Constructing chaos: Tel Aviv’s hand in Syria’s
sectarian slaughter
The massacre of at least 1,500 Alawites on Syria’s
coast was the calculated result of an Israeli operation designed to incite
rebellion, fracture the state, and redraw its borders along sectarian lines.
The Cradle's Syria Correspondent
OCT 29, 2025
https://thecradle.co/articles/constructing-chaos-tel-avivs-hand-in-syrias-sectarian-slaughter
On 7 March, Syrian security forces and affiliated
armed factions perpetrated the massacre of more than 1,500 Alawite civilians, including
many elderly, women, and children, in 58 separate locations on the Syrian
coast.
Though the killings were executed by sectarian forces loyal to Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu
Mohammad al-Julani), a former Al-Qaeda commander, the path to the massacre was
paved by a covert Israeli strategy aimed at inciting an Alawite uprising.
Israel's plan hinged on pushing Alawites into the
“trap” of launching an armed rebellion, with false promises of external
support, only to give Sharaa’s forces the pretext to carry out the mass
slaughter of Alawite civilians in “response.”
Israel’s goal was consistent with its long-standing
aim, articulated in the infamous Yinon Plan: to dismantle Syria and reshape it into “weak, decentralized ethnic
regions,” following former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s fall.
Netanyahu goes to Washington
After 14 years of sustained support from the US, Israel, and regional allies, the
extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly the Al-Qaeda affiliate,
the Nusra Front – seized control of Damascus in December 2024. Its leader,
Julani, rebranded as Ahmad al-Sharaa, swiftly assumed the
presidency.
On the very day of this power shift, Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took credit for Assad’s fall and began a mass bombing
campaign to destroy what was left of the country’s military capabilities.
However, toppling Syria’s government and destroying
its army was not the end of Israel’s plan for Syria.
On 9 January, Netanyahu’s cabinet met to discuss
organizing an international conference to “divide Syria into cantons,” Israeli
news outlet i24 News reported.
“Any proposal deemed Israeli will be viewed
unfavorably in Syria, which necessitates an international conference to advance
the matter,” the outlet noted.
In other words, to be successful, Israel’s project to
divide Syria needed to originate, or seem to originate, from Syrians
themselves.
Less than a month later, on 2 February, Netanyahu
visited Washington to present a “white paper” regarding Syria to US officials.
After Netanyahu’s visit, Reuters reported that “Israel is lobbying the United States to
keep Syria weak and decentralized, including by letting Russia keep its
military bases there to counter Turkey's influence.”
The Times of Israel later commented that Israel was lobbying the “US to buck
Sharaa’s fledgling government in favor of establishing a decentralized series
of autonomous ethnic regions, with the southern one bordering Israel being
demilitarized.”
Reports later leaked into political circles about a
meeting two days later, on 4 February, between US officials and a
representative of the most influential Druze religious leader in Syria, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, in Washington, DC.
Al-Jumhuriya reported that according to Syrian and American sources
with direct knowledge of the meetings, discussions revolved around “a plan for
an armed rebellion against the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa.”
The rebellion would reportedly include Hijri’s Druze forces from Suwayda, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) from northeast Syria, and Alawite groups from the Syrian coast,
but with “Israeli support.”
When asked about the meeting, Hijri’s representative
confirmed to Al-Jumhuriya that it had taken place but stated
that the proposal for a rebellion had not come from the Druze.
“The proposal originated from a state, not from any
Syrian faction,” Hijri's representative clarified, in a likely reference to
Israel.
Inventing the insurgency: Meqdad Fatiha
Just two days later, on 6 February, an Alawite
resistance group, the “Coastal Shield Brigade,” was allegedly formed.
A video announcing the
group’s establishment claimed its fighters would respond to sectarian massacres
carried out by HTS-led security forces against Alawites since December,
including in the village of Fahel, where 15 former officers in the Syrian army were
killed, and the village of Arzeh, where 15 people were killed as well, including a
child and an elderly woman.
In both villages, former officers in Assad’s army had
given up their weapons and completed a reconciliation process with the new
authorities in Damascus, but were nevertheless murdered in their homes by
militants linked to Syria’s new extremist-led security forces.
The Coastal Shield Brigades was allegedly led by
Meqdad Fatiha, a former member of the 25th Special Forces and
the Republican Guard of the Assad government.
Activists on social media circulated the
video, which allegedly showed Fatiha declaring the establishment of the brigade
from a base in the Latakia Mountains.
