US may ask UN to mandate force in Gaza for 2 years

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2621566/middle-east

NEW YORK: The US has drafted a UN resolution that approves a two-year mandate for a Gaza transitional governance body and an international stabilization force in the Palestinian enclave, according to the text seen by journalists.

The draft — which is still being developed and could change — was shared with some countries this week, but has not yet been formally circulated to the 15-member Security Council for negotiations, diplomats said. It was not immediately clear when Washington planned to do that.

A State Department spokesperson said discussions with UN Security Council members and other partners on how to implement President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan were ongoing and declined to comment on “allegedly leaked documents.”

The two-page text would authorize a so-called Board of Peace transitional governance administration to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force in Gaza that could “use all necessary measures” — code for force — to carry out its mandate.

The ISF would be authorized to protect civilians and humanitarian aid operations, work to secure border areas with Israel, Egypt and a “newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, which the ISF will be responsible for training and supporting.

The ISF would stabilize security in Gaza, “including through the demilitarization of non-state armed groups and the permanent decommissioning of weapons, as necessary.”

The Trump plan also ends Hamas governance of Gaza and says the enclave would be demilitarized. Hamas has not said whether it will agree to demilitarize Gaza — something the militants have rejected before.

The ISF would deploy under a unified command agreed by the Board of Peace and in close consultation with Egypt and Israel after detailed status of mission and forces agreements have been reached, according to the resolution.

While the Trump administration has ruled out sending US soldiers into Gaza, it has been speaking to Indonesia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Turkiye and Azerbaijan to contribute to the multinational force.

It remains unclear whether Arab and other states will be ready to commit troops to the force.

Dick Cheney (1941–2025): The Dark Legacy of a War Criminal

by Alan Mosley | Nov 5, 2025 

https://original.antiwar.com/Alan_Mosley/2025/11/04/dick-cheney-1941-2025-the-dark-legacy-of-a-war-criminal/

Former U.S. vice president Richard “Dick” Cheney died on 3 November 2025 at age 84; his family said he had suffered from pneumonia and cardiac and vascular disease. Best known for steering national security policy after the 9/11 attacks, he became the dominant force behind a “war on terror” that unleashed torture, preventive war and mass surveillance. Amnesty International has described him as one of the principal architects of a program that amounted to torture, while the Brown University Costs of War project attributes more than 900,000 deaths and trillions of dollars in spending to the post‑9/11 wars he championed. Cheney’s legacy is one of unprecedented destruction and the erosion of civil liberties.

From prudence to preemption

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell resisted calls to topple Saddam Hussein. Cheney argued that invading Baghdad would force the U.S. to occupy Iraq alone, risk its territorial integrity, and require unacceptable casualties: “It’s a quagmire if you go that far,” he told PBS’s Frontline in 1994, asking how many additional dead Americans Saddam was worth. Those words reflect a prudence that vanished after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Within days, the vice president laid out a radical new doctrine. On NBC’s Meet the Press he said America must operate on the “dark side,” spend time in the shadows, and use “any means at our disposal” to achieve its objectives.

Cheney’s longtime counsel, David Addington, and Justice Department lawyers John Yoo and Jay Bybee drafted memos arguing that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees captured in the war on terror. The State Department’s legal advisor warned that claiming the president could suspend the Geneva Conventions was legally flawed and would reverse over a century of U.S. policy. Cheney pressed ahead, telling the Washington Times that he “signed off” on the CIA’s secret detention and rendition program and, as a principal participant in National Security Council meetings, he authorized the agency’s interrogation program, including waterboarding. In 2006 he called waterboarding a “no‑brainer,” and in 2009 he acknowledged knowing about the practice “as a general policy that we had approved.”

Torture and the repudiation of law

The vice president’s embrace of waterboarding ignored that the technique has long been treated as torture under U.S. and international law. Amnesty International notes that Japanese officials were convicted at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials for subjecting U.S. pilots to waterboarding, and U.S. courts have sentenced sheriffs to prison for using the technique. Amnesty stresses that its status as torture is “not a matter of opinion.” The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that approving aggressive interrogation techniques sent a message that physical pressure and degradation were acceptable treatment for detainees. Amnesty calls Cheney “one of the principal architects of a policy that amounted to torture.”

Cheney’s legal defense of the program was rife with distortions. He misrepresented Justice Department opinions, falsely suggested Japanese waterboarders were never prosecuted, overstated detainee recidivism, insisted detainees had no rights under the Geneva Conventions, and repeated unproven claims of ties between Saddam Hussein and al‑Qaeda.

