Israel's Lobby 2.0: What Walt & Mearsheimer didn't anticipate
In their new book, Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick chart
the evolution of this powerful special interest and its unmatched influence in
the US
Aug 26, 2026
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-lobby-book/?
In March 2006,
the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) denounced the essay by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt,
"The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," as a
"a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking the canards of
Jewish power and Jewish control."
In their essay, which was the basis of the book of the
same name that appeared the next year, Mearsheimer and Walt had been careful to
distinguish the Israel lobby from a lobby by and for Jews, but it was to no
avail in the furor that the essay and book provoked.
Two decades later, as the United States and Israel
wage a senseless war against Iran, Mearsheimer and Walt's case for the inordinate
influence of Israel and the Israel lobby over American foreign policy looks
pretty good. So does their contention that the policies promoted by Israel and
its lobby are not in America's interest.
Eli Clifton, an investigative journalist who has
documented the lobby's influence, and Ian Lustick, a retired political
scientist and expert on the Middle East, have written a worthy sequel to Mearsheimer and
Walt's book, entitled "Israel's
Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power". Like Mearsheimer and Walt, they use the term
"lobby" to refer to a "loose network" of groups, media outlets, and wealthy individuals. They do an
excellent job of explaining how this lobby has grown and altered its approach
over the last two decades.
As Clifton and Lustick show, the lobby has changed the
way it tries to influence election outcomes. Before the Supreme Court ruled on
Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, which opened the door to super-PACs and
unlimited contributions, AIPAC and affiliated groups tried to influence
elections and elected officials through campaign contributions. But AIPAC
itself did not contribute to candidates or officials. Instead, its leadership
urged its members, which included the very wealthy, to back certain politicians
and to oppose others based on whether they had backed or opposed measures that
were in Israel's interest. Members of the House and Senate committees that
oversaw foreign aid could expect generous contributions if they backed aid to
Israel. Donors gave these contributions directly to candidates and to
sympathetic local PACs like Badger PAC or Gold Coast PAC, which in turn doled
them out to candidates.
In the last decade, national groups that support
Israel's government have established their own super PACs that wage independent
expenditure campaigns either for or against candidates. In 2019, Mark Mellman
founded Democratic Majority for Israel. In 2021, AIPAC founded the United
Democracy Project. These committees have spent huge sums. According to Federal
Election Commission records, the United Democracy Project has doled out $104
million between January 1, 2025, and July 31, 2026. In August, the UDP
alone spent $2.5 million to oppose an Afghan-American
candidate, Aisha Wahab, in a runoff for the northern California congressional
seat vacated by Democratic Rep. Eric Swalwell.
In the past, wealthy American supporters of Israel's
government also exercised influence as individuals. Businessman Abraham
Feinberg was a major funder of Harry Truman's 1948 campaign, which gained him
access to Truman and allowed him to influence Truman's policy toward the new
state of Israel. Feinberg was, however, small potatoes by current standards.
During the last decade, what Clifton and Lustick describe as a "small set
of megadonors" have backed unconditional support for Israel. Clifton and
Lustick highlight nine donors, including Miriam and the late Sheldon Adelson,
Jeff Yass, Larry Ellison, Haim Saban, the late Bernard Marcus, and Paul Singer,
who have contributed over $1.7 billion in disclosed contributions since 2012.
These contributions, they note, do not include undisclosed "dark
money."
Some of these contributions, like those from the
Adelsons, directly affected policy. The Adelsons’ contributions to Donald Trump
in 2016 were reportedly based on an understanding that he would
recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem,
which he did upon taking office. While AIPAC and the formal lobbies have
influenced Congress, the megadonors have specialized in winning over the
executive branch.
The groups supportive of Israel's government have also
changed how they have made their case for supporting Israel. When Mearsheimer
and Walt were writing their book, the groups could still rely on widespread
public support for Israel. If anything, the pro-Israel set in American politics
had grown to include Republican evangelicals as well as Democratic liberals.
