'West Asia is no longer our battle': Moscow withdraws from the arena

Moscow is reducing its active involvement in West Asia, shifting from managing regional conflicts to maintaining a visible presence and using the region as leverage against the west.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

NOV 1, 2025

https://thecradle.co/articles/west-asia-is-no-longer-our-battle-moscow-withdraws-from-the-arena

In modern diplomacy, some of the most important messages are no longer conveyed through diplomats. Instead, they are presented in policy forums, roundtable meetings, and “expert” committees – spaces that allow states to express what they truly think without making official statements. These platforms enable governments to test red lines, issue warnings, and shape regional narratives through analysts and strategists who speak with authority but do not formally represent the state. 

From 19 to 23 October, Moscow hosted the fifth International Research and Expert Forum, “Russia–the Middle East,” bringing together researchers and experts from Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Turkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. Most participants were academics affiliated with research centers closely connected to their countries’ Foreign Ministries. From the very first day, it was clear that one of Moscow’s main objectives in organizing the forum was to send a clear message: Russia’s approach toward West Asia has changed.

The new Russian approach to West Asia

Russia’s current approach to West Asia is based on a fundamental conviction that the region is primarily an American sphere of influence, and that any direct Russian attempt to compete with the US would be costly and futile. During the ‘West Asia and Russia Experts Forum,’ Andrei Denisov, Member of the Council of the Russian Federation, emphasized: 

“In West Asia, there is only one player, and that is the United States. Any other player who intervenes will lose, because the United States will not allow any international actor to operate freely in the region.”

Moscow’s position stems from its belief that its southern security – meaning the security of its southern borders and immediate regional environment – constitutes its highest security priority. Therefore, Russia’s involvement in the crises and wars of the region is no longer aimed at influencing or managing their outcomes, but rather at preventing the repercussions of chaos and instability from spilling over into Russia itself or its immediate neighborhood.

From this standpoint, Moscow has become convinced that the countries of the region must shape their own regional order. Russia no longer believes it is in its interest to play the role of a power that re-engineers West Asia, as earlier iterations of Russian policy once attempted to do. Instead, it now prefers to maintain open relations with all sides and to deal with any existing de facto authority, rather than investing in a regional project of its own.

This point was emphasized by Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy director for Scientific Affairs at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who stated that “The era of the old Russia that tried to shape the region is over. Now, Russia is not concerned with what happens in the region, but it will work with any actor that exists within it.”

Reserved neutrality and active participation

Within this framework, Moscow states clearly that West Asia is not a strategic priority compared to Eastern Europe, and that its political and military resources are directed primarily toward that front. This shift is clearly reflected in its position during the war against Iran, where Moscow informed Tehran that it could not provide direct military support. The most it could commit to was refraining from assisting Israel – meaning that “relative neutrality” is the maximum form of help Russia can offer.

Instead of entering into a costly confrontation with Washington, Russia is increasingly moving toward a model closer to the Chinese approach: avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, building channels with all parties, concluding economic and technological deals, managing flexible relations even among warring rivals, exercising great caution in explicitly siding with any actor, and criticizing American, Israeli, Gulf, or Iranian policies when necessary, but without turning it into blind hostility.

In this context, Moscow promotes the idea of “reserved neutrality” and “active participation” – that is, presenting itself as a present, balanced, and cautious power that talks to everyone and benefits from economic opportunities without bearing the costs of deep security engagement. Here, Russia bets on the tools of soft power and economic influence rather than military involvement, by exporting wheat and energy, participating in civilian nuclear power projects, intensifying academic exchanges, opening university branches, and activating networks of friendly elites in the region, including Russian-speaking communities and holders of dual nationality.

The practical outcome is Russia’s acknowledgment that its role in West Asia has declined, shifting from an ambition to manage regional balances to merely keeping communication channels open and securing whatever benefits can be obtained at minimal cost. This is in an environment that Moscow views as dominated by a single effective actor – the US – where any party that attempts to challenge this reality directly becomes drained before achieving any real gains.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Consequently, Moscow has shifted from a policy of deep engagement to one of minimal positioning, aimed not at shaping Syria’s transitional phase but at preserving a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean by maintaining operations at the Hmeimim air base, the Tartous naval facility, and a limited presence in Qamishli for potential future use.