The road to Baghdad and the case for war

He cautioned against occupying Iraq in 1994 but became the administration’s leading voice for war nine years later. On March 16, 2003 he declared that Saddam had “reconstituted nuclear weapons” and that Americans would be greeted as liberators. These claims proved false. He insisted there was “no doubt” Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and ties to al‑Qaeda, yet evidence was lacking. Retired colonel Lawrence Wilkerson later alleged the administration manipulated intelligence to justify invasion and suggested that Cheney’s push to ignore the Geneva Conventions may constitute a war crime.

Cheney’s radicalism was not limited to Iraq. He championed a “unitary executive” theory contending that the president alone decides matters within the executive branch. Legal scholar Martin Lederman observed that he sidelined dissenting views in the military and intelligence agencies. Chip Gibbons, writing in Jacobin, describes him as an enemy of democracy whose agenda included war, indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and torture.

Human cost: war, death, and permanent surveillance

The human toll of Cheney’s policies is staggering. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that more than 940,000 people have been killed by direct post‑9/11 violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan, including over 432,000 civilians. Indirect deaths raise the toll into the millions. In Iraq alone, about 29,199 bombs were dropped, causing heavy civilian casualties, and a 2006 survey estimated over 600,000 civilian deaths. Current Affairs compares Cheney’s record to that of serial killer Samuel Little, concluding that “Little was strictly an amateur.”

The costs extended beyond foreign battlefields. Ryan McMaken of the Mises Institute writes that in a more reasonable world, people like Cheney would be forgotten, shamed, and disgraced. The post‑9/11 wars did nothing to enhance freedom, yet thousands of American families paid with their blood and millions continue to pay through taxes and inflation. McMaken lists domestic infringements such as the Patriot Act, warrantless surveillance, TSA groping, and FISA abuses, and none of the architects have been held accountable.

Colonel Wilkerson, Powell’s former chief of staff, told ABC News that Cheney “was president for all practical purposes” during Bush’s first term and feared being tried as a war criminal. The Washington Post dubbed him the “vice-president for torture,” and Wilkerson said his push to disregard the Geneva Conventions amounted to an international crime. Chip Gibbons asserts that he “reduced nations to rubble, shredded the Bill of Rights, and enacted programs of surveillance, abduction, detention, and torture.”

The culture of impunity Cheney helped foster has not faded. Politicians continued to accept his endorsements despite his record, while he insisted the CIA’s interrogation techniques did not violate international agreements and his allies still argued for expansive presidential war powers.

An opinion essay by law professor Ziyad Motala in Al Jazeera argues that Cheney is the architect of some of the most disastrous foreign and domestic policies of the early twenty‑first century. Motala contends that Cheney’s policies left “a trail of death and destabilization” and that the havoc unleashed by the Iraq War and the broader “war on terror” continues to reverberate, causing “suffering and instability far surpassing anything Trump has wrought.” He notes that estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths range from hundreds of thousands to well over a million and that the war destabilized an entire region, paving the way for extremist groups like ISIL and ongoing cycles of violence and displacement. The war drained trillions from the U.S. economy and left thousands of U.S. troops dead and many more with life‑altering physical and psychological wounds.

The economic burden of these wars is also staggering. Nearly twenty years after the United States invaded Afghanistan, the global war on terror had cost about $8 trillion. That figure includes not only Department of Defense spending but also State Department expenditures, care for veterans, Department of Homeland Security funds, and interest payments on war borrowing. Brown’s Cost of War Project Co‑director Catherine Lutz said the Pentagon now absorbs the majority of federal discretionary spending, yet most people do not realize the scale of this funding. She warned that these costs will continue for decades as the country pays for veterans’ care and the environmental damage wrought by the wars.

Cheney championed the Patriot Act as a key pillar of the “war on terror” and campaigned aggressively to renew its provisions. In January 2006 he and President Bush launched a “double‑barrelled assault” on critics of domestic surveillance and opponents of the law; Cheney told the Heritage Foundation that Americans could not afford “one day” without the Patriot Act. Civil liberties groups argue that the Patriot Act dramatically expanded government surveillance powers at the expense of constitutional freedoms. Under the law, investigators can monitor online communications on an extremely low legal standard, and secret court orders can compel companies to hand over lists of what people read or which websites they visit. The American Civil Liberties Union notes that the law is enforced in secret, weakens judicial review, and allows agents to seize business and communications records without probable cause. By 2004 the ACLU had filed lawsuits challenging these provisions and denounced the administration’s claim that there were no abuses as a “red herring.” The Patriot Act turned ordinary Americans into subjects of a vast dragnet, chilling free speech and giving the executive branch powers reminiscent of past crises.

