What the Iran-Iraq war taught today’s Iranian leaders - and why that matters

Iran’s response to the US-Israeli war is rooted in the legacy of the 1980s conflict, which defined the country’s political and military structure

By MEE correspondent

Published date: 23 April 2026 

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-iran-iraq-war-taught-todays-iranian-leaders-and-why-matters

In September 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered a full-scale ground and air attack on Iran, hoping for a quick victory. 

He told the Iraqi people he would reach Tehran within weeks. Instead, the war lasted nearly eight years and killed more than a million people.

Beyond the vast destruction, the war helped shape the Islamic Republic of Iran into the system it is today.

At the time, Iran was still grappling with the turmoil of the 1979 revolution, which had toppled the Shah, a key ally of the US and Israel in the Middle East. 

The post-revolutionary Iranian army was falling apart, while nationalist, leftist and even moderate religious groups were competing with the ultraconservative clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first supreme leader.

Saddam Hussein’s invasion not only failed to bring down Khomeini’s rule, but it also ended up helping entrench it. 

The war allowed the new leadership to tighten its grip, eliminate opposition groups, and consolidate power and institutions. 

During those years, a quote attributed to Khomeini appeared on walls across Iranian cities: “War is a blessing.”

It was, says Behrouz Farahani, an Iranian opposition figure based in Paris and critic of the US-Israeli war on Iran, cover for Khomeini’s ruthlessness.

“For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext and the foundations of totalitarianism can be strengthened.”

The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. A year later, Khomeini died and reconstruction began in full swing as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second supreme leader, grew stronger.

Over time, graffiti quoting Khomeini faded, replaced by statements from Khamenei.

But the lessons the ruling establishment drew from that war have shaped its response to political and military tensions ever since.

Many of the figures who have dominated Iran’s political and military landscape in past decades rose through the ranks during the Iran–Iraq War.

Among them was Qassem Soleimani, the slain commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, his successor Esmail Qaani, as well as Ali Larijani, a former senior security official assassinated by Israel on 17 March.

Even those now leading negotiations with the US are part of the same generation shaped by the war.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, served in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War before moving to diplomacy.

And parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the most influential men  in Iran today, remained in the military ranks for years after the war, later exchanging his uniform for civilian office.

Perhaps as these leaders and other members of the establishment entrench their rule in the face of the US-Israeli war launched on 28 February, they too will be repeating Khomeini’s mantra of war as a “blessing”.

No allies, no choice

One of the first lessons the Islamic Republic learnt from the Iran-Iraq war was that, in the post-revolutionary context, it had few real options on the international stage. 

The ideology that shaped Iran’s political system after 1979 left the new rulers with very few allies.

When the war began, not only did western powers back Saddam Hussein, but most Arab countries in the region, with the exception of Syria and, at times, Libya, sided against Iran. 

And with Iraq’s military quickly proving stronger, Iran lost parts of oil-rich Khuzestan province to the invading forces.

Despite its isolation, internal chaos and struggle to secure weapons, Iran managed to push Iraqi forces back after about a year.

That dynamic of steadfastness when confronted by a stronger adversary has been played out again in this latest war

Maziar Behrooz, a prominent researcher of contemporary Iranian history and author of Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia, says the country’s response to the US-Israeli assault reflects the lessons Iran’s leaders learnt from that conflict four decades ago.

“While Iran was under attack by Iraq, they [the Iranian establishment] realised they were not going to receive any help from the outside, so they had to rely on themselves,” he explains.

“The lesson from that war was missile technology, which they reverse-engineered and then improved. Today we see its result, both in Iran’s drone and missile technologies, which have inflicted substantial damage to those who have now attacked Iran.”

Behrooz also highlights another lesson learnt in the Iran-Iraq war: move key operations underground.

After the war ended in 1988, Iran began building missile and drone facilities deep inside the mountains and moved parts of its nuclear programme underground.

This shift was one of the reasons the US and Israel have failed to stop Iranian missiles from being launched at Israel and Gulf Arab states over the past few weeks.

But self-reliance was not limited to the military. It also became central to Iran’s political approach.

