The axis era: West Asia's new map after the ‘Flood’

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was never just an act of war. It cracked the facade of regional stability, exposed the fault lines of power, and accelerated the pull into four contending poles now reshaping West Asia.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

JAN 16, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/the-axis-era-west-asias-new-map-after-the-flood

“Al-Aqsa Flood was a preemptive strike – meant to break the American-Zionist project in this region.”  — Ihsan Ataya, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) official, speaking to The Cradle on 28 October 2023

Until recently, regional developments in West Asia could still be parsed through the old frameworks of isolated conflicts, bilateral rivalries, or proxy skirmishes. No longer. 

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023 was a strategic rupture that reset the rules of deterrence, legitimacy, and the acceptable use of force. Since that day, West Asia has transformed into a single, hyper-connected battlespace where borders blur, fronts overlap, and crises no longer unfold in isolation.

Everything since 7 October has operated within a new strategic equation. Major powers have scrambled to adjust their priorities, allies and adversaries have redrawn their lines, and familiar arrangements have begun to fray. 

The usual safeguards – diplomatic cover, economic pressure valves, even military deterrents – have eroded. The region is no longer a patchwork of separate flashpoints, but a volatile system where any single spark – a border incident, trade maneuver, or diplomatic shift – can trigger a chain reaction. What we are witnessing is the active remaking of the region’s balance of power, in real time.

Four axes, no hegemon

At the heart of this transformation is the emergence of four distinct centers of power: Iran, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli occupation state. Each commands influence across multiple domains, but none has been able to translate that into uncontested dominance. Instead, the region is pulled between four gravitational fields, each shaping alliances, conflicts, and narratives.

Iran and Saudi Arabia wield energy resources that extend their reach beyond West Asia. Iran also commands loyalty from Shia populations and maintains long-standing partnerships with resistance movements. 

Turkiye and Iran are large, populous states with deep historical imperial roots, strategic geography, and expansive militaries. Saudi Arabia – and, to a lesser extent, Turkiye – also possess significant soft power, rooted in religious and cultural legitimacy. Israel, for its part, remains a military and technological leader, backed by a “special relationship” with Washington and an unconfirmed nuclear arsenal.

None of these powers, however, holds all the cards. Their simultaneous rise has prevented the emergence of a regional hegemon. Instead, they check each other’s advances in an unstable balance shaped by history, ideology, and ambition.

These four axes do not operate as formal alliances. They are fluid zones of influence that shape how states, movements, and even markets align. What matters is not fixed membership but the gravitational pull – the capacity to compel decisions, offer protection, impose costs, or shape narratives. And in the volatile aftermath of 7 October, that pull has only intensified.

This structure exists because none of these actors enjoys a decisive edge. Nor are they all equally accepted in the region. Influence alone is not enough; a power must be willing to act, and others must be willing to accept its leadership. 

No state in recent West Asian history has sustained all three traits long enough to become a hegemon. Instead, they maneuver to secure their turf or deny rivals supremacy. These competitions flare during upheaval – the Persian Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and now, the post-Operation Al-Aqsa Flood rupture.

Most regional states now orbit one of these four axes. Riyadh leads many of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, excluding Qatar and the UAE. Abu Dhabi a key member of the ‘Axis of Normalization’ has naturally tilted toward the Israeli camp. Resistance movements align with Iran. 

Qatar leans toward Turkiye, a relationship underpinned by their shared support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked movements across the region. Egypt, once a power in its own right, has largely fallen under Saudi sway.

The battle for Yemen’s south is a Gulf power play

Saudi–UAE competition has long been framed as a rivalry within the Gulf’s inner circle – two partners with diverging tactics, not clashing visions. That frame no longer holds. The UAE's normalization with Tel Aviv recast Abu Dhabi as an enabler of Israeli regional integration – not just a competitor to Riyadh, but a channel for Israeli expansion. 

This realignment has sharpened Saudi sensitivities. While Riyadh may overlap with Israel tactically, it does not accept Tel Aviv as a strategic arbiter. The concern is not Emirati–Israeli ties per se, but their functional depth – a fusion of Emirati capital and logistics with Israeli security expertise and global networks. That combination, Riyadh fears, could project power into Saudi Arabia’s own sphere.

This is especially acute in southern Yemen, where Abu Dhabi’s ambitions risk handing Tel Aviv a presence on Saudi Arabia’s southern flank. Riyadh views this not as regional jockeying but a direct threat to its national security. 

The Saudi position is clear: tactical overlap with Israel is tolerable to a point, but a UAE–Israel axis inside the Gulf is a red line. This has outgrown the bounds of a Gulf rivalry. It is now a clash between two distinct regional visions–one seeking to contain Israel’s expansion, the other enabling its entrenchment.

Tel Aviv’s regional project threatens friend and foe alike

For decades, Hezbollah’s late secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned that weakening the Axis of Resistance would eventually endanger every state in the region – including those aligned with Washington. In a 2013 speech, Nasrallah stated:

“If Syria falls, Palestine is lost – and with it, the resistance in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. If Syria falls to the US, Israel, and the takfiris, our region will enter a dark, brutal era. That is our assessment.”

A decade later, Tel Aviv’s regional conduct bears out that warning. Israel no longer limits its actions to a single front. It moves across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Iran in concert, treating the region as a unified battlespace.

Recent events – setbacks for the resistance, Syria’s erosion, the expansion of Israeli operations – have made clear that Tel Aviv respects no boundaries, not even those of friendly governments. 

For Iran, the threat is direct and existential. Israeli officials routinely declare that dismantling the Islamic Republic is their strategic goal. That goal has been pursued through assassinations, sabotage, ‘color revolutions,’ proxy attacks, and now open war.

For Turkiye, the threat is strategic. Israel challenges Ankara’s influence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, pushing alternative trade corridors that sideline Turkish geography. Syria, in particular, has become a theater where Israeli freedom of action clashes with Turkish security priorities.

For Saudi Arabia, the concern is structural. Tel Aviv’s attempt to rewrite regional rules threatens Riyadh’s autonomy and leadership. The greater danger lies in the emerging regional architecture – an order shaped to entrench Israeli dominance while sidelining Arab powers into subordinate roles.

Since 7 October, Tel Aviv has expanded its operational playbook: preemptive strikes, multi-front campaigns, and intensified deterrence. This has heightened the perception of threat across all major powers. 

That does not mean a new anti-Israel alliance is forming. But it does mean each actor – except Iran, which sees Israel as an inherent enemy – now views Israeli expansion as a constraint on their own strategic space.

What looms larger than open conflict is a strategic shift that could allow one actor to reshape the rules of engagement for the entire region.