Assessing the indictment

The case against Dick Cheney therefore does not rest on partisan vitriol but on the record of his own words and deeds. He reversed his warnings about occupying Iraq and promoted a war based on false claims; advocated operating on the “dark side;” authorized secret prisons and waterboarding despite the practice being recognized as torture; backed legal memos undermining Geneva protections; and misled the public about weapons of mass destruction and al‑Qaeda ties. He championed a unitary executive theory that sidelined constitutional checks. The wars he supported killed hundreds of thousands and created millions of refugees, while at home they ushered in surveillance and curbs on civil liberties. He is the poster child of a modern war criminal in the American neo-conservative tradition.

It would be facile to claim that Cheney alone bears responsibility for America’s post‑9/11 disasters. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama signed off on the wars and the surveillance, Congress appropriated funds, and the courts often acquiesced. Yet Cheney’s imprint on U.S. foreign policy is unmistakable. Through his mastery of bureaucratic infighting and his ability to marginalize dissent, he institutionalized torture, preventive war, and executive supremacy as tools of statecraft. His death prompts reflection on whether the nation will continue to venerate officials whose legacies consist of bombed cities, dead civilians, shattered constitutions, and a global “war on terror” that has left the world less free and no safer.

Report: US Preparing Mexico Mission Against Cartels That Would Include Troops and Drone Strikes

According to NBC News, the Trump administration is considering going through with the plan even if the Mexican government objects

by Dave DeCamp | November 3, 2025

https://news.antiwar.com/2025/11/03/report-us-preparing-mexico-mission-against-cartels-that-would-include-ground-troops-and-drone-strikes/

The Trump administration has begun developing detailed plans to send US troops and intelligence officers into Mexico to target cartels in operations that would include drone strikes, NBC News reported on Monday, citing current and former US officials.

The report said that US military personnel have already begun training for the potential mission, though a deployment is not imminent. Many of the troops would come from Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and would operate under the authority of US intelligence agencies, with involvement from CIA officers.

Unlike the current US bombing campaign against alleged drug boats in the waters of Latin America, which the Trump administration is conducting without legal authority, the idea of the campaign in Mexico would be to keep it secret and not publicize attacks.

The NBC report said the administration wanted to operate in coordination with the Mexican government but was also considering conducting the campaign without Mexico’s approval, which would mark a significant violation of the country’s sovereignty. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has increased law enforcement cooperation with the US and has allowed the CIA to ramp up surveillance flights along the border, but she has repeatedly ruled out US military intervention in her country.

“The United States is not going to come to Mexico with the military,” Sheinbaum said in August. “We cooperate, we collaborate, but there is not going to be an invasion. That is ruled out, absolutely ruled out.”

The Mexican leader has also condemned US strikes on boats in the region, saying she “doesn’t agree” with the policy. The US recently bombed several alleged drug vessels in the Eastern Pacific, and in one case, the Mexican Navy had to rescue a survivor.

The Trump administration has not provided any evidence to back up its claims that the boats it has been targeting were carrying drugs and has admitted to Congress that it doesn’t know the identities of the people it has killed. Since the bombing campaign began on September 2, the US military has extra-judicially executed 64 people at sea.

The strikes on boats and the push toward regime change in Venezuela have come under increasing scrutiny from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress due to the lack of transparency and lack of legal authority.

“People were very frustrated in the information that was being provided. It was a bipartisan briefing, but people were not happy with the level information that was provided, and certainly the level of legal justification that was provided,” Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH) said after a briefing on the military campaign.

The NBC report signals that the potential US bombing campaign in Mexico, which would target alleged cartel targets, would have even less transparency since the idea is to do it in secret.

In response to the report, a senior administration official told NBC, “The Trump administration is committed to utilizing an all-of-government approach to address the threats cartels pose to American citizens.”

What’s behind Israel’s new plan to divide Gaza in two

While Trump hails "peace," Israel is entrenching a new regime of fortified borders, proxy rule, and engineered despair — with expulsion still the end goal.

By Muhammad Shehada October 31, 2025

https://www.972mag.com/trump-israel-plan-divide-gaza/

Since the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came into effect, the Trump administration has been hailing the beginning of a new chapter in Gaza. “After so many years of unceasing war and endless danger, today the skies are calm, the guns are silent, the sirens are still, and the sun rises on a Holy Land that is finally at peace,” the president declared during his speech at the Knesset earlier this month. But facts on the ground reveal a dramatically grimmer reality and shed light on Israel’s new plan for the enclave’s permanent subjugation. 

