Why Arab states now oppose a US-Israel attack on Iran

Mohamad Elmasry

16 January 2026

Arab governments that once tolerated the idea of US-led regime change in Iran are now urging restraint, recognizing that Israeli expansionism has become the region's main threat

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-arab-states-now-oppose-us-israel-attack-iran

Only a few years ago, many Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, may have viewed a US regime change attack on Iran favourably.

For decades, they regarded Iran with deep suspicion, often treating it as the region's primary threat. But now, as US President Donald Trump reportedly mulls exactly such an attack, Arab leaders, including Gulf rulers long at odds with Tehran, are lobbying the US administration not to strike Iran.

For 27 months, Arab leaders have watched Israel's rampage throughout the region, in pursuit of its "Greater Israel" project, an expansionist biblical vision for territory spanning from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Nile River in Egypt.

To this end, Israel has significantly expanded its illegal occupation of Arab lands. Not only has Israel carried out genocide in Gaza and indicated its plans to take the territory over, but it has also deepened its hold in the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon.

Perhaps most alarming for Arab leaders, after months of Netanyahu openly declaring his expansionist ambitions, was Israel's unprecedented assault on Qatar, a US ally, in September 2025. That escalation had been preceded only a few months earlier, in June, by Israel convincing the US to bomb Iran in an assault aimed at destroying Iran's nuclear programme and ensuring Israel remains the region's sole nuclear power.

In short, Israel's aim of absolute regional hegemony has never been clearer, and a US strike on Iran would represent both an extension of Israeli aggression and an expansion of its regional power. 

This is the structural shift at the heart of Arab opposition to a potential US-Israel attack on Iran.

Israeli expansionism

Although Israel has attempted to distance itself from a possible US strike on Iran, evidence suggests it is actively fuelling ongoing anti-regime protests that have helped precipitate the most recent American interference.

Earlier this month, both former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and current Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu suggested that Israeli agents are fuelling the protest movement from the front lines.

Meanwhile, Israel's Channel 14 has insinuated that Israel has been supplying weapons to opposition protesters, who have reportedly killed dozens of Iranian security personnel.

These reports will almost certainly be read by Arab leaders in the context of Israel's decades-long attempt to convince the US to carry out a regime change operation in Iran, as well as America's history of covert regime change and chaos operations in the region.

But Israel's push for regional hegemony is not the only calculation affecting how Arab states view conflict between Iran and the US-Israel axis, or the potential collapse of the Iranian regime.

Recent regional shifts also play an important role.

Since 2023, Iran has been severely weakened, with sanctions crippling the economy and direct attacks by the US and Israel compromising both the country's military capabilities and nuclear programme.

Iran's proxy network has also been degraded. Syria's Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024, and Lebanon's Hezbollah has suffered mightily in the face of constant Israeli bombardment.

From the perspective of Arab governments, Iran's decline has rendered further attack unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive.

Indeed, while a weak Iran may be manageable and perhaps even desirable, the costs of a completely collapsed Iranian state greatly outweigh any potential benefits.

A shifting threat map

Gulf countries need stability to preserve regional security and further economic interests.

They worry in particular about what an attack on Iran, and a potential Iranian retaliation, could do to oil and natural gas prices.

An Iranian retaliation would likely threaten the Strait of Hormuz, which is essential to the transport of both natural gas and oil. Egypt fears that regime collapse in Iran could lead to further instability in the Red Sea and Suez Canal, both vital to the Egyptian economy.

It is also worth noting that Arab states have themselves moved diplomatically closer to Iran in recent years, in part because of Israeli aggression and expansionism. The Saudis and Iranians restored diplomatic relations in 2023 and moved closer after Israel's September 2025 attack on Qatar.

Iran's relationship with Egypt has also improved.

Moreover, recent events, and in particular Israel's unchecked aggression and territorial expansion, have forced a structural shift in how Arab states assess regional threats.

Gone, at least for now, are the days when Saudi Arabia viewed Iran as its foremost enemy, when Qatar saw Saudi Arabia as its principal threat, or when Egypt treated Qatar as the chief source of regional instability.

Increasingly, Arab regimes, with perhaps the exception of the UAE, now view Israel as the region's most destabilising force.