Peyman Jafari, an Iranian historian and professor at the College of William & Mary, Virginia, says the Iran-Iraq war pushed Tehran toward independence in all fields. 

Before 1979, the country had been heavily dependent on western powers, especially the US, in both military and civilian sectors. 

That fundamentally changed during and after the Iran-Iraq war.

“The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources,” Jafari explains.

“Reliance on their own initiatives and strategising their policies within this framework became of high importance for them in the military, industry, intelligence, and all other fields.”

Consolidating power

The war also defined how the new ruling establishment would deal with power at home.

Behrooz points to the overlap between the US embassy hostage crisis and Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980. 

The United States’ reputation among the Iranian public was low during the Islamic Revolution, due to the CIA’s involvement in the 1953 coup that removed the democratically elected prime minister and handed power back to the Shah.

When dozens of US diplomats and citizens were detained in the embassy in 1979, that anti-American sentiment only grew.

Soon after, Behrooz noted, Saddam Hussein invaded, “and then you have a war on your hands”.

“The regime used both issues to rally support for the cause and also to consolidate power,” he explained.

This consolidation was also driven by a widespread crackdown.

After 1981, the establishment moved faster to eliminate its main rivals, beginning with the key opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation. 

Pro-Khomeini factions continued their suppression by forcing out Abolhassan Banisadr, the country’s first post-revolution president, carrying out military operations against Kurdish organisations, and dismantling leftist and nationalist groups.

These moves also reshaped Iran’s post-revolutionary society. While many supported the new order, others stepped back and waited.

“There was substantial popular support for the regime, but there were also substantial bystanders: people who stepped back, watched what was going on, and waited to see who would win,” Behrooz said.

A similar dynamic can be seen following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. 

The government used the war to stoke nationalist sentiment and somewhat repair its image with the public, which had been rocked after the brutal suppression of nationwide anti-establishment protests in January.

Moreover, the war gave the ruling establishment an opportunity to tighten control.

Executions of imprisoned dissidents increased, stricter laws on “espionage” and “contact with foreign media” were introduced, and arrests on these charges became more widespread.

Building the system

Beyond providing cover to eliminate opposition groups, the Iran-Iraq War also played a key role in shaping Iran’s system of governance. 

When the war ended, many senior and mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) commanders moved into politics, the economy, culture and even sports management.

According to Jafari, this shift had already begun during the conflict, but accelerated after the fighting stopped. 

As military operations ended, state institution-building picked up speed, while the large number of people who had spent years on the battlefield were redirected into other sectors.

Jafari describes this process as driven by a form of “army brotherhood”.

“We should not forget the human aspect of that war,” he stressed. 

“The Iran-Iraq war was the cultivation of army brotherhood among the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, that sense of ‘we went through the war’, which is seen among all who fought a war. But because that war lasted very long, that brotherhood was really forged in steel.”

When these fighters returned from the frontlines, the strong ties they had formed became a force behind the creation of new institutions and the expansion of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system.

The effects of this deep institutionalisation have become clear in the latest war. While the US and Israel expected that targeting Iran’s political and military leadership would bring down the entire system, the outcome was the opposite.

Explaining this miscalculation, Jafari said: “This is rooted in this slivery orientalist idea that these Iranians are kind of savages who cannot organise any modern state. This system is very organised, with layers of offices, a finance system, and planning for its own survival.”

An unresolved problem

If the Iran-Iraq war taught the Islamic Republic how to survive external threats, it did not resolve its internal tensions. 

Whatever the outcome of this war, some of Iran’s internal problems remain unresolved.

Public dissatisfaction with Khomeini and his followers existed even during the Iran-Iraq war. 

But at that time, the establishment had broader support and faced fewer limits in suppressing dissent. 

Today, that balance has shifted, narrowing the circle of power and increasing the distance between the state and society.

Behrooz explains: “In any country, when you do not take care of your citizens, they will be unhappy with you. In democratic countries, they vote you out. In undemocratic countries, the ability to listen to the base diminishes over time, and as repression intensifies, understanding what the base demands becomes increasingly impossible.”