With the so-called “Yellow Line,” Israel has divided the Strip in two: West Gaza, encompassing 42 percent of the enclave, where Hamas remains in control and over 2 million people are crammed in; and East Gaza, encompassing 58 percent of the territory, which has been fully depopulated of civilians and is controlled by the Israeli army and four proxy gangs. 

Under the Trump plan, this line was intended as a temporary marker — the first stage in Israel’s gradual withdrawal from the Strip as an International Stabilization Force assumed control on the ground. Instead, Israeli forces are digging in, reinforcing the division with earthworks, fortifications, and barriers that suggest a move toward permanence.

West Gaza is coming to resemble southern Lebanon, which the Israeli army has continued to bomb periodically after signing a ceasefire with Hezbollah last November. Since the start of the truce in Gaza, Israeli airstrikes, drone strikes, and machine gun fire have continued to pummel the population on a daily basis, usually under the unsubstantiated pretext of “foiling an imminent attack,” retaliating for alleged assaults on Israeli soldiers, or targeting individuals who approach the Yellow Line. So far, these assaults have killed over 200 Palestinians, including dozens of children. 

Israel is still restricting aid to West Gaza, with an average of around 95 trucks entering per day during the first 20 days of the ceasefire — well below the 600 per day stipulated in the agreement between Israel and Hamas. Most residents have lost their homes, but Israel is still preventing the entry of tents, caravans, prefabricated housing units, and other essentials, with winter approaching.

East Gaza, once the enclave’s breadbasket, is now a desolate wasteland. Colleagues and friends who live nearby describe the constant sound of explosions and demolitions: Israeli soldiers and private settler contractors are still systematically flattening all remaining buildings, except the small camps designated for the gangs living under Israeli army protection and lavished with guns, cash, vehicles, and other luxuries.

Israel has no intention of leaving East Gaza anytime soon. The army has been cementing the Yellow Line with concrete blocks — swallowing large swaths of West Gaza in the process — and Defense Minister Israel Katz has openly boasted about authorizing fire on anyone who comes near the barrier, even if only to try to reach their home. Reports also suggest Israel is planning to expand the Yellow Line further into West Gaza, but the Trump administration appears to be delaying this move for now. 

And in a press conference last week, Trump’s envoy Jared Kushner announced that reconstruction would only happen in areas that are currently fully controlled by the Israeli army, while the rest of Gaza will remain rubble and ash until Hamas fully disarms and ends its rule.

These hardening divisions between East and West Gaza portend what Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer has called “the two-state solution … within Gaza itself.” Israel would allow symbolic reconstruction in areas of Rafah ruled by its proxy gangs, while the rest of East Gaza would likely become a flattened buffer zone and dumping ground for Israel. In this scenario, West Gaza would remain in a perpetual state of war, wreckage, and deprivation.

This is not post-war rebuilding but rather engineered despair, imposed through walls, the constant threat of military violence, and networks of collaborators. Gaza is being remade not for the benefit of its people, but to entrench permanent Israeli control and advance its longstanding objective: forcing Palestinians out of the Strip.

Hamas reasserts control

For its part, Hamas has been trying to reassert control in West Gaza to reverse the societal collapse Israel has engineered throughout two years of genocide. As soon as the ceasefire went into effect, Hamas launched a security crackdown to pursue criminals and disarm Israeli-backed clans and militias.

The campaign peaked with the public execution of eight alleged collaborators, along with heavy clashes with the Daghmoush clan — a calculated show of force intended to intimidate rival groups. The strategy appeared effective: several families soon handed over their weapons to Hamas without a fight.

With this campaign, Hamas also aims to convey, both domestically and internationally, that it hasn’t been defeated despite its substantial losses during the war, and that it cannot be sidelined in debates over Gaza’s future. At the same time, the group is trying to restore a semblance of civic order and exact revenge on gang members and criminals who exploited the chaos of war to loot and prey on civilians. This is also part of an effort to recover legitimacy after losing much of its popular support as a result of Gaza’s vast destruction.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been desperate to persuade Trump to allow Israel to resume the genocide, capitalizing on isolated incidents in Rafah to justify renewed military action. In one case, two Israeli soldiers were killed reportedly after running over unexploded ordinance; in another, soldiers were attacked by what appeared to be a small Hamas cell with no awareness of the ceasefire or connection to the group’s chain of command. 

Netanyahu has also been weaponizing Hamas’ security crackdown, portraying it as a killing spree against civilians, and has accused the group of refusing to return hostage bodies or disarm — all in an effort to persuade Washington to greenlight a renewed offensive in Gaza under the pretext of pressuring Hamas. 

