'West Asia is no longer our battle': Moscow withdraws from the arena

Moscow is reducing its active involvement in West Asia, shifting from managing regional conflicts to maintaining a visible presence and using the region as leverage against the west.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

NOV 1, 2025

https://thecradle.co/articles/west-asia-is-no-longer-our-battle-moscow-withdraws-from-the-arena

In modern diplomacy, some of the most important messages are no longer conveyed through diplomats. Instead, they are presented in policy forums, roundtable meetings, and “expert” committees – spaces that allow states to express what they truly think without making official statements. These platforms enable governments to test red lines, issue warnings, and shape regional narratives through analysts and strategists who speak with authority but do not formally represent the state. 

From 19 to 23 October, Moscow hosted the fifth International Research and Expert Forum, “Russia–the Middle East,” bringing together researchers and experts from Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Turkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. Most participants were academics affiliated with research centers closely connected to their countries’ Foreign Ministries. From the very first day, it was clear that one of Moscow’s main objectives in organizing the forum was to send a clear message: Russia’s approach toward West Asia has changed.

The new Russian approach to West Asia

Russia’s current approach to West Asia is based on a fundamental conviction that the region is primarily an American sphere of influence, and that any direct Russian attempt to compete with the US would be costly and futile. During the ‘West Asia and Russia Experts Forum,’ Andrei Denisov, Member of the Council of the Russian Federation, emphasized: 

“In West Asia, there is only one player, and that is the United States. Any other player who intervenes will lose, because the United States will not allow any international actor to operate freely in the region.”

Moscow’s position stems from its belief that its southern security – meaning the security of its southern borders and immediate regional environment – constitutes its highest security priority. Therefore, Russia’s involvement in the crises and wars of the region is no longer aimed at influencing or managing their outcomes, but rather at preventing the repercussions of chaos and instability from spilling over into Russia itself or its immediate neighborhood.

From this standpoint, Moscow has become convinced that the countries of the region must shape their own regional order. Russia no longer believes it is in its interest to play the role of a power that re-engineers West Asia, as earlier iterations of Russian policy once attempted to do. Instead, it now prefers to maintain open relations with all sides and to deal with any existing de facto authority, rather than investing in a regional project of its own.

This point was emphasized by Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy director for Scientific Affairs at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who stated that “The era of the old Russia that tried to shape the region is over. Now, Russia is not concerned with what happens in the region, but it will work with any actor that exists within it.”

Reserved neutrality and active participation

Within this framework, Moscow states clearly that West Asia is not a strategic priority compared to Eastern Europe, and that its political and military resources are directed primarily toward that front. This shift is clearly reflected in its position during the war against Iran, where Moscow informed Tehran that it could not provide direct military support. The most it could commit to was refraining from assisting Israel – meaning that “relative neutrality” is the maximum form of help Russia can offer.

Instead of entering into a costly confrontation with Washington, Russia is increasingly moving toward a model closer to the Chinese approach: avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, building channels with all parties, concluding economic and technological deals, managing flexible relations even among warring rivals, exercising great caution in explicitly siding with any actor, and criticizing American, Israeli, Gulf, or Iranian policies when necessary, but without turning it into blind hostility.

In this context, Moscow promotes the idea of “reserved neutrality” and “active participation” – that is, presenting itself as a present, balanced, and cautious power that talks to everyone and benefits from economic opportunities without bearing the costs of deep security engagement. Here, Russia bets on the tools of soft power and economic influence rather than military involvement, by exporting wheat and energy, participating in civilian nuclear power projects, intensifying academic exchanges, opening university branches, and activating networks of friendly elites in the region, including Russian-speaking communities and holders of dual nationality.

The practical outcome is Russia’s acknowledgment that its role in West Asia has declined, shifting from an ambition to manage regional balances to merely keeping communication channels open and securing whatever benefits can be obtained at minimal cost. This is in an environment that Moscow views as dominated by a single effective actor – the US – where any party that attempts to challenge this reality directly becomes drained before achieving any real gains.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Consequently, Moscow has shifted from a policy of deep engagement to one of minimal positioning, aimed not at shaping Syria’s transitional phase but at preserving a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean by maintaining operations at the Hmeimim air base, the Tartous naval facility, and a limited presence in Qamishli for potential future use.

The local system that once sustained Russian influence no longer exists in a form that Moscow can rely on. The Syrian landscape has become increasingly fragmented and divided, and deep field engagement now carries the risk of being drawn into internal conflicts with diminishing returns.

Accordingly, it can be said that what Moscow is doing today is reducing costs while keeping its options open – by scaling down its presence and avoiding the expenses of acting as Syria’s ‘security manager,’ without completely abandoning the military infrastructure it might need later.

The third driver is the increasing risk of being drawn into escalation between Iran and Israel. This year witnessed the first direct confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. There is no doubt that Iran is a vital partner for Russia, but this relationship has not reached a level that would compel Moscow to support Tehran in its conflict, especially since it does not wish to slide into a military stance openly hostile to Israel or the United States.