The lesson the Islamic Republic did not learn is that repression alone cannot resolve dissatisfaction, simply because it deepens it over time.

Jafari puts it more directly: “Because of the ideological, political and cultural restrictions, many citizens do not feel that they can be integrated in this system. Moreover, we have economic problems, poverty, mismanagement, and corruption, and that’s why the majority are fed up with the system.”

Islamabad’s post-war push: A new Gulf security order takes shape

The US security umbrella no longer looks untouchable, and regional powers are moving quickly to fill the vacuum before Washington can reassert control.

F.M. Shakil

APR 22, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/islamabads-post-war-push-a-new-gulf-security-order-takes-shape

US President Donald Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire with Iran at Pakistan’s request has given Islamabad more time to push for a broader settlement between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. Yet even as diplomacy inches forward, the war has already triggered a deeper shift across West Asia.

A Pakistan-brokered truce is now tied to a broader regional realignment. Persian Gulf states, long dependent on Washington’s military shield, are openly questioning whether that shield still works. In its place, a new conversation has emerged: one centered on regional defense cooperation led by Muslim-majority states rather than the US.

Iran signaled cautious optimism last week about joining a second round of talks in Islamabad. Reports had suggested Tehran might refuse to attend after a US naval assault on an Iranian vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, but Trump’s decision to extend the ceasefire has bought negotiators more time.

That development reportedly pushed Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to press Washington for a ceasefire extension and an easing of the blockade. Trump’s decision to prolong the truce has partly addressed Iran’s conditions for rejoining negotiations, although the blockade remains in place.

Munir, who concluded a three-day visit to Tehran last week, has remained in direct contact with Trump while Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has carried out parallel diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkiye.

Yet another obstacle to an agreement is the status of the enriched uranium that Iran possesses. Latest updates reveal that both Russia and China have offered to store Iranian uranium to address a major US demand for a peace agreement. 

A regional order without Washington

Parallel to the peace effort, intense diplomacy is underway between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkiye, and Egypt over a possible “Muslim” replacement for the US-led Gulf security architecture.

A quadripartite meeting on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held from 17–19 April in Turkiye, reportedly focused on lowering tensions and building a new regional security structure. Sources speaking to The Cradle say there is now broad support for an “internal security apparatus” rooted in economic integration and defense coordination.

Ankara has proposed what it describes as an “organized regional security platform” built around the idea that regional states, not outside powers, should be responsible for defending West Asia.

The urgency behind those discussions is easy to understand.

Several Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, now believe that US bases in the Persian Gulf have become liabilities rather than assets. After Iranian strikes damaged or destroyed multiple US military facilities in the region, Gulf governments began to question whether the US presence protects them or simply turns them into targets.

Zahir Shah Sherazi, executive vice president of Bol News, tells The Cradle:

“Targeting the US bases and installations in the Gulf states, where American outposts were located, was a strategic and insightful military tactic of Iran that exposed the true nature of Washington. The Gulf nations came to understand that the US is unable to safeguard them, as its primary focus lies on the Zionist state and its expansionist ambitions.” 

Sherazi states that the concept of a Greater Israel stems from the expansionist designs of the Zionist state, which is working on it in the West Bank, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria under US protection. This situation, he argues, has worried the Gulf states, and even Turkiye is at risk of clashing with Israel in Syria and Lebanon. 

These apprehensions led to the formation of a NATO-like force in West Asia, not to counter Iran but Israel’s expansionist designs. He says Iran may join this force after its war, making it a strong military alliance against the US and Israel.

Sunni alliance or regional deterrent?

Not everyone sees the proposed force in the same way.

Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), tells The Cradle that the project could end up functioning as a Sunni coalition rather than a genuinely regional defense structure.

In his view, the force may ultimately suit both Washington and the occupation state because it could be used to contain Iran while protecting the oil-rich Arab monarchies.

“This force is perceived as a facilitator of the Abraham Accords, as it is designed to fortify regional alliances and counteract Iranian influence in the Middle East. This coterie may emerge as an alternative security arrangement, specifically for Saudi Arabia, as the US military bases have become liabilities rather than functioning as a protective umbrella for the Gulf and Arab states.” 