However, there was no evidence that the group was
real. Fatiha's face was covered by a black balaclava in the video, making it
impossible to verify whether he was really the person speaking. This was odd,
given that his appearance was already known from his Facebook profile.
The theatrics pointed to an intelligence fabrication –
likely Israeli – designed to present the illusion of an organic Alawite
insurgency.
A meeting in Najaf?
Just five days later, the narrative of an organized
Alawite insurgency was reinforced by reports in Turkiye Gazetesi, an
Islamist-leaning pro-government newspaper in Turkiye.
The report claimed that Iranian generals and former
commanders in the Syrian army under Assad had met in the Shia holy city of
Najaf in Iraq to plan a major uprising against Sharaa in Syria.
The scheme reportedly involved Druze factions, the
Kurdish-led SDF, Alawite insurgents on the coast, Lebanese Hezbollah, and,
improbably, ISIS.
Large amounts of weapons were allegedly being sent by
land from Iraq and by sea from Lebanon to the Syrian coast, the report added.
“Some surprising events were expected to occur in
Syria in the near future,” the Iranian generals allegedly in attendance
said.
While “surprising events” did occur one month later
with the massacre of Alawites on 7 March, the reports of the Najaf meeting are
likely fabricated.
It is unlikely that a Turkish newspaper would have
access to a detailed account of a secret meeting taking place between top
Iranian generals and former Syrian officers.
It is also unlikely, and even ridiculous, that Iran and Hezbollah would be
coordinating with their long-time enemy, ISIS, or with the US-backed SDF.
Kurdish-Syrian commentator Samir Matini amplified the
narrative through widely viewed livestreams, pushing the idea of “surprising
events” to come. The aim: to pin Israel’s plan on Iran and Hezbollah and create
a smokescreen of chaos.
Sectarian killings fuel resistance
Amid the propaganda claiming a foreign-backed Alawite
insurgency was being organized, Julani’s security forces stepped up attacks against Alawite civilians in the coastal
region.
Syrian journalist Ammar Dayoub reported in Al-Araby al-Jadeed that
Alawites were often targeted solely based on their religious identity, rather
than because they were “remnants of the regime.”
Dayoub observed that “these violations have targeted
people who opposed the previous regime, and young people who were only children
in that period, as well as academics and women.”
In response to the sectarian killings, Alawites began
to defend themselves.
One key event occurred on 8 January, when armed men
linked to the Damascus government killed three Alawite farmers in the village of Ain
al-Sharqiyah in the coastal region of Jableh. The men were working their lands
across from the Brigade 107 base when they were killed.
In response, a local man named Bassam Hossam al-Din
gathered a group of local men, arming them with light weapons. They attacked
members of Julani's internal security forces, known as General Security,
killing one and abducting seven more, before barricading themselves in an
Alawite religious shrine.
The General Security launched a campaign against them,
swiftly killing Hossam al-Din and his group.
A former intelligence officer of the Assad government,
speaking with The Cradle, says these killings motivated him
and others to fight back:
“All this fueled enormous resentment in the area,
which grew worse day by day. After Bassam Hossam al-Din’s death, some people
here – including former government military personnel and civilians – began to
gather.”
Crucially, they were “encouraged by reports and
promises [of help] they received from outside.”
They were told they would receive support, including
by sea, from the US-led international coalition, in coordination with the Druze
in Suwayda and Kurds in northeastern Syria.
“They were given hope of escaping this miserable
situation,” the former intelligence officer tells The Cradle.
In the following weeks, Alawites continued to clash
with Syrian security forces in an effort to defend themselves from raids and
arrests.
In late February, Alawite insurgents attacked a police
station in Assad's hometown of Qardaha, located in the mountains
overlooking the coastal town of Latakia.
According to Qardaha residents and activists who spoke to Reuters, “the incident began when
members of security forces tried to enter a house without permission, sparking
opposition from residents.”
“One person was killed by gunfire, with locals
accusing the security forces of the shooting,” Reuters added,
further suggesting that local Alawite men were acting in self-defense.
What happened in Datour?
The simmering conflict escalated further on 4
March. Reuters reported that, according to Syrian state media, two
members of the Defense Ministry had been killed in the Datour neighborhood in
Latakia city by “groups of Assad militia remnants,” and that security forces
had mounted a campaign to arrest them.
One Datour resident told Reuters there had been heavy gunfire
in the early hours and that security forces in numerous vehicles had surrounded
the neighborhood.
A security source speaking with the news agency blamed
the violence on a “proliferation of arms” among former security and army
personnel who had refused to enter into reconciliation agreements with the new
authorities.