For this reason, Russia’s position during the 12-day Israeli war on Iran in June was limited to rhetorical calls for restraint, offers to mediate, and public warnings about global instability. No tangible military support was provided. In this context, some Russian analysts believe that a full-scale regional war involving Israel, Iran, and their allies could force Russia into taking a direct side, which would threaten its remaining access to Syria, the Gulf states, and Turkiye. It would also endanger energy transit routes and infrastructure projects that Russia seeks to implement with Iran and across Eurasia.

Therefore, deeper Russian military intervention in West Asia is now seen more as a responsibility trap than an opportunity, one that could drag Russia into an open confrontation with US-aligned forces or undermine its delicate balance between Iran, Israel, Turkiye, and the Gulf states.

Fourthly, Russia receives diminished diplomatic returns relative to the efforts it expends. 

Between 2015 and 2021, Moscow marketed itself to Arab capitals as the only actor capable of engaging all regional players – an image that carried real value for countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. But by 2025, this image had weakened significantly.

Reduced influence with regional partners

Cooperation between Russia and regional powers remains active in energy, logistics, grain, and arms. Yet Moscow is no longer regarded as an effective security mediator or crisis manager, a shift underscored by the failure – so far – to hold the inaugural Russian–Arab summit, originally scheduled for October 2025. In April, Moscow had planned the summit to bring Arab leaders to the capital, with President Vladimir Putin envisioning a scene reminiscent of the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting between Arab leaders and Trump. However, the Arab states requested a postponement, citing preoccupation with regional developments and the implementation of Trump’s ‘Gaza peace plan.’

From Moscow’s perspective, if key Arab states are avoiding direct engagement and no longer view Russia as indispensable, maintaining large, exposed assets or investing heavily in mediation produces less influence than before, reducing the rationale for high-risk involvement in the region.

West Asia as a lever against the west

For these reasons, West Asia’s status has been downgraded from a primary front to a tool of leverage. 

Today, Moscow uses the region more to send signals to the west than to achieve lasting local outcomes. Some Russian leaders, for instance, hint at the potential of providing Iran with nuclear warheads, signaling to Washington and Europe that Russia remains capable of complicating crisis management.

In practice, Russia aims to maintain a visible presence – through its Syrian bases, statements on Palestine, high-level contacts with Iran, Turkiye, and Gulf states, and meetings with Arab leaders – ensuring it remains part of regional dialogue. 

At the same time, it avoids deep engagement that could make it accountable for outcomes beyond its control, especially as Washington has reasserted influence in West Asia through Israel's aggressions and affairs, underscoring the region’s strategic importance and signaling it remains off-limits to rivals.

Overall, these dynamics reflect a shift in Moscow’s foreign policy. Faced with an existential crisis in Ukraine, an unreliable Syria, a high-risk Iran–Israel confrontation, and hesitant regional partners, Russia now treats West Asia primarily as a bargaining chip. Its approach is calculated containment: maintaining a foothold, preserving influence, and signaling presence, while steering clear of commitments it cannot control.

Is Iran the exception?

There is no doubt that Iran is a key strategic partner for Russia in West Asia – perhaps the most important one. This is consistently affirmed by official Russian statements. Iran is part of the North–South economic corridor stretching from Russia to India, is the only West Asian member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is a member of BRICS, and is the most anti-American actor in the region and the most willing to cooperate with Moscow across multiple fields. In addition, the two countries have a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The importance of Tehran to Moscow can be seen through the statements of various Russian officials. Following the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and Tehran in January 2025, President Putin said, “The Russian–Iranian treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership represents a real achievement … We are unanimously determined not to stop here and to take our relations to a qualitatively new level.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stated, “Our joint assessment is that Russian–Iranian relations are of a special nature and fully in line with the spirit of comprehensive strategic partnership. These ties continue to develop dynamically despite the complex regional and global situation and the attempts to pressure our two countries with the aim of hindering the development of both Iran and the Russian Federation.”

During the same forum mentioned earlier, all Russian researchers and academics emphasized Iran’s great importance to Russian leaders, who view it as a cornerstone for cooperation in West Asia. They affirmed that there are no limits to the collaboration in the economic and political fields, but the challenge lies in security and defense. According to them, Moscow is not prepared to provide a significant level of military support, fearing it could affect its relations with the Gulf states or draw it indirectly into a war against the US and Israel. They cite as evidence the recent 12-day Israel–Iran war, during which Moscow offered no notable military contribution.

It should be noted that this view contradicts Moscow’s official stance. During a press conference on 15 October, Foreign Minister Lavrov affirmed that “with regard to our military–technical cooperation with Iran, following the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, there are no longer any restrictions on us. We are supplying the equipment Iran needs fully in accordance with international law.”

Hence, the question is legitimate: does the Russian–Iranian partnership include the fields of security and defense, or has it not yet reached that level? In any case, it is history – not official statements or analyses – that will answer this question. The Israeli–Iranian confrontation continues, and everyone awaits a second round of war. The US goal of toppling the Iranian government also remains part of Washington’s vision. Accordingly, Moscow’s future performance toward Iran will determine whether its declarations are truly serious – or merely rhetorical.