Israeli expansionism, its willingness to strike across borders without regard for accepted international norms, and its open pursuit of regional hegemony have fundamentally altered how Arab leaders assess risk.

Arab leaders now fear that they may already be on the path of "Greater Israel", or that they could be Israel's next target.

Trump's de-escalation rhetoric on Wednesday may have clarified what some analysts believe has been the US plan all along: squeeze the Iranian economy, support opposition protesters on the ground, and seek regime collapse without the costs of a direct military intervention.

Should the de-escalation trend continue, Arab leaders will be pleased, at least until the next Israeli effort to weaken, destabilise and fragment the region.

The irony is that Israeli belligerence - and American belligerence at the behest of Israel - carries the potential to unite a divided region, if not on the basis of common interests, then at least on the basis of a common threat.

The axis era: West Asia's new map after the ‘Flood’

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was never just an act of war. It cracked the facade of regional stability, exposed the fault lines of power, and accelerated the pull into four contending poles now reshaping West Asia.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan

JAN 16, 2026

https://thecradle.co/articles/the-axis-era-west-asias-new-map-after-the-flood

“Al-Aqsa Flood was a preemptive strike – meant to break the American-Zionist project in this region.”  — Ihsan Ataya, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) official, speaking to The Cradle on 28 October 2023

Until recently, regional developments in West Asia could still be parsed through the old frameworks of isolated conflicts, bilateral rivalries, or proxy skirmishes. No longer. 

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023 was a strategic rupture that reset the rules of deterrence, legitimacy, and the acceptable use of force. Since that day, West Asia has transformed into a single, hyper-connected battlespace where borders blur, fronts overlap, and crises no longer unfold in isolation.

Everything since 7 October has operated within a new strategic equation. Major powers have scrambled to adjust their priorities, allies and adversaries have redrawn their lines, and familiar arrangements have begun to fray. 

The usual safeguards – diplomatic cover, economic pressure valves, even military deterrents – have eroded. The region is no longer a patchwork of separate flashpoints, but a volatile system where any single spark – a border incident, trade maneuver, or diplomatic shift – can trigger a chain reaction. What we are witnessing is the active remaking of the region’s balance of power, in real time.

Four axes, no hegemon

At the heart of this transformation is the emergence of four distinct centers of power: Iran, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli occupation state. Each commands influence across multiple domains, but none has been able to translate that into uncontested dominance. Instead, the region is pulled between four gravitational fields, each shaping alliances, conflicts, and narratives.

Iran and Saudi Arabia wield energy resources that extend their reach beyond West Asia. Iran also commands loyalty from Shia populations and maintains long-standing partnerships with resistance movements. 

Turkiye and Iran are large, populous states with deep historical imperial roots, strategic geography, and expansive militaries. Saudi Arabia – and, to a lesser extent, Turkiye – also possess significant soft power, rooted in religious and cultural legitimacy. Israel, for its part, remains a military and technological leader, backed by a “special relationship” with Washington and an unconfirmed nuclear arsenal.

None of these powers, however, holds all the cards. Their simultaneous rise has prevented the emergence of a regional hegemon. Instead, they check each other’s advances in an unstable balance shaped by history, ideology, and ambition.

These four axes do not operate as formal alliances. They are fluid zones of influence that shape how states, movements, and even markets align. What matters is not fixed membership but the gravitational pull – the capacity to compel decisions, offer protection, impose costs, or shape narratives. And in the volatile aftermath of 7 October, that pull has only intensified.

This structure exists because none of these actors enjoys a decisive edge. Nor are they all equally accepted in the region. Influence alone is not enough; a power must be willing to act, and others must be willing to accept its leadership. 

No state in recent West Asian history has sustained all three traits long enough to become a hegemon. Instead, they maneuver to secure their turf or deny rivals supremacy. These competitions flare during upheaval – the Persian Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and now, the post-Operation Al-Aqsa Flood rupture.

Most regional states now orbit one of these four axes. Riyadh leads many of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, excluding Qatar and the UAE. Abu Dhabi a key member of the ‘Axis of Normalization’ has naturally tilted toward the Israeli camp. Resistance movements align with Iran. 

Qatar leans toward Turkiye, a relationship underpinned by their shared support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked movements across the region. Egypt, once a power in its own right, has largely fallen under Saudi sway.