Concerning the prospects of this force, Gul is not so optimistic. He is of the view that such an organization could not effectively assume the responsibility of regulating this region.

“It is a highly intricate issue that is both challenging and difficult to implement due to several internal differences and conflicting interests, such as the ongoing tensions between Iran and Turkiye, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which complicate any potential regulatory efforts.” 

US bases become a burden

Even as Trump signals a possible drawdown of US military operations in West Asia, Washington continues to expand its military footprint.

Trump has suggested that thousands of US troops could leave Iraq and Syria by September 2026. Yet his administration has also sent an additional 2,500 marines to the region.

That contradiction has reinforced Russian warnings that “the US and Israel can use the peace talks to prepare for a ground operation against Iran, as the Pentagon continues to increase US troop numbers in the region.”

Gul believes a large-scale US withdrawal from Gulf bases would leave the occupation state more isolated. Without those facilities, Tel Aviv would lose much of the logistical and intelligence infrastructure that underpins its military reach across the region.

He argues that Washington will maintain a military foothold in West Asia for as long as it sees Israel as vulnerable.

A recent report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) urged the Pentagon to reassess its Gulf basing strategy once the war with Iran ends. The report argued that Bahrain and the UAE should remain key hubs for US naval power, while other facilities may create more problems than advantages.

AEI suggested that Washington rely more heavily on Greece and Cyprus instead of accommodating Turkiye. It also argued that the US should deepen its presence in Somaliland rather than maintain extensive deployments in Saudi Arabia and Oman.

According to the Middle East Institute (MEI), US forces remain stationed in the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Roughly 50,000 troops are spread across 19 known sites.

“The US security umbrella became more of a liability, directly threatening the sovereignty of the host countries, especially since these bases were implicated in the attack on Iran. Although Iran is not a threat to the GCC's sovereignty, it is assaulting the US bases from which the US attacks Iran,” Gul says.

Sherazi said that given the losses the US sustained despite having an edge over Iran in military might, air superiority, and technology, it had already abandoned outposts in Saudi Arabia and Qatar due to Iranian resilience and intense retaliation.

Pakistan moves in as Gulf protector

Pakistan deployed 13,000 troops and a fleet of 10 to 18 fighter jets, including advanced platforms such as the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III and J-10CE fighters, at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

Sherazi goes further. He argues that despite its military superiority and technological edge, Washington has already been forced to abandon some positions in Saudi Arabia and Qatar because of Iranian retaliation.

“Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan have established strong connections in trade and defense collaboration. Qatar appears to be signaling its intention to join this Saudi–Pakistan defense mechanism. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also declared that their territories will not be used for actions against Iran.”

Pakistan has already started positioning itself as an alternative security guarantor for the Gulf monarchies.

Islamabad and Ankara are also deepening military cooperation. Pakistan is involved in the KAAN stealth fighter program, while Turkiye is providing support in drone technology, training, and military equipment.

There is also growing speculation that Iran may quietly support parts of this regional transition. One of Tehran’s key demands in recent negotiations with Washington was reportedly the closure of US military bases across the region.

“Almost all Middle Eastern nations, except for a few like the UAE, support an indigenous security mechanism in the region due to the US-Israel collusion that has caused significant bloodshed among Arab nations,” Sherazi says. 

“Now is the time for a robust force to end the barbarity of the Zionists and their supporters.” 

Katz: Israel Waiting for US ‘Green Light’ To Attack Iran, Plunge Country Into the ‘Stone Age’

The minister also said the IDF was ready to 'complete the elimination of the Khamenei dynasty'

by Dave DeCamp | April 23, 2026

https://news.antiwar.com/2026/04/23/katz-israel-waiting-for-us-green-light-to-attack-iran-plunge-country-into-the-stone-age/

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Thursday that Israel was waiting for a “green light” from the US to break the ceasefire and renew attacks on Iran to plunge the country into the “stone age,” and finish off the Khamenei family, a sign that the truce is on the brink of collapse.

“Israel is prepared to renew the war against Iran. The IDF is ready in defense and offense, and the targets are marked,” Katz said, according to The Times of Israel.

