The Canard of a ‘Hamiltonian Foreign Policy’

by Aaron Sobczak | Sep 3, 2024

https://libertarianinstitute.org/articles/the-canard-of-a-hamiltonian-foreign-policy/

Walter Russell Mead asserts in a new piece in Foreign Affairs that what he labels “Jacksonian national populism” and “Jeffersonian isolationism” have both made a significant comeback in the twenty-first century. According to Mead, George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq mirrors Jacksonian populism, and Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 signalled the collapse of neoconservatism in the American electorate. Shockingly, he also asserts that both parties have been dominated by restraint and free trade. His article emphasizes the collapse of liberal globalism, and the importance of a return to Hamiltonian foreign policy. 

What is a Hamiltonian foreign policy? Mead’s inconsistent, utopian opinion is that Alexander Hamilton’s focus was essentially neo-colonialist and mercantilist in nature. His view of Hamilton is that he supported a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, with a focus on corporate success and economic protectionism. He lays out a romantic view of Hamilton, the “patriot” who supported a nation emphasizing business interests over laissez-faire capitalism. This is done through a lens which paints Hamiltonian nationalism as a purely selfless strategy for statecraft, rather than a corrupt mixture of government and business interests, resulting in a type of corporatism. This type of relationship, when extended beyond the national borders of the United States, becomes neo-colonial in nature. 

First, it’s necessary to refute the romantic fiction of Alexander Hamilton. He was not an American patriot, but a hyper fan of the British Empire and its mercantilist system. Hamilton advocated against state sovereignty, and against the federal system altogether. He pursued centralized state power and a president who would stay in office for life. He regularly acted as an apologist for the British, even scheming to keep the colonies under the crown until it was not politically popular. Hamilton envisioned America as an extension of British mercantilism, an economic model which is chronically unable to perform efficiently.

Mercantilism was a system which gave explicit privileges to individuals or groups favored by the state. Thus, economic decisions were not made with market preferences in mind, but with the interests of those favored corporations. The mercantilist system fell out of political popularity as it became increasingly ineffective and costly. As new avenues of trade opened around the world, it became abundantly clear that this form of economic protectionism was not viable. 

Rather than embracing the enlightenment principles espoused by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton was dedicated to the regressive ideas of Thomas Hobbes, who romanticized the sovereign and had no understanding of spontaneous cooperation or market efficiency. The United States was founded on the ideals of self-determination and the consent of the governed. Hamilton’s legacy is directly opposite, and his ideas have managed to stay popular after his death, partly due to the nationalist victory at the Constitutional Convention.

Just as high levels of state interventionism and economic planning have been prevalent in America, so has Hamiltonian foreign policy. Mead asserts in his article that liberal internationalism and neoconservatism are distinctly different from his Hamiltonian pragmatism; the problem is that historically, the incentives have always revolved around cronyism and American influence. 

At best, ideas of international order and humanitarianism are never consistently upheld. After leading the United States into World War I, President Woodrow Wilson crafted the League of Nations, an organization meant to end future conflicts and uphold ideas of self-determination. Neither of these things were accomplished. Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie famously pleaded for the League of Nations to stop Italy from invading his country, but nothing was done. Additionally, Wilson’s interventions into the Caribbean and Central America were anything other than altruistic. Marine Corps Major General Smedly Butler said about his actions under Wilson, “I helped make Mexico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Banky boys to collect revenue in. I helped purify Nicaragua for the internal banking house of Brown Brothers…I brought light to the D.R. for American sugar interests in 1916.”

Another supposed internationalist, President Barack Obama, infamously ruined Libya for generations when he involved America in the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Obama also increased American involvement in Syria to depose Bashar al-Assad. To do this Obama funded islamic rebel groups, with some of whom were part of the Islamic Brotherhood. Maybe most damning, Obama allowed the Saudi Arabian regime to commit what is widely regarded as genocide against Yemenis. The Saudi air force was maintained and funded by the United States, and their multi-year war killed over 300,000 people and left 80% of the population in dire need of humanitarian assistance. 

The neoconservative mission of policing the world with a mission of punishing evildoers is also historically inconsistent. Neoconservatives have had no problem ensuring that America’s presence is felt around the globe, but Washington has done a terrible job of ensuring that they ally with virtuous partners and consistently punish evil. The United States under Ronald Reagan supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, even helping Iraq obtain chemical weapons. His successor President George H.W. Bush would lie America into war against Saddam’s Iraq, a country which the United States still occupies.

Even brief glimpses of a truly realist foreign policy have not lasted long. President John F. Kennedy was assassinated after he challenged the most militant segment of the national security state. President Donald Trump during his 2016 campaign often spoke of the need to bring the troops home and avoid unnecessary war, but he was unable to fully realize this and acted consistently in a way which favored Saudi and Israeli interests rather than American. 

Mead’s article asserts that Hamiltonian foreign policy is out of fashion, and that American politicians act in accordance with liberal or isolationist values. This is of course absurd, and demonstrably false. Any serious person with an ounce of historical understanding can see that most of American foreign policy has always been geared towards securing business interests and American supremacy. The Marshall Plan was not an altruistic program, but a scheme meant to open European markets to America when Europe was recovering from the devastation of World War II. The United States supported communist Pol Pot in Cambodia simply to deter Vietnamese regional influence. Bush Sr. did not go to war with Iraq in 1990 simply to defend Kuwait, but to defend American and British oil interests in the region.

Consistently, America has been on the wrong side of conflict and intervention. This is usually to favor bankers, defense contractors, incumbent politicians, and other special interest groups. The fantasy that America has retreated into isolationism should not be taken seriously, nor should the idea that neoconservatives and neoliberals act primarily to serve their ideologies. 

Every aspect of Alexander Hamilton’s legacy should be remembered for what it was; he was an elitist, hyper-nationalist chameleon who used the Federalist Papers to spread propaganda and to ensure that the nationalists would succeed in securing power at the Constitutional Convention. His love of mercantilism should be an additional blotch on his record, rather than something to admire.