The battle for Yemen’s south is a Gulf power play

Saudi–UAE competition has long been framed as a rivalry within the Gulf’s inner circle – two partners with diverging tactics, not clashing visions. That frame no longer holds. The UAE's normalization with Tel Aviv recast Abu Dhabi as an enabler of Israeli regional integration – not just a competitor to Riyadh, but a channel for Israeli expansion. 

This realignment has sharpened Saudi sensitivities. While Riyadh may overlap with Israel tactically, it does not accept Tel Aviv as a strategic arbiter. The concern is not Emirati–Israeli ties per se, but their functional depth – a fusion of Emirati capital and logistics with Israeli security expertise and global networks. That combination, Riyadh fears, could project power into Saudi Arabia’s own sphere.

This is especially acute in southern Yemen, where Abu Dhabi’s ambitions risk handing Tel Aviv a presence on Saudi Arabia’s southern flank. Riyadh views this not as regional jockeying but a direct threat to its national security. 

The Saudi position is clear: tactical overlap with Israel is tolerable to a point, but a UAE–Israel axis inside the Gulf is a red line. This has outgrown the bounds of a Gulf rivalry. It is now a clash between two distinct regional visions–one seeking to contain Israel’s expansion, the other enabling its entrenchment.

Tel Aviv’s regional project threatens friend and foe alike

For decades, Hezbollah’s late secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned that weakening the Axis of Resistance would eventually endanger every state in the region – including those aligned with Washington. In a 2013 speech, Nasrallah stated:

“If Syria falls, Palestine is lost – and with it, the resistance in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. If Syria falls to the US, Israel, and the takfiris, our region will enter a dark, brutal era. That is our assessment.”

A decade later, Tel Aviv’s regional conduct bears out that warning. Israel no longer limits its actions to a single front. It moves across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Iran in concert, treating the region as a unified battlespace.

Recent events – setbacks for the resistance, Syria’s erosion, the expansion of Israeli operations – have made clear that Tel Aviv respects no boundaries, not even those of friendly governments. 

For Iran, the threat is direct and existential. Israeli officials routinely declare that dismantling the Islamic Republic is their strategic goal. That goal has been pursued through assassinations, sabotage, ‘color revolutions,’ proxy attacks, and now open war.

For Turkiye, the threat is strategic. Israel challenges Ankara’s influence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, pushing alternative trade corridors that sideline Turkish geography. Syria, in particular, has become a theater where Israeli freedom of action clashes with Turkish security priorities.

For Saudi Arabia, the concern is structural. Tel Aviv’s attempt to rewrite regional rules threatens Riyadh’s autonomy and leadership. The greater danger lies in the emerging regional architecture – an order shaped to entrench Israeli dominance while sidelining Arab powers into subordinate roles.

Since 7 October, Tel Aviv has expanded its operational playbook: preemptive strikes, multi-front campaigns, and intensified deterrence. This has heightened the perception of threat across all major powers. 

That does not mean a new anti-Israel alliance is forming. But it does mean each actor – except Iran, which sees Israel as an inherent enemy – now views Israeli expansion as a constraint on their own strategic space.

What looms larger than open conflict is a strategic shift that could allow one actor to reshape the rules of engagement for the entire region.

On Foreign Policy, Trump 2.0 Is Dangerously Unrestrained 

The president still has time to put America first.

Doug Bandow

Jan 15, 2026

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/on-foreign-policy-trump-2-0-is-dangerously-unrestrained/

Even as he underwrites and wages multiple wars, proposes a gargantuan $500 billion increase in military outlays, and plans to build his own Arc de Triomphe, President Donald Trump apparently believes himself to be a man of peace. He has become a classic example of historian Lord Acton’s dictum in action: “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 

As Trump completes the first year of his second term, he is demonstrating that his first term was merely a playful preview. This time he has gotten serious, with new wars and threats of war multiplying, sometimes on an almost daily basis. He believes that there are no meaningful limits—legal, institutional, constitutional, or even moral, other than his own musings—on loosing the dogs of war with the most powerful military on earth. This makes him potentially the most dangerous U.S. president yet.