Katz said Israel was “awaiting a green light from the United States, first and foremost to complete the elimination of the Khamenei dynasty, the initiator of the extermination plan against Israel, and the successors of the successors of the leadership of the Iranian terror regime, and in addition to return Iran to the age of darkness and stone by blowing up central energy and electricity facilities and crushing national economic infrastructure.”

He added that the renewed bombing campaign “will be different and deadly and will add devastating blows in the most painful places, following the enormous blows the Iranian terror regime has already suffered so far, that will shake and collapse its foundations.”

The threat from Katz comes on the same day that President Trump amplified calls to kill Iranian leaders who won’t accept US demands for a deal. Katz’s rhetoric also echoes President Trump, who has previously threatened to send Iran back to the “stone age” by destroying all of its power plants.

Trump has also threatened to unleash “hell” on Iran, “blow up” the entire country, and at one point said an “entire civilization would die” if he escalated his bombing campaign.

The American People Should Not Be Forced to Fund Israel’s Atrocities

04/15/2026 •Mises Wire•Connor O'Keeffe

https://mises.org/mises-wire/american-people-should-not-be-forced-fund-israels-atrocities

Today is tax day. It’s a day where Americans everywhere are forced to reflect on all the income we’ve been forced to hand over to the government. Unpleasant as that is by itself, it’s also worth going a step further and using the occasion to reflect on what the government is using our money for.

There are, of course, the big-ticket items. The programs the government spends the most money on: entitlements and war. The federal government spends trillions of dollars on generational wealth transfers like Social Security, demand-side healthcare subsidies like Medicare and Medicaid that have caused the price of healthcare to skyrocket for everybody (including those dependent on government support), and a massive war-making apparatus that is constantly creating new enemies by attempting to maintain a costly global empire—not to mention, by the way, all the wealth siphoned away from us by the government through inflation.

There’s plenty there to get upset about. But, these days, there’s another use of our tax dollars that, while not as quantitatively dramatic, is quickly, understandably, and rightfully coming under a lot of scrutiny: foreign aid to the Israeli government.

This is not a new spending program. The US government has been sending money to the Israeli government for decades. In total, Israel has received far more “foreign aid” from the US than any other government. And most of that money—especially in recent years—has gone to the Israeli military.

Also, much of this transfer has taken the form of recurring annual payments. So it’s not really accurate to think of this as foreign aid as most people understand it. It’s more accurate to say that a portion of Israeli government programs are funded by American taxpayers and have been for a long time.

This setup has been remarkably uncontroversial with the American public for nearly its entire existence. It’s remarkable because these are literally taxes being paid to a foreign government and because that government has carried out abhorrent atrocities since its founding—the exact kinds of atrocities Americans have prided themselves on opposing.

There are a lot of reasons for that persistent public and institutional support, ranging from tribalism to apathy. But a primary reason has been the success of the Israel lobby.

As I explained a few weeks ago, the massive war-making apparatus in DC was not built up to current levels because that was in the interest of the American people, but because it was in the interest of all the government bureaucrats and officials making up the “national security state” and the weapons companies and other “defense” contractors who stood to benefit.

These groups are perpetually lobbying heavily for more money, more power, and more foreign interventions. But their interest in growth is constant and largely indifferent to geopolitics. As long as the warfare state keeps growing and never shrinks, they will be happy.

The specific directions and objectives of American foreign policy are primarily determined by domestic and foreign interest groups that lobby to steer Washington’s war-making apparatus to serve their own ends.

That isn’t a glitch or the recent corruption by special interests of a system that used to work for the American people. It’s how American foreign policy has operated since at least the end of World War II. Government officials and industry insiders conspired to build a massive warfare state, then turned around and offered it up for sale to whichever groups had enough money to lobby effectively and the geopolitical enemies necessary to justify further growth.

The Israeli government and its ideological allies have proven to be remarkably good at using this setup. They are, arguably, the most effective foreign lobby in American history—especially because they have extended their efforts beyond politicians in DC to the opinion molders in American academia and media.