The U.S. president, still euphoric from the rare wave of positive media coverage surrounding the Gaza ceasefire, has so far been reining Israel in, although it remains unclear how long this will last. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is next in line to babysit Netanyahu, following visits from Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, and Secretary of state Marco Rubio. 

For now, the president is determined to preserve the ceasefire, even if only nominally, to avoid the perception of failure or of having been played for a fool by Netanyahu. But the Israeli prime minister is betting that, with time, Trump will be distracted by the next big thing, lose interest in Gaza, and once again give him a free hand.

‘New Rafah’

But if it is unable to return to a full-scale assault, Israel’s backup plan has been to persuade the White House to limit reconstruction to Israel-controlled East Gaza, beginning in Rafah — conveniently along the border with Egypt, where upwards of 150,000 Gazans have already fled (reconstruction in the north, in areas such as Beit Lahiya, is notably absent from these plans). According to reports in the Israeli media, the rebuilt town — which would include “schools, clinics, public buildings, and civilian infrastructure” — would be surrounded by a vast buffer area, effectively comprising a “kill zone.”

Eventually, Israel may allow or even encourage Palestinians to move into the reconstructed areas in Rafah, as a “safe zone” in Gaza where civilians can flee Hamas — an idea that pro-Israeli voices in the American media have been trying to sell. Since Hamas cannot be fully eliminated from Gaza, as Israeli political columnist and Netanyahu ally Amit Segal recently admitted, the only “future” for Palestinians in the enclave will be in the demilitarized East under Israeli control. 

“A new Rafah … this would be the moderate Gaza,” Segal told The New York Times’ Ezra Klein. “And the other Gaza would be what lies in the ruins in Gaza City and the refugee camps in central Gaza.”

Currently, the only Palestinian inhabitants in Rafah are members of Yasser Abu Shabab’s militia — an ISIS-linked group armed, financed, and sheltered by Israel. It seems highly unlikely that many Palestinians would accept living under the rule of a warlord, convicted drug dealer, and collaborator who has been systematically looting food supplies and enforcing starvation in Gaza at Israel’s behest. Moreover, anyone crossing into Israeli-controlled East Gaza risks being seen as a collaborator, as happened to prominent anti-Hamas activist Moumen Al-Natour, who fled Hamas’ recent crackdown for Abu Shabab’s territory and was subsequently disowned by his family.

Even if some desperate Gazans do agree to move to Rafah, Israel will not simply let them cross en masse from West to East Gaza, invoking the pretext of preventing Hamas infiltration among the crowds. The “security bubbles” plan — first pitched by then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in June 2024 — which envisioned the creation of 24 closed-off camps to which Gaza’s population would be gradually moved, provides a blueprint: The Israeli army would likely inspect and clear each individual permitted to cross into East Gaza, inevitably producing a long and intrusive AI-powered bureaucratic process that would leave applicants vulnerable to blackmail by Israeli security agencies, which could demand collaboration in exchange for entry. 

Israel has made it abundantly clear that anyone who would cross into that “sterile area” in Rafah would not be allowed to cross back to the other side of Gaza — turning Rafah into a “concentration camp,” as Israel’s former prime minister, Ehud Olmert, put it. Many Palestinians would thus avoid entering East Gaza out of fear that if Israel resumes the genocide at its former intensity, they could be pushed into Egypt. Indeed, even while laying out plans to allow reconstruction in Rafah, the Israeli army is still demolishing and blowing up the remaining homes and buildings in that very area.

Ultimately, Israel’s “New Rafah” would serve as a Potemkin village — an external façade to make the world believe the situation is better than it actually is, offering only basic shelter and marginally more security to Palestinians who flee there. And without full reconstruction or any political horizon, this plan seems to resemble what Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich promised in May: “The Gazan citizens will be concentrated in the south. They will be totally despairing, understanding that there is no hope and nothing to look for in Gaza, and will be looking for relocation to begin a new life in other places.”

Disarmament as trap

Regardless of whether reconstruction proceeds in East Gaza, Israel will increasingly point to it as a “terror free” and “de-radicalized” zone and continue to bomb the other side under the pretext of disarming and deposing Hamas.

The Islamist group has already agreed to hand Gaza over to an administrative technocratic committee and allow a new Palestinian security force trained by Egypt and Jordan to be deployed in the enclave along with an international protection mission. Netanyahu, however, has outright rejected the entry of 5,500 Palestinian policemen into Gaza, refused to allow Turkish or Qatari stabilization forces into the Strip, and obstructed the creation of the administrative committee.