During his first term Trump backed Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Yemen, underwriting personal tyranny and mass killing. This term he struck Yemen’s Ansar Allah militant group directly, despite the lack of any meaningful U.S. interests at stake. During his first term he supported Israel against all comers, most importantly backing its brutal occupation of the perpetually helpless Palestinians, whom Israel treats rather as ancient Sparta treated its helots. This term he armed and reinforced Israel in its continuing wars in Gaza and Lebanon, despite catastrophic civilian losses, as well as its illegal and unprovoked attack on Iran. Trump I merely assassinated one Iranian military leader and abandoned diplomacy regarding Iran’s nuclear program; Trump II used diplomacy as a ruse to facilitate Israel’s illegal and unprovoked attack on Iran before joining in the bombing later. Now he is threatening to intervene, somehow, in that nation’s internal strife.

Trump I mulled using force against Venezuela, but backed down in the face of broad regional opposition. Trump II arbitrarily terminated special envoy Richard Grenell’s diplomatic initiative and launched illegal and unprovoked attacks on Venezuela, while also threatening other Latin American governments that he dislikes, including Colombia, Panama, and even Mexico. Peering obliviously into the hideously complex imbroglio of Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria, the president issued violent Truth Social threats, followed by launching a handful of missiles in the name of protecting Christians. Testing the limits of the dictum that targets of his opprobrium should take him seriously, not literally, Trump is aggressively threatening to swallow Greenland, despite the current lack of threats and his previous neglect of America’s military role on the island. 

Perhaps worse, the onetime scourge of U.S. subsidies for whiny wealthy allies has abandoned all talk of withdrawing U.S. forces from Europe, South Korea, and Japan. Once allies promised to spend more on their militaries, even when it was difficult to distinguish reality amid their abundant smoke and mirrors, Trump lost interest in having them take over responsibility for their own security. Hence Washington remains entangled in the Russia–Ukraine war, a tragedy that grows ever more dangerous for America as European nations continue to escalate their proxy war against Moscow. 

Then there is the Middle East. Even more so than his predecessors, Trump has denied nothing to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even demanding that the nominally democratic state pardon the latter over alleged crimes. Worse, Trump appears determined to make America the guarantor of absolute monarchy in the region, declaring a security commitment—with neither treaty nor congressional assent—for Qatar. He has pressed to do the same for the even more corrupt and brutal Saudi Arabia, if only it would recognize Jerusalem.

Trump I was always more Jacksonian unilateralist than Ron-Paulian noninterventionist, but he earned support from restrainers with his dramatic criticism of the Iraq war, a welcome if convenient reversal from his attitude at the time. However, Trump II has reinvented himself as a neoconservative warrior with barely the pretense of morality or principle. The president evidently wants to be in control: Like his perpetually addled and confused predecessor, he declared that he runs the world. Toward that end he has proved even more willing to wage economic as well as kinetic war. Like the mythical Zeus tosses thunderbolts, Trump issues sanctions and tariffs against almost whoever or whatever engages his ever-evanescent attention span.

The downsides of the president’s approach are significant. The first is to risk involvement in complicated and dangerous imbroglios of little relevance to American security and beyond American solution. So far, the president’s predictable inattention to detail and waning interest in whatever had captured his interest yesterday has protected the U.S. from disaster. For instance, the administration gave up against Yemen’s Houthis, abandoning its expensive but fruitless naval mission. The White House no longer is talking about launching a religious crusade in Nigeria. If Iran’s protests wane, he may abandon that issue as well. The U.S. is likely to avoid conflict with Russia if the latter continues to win its war, albeit in a terribly slow and costly manner, while evading a clash involving NATO, which would be a wild and likely a losing gamble.

The second problem is the bankruptcy of the American people. The Pentagon budget is the price of America’s foreign policy. The U.S. needs very little to defend itself and its domination of the Western Hemisphere. Most American personnel and weapons are devoted to defending the gaggle of nominal allies around the world that have leeched off of the U.S. for years, and often decades. Surely it is time for South Korea to defend itself from the North, the Europeans to guard against Russia, and the coalition of Israel and Gulf monarchies to protect themselves from Iran. Even China can be constrained by Japan, which could make aggression too expensive to contemplate. As for Taiwan, are the American people prepared to fight a nuclear war thousands of miles from home that would look uncomfortably like the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse? 

