Donroe Doctrine: Catalyst for a US Strategic Contraction in the Indo-Pacific?

by Harris Jenner | Jan 18, 2026

https://original.antiwar.com/Harris_Jenner/2026/01/18/donroe-doctrine-catalyst-for-a-us-strategic-contraction-in-the-indo-pacific/

The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, marked a watershed moment in international affairs. The operation’s significance lies not only in its brazen execution but in the geopolitical shockwave it triggered. Framed by President Donald Trump as a “law-enforcement” strike against a “drug cartel” leader, the move has since unleashed a cascade of global threats, alienated key allies, and signaled a profound shift in America’s role – from guarantor of a rules-based order to its primary disruptor. Analysts warn that this aggressive revival of Monroe Doctrine principles is precipitating an international credibility crisis, straining alliances, and may force a broad strategic contraction, including in the critical Indo-Pacific region.

Operation Absolute Resolve and the Image of the Rule-Breaker

The mission to seize Maduro, dubbed Operation Absolute Resolve, proved a tactically flawless endeavor with strategically catastrophic consequences. President Trump’s justification – waging a “war on drugs and terrorism” – failed to conceal what critics call nakedly hegemonic behavior. In a single stroke, Washington unilaterally abrogated the core principles of sovereignty and non-intervention it had long championed.

The international reaction was swift and critical. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stated “These developments constitute a dangerous precedent”. Key allies voiced profound unease. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz insisted that “principles of international law must apply,” while Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez declared on X that Spain would “not recognize an intervention that violates international law.” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer pointedly clarified, “We were not involved.” The unified dismay revealed the fragility of American alliances under sudden strain.

“Allowing such a precedent will further undermine respect for international law, state sovereignty, and civilian protections,” said Celeste Kmiotek, a senior staff lawyer at the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. The message from the White House was unambiguous: the Western Hemisphere remains an exclusive U.S. zone where American security preferences override all other considerations. This unilateralist posture has, in the eyes of many allies, transformed the United States from the system’s guarantor into its primary rule-breaker.

A Widening International Credibility Crisis

In the days following the Venezuela operation, President Trump and his administration issued a series of stark warnings worldwide, cementing an image of the United States as a global “troublemaker” and triggering a deepening credibility crisis.

Trump’s renewed threat to “take over Greenland” prompted a sharp transatlantic rebuke. European leaders issued a joint statement asserting Arctic security “must be achieved collectively.” Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen had earlier warned such an act would mean “the end of the NATO military alliance,” a sentiment echoed by European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, who said it would spell “the end of the trans-Atlantic partnership.” This pattern, observers note, has recast the U.S. from an unreliable partner into an active unilateralist power, creating a severe trust deficit in Europe.

Simultaneously, the administration leveled threats across the Western Hemisphere, reviving the image of American big-stick diplomacy. Trump accused Colombian President Gustavo Petro of cocaine trafficking and hinted at military action, suggested Cuba was “ready to fall,” and claimed U.S. forces would hit cartels in Mexico on land. Beyond the hemisphere, he warned that the U.S. was “locked and loaded” if Iran killed peaceful protesters – a threat he later appeared to walk back by claiming he had “reliable information” that killings in Iran were stopping. This suggests he is wavering on direct military action.

This aggressive approach is leading the nation “down a dark hole,” wrote Ted Piccone, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, in a recent analysis. “The harmful consequences for U.S. national security, and international peace and security more broadly, will unspool for years to come,” he argued.

The Western Hemisphere Quagmire and a Looming Strategic Contraction

Administration officials frame the action in Venezuela not as an isolated event, but as the execution of a doctrinal shift outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy. The document explicitly reorients U.S. focus toward its immediate neighborhood, reviving the Monroe Doctrine with a “Trump Corollary” that treats the hemisphere as an exclusive zone of American influence.