Similarly, disarmament is an area of ambiguity that gives Israel a near-endless pretext for preventing reconstruction in West Gaza and maintaining military control. Hamas has signaled that it would agree to decommission its offensive weapons (such as rockets), and already accepted giving up the rest of its light defensive weaponry (including firearms and anti-tank missiles) as the outcome of a peace agreement, rather than its prerequisite. 

Hamas is also open to a process similar to Northern Ireland whereby it would lock its defensive weapons up in warehouses and commit to a full mutual cessation of hostilities for a decade or two, or until the end of Israel’s illegal occupation. In that case, the remaining light weaponry would function as a form of insurance that Israel would not renege on its promises of withdrawing from Gaza and ending the genocide.

Both the British and Egyptian governments, along with Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, are currently pushing for that Northern Ireland decommissioning model — a sign that they recognize the sensitivity and complexity of the disarmament issue. 

Israel’s insistence on immediate full disarmament is a deliberately unworkable trap that demands Palestinians’ complete surrender. Even if Hamas’ leadership in Doha is somehow coerced into accepting this capitulation, many of their own members and other militant groups in Gaza are bound to disobey. This would be similar to Colombia’s disarmament agreement where many FARC militants defected and created new militias or joined gangs. 

And as long as the Israeli army remains inside Gaza, with no genuine prospect of ending Israel’s siege and apartheid rule, there will always be an incentive for some actors to take up arms. Israel can then point to those splinter groups or individual militants as justification to continue bombing and occupying Gaza.

Israel spent over 740 days, close to $100 billion, and lost about 470 soldiers to reduce Gaza to dust. As Netanyahu bragged in May, Israel has been “destroying more and more houses [in Gaza, and Palestinians accordingly] have nowhere to return,” adding, “The only obvious result will be Gazans choosing to emigrate outside of the Strip.” 

Even after failing to achieve mass expulsion through direct military assault, Israel’s leadership is now pursuing the same outcome through attrition and engineered despair, using rubble, siege, and periodic bombing as instruments of demographic redesign. The prospect of ethnic cleansing has not disappeared with the ceasefire; it has merely evolved into a new policy, disguised and normalized through bureaucratic planning.

'West Asia is no longer our battle': Moscow withdraws from the arena

Moscow is reducing its active involvement in West Asia, shifting from managing regional conflicts to maintaining a visible presence and using the region as leverage against the west.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

NOV 1, 2025

https://thecradle.co/articles/west-asia-is-no-longer-our-battle-moscow-withdraws-from-the-arena

In modern diplomacy, some of the most important messages are no longer conveyed through diplomats. Instead, they are presented in policy forums, roundtable meetings, and “expert” committees – spaces that allow states to express what they truly think without making official statements. These platforms enable governments to test red lines, issue warnings, and shape regional narratives through analysts and strategists who speak with authority but do not formally represent the state. 

From 19 to 23 October, Moscow hosted the fifth International Research and Expert Forum, “Russia–the Middle East,” bringing together researchers and experts from Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Turkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. Most participants were academics affiliated with research centers closely connected to their countries’ Foreign Ministries. From the very first day, it was clear that one of Moscow’s main objectives in organizing the forum was to send a clear message: Russia’s approach toward West Asia has changed.

The new Russian approach to West Asia

Russia’s current approach to West Asia is based on a fundamental conviction that the region is primarily an American sphere of influence, and that any direct Russian attempt to compete with the US would be costly and futile. During the ‘West Asia and Russia Experts Forum,’ Andrei Denisov, Member of the Council of the Russian Federation, emphasized: 

“In West Asia, there is only one player, and that is the United States. Any other player who intervenes will lose, because the United States will not allow any international actor to operate freely in the region.”

Moscow’s position stems from its belief that its southern security – meaning the security of its southern borders and immediate regional environment – constitutes its highest security priority. Therefore, Russia’s involvement in the crises and wars of the region is no longer aimed at influencing or managing their outcomes, but rather at preventing the repercussions of chaos and instability from spilling over into Russia itself or its immediate neighborhood.

From this standpoint, Moscow has become convinced that the countries of the region must shape their own regional order. Russia no longer believes it is in its interest to play the role of a power that re-engineers West Asia, as earlier iterations of Russian policy once attempted to do. Instead, it now prefers to maintain open relations with all sides and to deal with any existing de facto authority, rather than investing in a regional project of its own.

This point was emphasized by Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy director for Scientific Affairs at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who stated that “The era of the old Russia that tried to shape the region is over. Now, Russia is not concerned with what happens in the region, but it will work with any actor that exists within it.”