The local system that once sustained Russian influence no longer exists in a form that Moscow can rely on. The Syrian landscape has become increasingly fragmented and divided, and deep field engagement now carries the risk of being drawn into internal conflicts with diminishing returns.

Accordingly, it can be said that what Moscow is doing today is reducing costs while keeping its options open – by scaling down its presence and avoiding the expenses of acting as Syria’s ‘security manager,’ without completely abandoning the military infrastructure it might need later.

The third driver is the increasing risk of being drawn into escalation between Iran and Israel. This year witnessed the first direct confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. There is no doubt that Iran is a vital partner for Russia, but this relationship has not reached a level that would compel Moscow to support Tehran in its conflict, especially since it does not wish to slide into a military stance openly hostile to Israel or the United States.

For this reason, Russia’s position during the 12-day Israeli war on Iran in June was limited to rhetorical calls for restraint, offers to mediate, and public warnings about global instability. No tangible military support was provided. In this context, some Russian analysts believe that a full-scale regional war involving Israel, Iran, and their allies could force Russia into taking a direct side, which would threaten its remaining access to Syria, the Gulf states, and Turkiye. It would also endanger energy transit routes and infrastructure projects that Russia seeks to implement with Iran and across Eurasia.

Therefore, deeper Russian military intervention in West Asia is now seen more as a responsibility trap than an opportunity, one that could drag Russia into an open confrontation with US-aligned forces or undermine its delicate balance between Iran, Israel, Turkiye, and the Gulf states.

Fourthly, Russia receives diminished diplomatic returns relative to the efforts it expends. 

Between 2015 and 2021, Moscow marketed itself to Arab capitals as the only actor capable of engaging all regional players – an image that carried real value for countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. But by 2025, this image had weakened significantly.

Reduced influence with regional partners

Cooperation between Russia and regional powers remains active in energy, logistics, grain, and arms. Yet Moscow is no longer regarded as an effective security mediator or crisis manager, a shift underscored by the failure – so far – to hold the inaugural Russian–Arab summit, originally scheduled for October 2025. In April, Moscow had planned the summit to bring Arab leaders to the capital, with President Vladimir Putin envisioning a scene reminiscent of the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting between Arab leaders and Trump. However, the Arab states requested a postponement, citing preoccupation with regional developments and the implementation of Trump’s ‘Gaza peace plan.’

From Moscow’s perspective, if key Arab states are avoiding direct engagement and no longer view Russia as indispensable, maintaining large, exposed assets or investing heavily in mediation produces less influence than before, reducing the rationale for high-risk involvement in the region.

West Asia as a lever against the west

For these reasons, West Asia’s status has been downgraded from a primary front to a tool of leverage. 

Today, Moscow uses the region more to send signals to the west than to achieve lasting local outcomes. Some Russian leaders, for instance, hint at the potential of providing Iran with nuclear warheads, signaling to Washington and Europe that Russia remains capable of complicating crisis management.

In practice, Russia aims to maintain a visible presence – through its Syrian bases, statements on Palestine, high-level contacts with Iran, Turkiye, and Gulf states, and meetings with Arab leaders – ensuring it remains part of regional dialogue. 

At the same time, it avoids deep engagement that could make it accountable for outcomes beyond its control, especially as Washington has reasserted influence in West Asia through Israel's aggressions and affairs, underscoring the region’s strategic importance and signaling it remains off-limits to rivals.

Overall, these dynamics reflect a shift in Moscow’s foreign policy. Faced with an existential crisis in Ukraine, an unreliable Syria, a high-risk Iran–Israel confrontation, and hesitant regional partners, Russia now treats West Asia primarily as a bargaining chip. Its approach is calculated containment: maintaining a foothold, preserving influence, and signaling presence, while steering clear of commitments it cannot control.

Is Iran the exception?

