The Middle East Has a New Saudi-Led Axis
The newfound bloc has emerged as a potential winner
from the Iran war.
By Anchal Vohra, a columnist at Foreign Policy
July 1, 2026
The Iran war inflicted substantial pain on Persian
Gulf states, as their exports and sense of safety declined. Yet some have
emerged more resolute about cooperating together on regional politics. A new
grouping outside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has emerged, including
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and non-Gulf actors Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. The
United Arab Emirates is conspicuous by its absence.
Some of these states have emerged as clear winners
from the war, while others are content with having built new resilience. There
is a veneer of camaraderie among them, but deep divisions lie underneath
regarding how best to deal with Iran and whether to pursue normalization with
Israel or brace for its feared hegemonic expansion. Either way, it’s clear
that the war in Iran has produced a new order in the Gulf that extends beyond
to the larger Islamic world.
The new bloc is defined by two goals: containing the
Iranian threat while also regaining influence in countries dominated by Iranian
proxies or allies such as Syria and Lebanon; and also pushing back against
Israel to define limits to its military adventurism. One regional observer said
Israel’s strike on Doha last year—to hunt Hamas members—spooked Gulf nations
into thinking that they could be next. It brought rivals such as Saudi Arabia
and Turkey closer together. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons underpin the alliance,
serving as a bulwark against Israel, under the Saudi-Pakistani defense
framework.
While there is no official name for the grouping—only
described as a Sunni alliance in Israeli reports or an expanding Islamic
NATO—it signals realignment built on deepening mistrust between Riyadh and Abu
Dhabi. As both wean away from an oil-based economy, Saudis are competing with
Emiratis to win over the same foreign investments.
In the post-Arab Spring phase, Saudis and Emiratis saw
eye to eye on the Muslim Brotherhood as a common threat and were aligned on
regional policy questions. Now interests appear to have diverged. The UAE
believes normalization and peace are the way forward with Israel, while Riyadh
has banded together a more Israel-critical bunch.
The grouping of five is also a Saudi bid to claim the
regional leadership role. The UAE’s exit from OPEC questioned the Saudi position as the unofficial
leader of the pack. Riyadh has now decided to host a regional summit between
Arab states and Iran, but it is unclear when it will take place and whether the
UAE will attend—but it will be circumspect of any assurance.
Saudi Arabia came under relatively fewer attacks than
many of its neighbors, but its sense of security was no less shaken.
Reuters reported that it even carried out numerous strikes
against Iran in response. Riyadh said whatever little trust had been built with
Iran as a result of the 2023 Beijing-led rapprochement was quashed.
On the economic front, Saudi Arabia benefited from the
rise in demand and the price of oil. In March, even as the Strait of Hormuz
remained shut, the value of Saudi exports recorded a three-year surge. Saudi oil company Aramco’s net profit jumped 26
percent for the first quarter as prices spiked from $74 to over $119 a barrel,
said Hesham Alghannam, a Riyadh-based scholar at the Carnegie Middle East
Center. The East-West Pipeline offered an alternative export route via the Red
Sea coast and operated at its full capacity of 7 million barrels.
However, Saudi GDP growth slowed to 2.8 percent from
3.7 percent because wells were shut, even as flows were rerouted, Alghannam
added. Experts are divided over Saudi Arabia’s economic projections, yet
the war has spurred the kingdom to strengthen its Red Sea
infrastructure.
Another player in the new alliance is Qatar. In 2017,
Qatar was ostracized by a quartet of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE,
but now it is recognized as a diplomatic leader. During the war with Iran,
Qatar’s geographical constraints, Washington’s inability to prevent Iranian
strikes on the Gulf, and Doha’s comparatively warmer prewar ties with Tehran
all led its leadership to conclude that diplomacy with Iran offered the best
path forward.
Qatar faced the fewest Iranian strikes during the war, though attacks
did target a key installation. A strike shut down its key Ras Laffan
refinery—one of the world’s largest liquefied natural gas facilities—reducing
its export capacity by an estimated 17 percent.
It then jumped full throttle into mediation efforts in
mid-May when Pakistan’s efforts to broker peace proved insufficient. Last week,
as U.S. and Iranian negotiators huddled for 18 hours at a luxury resort
overlooking Lake Lucerne in Switzerland, there was reason to believe that an
exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah might derail the talks, a person
familiar with the events told me.
“Even as the principals sat down for talks”—referring
to U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, Trump advisors Steve Witkoff and Jared
Kushner, and chief Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—“there were
tensions over Lebanon,” the person said. He complimented Qatari mediators for
extinguishing last-minute fires, adding that Qatar used its channels with Iran
to get Hezbollah to release a statement agreeing to a cease-fire and also
encouraged the Americans to get Israel to back off.
Other members of the Saudi-led grouping also intend to
gain from the war. Egypt hopes to benefit from a Saudi rush to expand its
infrastructure. Riyadh has formalized plans to build a bridge to Sinai, aiming to turn Egypt’s Mediterranean coast into a
gateway to Europe. Turkey hopes to boost arms sales, as apprehensions over security are unlikely to
subside anytime soon. Pakistan, for its part, enjoyed some good press after years of international condemnation for
supporting terrorist networks.
The UAE has also decided to improve its logistics
and reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz to zero. Even
during the war, it managed to export via its Fujairah port and is now looking
at expanding eastern ports along the Gulf of Oman. The UAE, however, is
outside the Saudi-led bloc. Alghannam of the Carnegie Middle East Center said
the bloc exists “because the GCC itself is unlikely to unify on Iran” but
also because for Saudi Arabia it is a “vehicle to project Arab leadership.”
Over the last few months, the mentor-protégé
relationship between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Emirati
President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan turned sour, largely over
disagreements over Yemen and Sudan.
It is unclear whether the UAE will attend any
Saudi-led Iran summit. The country endured more
than 3,000 Iranian missile and drone attacks—more than the total number of attacks on the other
five GCC members—and is thus more at odds with Iran. It would have preferred a
longer U.S. military operation against Iran to debilitate Iranian capabilities
before a cease-fire was struck.
A more divisive divergence between the two blocs,
however, is over Israel. “There are two camps: one pro-Israel, and the other is
an Israel-cautious camp,” a Gulf official told me over the phone.
The Emirati commitment to the Abraham Accords
weathered the recent conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, whereas Saudi Arabia found
it difficult to pursue normalization in such an atmosphere. The UAE reportedly
received key defense equipment from Israel during the war: “an Iron Dome air
defense system with troops to operate it,” Axios reported in April. That indicates an enhancement in
future defense-related cooperation against Iran.
The Emiratis see Iran as a bigger threat than many of
their neighbors, including those now following the Saudis’ lead. The UAE was
struck by Iran with an unmatched ferocity and helped by Israel, while Saudi
Arabia wants to contain both Iran and Israel. What’s clear is that the
divergence over how to manage the collective security of the Gulf will define
the future of the region—and that the UAE is likely to be on the outside with
its own vision to break with the status quo.