Yet the capture of Maduro has not resolved the Venezuelan crisis; it has traded one set of problems for another, potentially more volatile set. Interim President Delcy Rodríguez now presides over a fractured nation, facing emboldened opposition, internal Chavista power struggles, and the threat of armed Colombian guerrilla groups like the ELN. The United States now bears a direct responsibility for stabilizing a country with a collapsed economy and a crippled oil infrastructure requiring massive, long-term investment.

The resources and diplomatic attention demanded by managing a volatile post-Maduro Venezuela – and by confronting other perceived regional threats – will inevitably draw focus from other theaters. “This operation signifies that the Trump administration will prioritize issues in the United States’ near abroad, with correspondingly less attention spent on other regions, including the Indo-Pacific theater,” said I-Chung Lai, President of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation, summarizing one prominent school of thought.

The 2025 NSS notably de-emphasizes great-power rivalry, stating a goal to “reestablish strategic stability with Russia” and highlighting the aim of “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” This rhetorical shift suggests Washington may be preparing for a more transactional and less engaged role in Asia. The ultimate cost of hemispheric overreach, analysts conclude, could be a forced strategic contraction, compelling America to retreat from its traditional commitments in the Indo-Pacific.

The Taiwan Paradox: Arms Sales as a Prelude to Retreat?

This impending contraction reveals a paradox in Washington’s Asia policy. The recent approval of a record $10 billion arms sale to Taiwan appears to be a robust show of support. Yet this hardline move directly conflicts with the conciliatory language of the Pentagon’s latest China report, which emphasizes peaceful intentions and disavows any aim to “strangle, dominate, or humiliate” Beijing. The contrast suggests an administration simultaneously escalating capabilities while trying to manage – and downplay – the risks of confrontation.

This apparent contradiction – arming Taiwan while seeking stability with China – can be understood through analytical frameworks proposed by regional security experts. Michael D. Swaine, senior research fellow in the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute, contends that Taiwan is not a sufficiently vital interest for the United States to go to war over, and it is urgent for Washington to begin transitioning to a policy to rule out the possibility of joining a war over the island. He outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, which consists of three parts:

First, a period of preparation to ready U.S. allies and partners for the policy that the United States will not intervene directly in defense of Taiwan. The transition process should focus on bolstering the self-defense capabilities and confidence of Taiwan and nearby U.S. allies.

Second, deliberate moves to end strategic ambiguity while enhancing other forms of support for Taiwan.

Third, an effort to minimize the possibility that China will conclude that it could seize Taiwan by force because of the new U.S. policy of nonintervention.

In this light, the record arms sale may serve a dual purpose. First, it acts as an immediate deterrent and provides political support. Second, and more consequentially, it could function as a calculated preparatory move for a broader strategic shift. By massively upgrading Taiwan’s defenses now, the administration may be positioning the island to better withstand future pressure, thereby granting Washington the latitude to scale back its security commitments without triggering an immediate crisis. This aligns with the NSS’s transactional, burden-sharing ethos, which expects allies to take primary responsibility for their own defense. The most provocative interpretation of current events is that the Trump administration is positioning Taiwan with a grand bargain with Beijing, especially whether the U.S. opposition to Taiwan independence is “under serious consideration” and will be part of a potential negotiation package during a future presidential visit to China. Swaine contends that Trump might slightly alter the OCP by stating that the U.S. now “opposes” (in contrast to “does not support”) Taiwanese independence, but he can’t see him going beyond that, he might simply want to improve relations with China so as to make better econ/tech deals and thus does not want the Taiwan issue to disrupt that effort.

The operation against Maduro was not merely a raid but the opening salvo of a revolutionary approach to statecraft. This new paradigm – signaled by stark Monroe Doctrine threats – is unilaterally assertive, dismissive of sovereignty, and corrosive to alliance trust. By focusing on hemispheric threats, it consumes strategic resources, breeds resentment, and risks endless entanglements. Consequently, mired in the Western Hemisphere, the US lacks the bandwidth for significant direct intervention in the Indo-Pacific. The ultimate price of this strategy may well be America’s strategic retreat from the Indo-Pacific.