There is no doubt that Iran is a key strategic partner for Russia in West Asia – perhaps the most important one. This is consistently affirmed by official Russian statements. Iran is part of the North–South economic corridor stretching from Russia to India, is the only West Asian member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is a member of BRICS, and is the most anti-American actor in the region and the most willing to cooperate with Moscow across multiple fields. In addition, the two countries have a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The importance of Tehran to Moscow can be seen through the statements of various Russian officials. Following the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and Tehran in January 2025, President Putin said, “The Russian–Iranian treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership represents a real achievement … We are unanimously determined not to stop here and to take our relations to a qualitatively new level.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stated, “Our joint assessment is that Russian–Iranian relations are of a special nature and fully in line with the spirit of comprehensive strategic partnership. These ties continue to develop dynamically despite the complex regional and global situation and the attempts to pressure our two countries with the aim of hindering the development of both Iran and the Russian Federation.”

During the same forum mentioned earlier, all Russian researchers and academics emphasized Iran’s great importance to Russian leaders, who view it as a cornerstone for cooperation in West Asia. They affirmed that there are no limits to the collaboration in the economic and political fields, but the challenge lies in security and defense. According to them, Moscow is not prepared to provide a significant level of military support, fearing it could affect its relations with the Gulf states or draw it indirectly into a war against the US and Israel. They cite as evidence the recent 12-day Israel–Iran war, during which Moscow offered no notable military contribution.

It should be noted that this view contradicts Moscow’s official stance. During a press conference on 15 October, Foreign Minister Lavrov affirmed that “with regard to our military–technical cooperation with Iran, following the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, there are no longer any restrictions on us. We are supplying the equipment Iran needs fully in accordance with international law.”

Hence, the question is legitimate: does the Russian–Iranian partnership include the fields of security and defense, or has it not yet reached that level? In any case, it is history – not official statements or analyses – that will answer this question. The Israeli–Iranian confrontation continues, and everyone awaits a second round of war. The US goal of toppling the Iranian government also remains part of Washington’s vision. Accordingly, Moscow’s future performance toward Iran will determine whether its declarations are truly serious – or merely rhetorical.

 

Rethinking Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME): A Policy Past Its Prime

by Jamie Haase | Oct 31, 2025

https://original.antiwar.com/Jamie_Haase/2025/10/30/rethinking-israels-qualitative-military-edge-qme-a-policy-past-its-prime/

Rethinking Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME): A Policy Past Its Prime

by Jamie Haase | Oct 31, 2025 | 

In business, an edge is earned. In U.S. diplomacy, it is handed out – nepotism with a human cost. Corporate America calls it a “sustainable competitive advantage,” the factor that separates market leaders from the rest, reflecting a company’s key competencies. In American foreign policy, however, winning can be guaranteed – and the price is measured not in profit, but in lives.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in America’s obligation to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), a mandate ensuring Israel remains militarily superior to its neighbors. What began as a Cold War–era security assurance has become a guarantee of supremacy. Under Israel’s current government, which openly disregards human rights and international law, the QME policy now threatens U.S. diplomacy across the Middle East.

President Lyndon B. Johnson’s promise to arm Israel more heavily than the Soviets were equipping Arab states has evolved into a binding status quo – perpetuating dependency, fueling regional mistrust, and tying American credibility to Israel’s increasingly immoral military agenda. Today, Israel faces no existential threat, and the Middle East has changed dramatically since the 1960s.

Israel’s QME evolved after the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars, when threats from leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and growing Soviet influence in the region convinced U.S. policymakers to strengthen Israel’s military position. When France cut off arms shipments in response to Israel’s illegal settlement expansion – which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention and has been condemned by the UN and International Court of Justice – Washington became Israel’s primary supplier of advanced weaponry, creating a dependence that endures today – though no longer relevant.

Scholar Avner Cohen notes that Israel’s ambiguous nuclear capability – never officially confirmed but widely acknowledged – has long served as a bargaining chip with Washington. It pressured U.S. lawmakers to guarantee Israel’s conventional military superiority, reducing the risk of nuclear escalation. At the time, however, any nuclear provocation would have been one-sided, since no other Middle Eastern state had comparable capabilities.