So, while the Israel lobby helped steer Washington’s foreign policy in ways beneficial to whatever regime was currently in power in Tel Aviv, they and their allies in the US also worked to ensure that pro-Israel narratives dominated in American media and, therefore, that the American public was either enthusiastically supportive of or, at least, indifferent to what the Israeli government was doing.

That narrative dominance began to show cracks after the internet shattered the Israel-friendly American political establishment’s monopoly over the information space. But the current historic collapse in public support for Israel didn’t really kick off until Hamas used its atrocity-laden attack on October 7, 2023, to bait the Israelis into a response that would destroy, not only the global sympathy they had garnered in the wake of the attack, but the broad US public support Israel had been enjoying for decades.

Israel’s response was predictable and brutal. The American public watched the Israelis rain airstrikes down on combatants and noncombatants at scale in Gaza for years. The horrors conducted by the Israeli military in that conflict, with US government support, go far beyond the scale of this article. But, overall, at least tens of thousands—likely over a hundred thousand—Gazans were killed in the war. And, at the very least, a substantial number of those killed were civilians.

The American public was clearly affected by the footage of horrors like children buried in rubble, paramedics being blown up while treating injured bombing survivors, crowds of hungry Gazans being shot at while desperately seeking food at aid stations, and much more. Public support for Israel began to take a nose dive.

And rightfully so. Not only were these atrocities happening in plain view, but we Americans were being forced to send money to the government committing them. Even after the Trump administration helped broker a ceasefire last year, the American public’s support for Israel has continued to fall. And one only has to glance at the news to see why.

For starters, Israel is continuing to kill people in Gaza. Since the so-called ceasefire went into effect last fall, the Israeli military has killed over 750 people and injured over 2,000.

And then, of course, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped encourage Trump to launch this latest air war on Iran. A war that was unpopular with the American public from the beginning, and that has caused significant and unavoidable economic damage that is now beginning to hit an American population that was already struggling economically. The war killed thousands of people—including thirteen American soldiers—all to momentarily deplete Iran’s military capabilities to help shore up Israeli hegemony in the region for the near future (notably, the operation has, so far, appeared to have had the opposite effect).

And finally, after Hezbollah entered the war that the US and Israel started, likely in an attempt to draw some heat away from their allies in Iran, the Israeli government launched a major invasion of southern Lebanon with the explicit stated purpose of permanently displacing over 600,000 people to expand Israel’s territorial control up to the Litani River. Over a million people have been, at least temporarily, displaced so far, and the operation has already brought about the exact kind of brutal civilian death the American public was already growing increasingly troubled by.

Much of that came last week when Israel launched a massive bombing campaign across the city of Beirut that killed over 250 people and injured over a thousand. The Israeli government first announced that the strikes had targeted and killed a Hezbollah leader, but later revised their statement to say it was the leader’s nephew who had been killed. But the timing and intensity of the strikes have led many to speculate that its purpose was actually to undermine Trump’s attempt to bring about a ceasefire and return to the negotiating table with Iran.

That is, at the very least, a believable theory that is in line with the recent behavior of Israeli government officials—especially Netanyahu, whose looming corruption trial gives him a strong personal reason to extend any and all wars Israel is involved in for as long as he’s able to. And it feeds the growing impression that Israel is emboldened by and taking advantage of US support.

In addition to those strikes on Beirut, the Israeli military in Lebanon has also targeted paramedics and medical facilities, killed a UN peacekeeper, struck and collapsed residential buildings, and even bombed a funeral where four family members of the deceased were killed, including a girl under the age of two. And moving beyond Lebanon, Israeli forces also recently killed a teenager in Syria and a nine-year-old girl in Gaza. And all of this has occurred in just the past two weeks.

It is ridiculous that, as Americans, our government forces us to bear a heavy tax burden to fund expensive domestic programs that make our lives harder, less affordable, and less safe, all to benefit government officials and their well-connected friends. Even more ridiculous is the fact that—in addition to all that—we are forced to pay taxes to other governments, too.