Reserved neutrality and active participation

Within this framework, Moscow states clearly that West Asia is not a strategic priority compared to Eastern Europe, and that its political and military resources are directed primarily toward that front. This shift is clearly reflected in its position during the war against Iran, where Moscow informed Tehran that it could not provide direct military support. The most it could commit to was refraining from assisting Israel – meaning that “relative neutrality” is the maximum form of help Russia can offer.

Instead of entering into a costly confrontation with Washington, Russia is increasingly moving toward a model closer to the Chinese approach: avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, building channels with all parties, concluding economic and technological deals, managing flexible relations even among warring rivals, exercising great caution in explicitly siding with any actor, and criticizing American, Israeli, Gulf, or Iranian policies when necessary, but without turning it into blind hostility.

In this context, Moscow promotes the idea of “reserved neutrality” and “active participation” – that is, presenting itself as a present, balanced, and cautious power that talks to everyone and benefits from economic opportunities without bearing the costs of deep security engagement. Here, Russia bets on the tools of soft power and economic influence rather than military involvement, by exporting wheat and energy, participating in civilian nuclear power projects, intensifying academic exchanges, opening university branches, and activating networks of friendly elites in the region, including Russian-speaking communities and holders of dual nationality.

The practical outcome is Russia’s acknowledgment that its role in West Asia has declined, shifting from an ambition to manage regional balances to merely keeping communication channels open and securing whatever benefits can be obtained at minimal cost. This is in an environment that Moscow views as dominated by a single effective actor – the US – where any party that attempts to challenge this reality directly becomes drained before achieving any real gains.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Reasons behind Russia’s retreat

To understand – rather than justify – the Russian approach, it is crucial to examine the reasons that drove Moscow to change its policy toward West Asia. The main driver behind this retreat is the war in Ukraine, which has absorbed the bulk of Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic capacities. The war in Eastern Europe demands ground and air forces, leadership attention, ammunition, financial resources, and political capital.

As the conflict approaches its fourth year, Russian planners are no longer attempting to manage multiple high-intensity fronts simultaneously. Everything outside Ukraine is now subordinated to the imperative of avoiding losses in Eastern Europe. Hence, Moscow’s primary focus remains on Ukraine, viewing every other issue – including West Asia – through the lens of its impact on that war, particularly as the region has grown increasingly volatile over the past two years.

The result is that our region has been downgraded from being an area of active Russian influence to a secondary, supporting track.

The second factor is linked to the erosion of the pillars that once granted Russia its regional influence – foremost among them, Syria. For an entire decade, Damascus was Moscow’s principal arena in West Asia, where it benefited from an air base in Hmeimim, a naval access point in Tartous, and a direct communication channel with the country's leadership. This position allowed Russia to present itself to regional capitals as a security guarantor that could not be bypassed.

However, with the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the disintegration of Syria’s security structure, Moscow’s ability to exert influence there declined automatically, while the cost of maintaining that influence increased. Russia is no longer capable of managing the balance of power within the Syrian theater as it once did; its very presence has become more of a burden than a leverage card.

Consequently, Moscow has shifted from a policy of deep engagement to one of minimal positioning, aimed not at shaping Syria’s transitional phase but at preserving a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean by maintaining operations at the Hmeimim air base, the Tartous naval facility, and a limited presence in Qamishli for potential future use.

The local system that once sustained Russian influence no longer exists in a form that Moscow can rely on. The Syrian landscape has become increasingly fragmented and divided, and deep field engagement now carries the risk of being drawn into internal conflicts with diminishing returns.

Accordingly, it can be said that what Moscow is doing today is reducing costs while keeping its options open – by scaling down its presence and avoiding the expenses of acting as Syria’s ‘security manager,’ without completely abandoning the military infrastructure it might need later.

The third driver is the increasing risk of being drawn into escalation between Iran and Israel. This year witnessed the first direct confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. There is no doubt that Iran is a vital partner for Russia, but this relationship has not reached a level that would compel Moscow to support Tehran in its conflict, especially since it does not wish to slide into a military stance openly hostile to Israel or the United States.

For this reason, Russia’s position during the 12-day Israeli war on Iran in June was limited to rhetorical calls for restraint, offers to mediate, and public warnings about global instability. No tangible military support was provided. In this context, some Russian analysts believe that a full-scale regional war involving Israel, Iran, and their allies could force Russia into taking a direct side, which would threaten its remaining access to Syria, the Gulf states, and Turkiye. It would also endanger energy transit routes and infrastructure projects that Russia seeks to implement with Iran and across Eurasia.