In 2008, Congress formally codified Israel’s QME through the Naval Vessel Transfer Act, requiring that any American arms sales to other Middle Eastern countries not adversely affect Israel’s military superiority. For decades, pro-Israel advocacy groups, including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), have lobbied to preserve and expand such commitments to Israel’s defense superiority. Today, Washington effectively manages the region’s arms market to maintain that position – acting as both principal supplier and gatekeeper.

In business, no company – even a dominant one – is immune to consequences. Unethical behavior invites competitors, investor losses, crashing stock prices, and destroys public trust. Israel’s QME eliminates such checks. Unlike a market advantage, Israel’s edge is guaranteed, regardless of respect for humanity. The United States is legally bound to preserve that supremacy, even when it is wielded unchecked and with impunity.

Initially just an informal security measure, it has now hardened into political dogma. Decades of lobbying and bipartisan support have made challenging the QME doctrine nearly unthinkable; most lawmakers reaffirm it by default. Today, Washington’s commitment to preserving Israel’s dominance serves domestic politics as much as it serves regional security some 7,000 miles away. It helps lawmakers court voters, donors, pro-Israel lobbying groups, and pro-Zionist evangelical constituencies – all while safeguarding campaign contributions and staying comfortably uncontroversial. Meanwhile, meaningful oversight remains largely absent.

This lack of accountability continues to reshape the Middle East. By design, QME blocks any Arab or Muslim-majority country from reaching parity with Israel. Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, for example, remain disadvantaged, while Israel enjoys exemptions no other state receives. The result is a rigid hierarchy that fuels resentment, weakens U.S. diplomacy, and reinforces the perception that America’s commitment to democracy is selective – and politically driven.

At home, the policy exposes a stark moral double standard. Lawmakers who condemn human rights abuses elsewhere routinely vote to expand Israel’s defense aid – even amid credible allegations of war crimes and civilian casualties mounting in the tens of thousands, conservatively. QME acts as a firewall, shielding Israel from scrutiny that other nations would face. By protecting Israel’s superiority, Washington erodes its own credibility, appearing less an honest broker and more a guarantor of permanent imbalance.

If Israel’s QME was once justified by survival, its persistence today reflects an unwillingness to adapt. The Middle East of 2025 is vastly different from the region during the Cold War, Vietnam, and pre-9/11 eras. Israel is a regional superpower and economically advanced, yet Washington treats its dominance as both a moral duty and a legal mandate – long after the original rationale had faded.

True security cannot rest on permanent superiority. It requires accountability, reciprocity, and restraint – the very qualities QME discourages. By tying U.S. credibility to Israel’s unchecked leverage, America loses the ability to promote stability and fairness. As long as Congress remains captive to the political machinery defending this imbalance, U.S. policy reflects power rather than principle.

Why does this law remain on the books, even as other outdated policies are discarded – especially when nations like Germany, the UK, and Italy are also supplying Israel with arms and advanced military technology? A policy built on guaranteed dominance cannot deliver lasting peace – especially in a region where millions live under occupation and starvation while denied equal rights in a state that prioritizes identity over equality.

Israel’s repeated ceasefire violations are part of its strategy to keep waging war on Gaza

Here’s Israel's strategy to continue the war on Gaza: find a pretext, no matter how baseless, use it to kill dozens of civilians and fighters, stop fire and claim you’re honoring the ceasefire. Then do it again.

By Tareq S. Hajjaj  October 29, 2025 

https://mondoweiss.net/2025/10/israels-repeated-ceasefire-violations-are-part-of-its-strategy-to-keep-waging-war-on-gaza/

The Israeli army announced that a soldier in Rafah had been killed by gunfire on Tuesday. Before the source of the gunfire could be confirmed, Netanyahu blamed it on Hamas, and gave the order for the army to launch “powerful strikes” on Gaza. The resumption of the Israeli bombing campaign killed over 100 people, 46 of whom were children, and 20 of whom were women, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health on Wednesday. 

Hamas released a statement saying it had nothing to do with the incident and that it remained fully committed to the ceasefire agreement in all areas. Nevertheless, the Israeli army carried out the attacks across several locations in Gaza. An army statement later said that Israeli forces had struck “30 terrorists holding command positions” in the Strip.

