Pakistan-Iran corridor punches through the Hormuz blockade

By opening six overland routes for Tehran-bound cargo, Islamabad is turning transit trade into strategic leverage as US pressure reshapes the Persian Gulf’s commercial arteries

F.M. Shakil

MAY 8, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/pakistan-iran-corridor-punches-through-the-hormuz-blockade

When more than 3,000 Iran-bound containers began piling up at Karachi’s ports, the Strait of Hormuz crisis had already moved beyond the sea. It was now pressing on Pakistan’s docks, customs authorities, and border crossings. Soon after, Islamabad announced an overland transit mechanism for third-country cargo moving through Pakistan and into Iran.

This shift occurs as Washington’s influence over Persian Gulf and West Asian nations continues to decline, leading to new geostrategic adjustments throughout the region, affecting ports, pipelines, and defense diplomacy.

Energy security, military cooperation, and trade routes are being reassessed, while China and Russia quietly push alternatives that reduce US influence and open new regional linkages.

Analysts say the emerging pattern is visible in calls for a combined Muslim force, efforts by Gulf and Arab states to dilute dependence on Washington, and the growing push to replace the dollar in energy transactions. Each trend points to a region testing how far it can move beyond the old US-led order.

For Pakistan, the calculation is also domestic.

Transit trade promises customs revenue, port activity, and leverage at a time when Islamabad is squeezed by debt, energy costs, and security pressures along its western frontier. A corridor serving Iran can also support Pakistan’s ambition to become a connector between the Arabian Sea, Central Asia, and western China.

A land bridge for Iran

In line with these regional developments, Pakistan made a surprising and daring move last month by allowing Iran to carry its commercial shipments across six overland routes, ending at the Taftan border crossing with Iran.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce issued the “Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026” on 25 April, and three major seaports—Karachi Port, Port Qasim, and Gwadar Deep-Sea Port—were designated to receive and dispatch cargo to Iran and onward to Central Asian states.

Media reports framed the decision as a way for Iran to bypass the US blockade linked to the Strait of Hormuz, although Islamabad has avoided presenting it in openly confrontational terms.

Earlier last month, Pakistan sent a shipment of frozen beef to Uzbekistan via Iran, opening a new overland route through the Gabd-Rimdan border crossing between Iran and Pakistan. It was a test shipment, and officials said that the Iran corridor will facilitate trade between Iran and Central Asia via Pakistan's ports of Karachi and Gwadar.

Global media have suggested that the new arrangement could thwart US efforts to halt Iranian cargo shipments, a ploy primarily aimed at limiting Iranian oil exports, especially to China, and at tightening pressure on Tehran’s economy.

Speaking to The Cradle, Mushahid Hussain Syed, a former information minister and head of Pakistan's Senate Defense Committee, says:

“The unfair blockade has left thousands of Iranian containers stuck at Karachi ports, which has made it harder for people in Iran to get consumer goods. However, I disagree with the media reports suggesting that the overland corridors with Iran render the US blockade of Hormuz technically ineffective. The media intentionally or unintentionally made this facility seem like a way to help Iran get around the US blockade, even though it has a pure business consideration and has nothing to do with making things worse between the US and Tehran.”

Syed says that establishing six overland transit lines to Iran will have major political, economic, and diplomatic consequences. The corridor, he adds, has gained importance amid the US Navy’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since 13 April.

The immediate result of Pakistan’s new regulations is the potential clearance of about 3,000 Iranian containers stranded in Karachi, after restrictions on ships traveling to and from Iran left essential food and consumer goods stuck in the Pakistani port city.

Washington’s silent consent?

Did the US allow Pakistan to provide Iran with land routes around the Strait of Hormuz blockade? Has the blockade become less effective now that Iranian cargo can move through Pakistan?

These questions have circulated on social media since The Economic Times of India published the headline, “Asim Munir’s double game: Pakistan punches a legal hole in the US naval blockade of Hormuz,” on 27 April.