Labeling politicians as "anti-Israel" or "pro-Palestinian"
could discredit them. In AIPAC's successful 1984 campaign to unseat Sen.
Charles Percy (R-Ill.), for instance, one of the groups sent around a mailer
describing Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress."
But as Israel's popularity has plummeted in the wake
of its disproportionate response to Hamas's October 7, 2023, massacre and to
Israel's continuing expansion in the Palestinian West Bank, the groups have had
to resort to deception and diversion against Israel's critics.
Instead of engaging the arguments of Israel's critics,
groups like the ADL, American Jewish Committee, the Adelson-backed Brandeis
Center for Human Rights and Law, and watchdog groups like CAMERA and the Canary
Mission began charging Israel's critics with antisemitism. "Their goal was
not to win debates about Israel," Clifton and Lustick write, "but to
prevent discussion about it." They successfully lobbied the Biden and
Trump administrations to endorse an official definition of antisemitism that
included criticisms of Israel. The Trump administration used charges of antisemitism to bludgeon liberal
universities and law firms they disliked. It would be surprising if Clifton and
Lustick escape being charged with antisemitism for exposing the machinations of
the Israel lobby.
The groups have also altered their campaign strategy.
In their advertising, the UDP and allied PACs have eschewed mention of American
policy toward Israel. Instead, they have attacked candidates they opposed by
citing their stands on whatever issues might resonate with the relevant
electorate. In their ads this year against Wahab, the groups advanced a spurious claim that she had made "teenage
girls more vulnerable to predators" by opposing a sex trafficking bill in
the state legislature.
In Michigan's Democratic Senate primary, AIPAC ran ads
claiming that Abdul El-Sayed "disrespected women." None of the ads
mentioned Israel. This tactic seemed to work in 2024 campaigns AIPAC and the
groups waged against then-Reps. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) and Jamaal Bowman (D-N.Y.),
but as the Iran War has deepened discontent with the U.S.-Israel alliance, it
failed against Wahab and El-Sayed. Mike Rogers, El-Sayed's Republican opponent
in the general election, even requested that AIPAC drop its plans to support him with
ads against El-Sayed.
As Clifton and Lustick show, the groups composing the
Lobby have seen a sharp growth in their staffs and revenues over the quarter
century. AIPAC and its educational foundation enjoyed a "fivefold increase
in revenue between 2000 and 2022.” The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (an AIPAC spinoff) increased its revenues from $5.2 million in 2001 to
$21.9 million in 2023. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), which
led the charge in 2015 against the Iran nuclear pact, increased its annual haul
from $1.12 million in 2001 to $17.8 million in 2022. Along with the megadonors,
the Israel groups enjoy the support of wealthy foundations, including the $256
million Koret Foundation and the $220 million Swartz Foundation. But the growth
of revenue has not been matched by a growth in influence. If anything, the
lobby's influence has declined, forcing it to resort to deceptive advertising
and incendiary accusations.
There are two parts of Clifton's and Lustick's
argument about which I wanted to read more. The first has to do with situating
the lobby in American politics. Clifton and Lustick accept Mearsheimer and
Walt's definition of the Israel lobby as "the loose coalition of
individuals and organizations that actively work to shape US foreign policy in
a pro-Israel direction." That might have been OK in 2007, but in 2008,
Jeremy Ben-Ami founded J Street, which billed itself as "pro-Israel,"
and which has attempted to move American foreign policy in a completely
different direction from AIPAC and the other "pro-Israel" groups that
Mearsheimer and Walt had assigned to the lobby. The lobby Clifton and Lustick
describe represents one interpretation of what it means to be
"pro-Israel."