Later on Wednesday, the Israeli army announced that it was “resuming the ceasefire” agreement after having killed over 100 people in a single night. The killing of the Israeli soldier and the bombing campaign came on the heels of days of rhetoric from Israeli politicians, who have accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire due to the slow return of the bodies of deceased Israeli captives – something Hamas has attributed to the lack of equipment and the massive amounts of rubble to dig through in Gaza.

Tuesday’s airstrikes were not the first time Israel bombed Gaza during the ongoing ceasefire agreement, under the pretense that Hamas had violated the ceasefire. On October 19, the Israeli army said that Hamas had violated the ceasefire following an explosion in Rafah that led to the death of two Israeli soldiers. Israel claimed Hamas was responsible, despite the resistance group’s denial of the accusation and the later emergence of reports that the explosion was from an Israeli bulldozer running over unexploded ordnance. The army killed over a dozen people in its “retaliation.” 

On the same day, Israel assassinated Yahya al-Mabhouh, a commander in the al-Qassam Brigades who took part in the October 7 attack and also led an elite battalion east of Jabalia refugee camp, according to local journalists. Israel also assassinated Ramez Zaqout, another fighter who participated in October 7. 

These strikes are part of an emerging pattern in which Israel continues to manufacture pretexts to launch a flurry of strikes across the Strip, targeting both civilians and Hamas members.

Mondoweiss reviewed the records of the people killed in airstrikes since the ceasefire went into effect. The evidence points to an Israeli tactic of assassinating resistance fighters that had evaded detection during the war, under the pretext of “retaliation” for alleged violations of the ceasefire by Hamas. In essence – Israel is continuing to carry out its war during the ceasefire.

On Tuesday’s strike, the Israeli army took advantage of the alleged sniping attack to assassinate several resistance fighters, although local authorities indicate the majority of deaths were civilians.

Among the dead were commander Hatem al-Qudra, a leader in the al-Qassam Brigades, as well as Abdullah al-Liddawi, the commander of the western battalion in the North Gaza Brigade, who had also been targeted four times during the war but survived until last night’s strikes, according to local sources.

The Israeli army stated that the fighters it had targeted included three battalion commanders, two deputy battalion commanders, and sixteen company commanders, in addition to targeting observation posts and rocket launch sites. The army named al-Qudra as one of the participants in the October 7 attack.

The attack came after a tense week in Israel amid a flurry of visits from top U.S. officials seeking to ensure Israel adheres to the ceasefire, which has precipitated an internal crisis in Israeli political circles.

According to the Gaza Government Media Office on October 28, the Israeli army has committed 125 violations of the ceasefire. The Media Office added that the Israeli army has carried out 52 shootings, nine incursions into residential neighborhoods with military vehicles across its designated withdrawal line, 55 bombing operations, and 11 demolitions of civilian buildings.

Since the ceasefire on October 10, Israel has killed 211 Palestinians and injured 597, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. A majority have been civilians.

Families burned alive in their tents

Among the civilians killed in Tuesday’s attacks were entire families. At Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, the Al-Shawaf family mourned five martyrs – a husband, wife, and their four children – who were all killed inside their tent. In a video testimony for Mondoweiss, an elderly woman who identified herself as the grandmother says that the family had been alone in the tent, with no connection to the resistance or military work.

Witnesses said that three men in a tent adjacent to theirs were also killed in the same incident, although their background remains unknown.

The slain children’s aunt, Huda al-Shawaf, said that the family had been sleeping in their tent in the Mawasi area, which was considered relatively safe even during the war.

“I was preparing for the dawn prayer in my tent, and before I prayed, I heard the sound of intense bombing,” she told Mondoweiss in a video testimony. “I knew the bombing was very close to our location, so I covered my eyes and ears and sat on the ground to avoid seeing or hearing the same horror we’ve experienced over the past two years. But after the explosion, my father screamed, saying, ‘it’s Muhammad’s sons, their tent’s burning.’”

She rushed toward their tent as the fire was still burning, Huda says.