Some observers see the development as evidence that backchannel peace talks are producing results. In that reading, Washington has accepted a partial easing of pressure while expecting Iran to reopen the Strait, thereby lowering the likelihood of a wider escalation.

On 1 May, US President Donald Trump was asked by a reporter whether he knew Pakistan had opened land routes with Iran. He replied that he was aware of it, while expressing respect for Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Majyd Aziz, President of the Employers Federation of Pakistan, tells The Cradle:

"Conventional wisdom and market intelligence suggest that China and Russia did play a role in this policy’s formulation. However, common sense indicates that the facility would not have been offered without tacit approval from Washington. The beneficial element is that despite UN economic sanctions, a constant smuggling system, and a 900-kilometer border, bilateral trade has the potential to become a normal conduit advantageous to both countries.”

Aziz explains that, in the case of China, the agreement would most likely enable China-Iran trade via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) rather than through Central Asian countries. Russia, always seeking access to warm-water ports, would also view Pakistan’s geography as an opportunity to bypass US and European sanctions.

He argues:

“The juxtaposition of China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan is ideal for streamlined transportation via land routes. Therefore, China could have played a facilitative role in convincing Pakistan that it would provide all diplomatic support, given its critical mass to withstand any negative reactions from the US or even Europe.”

Aziz adds that a key bottleneck to implementation remains the hesitation of Pakistani commercial banks to support transit trade with Iran due to US sanctions. Without letters of credit, insurance coverage, and banking channels, the corridor could remain a narrow emergency route rather than the broader trade artery its supporters envision.

From Jebel Ali to Gwadar

Iran has been uprooting its logistics infrastructure from the Persian Gulf to shift its maritime trade—mostly handled by the UAE—to Pakistan’s overland corridor.

The movement of a large amount of Iranian-linked cargo, worth tens of billions of dollars, from busy hubs in the UAE—particularly Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port—to ports like Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim indicates a clear shift in the regional trade scene, driven by increasing geopolitical tensions.

Iran has depended on the UAE's re-export systems for a long time, managing about US$22 billion in imports in the year 2025. Total bilateral trade has increased to roughly US$27 billion.

However, due to significant security concerns, including the need to avoid potential sanctions and disruptions to sea routes, as well as the increasing instability in the region that could affect trade, this setup is gradually being shifted to overland routes.

In a series of posts on X, The Tehran Times, Iran’s leading international daily, said the country has replaced the UAE’s Jebel Ali port with Pakistani seaports.

The newspaper argued that replacing the UAE route with the Pakistani overland corridor could accelerate cargo movement, reduce costs, and bring Iran closer to the $60 billion CPEC network and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), positioning Pakistan as a bridge between South Asia and Eurasia amid a period of contested sea power.

“Setting up six overland routes, such as Gwadar and Taftan, is a smart move that will help both Iran and Pakistan. The main goal of this corridor is to resolve the problem of Iranian cargo that is stuck and to make it easier for goods from other countries to enter Iran through Pakistan,” Syed opines.

Temporary fix or permanent corridor?

How long will the Hormuz crisis persist? Could it still escalate into shortages of oil, gas, and other commodities, deepening global instability? In Pakistani trade circles, the question now is what happens to the land-route mechanism with Iran if the Strait reopens for regular shipping. Aziz reveals:

“The argument over these variables continues, as the Strait became a tinderbox, exacerbating the front-loading shipping costs. A suspension of hostilities, the opening of the Strait, and the resumption of oil, gas, and commodity cargo would eventually release pressure on the global economy. However, the six land-route facilities to Iran will remain intact and eventually become permanent, even if the war ends. This will not only generate considerable revenue, but hopefully, the much-delayed Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline will start functioning.”

He adds that the underlying issue remains Tel Aviv's confrontational approach, rooted in Israel's substantial and unwavering influence over Washington.

“Netanyahu would be uncomfortable with the US backing down and Iran consenting to a sensible compromise; therefore, the battle will continue in a blow-hot, blow-cold phase,” Aziz remarks.