If the president nevertheless wants to run the world, he needs a lot more force. Hence his proposal for a $1.5 trillion military budget. The president’s fiscal priorities, to hike military outlays, protect entitlement spending, and cut taxes, have the U.S. on a catastrophic course. In 2025 the U.S. spent $7 trillion, borrowing $2 trillion of the funds and devoting more than $1 trillion to simply pay interest on the resulting debt. With Uncle Sam planning to continue down this path, budget deficits, debt totals, and interest payments will continue to rise until the entire federal financial structure risks collapse.

Finally, the president’s approach is ultimately unproductive, even unrealistic. While cynicism about “rules-based order” is appropriate—the U.S. and its allies carefully wrote the rules and freely violate them to their benefit—there still is some value in both hypocrisy and insincerity. Pretending to be committed to something beyond pure self-interest, acting like there are constraints even on the pursuit of legitimate and valuable interests, is important. Claiming that Washington can do whatever it wants irrespective of principle, morality, or consequence is already unsettling allied states and encouraging less friendly ones. 

Even more perversely, the administration is wasting economic resources, military credibility, and political capital to achieve what could be gained diplomatically. For instance, though Trump’s Venezuela machinations have been defended by some conservative realists, even Trump admitted that a peaceful solution was available there. So too with Greenland and Panama, even absent talk of war and military strikes. The president’s trolling of former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau yielded a recalcitrant government in Ottawa and an angry population. Trump’s blustering reinforced Australia’s previous leftward shift in last year’s election. His refusal to even acknowledge the humanity of tens of thousands of dead Palestinian civilians, let alone to take their lives into account in U.S. policy, will continue to fuel instability in the Middle East. Most bizarre may have been the president’s willingness to offend rising powers—Brazil and India, for instance—essentially scoring own goals in today’s geopolitical great game. 

Trump still has time to put America first in practice as well as rhetoric. To start, he should maintain focus on the U.S. “near abroad” but rediscover diplomacy and economic engagement in advancing American interests. Most importantly, he should more rigorously assess more distant diminishing priorities. The world will always be unstable and messy, but most international crises need not be Washington’s responsibility. Uncle Sam should step back. The president’s job is to run the U.S. government, not the world, as he claimed, and to do so to protect America, its people, territory, liberties, and prosperity. That should be his legacy.

7 Out Of 10 Voters Do Not Want the U.S. To Take Military Action Against Iran For Killing Of Protesters, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 70% Say Presidents Should Seek Congressional Approval Before Taking Military Action Against Another Country

January 14, 2026

https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3945

In the wake of U.S. threats of military action against Iran if protesters there are killed while demonstrating against the Iranian government, 70 percent of voters think the U.S. should not get involved, while 18 percent think the U.S. should take military action against Iran, and 12 percent did not offer an opinion, according to a Quinnipiac (KWIN-uh-pea-ack) University national poll of registered voters released today.

Independents (80 - 11 percent), Democrats (79 - 7 percent), and Republicans (53 - 35 percent) think the U.S. should not get involved if protesters in Iran are killed while demonstrating against the Iranian government.

MILITARY ACTION & CONGRESS

Voters 70 - 24 percent think that, in general, if a president decides to take military action against another country, they should first receive approval from Congress.

There are differences along political party lines.

Democrats (95 - 2 percent) and independents (78 - 18 percent) think a president should first receive approval from Congress, while Republicans (54 - 35 percent) think a president should not.

"Talk of the U.S. military potentially intervening in Iran's internal chaos gets a vigorous thumbs down, while voters signal Congressional approval should be a backstop against military involvement in any foreign crisis,"said Quinnipiac University Polling Analyst Tim Malloy.

VENEZUELA

Voters are divided on the Trump administration's decision to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and bring them to the United States to face drug trafficking charges, as 47 percent support the decision, while 45 percent oppose it.

Republicans (85 - 7 percent) support the decision, while Democrats (79 - 11 percent) oppose it. Independents are divided, with 45 percent supporting it and 47 percent opposing it.

Voters 53 - 41 percent do not think the Trump administration is providing a clear explanation of the reasons behind the United States' actions against Venezuela.

Voters 57 - 35 percent oppose the United States running Venezuela until it is satisfied that the government there will operate the way the U.S. wants it to.

