Mamedov

Jun 17, 202

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-u-s-iran-deal-could-help-transform-americas-mideast-strategy/

Following intensive talks, we are pleased to announce that the Peace Deal between the United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran has been REACHED.”

The Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s statement this week confirms a cessation of hostilities between Washington and Tehran, to be formalized on June 19 in Geneva. Vice President J.D. Vance is expected to sign the deal alongside Iran’s Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—the man with whom he negotiated in Islamabad during the first U.S.–Iran talks at this level since 1979. Intriguingly, both Vance and President Donald Trump on Monday said a deal had already been signed. Military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, will terminate immediately and permanently; the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for the global oil trade, will reopen.

That, at least, is the idea, though the two sides will need to implement the agreement to get Israel’s war in Lebanon ended and the Strait of Hormuz truly open for shipping. Similarly, modalities will have to be found to implement the sanctions relief and unfreezing of Iranian assets reportedly in the agreement. And then comes the even harder part: Once it takes effect, the “memorandum of understanding” will kick off 60 days of discussions on thorny issues related to Iran’s nuclear program—enrichment levels, inspection regimes, and breakout timelines. 

Those negotiations will face spoilers on both sides. In Washington, neoconservatives like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and its CEO Mark Dubowitz will oppose any outcome short of total Iranian capitulation. They have spent decades arguing that only maximum pressure, regime change, and war can suffice to address “the Iranian threat.” 

In Tehran, hardliners associated with the so-called Steadfast Front, who dream essentially of a North Korean model for Iran, view any compromise as a betrayal of the revolution’s principles. Lacking deep political support, they exert pressure on the negotiators through the media and the hardline-dominated parliament.

Then there is Israel, which still has levers to derail any final agreement by escalating violence in Lebanon, despite Trump’s clear preference for ending the war on all fronts.

Amid the intense activity of all these potential spoilers, the agreement could easily collapse before it reaches its second stage. That is the real danger of the coming months.

Yet the deal already agreed—pending its official public signing in Geneva—has far wider geopolitical ramifications than a transactional ceasefire. That is because it reveals the limits of American power and opens a path to a long-overdue U.S. strategic recalibration in the Middle East.

What did the war actually prove? The U.S. entered this conflict believing that conventional military superiority would quickly compel radical changes in the policies of the Iranian government, if not regime change. That was a costly error. Air campaigns, naval interdictions, and strikes against the IRGC and political leadership did not produce capitulation. They produced Iranian entrenchment. The regime remains in place, more emboldened than ever.

Here is the deeper irony: The threat of war had preserved American leverage, and the waging of war destroyed it. So long as the prospect of the use of force remained ambiguous, Iran had to hedge. Once force was actually applied and failed to produce decisive results, Tehran learned that the United States could not achieve its maximalist objectives militarily. That knowledge permanently shifted the bargaining dynamic.

But this outcome need not be seen as catastrophic. It can instead produce a realistic reassessment of American presence and partnerships in the Middle East.

The coalition that helped end the war diplomatically points the way forward. The Pakistani statement identifies the mediators: apart from Pakistan itself, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Some of these states were more involved than others, but all invested diplomatic capital to wind down a conflict that none of them initiated and all recognized as contrary to their interests. They understood that the U.S.–Iran war had destabilized the entire region, and that a widening of that war would devastate it.

Now contrast them with the states that pushed for escalation: Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Both view Iran as an existential threat. Both prefer that the United States bear the costs of containing it. But from a U.S. perspective, their advocacy was not friendly counsel. It was an attempt to outsource their security dilemmas to American forces. This is not to condemn Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. It simply notes that their interests and American interests are not aligned on the question of war with Iran. In fact, they are fundamentally incompatible.

The strategic opportunity is now visible. The deal allows the United States to do what it should have done a decade ago: recalibrate its regional posture downward while ensuring that no single power—Iranian, Saudi, Turkish, or Israeli—dominates the Gulf.

The framework is straightforward. If the final deal is reached, it would enable the U.S. to sharply reduce its military footprint in the Gulf. The primary responsibility for regional security would likely shift to an alignment of regional powers: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt. These states have the economic weight, military capacity, and diplomatic relationships with Tehran to manage the regional frameworks without direct American combat involvement.

This is not abandonment. The United States could become the offshore balancer it has long wanted to be, rather than the regional micromanager and onshore garrison it actually became.

Israel and its supporters in Washington would not like any of these developments. But ultimately, Israel’s long-term security depends less on American military guarantees than on its own deterrent capabilities and its eventual accommodation with its neighbors. The United States has demonstrated that it will not fight a major war to fulfill Israel’s maximalist goals. That fact is now evident to both parties. Israel’s best path forward is therefore to adjust its own force posture and pursue regional normalization on terms that do not require American combat power. And that starts with charting a credible path to a viable Palestinian state. That is a harder path, but a more reliable one.

Finally, the implications for American domestic politics are deep. By signing the deal in Geneva, J.D. Vance could become the visible face of America’s Middle East recalibration toward realism. His signature on June 19 would mark a strategic recognition: The U.S. is overextended, the war exposed that overextension, and now the administration is correcting course. Entering the 2028 election cycle, Vance could plausibly claim to have extracted the U.S. from a costly war that had no realistic path to victory. Given the polling data on Americans’ views of the Iran War, that sounds like a good position for the VP to be in.

