Why the Trump administration will have to accept a Hormuz toll
It wouldn't be unprecedented, and Gulf countries are
already seeking alternatives to the strait, which means its importance will
eventually diminish
Aug 10, 2026
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/straight-of-hormuz-toll/
In the weeks since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding collapsed, Washington and Tehran have used the
time to strengthen their respective positions in the event negotiations resume.
For the United States, this has largely taken the form
of overt threats by President Donald Trump himself and hints that an even more
comprehensive U.S. bombing campaign against Iranian strategic targets is on the
table. For Iran, the strategy is familiar: ensure maritime traffic
through the Strait of Hormuz is kept to an
absolute minimum.
U.S. and Iranian officials continue to give
conflicting accounts of where negotiations stand. Despite Trump’s repeated
declarations that Tehran is begging for a deal, the Iranians stress no talks
are occurring with the United States. Still, both sides seem to agree that any
pending agreement will center on the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway
that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved capable of shutting down
at will.
Various schemes have been proposed between Iran and Oman, the two countries on
either end of the strait. While a deal is not finalized, Iran will most
certainly retain more power over the strait’s traffic than it did before the
war began in February.
The question now is whether tolls or fees will
accompany any arrangement worked out between Tehran and Muscat. The Trump administration is dead set against acceding to any fee
structure because it would provide the Iranian government with additional
revenue and represent visible proof that Trump’s preventive war was a strategic
mistake. Referring to the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary of State Marco
Rubio reiterated the
U.S. position in
July: "If we create a precedent in the Middle East where a nation-state can decide that they are
going to control an international waterway, charge a toll…we have created a
very dangerous precedent which will repeat itself in other parts of the world.”
Of course, permitting an Iranian toll or fee structure
isn’t ideal. Before the war, such a hypothetical would have been difficult to
imagine. The strait at that time was free and open, and roughly 120 to 150
ships relied on the route each day to get their products to customers
worldwide.
The United States wants Iran to return to this status
quo. Yet Iran has no intention of doing so — and to expect otherwise is to be
completely ignorant of how events have played out since.
Trump’s war handed Iran the perfect excuse to leverage
its geography, and the Iranians didn’t hesitate to do so. Originally, Tehran’s
shuttering of the strait aimed to increase the cost on Washington and
eventually convince U.S. partners in the region to pressure Trump into ending
the war. But over time, the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to Iran’s more
aggressive posture toward its neighbors writ-large, has become something far
more valuable: a strategic card Iran can play whenever Trump threatens to accelerate
military operations.
Re-opening the strait is now as important to the
United States as containing Iran’s nuclear program, if not more so. The
question is how to do it.
Trump originally tried to pursue this objective
through military force, hoping U.S. strikes could degrade Iran’s military
capacity to such an extent that the IRGC would have to stop shooting at ships.
The strategy overestimated the U.S. military’s power to force a change in
Tehran’s strategic calculus and underestimated Iran’s ability to manufacture
and launch cheap drones and missiles at scale. Every U.S. strike merely
reaffirmed the Iranian government’s belief that the war was existential for
them. Instead of capitulating, Iran fought back, targeting vessels that used
the southerly route near Oman’s coast and making it clear that heavier U.S.
bombing would compel more Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.
U.S. military attempts to bring the strait back to its
pre-February state have failed and will likely continue to fail. If the Trump
administration seeks to extricate itself from a war without end, its best
option is to accept a toll or fee structure in the regional chokepoint. Hawks
on Capitol Hill would no doubt scream bloody murder, and some of Trump’s own
political allies will have a difficult time explaining how such a scheme is
appealing. But if the choice is between swallowing fees or endless conflict,
then the former is the better option. The Trump administration may not like
paying for the privilege of using the strait, but its decision to go to war in
the first place created the situation the United States is now in. Bad policies
have unintended consequences.
Fortunately, fees in the strait would not be the end
of the world.
This wouldn’t be the first time a country located next
to a critical trade chokepoint received some form of compensation. The most
obvious case is the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, where shipowners contribute
to a voluntary fund, administered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, for
navigational assistance, maritime safety, environmental protection and search
and rescue. A similar arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz would thus not set a
precedent. In fact, shipping companies and the insurance carriers that
underwrite them might even view these voluntary payments as in their own
interest if it helps prevent even costlier disasters or accidents.
There’s no use brushing the obvious under the rug:
U.S. acceptance of Iranian tolls or fees would be an embarrassing
acknowledgment that Iran is now a principal arbiter of the strait. Moreover,
depending on how high the fees are — Tehran is reportedly
demanding 7% of
the value of a ship’s cargo — the Iranians would be collecting revenue they
wouldn’t have had prior to the war.
But even this scenario is not as dire as many assume.
In practice, Iran’s leverage dissipates with every month that passes by. The
Gulf Arab states are not sitting still and watching the new status quo
helplessly. Rather, Tehran’s neighbors are increasingly adapting to Iran’s
machinations by tapping into pipelines that bypass the strait altogether
and exploring
future projects that
make their energy infrastructure more durable and less vulnerable to a single
chokepoint.
Saudi Arabia is using its cross-country east-west pipeline to
export more crude oil through the Red Sea. While this alternative route remains
vulnerable to strikes by the Iran-aligned Houthis and doesn’t fully compensate
for the loss of normal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, it has still allowed
the kingdom to avoid shutting down production entirely. Ditto the United Arab
Emirates, which is sending more crude through its Fujairah export terminal,
located outside the strait. Fujairah’s share of UAE exports increased to
66% in July from 51%
a month earlier. Iran’s actions during the war will only reinforce Persian Gulf
oil producers’ desire to diversify their routes, reducing Tehran’s ability to
obstruct energy flows in the future.
Negotiations on reopening the Strait of Hormuz
continue. If there comes a point where fees for passage are unavoidable, then
U.S. policymakers should keep a cool head. Ceding the point would be the most
efficient way for the United States to remove itself from a foolish conflict at
minimal cost.