Voters 73 - 21 percent oppose the United States sending ground troops into Venezuela in order to control the country.

Voters 55 - 38 percent oppose the U.S. taking over Venezuela's oil sales.

Voters are split on whether they think the U.S. actions in Venezuela will improve the lives of everyday Venezuelans, as 45 percent think they will improve their lives, 44 percent do not think so, and 11 percent did not offer an opinion.

"Voters are divided on the merits of overthrowing Maduro. And while split on whether in the long run, the people of Venezuela will be better off, they strongly disapprove of America's temporary domain over Venezuela and are heartily against putting U.S. troops on the ground,"added Malloy.

GREENLAND

In the wake of discussions about the United States trying to either buy Greenland or use military force to take control of it, voters say:

• 86 - 9 percent they would oppose the United States trying to take Greenland by military force;
• 55 - 37 percent they would oppose the United States trying to buy Greenland.

MEXICO & COLOMBIA

Voters 57 - 37 percent would oppose the United States taking military action to attack suspected illegal drug facilities in Mexico, if this meant acting without the permission of the Mexican government.

Voters 55 - 36 percent would oppose the United States taking military action to attack suspected illegal drug facilities in Colombia, if this meant acting without the permission of the Colombian government.

TRUMP JOB APPROVALS

Forty percent of voters approve of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president, while 54 percent disapprove, unchanged from Quinnipiac University's December 17, 2025 and October 22, 2025 polls.

Voters were asked about Trump's handling of:

• his job as Commander in Chief of the U.S. military: 43 percent approve, while 53 percent disapprove;
• the economy: 42 percent approve, while 53 percent disapprove;
• U.S. policy toward Venezuela: 41 percent approve, while 52 percent disapprove;
• foreign policy: 41 percent approve, while 56 percent disapprove.

U.S. IN THE WORLD

Half of voters (50 percent) think, under Donald Trump, America's moral authority in the world has gotten weaker, 34 percent think it has gotten stronger, and 13 percent think it has remained about the same.

Forty-six percent of voters think, under Donald Trump, America's leadership in the world has gotten weaker, 42 percent think it has gotten stronger, and 10 percent think it has remained about the same.

Voters 52 - 38 percent do not think it's in the national interest of the United States to expand its power in the western hemisphere, with 10 percent not offering an opinion.

Nearly 9 out of 10 voters (88 percent) think, in general, the United States should work with other nations to solve problems, while 7 percent think the United States should work alone to solve problems.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION APPROVALS

Job approval ratings for six Trump administration officials:

• Secretary of State Marco Rubio: 42 percent approve, 45 percent disapprove, with 13 percent not offering an opinion;
• Vice President J.D. Vance: 41 percent approve, 49 percent disapprove, with 9 percent not offering an opinion;
• Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth: 40 percent approve, 49 percent disapprove, with 11 percent not offering an opinion;
• Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy Jr.: 39 percent approve, 50 percent disapprove, with 10 percent not offering an opinion;
• White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles: 35 percent approve, 40 percent disapprove, with 25 percent not offering an opinion;
• White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller: 34 percent approve, 44 percent disapprove, with 23 percent not offering an opinion.

1,133 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from January 8th - 12th with a margin of error of +/- 3.7 percentage points, including the design effect.

The Quinnipiac University Poll, directed by Doug Schwartz, Ph.D. since 1994, conducts independent, non-partisan national and state polls on politics and issues. Surveys adhere to industry best practices and are based on probability-based samples using random digit dialing with live interviewers calling landlines and cell phones.

China to Get Ready for War with the US in 2026

Hua Bin • January 13, 2026

https://www.unz.com/bhua/china-to-get-ready-for-war-with-the-us-in-2026/

Trump and the US regime is on the move.

After kidnapping (or reverse-ICEing, as some called) Maduro, he openly calls to annex Greenland and attack Iran for its repressed population (seriously? not for the Jews?)

He threatens to send troops to Mexico, and to take care of Colombia and Cuba.

The Orange pirate of the Gulf of USA also threatens 50% tariff on all EU imports and has specifically targeted Spain with threats to make it “pay twice as much” for defense spending.

He is putting a new 25% tariff on importers of Iranian oil, which is specifically about China since Beijing buys over 90% Iranian oil exports.

