For Lebanon’s new government, dangers around every corner

The new administration in Beirut, shaped by fragile alliances, foreign influence, and the sidelining of major political parties, offers a glimmer of reform but risks repeating corrosive, old political patterns.

The Cradle's Lebanon Correspondent

FEB 15, 2025

https://thecradle.co/articles/for-lebanons-new-government-dangers-around-every-corner

The newly formed Lebanese government, led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, convened its first cabinet session this week, where it began drafting its official ministerial statement and launching its mandate to govern. 

Emerging from a turbulent backdrop of political, military, and international shifts, the Salam government potentially symbolizes a new chapter for Lebanon: the election of General Joseph Aoun as president of the republic after a protracted vacancy in that position, Salam’s rise to the premiership after his tenure as president of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ), and Hezbollah’s diminished influence - with its domestic political allies largely side-lined, and the inclusion of factions historically opposed to Hezbollah in the ministerial cabinet. 

But in its first major test, the fledgling government faces Israel’s refusal to withdraw from southern Lebanon on the 18 February deadline mandated by a US-brokered ceasefire agreement. 

Tel Aviv has recently demanded a 10-day extension – a second one, after the initial 60-day deal term expired on 26 January. And, the Israelis are demanding that they retain troop presence for the forseeable future in five strategic Lebanese sites near the border areas.

Removing the resistance 

For the first time since the 1989 Taif Agreement which ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, the country’s ministerial statement may omit key language about its ‘resistance.’ For more than three decades, the phrase “the people, the army, the resistance” has been the political cornerstone underscoring Lebanon’s internal direction, rather than specifically legitimizing armed resistance against foreign occupation. 

All post-Taif Lebanese administrations - even through Syria’s military presence until 2005 and thereafter - consistently endorsed the Lebanese people's right to defend and resist against Israeli occupation, enshrining the ‘Army, People, Resistance’ triad.

However, recent developments—Israel’s regional aggressions and the overthrow of the Syrian government—have jeopardized this equation, which has been subjected to ferocious internal and external pressures. Washington, in particular, has played an outsized role in establishing a US-friendly government in Lebanon, exploiting Israeli efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military arsenal under the pretext of curbing Iranian influence in Lebanon.

While the Aoun-Salam administration by no means signals rapprochement with Tel Aviv, the president’s inaugural address and Salam’s early remarks advocate for a more diplomatic stance with the occupation state. In this regard, the duo appears poised to leverage international backing to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories, bring all internal weapons under state control, and bolster army deployment in the south - in exchange for international financial assistance.

Political alliance shifts and economic concerns

The Salam cabinet blends sectarian quota preservation with fresh business and financial faces, still upholding Lebanon’s delicate multi-sectarian fabric. Despite intensive foreign pressure, the Finance Ministry remains under control of the Shia sect - entrusted to Yassin Jaber from Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri’s quota, which reflects Hezbollah and Amal’s enduring political sway. However, the intervention and influence of Washington and Saudi envoy Prince Yazid bin Farhan in the weeks of prolonged ministerial post deliberations were evident in the final cabinet line-up.

Veteran faces like Tarek Mitri and Ghassan Salamé represent the few experienced politicos in Salam’s cabinet, which is filled with first-timers. But former pro-US prime minister Fouad Siniora’s subtle yet potent influence - stemming from his strong relationship with the prime minister - casts a long shadow over this government. Siniora’s tenure, it merits mentioning, brought Lebanon much strife, especially his decisions to dismantle Hezbollah’s communications network in May 2008 (which failed), downgrade relations with popular Sunni leader Saad Hariri, and side with Saudi Arabia in its 2017 campaign against Hariri.

Ministers from the US-aligned ‘Kulluna Irada,’ with backgrounds in western financial institutions, stir public and labor union anxieties over economic policies favoring IMF mandates at the expense of small depositors. This concern is reinforced by the presence of bank-centric political figures such as MP Mark Daou, which clearly contradict Aoun’s financial reform vision set out in his inaugural speech.

There is now widespread fear that US-backed ministers and their economic policies could further marginalize small depositors – the majority of Lebanese citizens - leaving Lebanon’s banking crisis unresolved and vulnerable, while deepening socioeconomic divides further.

The ascent of the right-wing, Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb parties - both anti-Hezbollah and pro-Israel proponents - to key ministries like Foreign Affairs and Justice, while excluding traditional Christian political allies of Hezbollah such as the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Marada parties, hints at the government’s current trajectory and shift in political power balances. 

The Transport Ministry’s controversial denial of an Iranian flight’s landing at Beirut’s Rafiq Hariri International Airport on Thursday - swayed by an Israeli military tweet - epitomizes this shift.

Saad Hariri’s complete absence from the cabinet is also fueling discontent within his substantial Sunni base that is wary of Salam’s monopoly over dozens of Sunni political appointments – key positions which former prime minister Najib Mikati respectfully left untouched during his tenure in the last government.

