The axis era: West Asia's new map after the ‘Flood’
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was never just an act of war.
It cracked the facade of regional stability, exposed the fault lines of power,
and accelerated the pull into four contending poles now reshaping West Asia.
JAN 16, 2026
https://thecradle.co/articles/the-axis-era-west-asias-new-map-after-the-flood
“Al-Aqsa Flood was a preemptive strike – meant to
break the American-Zionist project in this region.” — Ihsan Ataya,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) official, speaking to The Cradle on 28 October 2023
Until recently, regional developments in West Asia
could still be parsed through the old frameworks of isolated conflicts,
bilateral rivalries, or proxy skirmishes. No longer.
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023 was a strategic rupture that reset the rules of deterrence, legitimacy,
and the acceptable use of force. Since that day, West Asia has transformed into
a single, hyper-connected battlespace where borders blur, fronts overlap, and
crises no longer unfold in isolation.
Everything since 7 October has operated within a new
strategic equation. Major powers have scrambled to adjust their priorities,
allies and adversaries have redrawn their lines, and familiar arrangements have
begun to fray.
The usual safeguards – diplomatic cover, economic
pressure valves, even military deterrents – have eroded. The region is no
longer a patchwork of separate flashpoints, but a volatile system where any
single spark – a border incident, trade maneuver, or diplomatic shift – can
trigger a chain reaction. What we are witnessing is the active remaking of the
region’s balance of power, in real time.
Four axes, no hegemon
At the heart of this transformation is the emergence
of four distinct centers of power: Iran, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli
occupation state. Each commands influence across multiple domains, but none has
been able to translate that into uncontested dominance. Instead, the region is
pulled between four gravitational fields, each shaping alliances, conflicts,
and narratives.
Iran and Saudi Arabia wield energy resources that
extend their reach beyond West Asia. Iran also commands loyalty from Shia
populations and maintains long-standing partnerships with resistance movements.
Turkiye and Iran are large, populous states with deep
historical imperial roots, strategic geography, and expansive militaries. Saudi
Arabia – and, to a lesser extent, Turkiye – also possess significant soft
power, rooted in religious and cultural legitimacy.
Israel, for its part, remains a military and technological leader, backed by a
“special relationship” with Washington and an unconfirmed nuclear arsenal.
None of these powers, however, holds all the cards.
Their simultaneous rise has prevented the emergence of a regional hegemon.
Instead, they check each other’s advances in an unstable balance shaped by
history, ideology, and ambition.
These four axes do not operate as formal alliances.
They are fluid zones of influence that shape how states, movements, and even
markets align. What matters is not fixed membership but the gravitational pull
– the capacity to compel decisions, offer protection, impose costs, or shape
narratives. And in the volatile aftermath of 7 October, that pull has only
intensified.
This structure exists because none of these actors
enjoys a decisive edge. Nor are they all equally accepted in the region.
Influence alone is not enough; a power must be willing to act, and others must
be willing to accept its leadership.
No state in recent West Asian history has sustained
all three traits long enough to become a hegemon. Instead, they maneuver to
secure their turf or deny rivals supremacy. These competitions flare during
upheaval – the Persian Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Arab uprisings,
and now, the post-Operation Al-Aqsa Flood rupture.
Most regional states now orbit one of these four axes.
Riyadh leads many of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, excluding Qatar and
the UAE. Abu Dhabi a key member of the ‘Axis of Normalization’ has naturally tilted toward the Israeli camp.
Resistance movements align with Iran.
Qatar leans toward Turkiye, a relationship underpinned
by their shared support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked movements across the region. Egypt, once a
power in its own right, has largely fallen under Saudi sway.
The battle for Yemen’s south is a Gulf power play
Saudi–UAE competition has long been framed as a rivalry within the Gulf’s inner circle – two partners
with diverging tactics, not clashing visions. That frame no longer holds. The
UAE's normalization with Tel Aviv recast Abu Dhabi as an enabler of Israeli
regional integration – not just a competitor to Riyadh, but a channel for
Israeli expansion.
This realignment has sharpened Saudi sensitivities.
While Riyadh may overlap with Israel tactically, it does not accept Tel Aviv as
a strategic arbiter. The concern is not Emirati–Israeli ties per se, but their
functional depth – a fusion of Emirati capital and logistics with Israeli
security expertise and global networks. That combination, Riyadh fears, could
project power into Saudi Arabia’s own sphere.
This is especially acute in southern Yemen, where Abu Dhabi’s ambitions risk handing Tel Aviv a
presence on Saudi Arabia’s southern flank. Riyadh views this not as regional
jockeying but a direct threat to its national security.
The Saudi position is clear: tactical overlap with
Israel is tolerable to a point, but a UAE–Israel axis inside the Gulf is a red
line. This has outgrown the bounds of a Gulf rivalry. It is now a clash
between two distinct regional visions–one seeking to contain Israel’s
expansion, the other enabling its entrenchment.
Tel Aviv’s regional project threatens friend and foe
alike
For decades, Hezbollah’s late secretary-general Sayyed
Hassan Nasrallah warned that weakening the Axis of Resistance would eventually
endanger every state in the region – including those aligned with Washington.
In a 2013 speech, Nasrallah stated:
“If Syria falls, Palestine is lost – and with it, the
resistance in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. If Syria falls to the US,
Israel, and the takfiris, our region will enter a dark, brutal era. That is our
assessment.”
A decade later, Tel Aviv’s regional conduct bears out
that warning. Israel no longer limits its actions to a single front. It moves
across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Iran in
concert, treating the region as a unified battlespace.
Recent events – setbacks for the resistance, Syria’s
erosion, the expansion of Israeli operations – have made clear that Tel
Aviv respects no boundaries, not even those of friendly governments.
For
Iran, the threat is direct and existential. Israeli officials routinely declare
that dismantling the Islamic Republic is their strategic goal. That goal has
been pursued through assassinations, sabotage, ‘color revolutions,’ proxy
attacks, and now open war.
For Turkiye, the threat is strategic. Israel
challenges Ankara’s influence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, pushing alternative trade corridors that sideline
Turkish geography. Syria, in particular, has become a theater where Israeli
freedom of action clashes with Turkish security priorities.
For Saudi Arabia, the concern is structural. Tel
Aviv’s attempt to rewrite regional rules threatens Riyadh’s autonomy and
leadership. The greater danger lies in the emerging regional
architecture – an order shaped to entrench Israeli dominance while sidelining
Arab powers into subordinate roles.
Since 7 October, Tel Aviv has expanded its operational
playbook: preemptive strikes, multi-front campaigns, and intensified
deterrence. This has heightened the perception of threat across all major
powers.
That does not mean a new anti-Israel alliance is
forming. But it does mean each actor – except Iran, which sees Israel as an
inherent enemy – now views Israeli expansion as a constraint on their own
strategic space.
What looms larger than open conflict is a strategic
shift that could allow one actor to reshape the rules of engagement for the
entire region.