This is Trump’s way to renege on his deal with President Xi from last October. A snake will be a snake, so par for the course.

Don Trump has obviously also dropped his dishonest effort to broker “peace” between Russia and Ukraine.

Much like his campaign promise to “end the Ukraine war in 24 hours”, his promise not to “do regime-change wars” is just another lie that his MAGA base must start getting used to.

Elect a fraud to presidency – you don’t turn the fraud into a President, you turn the presidency to a fucking joke.

I am not sure whether this proven war criminal is still angling for the Nobel peace prize.

But given the track record of the Nobel committee, they might very well award him that – as if Nobel peace prize means anything!

Just ask Obama.

Yesterday, the command in chief of the USA saw it fit to put out a fake Wikipedia page, announcing himself the “acting president of Venezuela”. On his (alternative) Truth media. Irony in full force.

Even Hitler had the decency and common sense NOT to christen himself the president of Poland, the Netherlands, or France.

Hitler actually conquered those places. Trump merely sent storm troopers to kidnap a sleepy overweight guy after some well targeted bribery to open the gate.

On my trip to Spain, I went to see the Ink against Hitler exhibition at the Museu Nacional d’Art de Catalunya, showcasing satirical drawings by Catalan artist Mario Armengol against the Third Reich.

It’s hard to not see today’s world in the old propaganda cartoons.

While those escapades happen thousands of kilometers away from China, Beijing is reacting with caution and patience.

However, there are increasing calls on Chinese social media to prepare for war with the US in 2026.

Not merely a renewed trade war, or sustained tech war. But a hot war.

The one common thread tying Trump’s theatrical bravados points in one direction – China.

His moves on Venezuela and Iran are squarely aimed at choke holding China’s oil supply. Beijing buys over 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports and 90% of Iran’s.

Though these purchases represent less than 10% of China’s total oil imports, US control over global oil supply poses a real energy security threat to Beijing.

If the US and Israel subdue Iran in a military conquest, the impact on the Gulf region will be profound. The Gulf sheiks will be completely under the thumbs of the US and Zionist interests.

And China buys a lot of oil from the Gulf.

In addition to an oil blockade, the US is also using open-sea piracy to disrupt China’s global commerce.

Though the news is falling off the radar in light of the sensational Venezuela raid and the rhetorics on Greenland, the US coast guard and navy are actively chasing and boarding oil tankers in international waters, including Russia-flagged ships.

Some of the tankers have Chinese ports as their destinations.

In the US Navy Institute report American Sea Power Project 2026 US-China Scenario, the Pentagon is recommending “hybrid warfare” in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

While warning the US is likely to suffer defeat in a war along Chinese coast and potential large-scale devastation to US homeland in a protracted war, it calls for disruptions of Chinese global commerce through Prize Law.

Prize law is a legal construct, last used by the US in WW2, that allows its military force to conduct official “visit and search” operations and seize an adversary’s vessels and cargo during an armed conflict.

The plan involves –

1) seizing vessels outside China’s defensive zones, away from its A2AD bubble;

2) depriving China of key resources such as oil and critical minerals;

3) stealing captured vessels to bolster US capacity by redeploying these vessels to support US war operations, addressing its sealift capacity shortfalls. The US ship building capacity is some 230 times smaller than China.

The strategy is outlined in the September 2024 Proceedings article “Prize Law Can Help the United States Win the War of 2026”.

The attacks on oil tankers by the US coast guard and navy in the Caribbean and Atlantic waters today is a dress rehearsal for conducting such piracy against Chinese-owned vessels.

To justify his plan to annex Greenland, Trump blatantly lies about Chinese influence in Greenland, saying “the place is full of Russian and Chinese ships”.

The lie is patently ridiculous.

China’s total trade with Greenland in 2024 was $383 million, about 0.006% of China’s total foreign trade.

China imports $377 million worth of Greenland fish and crustacean products. It exports $6 million worth of commodities, rubber and toys.

So what Chinese ships are all over Greenland?

The invocation of China and Russia in the context of Greenland has nothing to do with their presence on the ground or influence over the island.

It is about blocking any potential Arctic routes for Russia and China as the ice caps melt.