So, Hariri threw a potential wrench in Salam’s agenda during a 14 February public address marking the 20-year anniversary of his father Rafiq’s assassination. In his speech, Hariri announced that he will revive his Future Movement political party after a hiatus of almost seven years, which followed the forced televised resignation of his prime ministership, from Riyadh, under Saudi duress. 

The party’s comeback will surely change the Sunni dynamic in Lebanon dramatically, as no leader has been able to fill Hariri’s shoes in the intervening years. Moreover, it has the potential to derail any Siniora-led wing of Salam’s government.

The political quicksand of elections, appointments

Municipal elections loom as a litmus test for public sentiment ahead of the 2026 parliamentary polls, with Salam’s unprecedented openness to non-sectarian electoral reforms standing out as a potential game-changer across Lebanon’s political landscape. The willingness of Salam’s government to consider electoral reforms that transcend sectarian lines marks a significant departure from previous administrations, and hints at broader structural changes potentially up his sleeve. 

First up, though, the government faces the urgent task of naming key appointments in security, judiciary, and top administrative roles. According to multiple sources speaking to The Cradle, there are over 450 vacancies in Lebanon’s public administration, including about 190 top-tier positions left unfilled since 2019 due to political instability. 

Political forces are aggressively maneuvering to influence appointments, including traditionally Shia-designated positions like the head of Lebanon’s General Security. As his first choice, Parliamentary Speaker Berri, the highest-ranking Shia political figure in Lebanon, has selected an existing General Security notable Murshid Suleiman. 

But the shortlist of candidates revealed to The Cradle are all figures outside that agency, including the Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) Brigadier General Moussa Karneib, the State Security Agency’s Brigadier General Hassan Choucair, and President Aoun’s preferred choice, the head of Bekaa’s Army Intelligence, Brigadier General Mohamed Al-Amin. Reportedly, Aoun will also compromise on Choucair because the two enjoy a friendship.

To replace himself as commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Aoun has selected Brigadier General Rudolf Heikal. He reportedly informed Hezbollah of this choice during his penultimate meeting with Hezbollah MP Muhammad Raad to secure his presidential vote. 

For the leadership of Lebanon’s ISF, according to sources, Fouad Siniora has thrown his weight behind close associate Mahmoud al-Kobrosli to replace Imad Othman who is close to Saad Hariri. Siniora also favors replacing the pro-Hariri head of the Information Branch, Khaled Hammoud, despite his professional competence. 

The latter has emerged as one of the directorate’s most qualified officers in recent years, and his leadership has helped achieve qualitative security improvements in the country. The decision to remove him, say insiders, is because Aoun, Salam, and Siniora don’t like Hammoud on a personal level. It’s a troubling sign that genuine reform, despite the public rhetoric, is nowhere on the horizon: In the Lebanese game of political horse trading, political bias overwhelmingly trumps merit.

Challenges, risks, and opportunities

Today, the Salam government’s foremost priorities include enforcing the ceasefire, ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, and reconstructing the south, Bekaa, and Beirut’s southern suburb (Dahiyeh), while addressing the Lebanese army’s resource crunch amid its unplanned deployments along the country’s southern and Syrian borders.

Its biggest current threat is the continued Israeli occupation, bombings, and destruction of southern Lebanese villages, the killing of Lebanese civilians and soldiers, and the daily violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty without the government’s ability to activate US pressure on Tel Aviv during US President Donald Trump’s administration. 

Continued Israeli occupation can singlehandedly sink the Aoun-Salam government – not only from the protracted humiliation of a foreign occupation, but because tens of thousands of displaced Lebanese civilians cannot return home. These southerners may resort to armed resistance against Israeli troops – underlining that the LAF, whose former commander is now Lebanon’s president, are unable to protect the country’s land or people.

The Lebanese army, despite sporadic American largesse, suffers from a lack of quantitative and qualitative resources – a deliberate US goal – leaving it financially and militarily unable to thwart stronger, larger forces across its borders.

LAF soldiers have been heavily deployed on the Syrian border since last week, concerned with security breaches by Syrian jihadist groups operating on the northern and eastern borders. This comes at a time when the army needs a massive deployment in the south to dismantle Israel’s pretexts for continued occupation and force its withdrawal.

Additionally, Lebanon faces ripple effects from Trump’s regional ambitions, Saudi political intervention, internal political vendettas, and the decade-long Syrian refugee crisis, but the Salam government’s window to instil confidence lies in tangible security, judicial, and economic reforms which are not firmly in his control. 

Moreover, the challenge of balancing internal political tensions, especially between Presidents Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, could hinder the government’s ability to execute its plans effectively. The upcoming Paris donor conference, though promising financial aid, may fall short of substantial relief, with concern already lingering over replicating last year’s $1 billion package.