“The seven-year-old girl had been torn apart. The rocket had hit her and torn her into pieces,” she continues. “I could not bear to look at the sight. I was the first to arrive and saw all the mangled and burned bodies. I went to my sister-in-law, she was taking her last breath, uttering the shahada. I then went to the other two children, they were still alive. I dragged them outside the tent, away from the fire, and comforted them, saying, ‘You are safe, you will be fine.’ They responded and spoke a little.”

The 7-year-old girl later succumbed to her wounds, Huda clarifies.

“I then went to the eldest son, who is 17, who had finished his schooling in recent months and was now seeking a scholarship to study engineering abroad. He had been killed in his bed, as had his younger sisters.”

Canadian charities channeling millions to fund Israeli army, illegal West Bank settlements

Ottawa's complicity in supporting Israel’s occupation of Palestine through unchecked financial networks persists despite growing public opposition

News Desk

OCT 28, 2025

https://thecradle.co/articles/canadian-charities-channeling-millions-to-fund-israeli-army-illegal-west-bank-settlements

A new investigation by The Fifth Estate, the investigative program of Canada’s public broadcaster CBC, has revealed that several Canadian charities funneled large sums to organizations tied to Israel’s military and the expansion of illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank.

The investigative episode released on 16 October found that registered charities, including the Jewish National Fund of Canada (JNF), Mizrachi Organization of Canada, and the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association (CZCA), issued tax receipts for donations that ultimately supported illegal settlements and the Israeli army.

According to The Fifth Estate, Mizrachi Canada alone sent $50 million between 2007 and 2022, followed by another $5 million in 2023 and 2024. The CZCA transferred millions more to Israeli military-linked institutions, such as the Association for Israeli Soldiers and Friends of the IDF.

While Canadian law prohibits funding foreign militaries, these organizations retained nonprofit status, allowing donors to claim tax deductions. 

Critics told CBC that these practices violate tax regulations and contradict Ottawa’s stated opposition to settlements.

The JNF, founded before the establishment of Israel, has long been accused of expropriating Palestinian land. 

Its Canadian branch has sponsored over 180 projects since 2000, including “Canada Park,” built over 7,000 dunams of occupied West Bank land.

In 2023, the JNF raised $4.4 million for projects in occupied Palestine and set a new goal of up to $30 million for its “Israel Resilience Campaign.”

Public pressure during Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza prompted Ottawa last year to revoke the JNF’s charitable status for failing to restrict the use of donations. 

However, JNF officials immediately formed a new entity, Friends of JNF Canada, to continue fundraising while the original fund appealed the decision.

JNF Canada President Nathan Disenhouse told National Post that the new charity would “fundraise for Israel in a similar way that JNF Canada did, but with the ability to issue tax receipts,” adding that its focus would include “the mental and physical health of Israelis.”

Independent Jewish Voices, which first filed the complaint leading to the delisting, accused the JNF of financing discriminatory and harmful projects in Israel and the occupied West Bank. 

The organization has since lost a judicial appeal and vowed to take the case to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Meanwhile, The Fifth Estate documented the human toll of these donations in the occupied West Bank, where Israeli settlers continue to attack Palestinian civilians with impunity.

In one case, Khader Nawajah, from the village of Khirbet Susya, recounted how settlers beat him and his wife with stones and sticks. His doctor said such cases occur “many times, sometimes daily.”

Since May 2024, Ottawa has sanctioned 17 individuals and seven entities for what it called “extremist settler violence against civilians,” even as Canadian charities continued to channel funds that sustain the same system of occupation and abuse.

Israeli lawmaker urges world to act to prevent ‘genocide’ in West Bank

October 25, 2025

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251025-israeli-lawmaker-urges-world-to-act-to-prevent-genocide-in-west-bank/

An Israeli Knesset member urged the international community not to wait for another genocide, warning that Israel is moving toward mass atrocities in the occupied West Bank, Anadolu reports.

“I appeal to the international community. You waited too long before intervening to stop the genocide in Gaza. Don’t wait for a similar scenario in the West Bank because we are getting close to that,” Ofer Cassif told Anadolu.