The source said that local Alawite leaders had, in
some cases, cooperated with security forces to hand over former personnel
suspected of committing crimes during the period of Assad’s rule in hopes of
staving off “crack downs and potential civil unrest.”
Testimonies from residents of Datour collected by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) indicated
that security forces carried out random arrests in Datour and indiscriminately
fired at civilian homes, resulting in several deaths, including that of a
child.
The campaign was “marked by sectarian rhetoric and
intense hate speech directed against the Alawite sect,” STJ added.
A source from Datour speaking with The Cradle reveals
that Julani’s government used a prominent local Alawite family to create the
proliferation of weapons needed to justify a crackdown.
The Aslan family had previously been close to Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother and
commander of the army’s elite 4th Division, but quickly
established good relations with the new government after it came to power in
December.
It became common to see General Security members from
Idlib spending time at the Aslan-owned businesses on Thawra Street at the
entrance to Datour.
When residents complained to the General Security
about criminal activity by the Aslan family, such as stealing money and
confiscating homes, the General Security took no action against the family.
The source speaking with The Cradle says
that on 4 and 5 March, members of the Aslan family distributed weapons to
Alawite men in the neighborhood, encouraging them to take up arms against the
General Security.
This was, of course, strange given the close
relationship between the Aslans and the General Security, as well as because
such a rebellion had little chance of success.
“Why would the Aslan family distribute weapons to
fellow Alawites in Datour while knowing a rebellion would fail?” the source
asks.
What happened in Daliyah?
On 6 March, a major clash erupted in the Alawite
villages of Daliyah and Beit Ana, which lie adjacent to one another in the
mountains of the Jableh countryside.
Sources from Daliyah speaking with The
Cradle confirm that a large General Security convoy entered the
village that morning to arrest a local man, Ali Ahmad, who had written posts
against the Julani government on Facebook.
General Security members took Ahmad from his work at
the local mini bus station and executed him at the entrance of the
village.
The General Security members then entered the nearby
house of a retired army officer, Taha Saad, in the adjacent village of Beit
Ana, killing his two adult sons.
In response to the killings, local men from the
village gathered light weapons and attacked the General Security members. After
the General Security called for reinforcements, a convoy of 20 vehicles arrived
to assist the government forces in the fight.
The sources in Daliyah speaking with The
Cradle state that around 20 members of the General Security and 17 men
from the village were killed in the gun battle.
As the clashes continued, Damascus sent helicopters to
drop bombs on Daliyah and Beit Ana until a Russian plane forced the helicopters
to withdraw.
Julani's army escalated further by firing artillery at
multiple Alawite villages in the mountain areas from the military academy in
Rumaylah on the coast, near Jableh city.
A source from Jableh speaking to The Cradle says
that the bombings made Alawites “go crazy,” especially because Daliyah is home
to an important Alawite religious shrine.
The massacre and its beneficiaries
When the Russian plane appeared over Daliyah and Beit
Ana, “People thought that this was ‘the moment,’ so they rose up on that
basis,” stated the former intelligence officer speaking with The
Cradle.
Alawite insurgents attacked General Security and army
positions in various areas across the coast, including Brigade 107 near Ayn
al-Sharqiyah, where Bassam Hossam al-Din’s group abducted the General Security
members before being killed in January.
“There was no Meqdad Fatiha or anyone else from
outside, no Iranians or any others. It was purely a popular force rising up
against this situation,” the former intelligence officer explains.
However, they were emboldened by promises of outside
help from the US-led coalition, the Druze, and the Kurds.
The clashes at the Brigade 107 base lasted all night,
but the Alawite insurgents paused the attack early the next morning, on 7
March, thinking that coalition forces would come to their aid and bomb the
brigade.
“They waited two hours, but no strikes came, no
support arrived. Their morale collapsed, they realized it was all lies, just a
trap,” the source goes on to say.
After the fighting stopped, disillusionment spread,
and the Alawite insurgents attacking the base withdrew and returned to their
villages.
Al Jazeera’s role
As the fighting still raged on 6 March, Al
Jazeera repeated the false reports from Turkish media claiming
Alawite insurgents were receiving massive external support from Iran,
Hezbollah, the Kurdish SDF, and even Assad.
The news outlet's propaganda gave Damascus the pretext
to mobilize not only formal members of military units from the Ministry of
Defense, but also many informal armed factions who responded to calls from
mosques to fight “jihad” against Alawites.