But as terrible as those rackets are, they are nothing compared to the moral hazards and moral outrages we are forced to pay for through Washington’s “foreign aid” to Israel. The American population as a whole is finally starting to wake up to this reality. But, regardless of opinion polls, all of us who oppose what the Israeli government is doing should, at the very least, not be forced to fund it against our will.

Israel’s Expansion Means an Unraveling of Middle East Stability

by José Niño | Apr 20, 2026

https://libertarianinstitute.org/articles/israels-expansion-means-an-unraveling-of-middle-east-stability/

The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran may have paused the most intense phase of direct military confrontation, but it has done nothing to resolve the deeper questions about Middle Eastern stability that have emerged since October 7, 2023. Behind the temporary calm lies a profound transformation in Israeli strategic thinking, one that has moved from containment to active regional reorganization.

Israel is not a normal democracy that abides by the rule of law or legal restraint. It is very much an expansionist state with bold ambitions and a demonstrated willingness to break international law. The events of the past two years have made this reality impossible to ignore.

The “Greater Israel” project, a term that has carried two primary meanings over the decades, has moved from the ideological fringe into the governing coalition of Israeli politics. In its narrower, post-1967 usage, “Greater Israel” referred to Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. In its maximalist, biblicist form, drawn from Genesis 15:18, it invokes the territory stretching “from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates,” a vast area encompassing parts of modern Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and potentially reaching into Iraq.

Once confined to religious nationalists and settler ideologues, this expansionist vision now sits at the cabinet table. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for Israel to “expand to Damascus,” displayed a map showing Jordan as part of Israel at a 2023 speech in Paris, and settler leader Daniella Weiss has publicly stated that “the real borders of Greater Israel are the Euphrates and the Nile.”

Netanyahu’s coalition agreement explicitly declares that “Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all parts of the Land of Israel” and that “the government will promote and develop settlements in all parts of the Land of Israel.” As Al Jazeera reported in February 2026, figures like Smotrich and Ben Gvir, once regarded as outside the mainstream, “are now in government, reflecting a wider radicalisation within Israeli society itself.”

Perhaps most striking is that this rhetoric is no longer confined to religious rights. Opposition leader Yair Lapid, an ostensibly secular figure, stated in February 2026 that he supports “anything that will allow the Jews a large, broad, strong land,” adding that “the borders are the borders of the Bible.” When even centrist politicians invoke biblical mandates to justify territorial expansion, the ideological transformation becomes undeniable.

The conflict with Hezbollah has catalyzed a significant shift in Israeli policy regarding Lebanon’s territorial integrity. The previous doctrine of containing Hezbollah has given way to explicit calls from senior Israeli officials for the permanent occupation and annexation of territory up to the Litani River, approximately thirty kilometers north of the current border.

Smotrich has repeatedly asserted that the military campaign in Lebanon must result in a “change of Israel’s borders.” On March 23, 2026, he told an Israeli radio program that the campaign “needs to end with a different reality entirely, both with the Hezbollah decision but also with the change of Israel’s borders.” He then declared at a Knesset faction meeting that “the Litani must be our new border with the state of Lebanon, just like the Yellow Line in Gaza and like the buffer zone and peak of the Hermon in Syria,” adding, “I say here definitively, in every room and in every discussion, too.” Al Jazeera reported that these were “the most explicit” statements by a senior Israeli official on seizing Lebanese territory since the current military operations began.

Defense Minister Israel Katz has adopted a complementary posture. He announced at the end of March that the IDF will maintain “security control over the entire area up to the Litani River” and that “hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon who evacuated northward will not return south of the Litani River until security for the residents of the north is ensured.”

The shift toward annexation is bolstered by the emergence of Uri Tzafon, a movement founded in late March 2024 that advocates for the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements in southern Lebanon. The group, whose name means “awaken, O North” in Hebrew, has organized conferences focused on what it describes as the “occupation of the territory and settlement” of southern Lebanon. Its leaders have invoked conquest, expulsion, and settlement as the necessary sequence for transforming the region.