Therefore, deeper Russian military intervention in West Asia is now seen more as a responsibility trap than an opportunity, one that could drag Russia into an open confrontation with US-aligned forces or undermine its delicate balance between Iran, Israel, Turkiye, and the Gulf states.

Fourthly, Russia receives diminished diplomatic returns relative to the efforts it expends. 

Between 2015 and 2021, Moscow marketed itself to Arab capitals as the only actor capable of engaging all regional players – an image that carried real value for countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. But by 2025, this image had weakened significantly.

Reduced influence with regional partners

Cooperation between Russia and regional powers remains active in energy, logistics, grain, and arms. Yet Moscow is no longer regarded as an effective security mediator or crisis manager, a shift underscored by the failure – so far – to hold the inaugural Russian–Arab summit, originally scheduled for October 2025. In April, Moscow had planned the summit to bring Arab leaders to the capital, with President Vladimir Putin envisioning a scene reminiscent of the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting between Arab leaders and Trump. However, the Arab states requested a postponement, citing preoccupation with regional developments and the implementation of Trump’s ‘Gaza peace plan.’

From Moscow’s perspective, if key Arab states are avoiding direct engagement and no longer view Russia as indispensable, maintaining large, exposed assets or investing heavily in mediation produces less influence than before, reducing the rationale for high-risk involvement in the region.

West Asia as a lever against the west

For these reasons, West Asia’s status has been downgraded from a primary front to a tool of leverage. 

Today, Moscow uses the region more to send signals to the west than to achieve lasting local outcomes. Some Russian leaders, for instance, hint at the potential of providing Iran with nuclear warheads, signaling to Washington and Europe that Russia remains capable of complicating crisis management.

In practice, Russia aims to maintain a visible presence – through its Syrian bases, statements on Palestine, high-level contacts with Iran, Turkiye, and Gulf states, and meetings with Arab leaders – ensuring it remains part of regional dialogue. 

At the same time, it avoids deep engagement that could make it accountable for outcomes beyond its control, especially as Washington has reasserted influence in West Asia through Israel's aggressions and affairs, underscoring the region’s strategic importance and signaling it remains off-limits to rivals.

Overall, these dynamics reflect a shift in Moscow’s foreign policy. Faced with an existential crisis in Ukraine, an unreliable Syria, a high-risk Iran–Israel confrontation, and hesitant regional partners, Russia now treats West Asia primarily as a bargaining chip. Its approach is calculated containment: maintaining a foothold, preserving influence, and signaling presence, while steering clear of commitments it cannot control.

Is Iran the exception?

There is no doubt that Iran is a key strategic partner for Russia in West Asia – perhaps the most important one. This is consistently affirmed by official Russian statements. Iran is part of the North–South economic corridor stretching from Russia to India, is the only West Asian member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is a member of BRICS, and is the most anti-American actor in the region and the most willing to cooperate with Moscow across multiple fields. In addition, the two countries have a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The importance of Tehran to Moscow can be seen through the statements of various Russian officials. Following the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and Tehran in January 2025, President Putin said, “The Russian–Iranian treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership represents a real achievement … We are unanimously determined not to stop here and to take our relations to a qualitatively new level.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stated, “Our joint assessment is that Russian–Iranian relations are of a special nature and fully in line with the spirit of comprehensive strategic partnership. These ties continue to develop dynamically despite the complex regional and global situation and the attempts to pressure our two countries with the aim of hindering the development of both Iran and the Russian Federation.”

During the same forum mentioned earlier, all Russian researchers and academics emphasized Iran’s great importance to Russian leaders, who view it as a cornerstone for cooperation in West Asia. They affirmed that there are no limits to the collaboration in the economic and political fields, but the challenge lies in security and defense. According to them, Moscow is not prepared to provide a significant level of military support, fearing it could affect its relations with the Gulf states or draw it indirectly into a war against the US and Israel. They cite as evidence the recent 12-day Israel–Iran war, during which Moscow offered no notable military contribution.

It should be noted that this view contradicts Moscow’s official stance. During a press conference on 15 October, Foreign Minister Lavrov affirmed that “with regard to our military–technical cooperation with Iran, following the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, there are no longer any restrictions on us. We are supplying the equipment Iran needs fully in accordance with international law.”

Hence, the question is legitimate: does the Russian–Iranian partnership include the fields of security and defense, or has it not yet reached that level? In any case, it is history – not official statements or analyses – that will answer this question. The Israeli–Iranian confrontation continues, and everyone awaits a second round of war. The US goal of toppling the Iranian government also remains part of Washington’s vision. Accordingly, Moscow’s future performance toward Iran will determine whether its declarations are truly serious – or merely rhetorical.