On the morning of 7 March, convoys of military
vehicles filled with tens of thousands of Sharaa’s extremist fighters began
arriving at the coast.
Because the Alawite insurgency was weak and
disorganized, with no help from abroad, it was not able to provide any
protection to Alawite civilians as the massacres unfolded.
Facing no resistance, Julani’s forces began
systematically slaughtering any Alawite men they could find, as well as many
women and children, in cities, towns, and villages across the coast, including
in Jableh, Al-Mukhtariyah, Snobar, Al-Shir, and the neighborhoods of Al-Qusour
in Baniyas and Datour in Latakia.
The massive scope and systematic nature of the
massacres, involving such large numbers of armed men in so many locations,
suggests pre-planning by Julani and his Defense Minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra – a former commander-in-chief of the HTS
military wing.
A media creation
The mobilization of Julani’s forces was also aided on
6 March by new videos appearing online claiming to show Meqdad Fatiha and
members of the Coastal Shield Brigade vowing to fight against the new
government.
In one video, the man claiming to be Fatiha was masked (this time
dressed like a character from the popular video game, Mortal Kombat, and
standing against a blank background), making it impossible to know who he was
and whether he was in the mountains of Latakia or in a television studio in Tel
Aviv or Doha.
In a separate video, Fatiha was masked and dressed
just like an ISIS militant beheading Christians on video in Libya in 2015,
leading to speculation the video was fake and had been created using
artificial intelligence (AI).
Another video was
later released in which Fatiha appeared without a mask, saying that previous
videos of him were indeed real, and not created using AI. However, the new
video also appeared fake, his face, shoulders, and eyes moving in an unnatural
way as he spoke.
During multiple visits to the Syrian coast, The
Cradle was not able to find any Alawites who expressed support for
Fatiha or believed his group was real.
The source from Daliyah states that, “No one here
supports Meqdad Fatiha. We all believe he works for Julani. The Coastal Shield
Brigade is fabricated.”
A former Alawite officer in Assad’s army from the
Syrian coast tells The Cradle, “We only see videos of Meqdad Fatiha
online. We believe he is just a media creation.”
After showing The Cradle his rotting
teeth, the former officer remarks, “Do you think we are getting help from Iran
or Hezbollah? I don’t even have money to fix my teeth.”
An Alawite woman whose husband and two grown sons
were murdered on 7 March suggests to The Cradle that
Fatiha is a fictitious person, only existing on Facebook and created by the
authorities to justify the massacres.
“Who is he? Julani created him. It’s a lie,” she
explains.
General Security fatalities
The mobilization of Sharaa’s extremist forces from
across the country was also aided by claims that Alawite insurgents had killed 236 members
of the General Security in attacks on 6 April.
Some General Security members were certainly killed,
but Syrian authorities never provided any evidence for this large number,
suggesting it was vastly inflated to heighten sectarian anger. When Reuters requested the names or an updated tally, Syrian officials
refused to provide them.
In one case, the pro-HTS “Euphrates Shield” Telegram
channel published a photo collage allegedly showing General Security members
killed by “regime remnants” during the fighting.
However, one of the fighters shown in the photos
quickly posted a story on his Instagram with a “laugh out loud” emoji to show
he was still alive, the Syrian Democratic Observatory showed.
Israeli ambitions
On 10 March, before the victims of the massacres had
been buried, i24 News published a letter claiming to be written by Alawite
leaders, asking Netanyahu to send his military to protect them.
“If you come to the Syrian coast, which is
predominantly Alawite, you will be greeted with songs and flowers,” the letter
stated.
It also called on Israel to unite against the “Islamic
tide led by Turkiye,” while asking for help in separating from “this extremist
state.”
When Israel secretly “greenlit” Julani’s massacre of Druze in Suwayda in July, the goal of dividing Syria was further
advanced. Many Druze are aware of the covert relationship between Damascus and
Tel Aviv, but, fearing extermination, feel they have little choice but to call on Israel
for protection and to establish an autonomous region in south
Syria.
Three weeks after the massacres of Alawites in March,
an Israeli general quietly admitted that sectarian violence in Syria benefits
Tel Aviv.
“This thing where everyone is fighting everyone, and
there’s an agreement with the Kurds one day, and a massacre of the Alawites the
second day, and a threat to the Druze on the third day, and Israeli strikes in
the south. All this chaos is, to some extent, actually good for Israel,” stated
Tamir Hayman while speaking with Israeli Army Radio.
“Wish all sides good luck (but) do it quietly. Don't
talk about it,” the general added.