“And don’t wait for a civil war inside Israel because we are getting close to that, too. Engage now. Do everything possible to stop these two dangers — they threaten both Palestinians and Israelis alike, and ultimately the entire region and the world. It’s not only a matter of justice; it’s in your own interest to stop this. You can do it. We can’t do it alone. We need you,” he added.

– Incident during Trump’s Knesset address

Regarding the incident when he and fellow lawmaker Ayman Odeh were expelled from the Knesset during US President Donald Trump’s speech last week, Cassif said, “It wasn’t really a speech. As you know, it was just a collection of words that weren’t necessarily connected. It was a theatrical performance, a show of three self-obsessed egomaniacs, especially (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu and Trump, and to some extent Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana as well.”

He added, “It was a display of flattery, truly disgusting. I must say it had no real substance other than boasting about each other.”

Cassif noted that he and Odeh were expelled because they raised a sign that read: ‘Recognize Palestine.’

“Everyone should understand, though many in Israel refuse to, that the only solution to the conflict, the only way to stop the bloodshed, destruction and suffering for both Palestinians and Israelis, is to recognize Palestine and to establish a real, independent, sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel. That was our message.”

“Let’s not forget that Trump himself was complicit in sacrificing Israeli hostages and in the massacre of Palestinians. He supported the Israeli government last March when it violated an agreement that was already on the table, one that could have saved thousands of lives among Palestinians, hostages and soldiers. We must remember that. Trump is part of the problem. He is not the savior,” he continued.

Cassif said their message also concerned the future. “A Palestinian state and an end to the occupation, that’s the only path forward. Ayman Odeh and I held a sign that said, ‘Recognize Palestine.’ That’s all. We didn’t shout, we didn’t speak, we didn’t say anything — just that sign. It was necessary, given the past and the future.”

 ‘The government wants to complete a fascist coup’

Regarding the Knesset’s winter session that began Monday and is expected to be the last of the current parliament, Cassif said, “There is no doubt that the government wants to achieve two main things in the coming months, whether elections take place as planned in October or earlier, like June or even before that.”

“The government wants, first and foremost, to continue the coup, what they call ‘judicial reform.’ It’s neither reform nor judicial. It’s a coup, fascist in every sense of the word. It’s dictatorial, a coup aimed at completely eliminating the independence of the judiciary. That’s something I criticize strongly, but that’s not the point; they want to destroy it,” he added.

He said that another aspect “is the complete destruction of media independence, which I also criticize severely. Despite everything, it remains somewhat independent, but the government wants to destroy it.”

“Third, the government wants to eliminate whatever civil rights are left. This government is waging war on every remaining element of democracy in Israel — whether it’s the judiciary, the attorney general, the media, civil society, or individual citizens. That’s what they’re doing. They want to complete a fascist coup,” Cssif added.

He said in recent days, Israel has seen “a horrifying level of violence in the occupied West Bank, especially against Palestinians and activists harvesting olives.”

“Occupation forces expelled them from their lands to make way for terrorist settlers, not only to beat Palestinians and attack them but also, as activists reported, to steal their food, for example, and take over the land. This is part of the annexation plan. It’s not just a fascist mob acting against the government’s policies. It’s part of government policy itself, and that’s another reason for deep concern.”

– Struggle is over who will be next Netanyahu

Asked about Israel’s political opposition, Cassif said, “There is only a nominal opposition, not a real one, because the vast majority of those who call themselves opposition members are aligned with the government and the coalition. They don’t offer a political alternative, only a personal one. Right now, the struggle in Israel between the so-called opposition and the coalition is over who will be the next Netanyahu.”

“We must never accept that, at the very least. We will continue our struggle as we always have. We were the pioneers of resistance inside the Knesset, and we will continue to fight against the genocide in Gaza and do exactly the same regarding the West Bank and the fascist coup. Unfortunately, I have no expectations from the opposition, but we will do our work,” he added.

– Israel has turned into a fascist regime

Reflecting on the changes in Israel in recent years, Cassif said, “As you know, everything is 100% negative, if not worse. It’s destroying Israeli society — at the expense of Israelis and, of course, Palestinians. It has turned Israel into a fascist regime.”