Al Arabiya English obtains 14-point draft of US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding

https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/06/16/al-arabiya-obtains-14point-draft-usiran-deal

Al Arabiya English has obtained a copy of the 14-point agreement expected to be signed on Friday between Washington and Tehran.

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article and the remaining Articles.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.

4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.

5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralization of mines by Iran.

6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, While ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.

7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article.

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.

10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.

11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.

12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.

13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.

14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

The Pro-Israel Lobby Is Trying to Fly Under the Radar

By

Luke Goldstein

Amid widespread public disapproval of Israel’s destruction across the Middle East, pro-Israel donors aligned with AIPAC appear to be resorting to new fundraising vehicles to covertly channel money to favored Democratic candidates.

https://jacobin.com/2026/05/israel-lobby-aipac-democratic-primaries

Amid widespread public disapproval of Israel’s mounting destruction across the Middle East, pro-Israel donors aligned with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) appear to be resorting to new, innocuous-sounding fundraising vehicles to covertly channel money to favored candidates in high-stakes Democratic primaries.

That now includes the Better Blue Fund, a newly formed umbrella group that’s using weakened campaign finance rules to act as a “one-stop shop” for contributions from some of the pro-Israel lobby’s largest longtime donors, albeit with no mention of having a pro-Israel agenda. In less than two months, the fund has amassed more than $250,000 as it backs Democratic candidates already under fire from progressive challengers for supporting military aid to Israel or receiving endorsements from pro-Israel groups.

That list includes former Rep. Ben McAdams in Utah, House incumbents Adriano Espaillat and Dan Goldman in New York, and Rep. Wesley Bell in Missouri, who are all facing contested primary races where their support for pro-Israel policies has come under scrutiny.

The Better Blue Fund was formed in March as a joint fundraising committee, meaning it allows multiple candidates to band together to raise larger sums than they could individually under campaign finance rules. As the courts and regulators have chipped away at aggregate spending limits, joint fundraising committees have become increasingly popular vehicles for candidates to receive massive sums from high-value donors who may have an interest in their policies.

Along with McAdams, Espaillat, Goldman, and Bell, the Better Blue Fund is currently fundraising for four other Democratic congressional candidates: Rep. Rob Menendez (NJ), Rep. Grace Meng (NY), Rep. Steve Cohen (TN), and Jeremy Moss, a Democratic challenger for Michigan’s Eleventh District. All of the committee’s favored candidates are currently endorsed by pro-Israel groups or have been in the past.

AIPAC and its affiliates have frequently dropped millions of dollars into contested elections and proudly taken credit for knocking their perceived adversaries out of office — including the recent ousting of Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY). But as voter sympathies shift away from supporting Israel, some of the operations’ donors now appear to be opting for a more low-profile approach by funneling money to outside entities with anodyne-sounding titles.

For example, in the 2020 Utah election cycle, McAdams was publicly endorsed by the Democratic Majority for Israel, a group dedicated to forging a close alliance between Democrats and Israel, and received a $5,000 donation from the group’s PAC in his failed reelection bid.

But this year, Democratic Majority for Israel hasn’t provided McAdams any direct financial support or public endorsement, while the Better Blue Fund is backing his campaign. That may be a tactical decision: McAdams has faced a barrage of attacks in the crowded race, including from progressive candidate Nate Blouin, for his past stances supporting unrestricted US military assistance to Israel.

As a congressman, McAdams voted in lockstep with pro-Israel groups on military funding, condemned boycotts of Israel, and attended congressional delegation trips to the country.

But at a recent debate, he decried, “the atrocities [Benjamin] Netanyahu has committed in Gaza [against] the Palestinian people,” though he suggested the conflict was not ongoing: “That has ended at this point.”

Familiar Donors

The Better Blue Fund has so far raised nearly $300,000 from a roster of pro-Israel donors. That includes $28,000 from financier Jonathan Jacobson, who in 2024 gave $2.5 million to AIPAC’s super PAC, United Democracy Project, making him the second-largest individual contributor to the group that election cycle. It also includes $24,500 from Rob Stavis, a partner at the venture capital firm Bessemer Venture Partners, who contributed $50,000 to Democratic Majority for Israel in 2024.

So far, Better Blue Fund’s largest single contribution is $31,500 from Eric Mindich, an investor who contributed $250,000 to Democratic Majority for Israel last cycle.

While the Better Blue Fund will eventually be distributing its war chest to the eight Democrats participating in the fundraising committee, the group has not yet reported any disbursements to candidates this quarter. When the fund does so, the donations will appear in candidates’ filings as Better Blue Fund contributions, obscuring the donors behind the spending and their affiliations with pro-Israel groups.

Along with the Better Blue Fund, longtime AIPAC donors have reportedly used other spending vehicles to hide recent spending on behalf of favored candidates.

In the Democratic primary race for Michigan’s Senate seat, a new PAC called the Center for Democratic Priorities, which had no prior campaign history, recently spent $5.3 million on ads boosting Congresswoman Haley Stevens, not long after AIPAC had championed her to donors in a fundraising email. The Center for Democratic Priorities’ registration documents revealed the organization shared the same treasurer as other pro-Israel groups and employed the same strategy firm used by these groups to place the ad buy.