Senior rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh wrote in a public letter that “after the conquest and expulsion of the hostile population, a Jewish settlement must be established, thus completing the victory.” Eliyahu Ben Asher, a founding member of Uri Tzafon, told Jewish Currents that “the Israeli-Lebanese border is a ridiculous colonial border,” building on his earlier assertion that “what is called ‘southern Lebanon’ is really and truly simply the northern Galilee.”

In mid-2024, the group used drones and balloons to drop eviction notices on Lebanese border towns, informing residents that “they are in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people, and that they are required to evacuate immediately,” according to a post the group made on its Telegram channel. In February 2026, dozens of Uri Tzafon activists crossed the border fence near the Lebanese town of Yaroun and planted trees inside Lebanese territory in what the group called a “moral and historical step.” The IDF detained two individuals and called the crossing “a serious criminal offense.” By April 2026, Jewish Currents reported that Uri Tzafon’s once-marginal ideas had gained “broad governmental and public support,” with the movement’s leaders now setting their sights on territory beyond the Litani, toward the Zaharani River, another dozen miles deeper into Lebanon.

The pursuit of “Greater Israel” and the annexation of buffer zones draw on a lineage of Israeli strategic thought that advocates for the fragmentation of rival Arab states. This lineage includes the 1982 Yinon Plan, an article published in the Hebrew journal Kivunim (“Directions”) and authored by Oded Yinon, who had served as a senior official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry and as a journalist for The Jerusalem Post. Yinon argued that the borders drawn by colonial powers were inherently unstable and that Israel’s security would be best served by what he called the “dissolution of the military capabilities of Arab states east of Israel.” He specifically proposed that Iraq should be divided into separate Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite entities, and that Syria and Lebanon should similarly fragment along sectarian lines.

The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey represents one of the most significant diplomatic casualties of the post-October 7 era. Israeli leadership has designated Turkey not merely as a problematic partner but as a strategic adversary whose regional ambitions require a coordinated counter-alliance.

Foreign Minister Israel Katz spearheaded this posture with highly personalized and escalatory rhetoric. Following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s July 28, 2024, speech suggesting that his country might intervene in Israel “just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya,” Katz responded on X that Erdoğan was “following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein” and that he “should remember what happened there and how it ended,” posting a photograph of Erdoğan alongside the former Iraqi dictator. Katz also instructed Israeli diplomats to “urgently dialogue with all NATO members” to push for Turkey’s condemnation and expulsion from the alliance, calling Turkey “a country which hosts the Hamas headquarters” and describing it as part of “the Iranian axis of evil.”

Beyond rhetoric, Netanyahu has articulated a vision for a regional counter-alliance. On February 23, 2026, ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel, Netanyahu announced a proposed “hexagon of alliances” that would include Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus, along with unnamed Arab, African, and Asian states. He stated that the initiative was designed to counter “the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.” While Netanyahu did not explicitly name Turkey as leading the Sunni axis, Israeli political discourse and analysts have pointed to Turkey under Erdoğan as the primary concern, with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently describing Turkey as “the new Iran.”

The shifts in Israeli rhetoric and doctrine since October 7 have had profound implications for its international standing. The “Greater Israel” rhetoric and the annexation of southern Lebanon have led to what observers describe as a “dark new phase” in Israel’s relations with the international community. Long-standing partners, including the United Kingdom, have suspended trade negotiations and imposed sanctions on individuals involved in the settler movement, citing the strident rhetoric of Israeli ministers as a primary cause.

The military campaign against Iran in early 2026 and the subsequent Iranian retaliation through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered the world’s biggest oil supply disruption since the 1970s. The reclassification of the Strait as a maximum war-risk zone led to insurance premiums surging by over 1,000% contributing to a global fuel crisis and massive volatility in financial markets. Within Israel, the economic damage from the multi-front war has been estimated at over $11.5 billion.

As Israel moves to dismantle the borders of the twentieth century, the resulting shockwaves are rattling both regional alliances and global energy markets. The Jewish state’s transformation into an expansionist power has turned former partners into strategic adversaries, making the recent ceasefire feel like a brief intermission in a much larger drama. In this new Middle East, the map is being redrawn by force, and the cost of that ink is being felt from the Litani River to the Strait of Hormuz.