As Clifton and Lustick note, the lobby has gradually
shifted rightward in American politics and in its view of Israel. AIPAC, which
was initially run by liberal Democrats and had its base in the Democratic
Congress, began moving toward the Republicans in 1982, when it made Robert
Asher its president. In 1993, it replaced its executive director Thomas Dine, a
former aide to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), with Howard Kohr, a Republican
operative. In its early days, AIPAC was aligned with Israel's social-democratic
Labor Party, but it has moved closer to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s
Likud Party and its aim for a Greater Israel. It harried Barack Obama's
attempts to achieve a two-state solution. Its PAC has not merely targeted harsh
critics of Israel like El-Sayed, but liberal Zionists like former Reps. Andy
Levin (D-Mich.) and Tom Malinowksi (D-N.J.).
And it's not just AIPAC. The constellation of groups
is now weighted toward Republican proponents of a greater Israel. It includes
Christians United for Israel, which boasts a larger membership than AIPAC; a revived,
Adelson-funded Zionist Organization of America; and the Republican Jewish
Coalition, which dwarfs its Democratic counterpart. The funders have also
tilted rightward. In the 1970s, AIPAC's president and major donor was real
estate developer Larry Weinberg, a liberal Democrat close to Vice President
Hubert Humphrey. Clifton and Lustick's lobby still includes major Democratic
donors including Saban, but more of the money is coming from Trump supporters
like Miriam Adelson, Yass, Singer, and Ellison.
In short, the lobby is increasingly part of a
conservative, pro-Trump Republican faction that backs the right wing of
Israel's politics. It is opposed not only by the Democrats who support J Street
— or beyond that, Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow — but also by a growing
group of Republican conservatives who believe that in his support for Israel,
Trump has betrayed his commitment to "America First." I would have
liked to know more about the political debates that took place inside AIPAC in
the 1990s when it shifted most decisively rightward and in AIPAC and other
groups during the Trump years.
What I would have also liked to read more about is the
precise relationship between the lobby and the Israeli government. AIPAC, the
main group in question, grew out of the American Zionist Council, which was
founded in 1949 and was funded by the Israeli government. In 1963, in response
to demands that it register as a foreign agent, AZC changed its name to the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and rewrote its charter to
exclude foreign contributions.
Since then, as far as is known, AIPAC has no financial
or other legal ties to Israel's government or institutions. But Clifton and
Lustick suggest that the lobby is "the agent of a foreign power." The
title of their book is similarly provocative. They called it "Israel's
Lobby" rather than "The Israel Lobby," and they subtitle the
book, "America in the Grip of a Foreign Power." That implies that the
lobby is subordinate to the Israeli government, even if it is not financed or
staffed by it.
They give one example of how that relationship has
worked, citing a quote in a book about U.S.-Israel relations from an unnamed
Israeli diplomat who served when George Shultz was Ronald Reagan's Secretary of
State. They wrote that the Israeli diplomat:
came up with the idea of "turning Israel into a
Major Non-NATO Ally. We told AIPAC, which started rolling the idea up and down
Capitol Hill corridors until it was accepted."
They also cite what an Israel official, unaware that
he was being recorded, said in 2015 to an American audience about the
government's efforts to get the Senate to oppose the Iran nuclear arms deal.
"We have the FDD. We have others working on ...data gathering, working on
activist organizations, money trail."
They summarize the relationship in this way:
"Israeli government operatives do not control the organizations ...
Israeli officials send signals that guide the behavior and the rhetoric of
Lobby leaders and thousands of activists." But these two examples don't go
far enough in making that case. The first is from a single source decades ago,
and the second is ambiguous. What does "having FDD" mean? One wants
to know whether the staff or the leadership in these groups have relationships
with people in Israeli government ministries who send them signals. Are there
examples of Israel's government persuading one of the groups to do something it
had not thought of doing or was wary of undertaking?
Answering these questions about the group's political
evolution or its precise relationship to the Israeli government would have
required trying to get people who have worked in these groups to talk candidly
about what went on. That kind of journalism is, perhaps, beyond the call of
duty for this book.
What Clifton and Lustick have provided is a
comprehensive and much-needed account of how the groups and individuals that
make up the lobby have attempted to influence American politics and policy.
That's quite an achievement, and anyone interested in America's relationship
with Israel should pick up Clifton and Lustick's book.
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