“So, in that sense, apart from the genocide, which is itself a crime, the ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and other atrocities, it’s clearly negative,” Cassif noted.

Occupation will end ‘in the coming years’

“If I may describe it as positive under such circumstances, I believe it has actually made it easier to establish a Palestinian state, end the occupation, and even democratize Israel to some extent. In the near term, everything is negative, but in the long term, I believe we will see positive outcomes. The occupation will end, in my opinion, within a few years. A truly independent Palestinian state will emerge — that means liberation for both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. I believe this will happen in the coming years.”

“In that sense, there is hope. We must remain optimistic, but we must also struggle and fight. We need the international community on our side. There must be a combination of our internal struggle and international efforts. Once we achieve that, nothing can stop us,” Cassif continued.

– Elections, Netanyahu’s prospects

Regarding the upcoming elections and Netanyahu’s chances, Cassif said, “There are two main issues here. First, the assumption that elections will even be held. Obviously, if it were up to Netanyahu and his fascist fanatics within the coalition, they would do everything possible to cancel or at least postpone them.”

“But if elections are held on time or earlier, the main danger right now is that the coalition and its extremist supporters outside parliament are already planning to turn the elections into a sham — unfair and biased at best. They are trying to pass laws that would, for example, prevent us from running in the elections. That plan has already started,” he said.

“Moreover, the police no longer exist as an independent force. It has turned into a private militia in the hands of the government in general, and specifically in the hands of the fascist extremist and convicted terrorist Itamar Ben-Gvir. On top of that, there are private armed militias of fascists just waiting for an order – and once they get it, whether from (National Security Minister) Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu, or others in this gang, they will do everything they can to prevent Palestinian and leftist citizens from voting. So, I expect elections that will not be fair.”

He added, “If that happens, as I fear it will, it will make victory for the fascist right even easier. But even if we succeed in fighting these plans and preventing such bias, we must remember that 50% of the people under Israel’s control are still deprived of the right to vote, I mean the Palestinians in the occupied territories. But hypothetically speaking, if we ignore that, and if we manage to hold fair elections, then I believe the fascists have no real chance of winning.”

“But I fear we will see violence, either before the elections, on election day, or even afterward if they lose. Who knows? Maybe after the results are published, as we saw in the United States when Biden won. We saw what happened there. I fear we will see something very similar here, maybe even worse. I hope I’m wrong,” added Cassif.​​​​​​​

 

Clearing Gaza’s surface of bombs will take up to 30 years, aid group says

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2620018/middle-east

GENEVA: Clearing the surface of Gaza of unexploded ordnance will likely take between 20 to 30 years, according to an official with aid group Humanity & Inclusion, describing the enclave as a “horrific, unmapped minefield.”

More than 53 people have been killed and hundreds injured by lethal remnants from the two-year Israel-Hamas war, according to a UN-led database, which is thought by aid groups to be a huge underestimate.

A US-brokered ceasefire this month has raised hopes that the huge task of removing them from among millions of tons of rubble can begin.

“If you’re looking at a full clearance, it’s never happening, it’s subterranean. We will find it for generations to come,” said Nick Orr, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal expert at Humanity & Inclusion, comparing the situation with British cities after World War Two.

“Surface clearance, now that’s something that’s attainable within a generation, I think 20 to 30 years,” he added.

“It’s going to be a very small chipping away at a very big problem.”

Orr, who went to Gaza several times during the conflict, is part of his organization’s seven-person team that will begin identifying war remnants there in essential infrastructure like hospitals and bakeries next week.

For now, however, aid groups like his have not been given blanket Israeli permission to start work on removing and destroying the ordnance nor to import the required equipment, he said.

COGAT, the arm of the Israeli military overseeing Gaza aid, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. It blocks items into Gaza which it considers have “dual use” — both civilian and military.

Orr said it was seeking permission to import supplies to burn away bombs rather than detonate them, to ease concerns about them being repurposed by Hamas.

He voiced support for a temporary force such as one foreseen in the 20-point ceasefire plan.

“If there is going to be any kind of future inside of Gaza, there needs to be an enabling security force that allows humanitarians to work,” Orr said.