Bottom line – the many seemingly disjointed adventures Trump and the US regime are pursuing are all targeted towards China.

Of course, China won’t fight a war with the US over Venezuela, or Iran, or Greenland. They are beyond China’s power projection capability and outside of its core interests. Unlike the US, China knows its limits.

However, Beijing will not let the US make these moves, cost free.

Commentators in China are calling for the country to get ready to take action on Taiwan in 2026.

Since the new Japanese prime minister has declared Japan would intervene militarily in a Taiwan scenario, China’s preparations will also include war against Japan.

Rather than letting Washington dictate the pace of the US China showdown, an accelerated conflict timetable in Western Pacific will derail US plans to gobble up the western hemisphere and the Middle East.

China has completed the critical assets to enforce its A2AD strategy with new naval capital ships, stealth fighters, unmanned ariel and underwater combat vehicles, as well as a large stockpile of hypersonic missiles.

The odds are heavily in China’s favor in a conflict with the US and its vassals in Western Pacific. And the US military knows that.

There are several clear benefits in taking action on Taiwan now.

First, taking out the weak Taiwan military before the recent $11 billion US arms sales arrive will reduce the cost of later operations.

Among the US arms are ATACMS missiles that can hit Chinese cities. Though easily interceptible, China cannot allow Taiwan to have weapons that can potentially threaten the mainland.

Second, taking over Taiwan can choke off advanced chip supply to the US while Washington is betting its economic future on AI.

Taiwan still supplies 80-90% of the most advanced chips globally from the TSMC fabs in Hsinchu. If Washington wants to stranglehold oil supply, Beijing can cut it off semiconductors.

It’s no secret that Washington has already developed plans to destroy these fabs in the event of a Chinese take-over of Taiwan. They are likely already wired for demolition and definitely high on the target list for US missiles.

But even if these fabs are destroyed, the loss to China is limited. After all, China has already been denied the most advanced TSMC chips by US coercion. It is making rapid progress to develop its own chip supply chains.

On the other hand, the impact on US tech industry will be enormous. Perhaps fatal.

The western media will claim that China has destroyed these fabs, using the same narrative around the Nord Stream.

But once bullets start flying, narrative becomes irrelevant. Physical reality is what counts. Lies won’t win wars.

The third benefit of a military operation over Taiwan is to destroy Tokyo’s plan to remilitarize.

Takaichi and the extreme right in Japan are hoping to use the Taiwan situation as cover to change its constitution and remilitarize, even obtain nuclear weapons.

Trump and the US regime has been prodding Japan down the path as its proxy to fight China.

Takaichi made her remarks about Taiwan being a “survival threatening” issue shortly after her first meeting with Trump last October. https://huabinoliver.substack.com/p/what-happens-if-japan-joins-the-war

Japan recently announced plans to increase its military spending by 100% from 1% of GDP to 2%.

Rather than waiting for the fruits of the toxic tree, in the context of a Taiwan war, China can invoke the UN-sanctioned Enemy States Clauses regarding defeated WW2 countries and deal with Japan before it fully remilitarizes, if Tokyo gets into the fray.

The last benefit is to the nations under US threat right now. A Taiwan operation in 2026 will give pause to US imperial expansion plans.

“Donroe Doctrine” will be history’s laughing stock, as the “Moron Doctrine”.

A defeat in a direct China US war over Taiwan will teach Washington some humility. Remember Korea?

If the US cowards out and doesn’t fight, then its credibility as the top bully is over.

There is probably no better way for China to assist countries like Venezuela, Iran, Colombia or Cuba whom China considers valuable members in a multi-polar world order.

Trump recently announced the US will spend $1.5 trillion on its military next year. That will raise its war spending from 3.5% of GDP to a full 5%.

A $1.5 trillion military budget means the US will spend more than the rest of the world combined on war making.

The country already has an enviable $38 trillion debt. So another couple of trillion is no biggie.

There is an old Chinese saying “dead pig is not afraid of boiling water”. We know who is the dead pig. My sorrow goes to its creditors.

China currently only spends less than 1.7% GDP on defense. To match US spending level of 5%, China will need to have a $1 trillion defense budget.

Given Pentagon purchasing department has admitted Chinese defense purchasing power vs the US is 3 to 1, that would give China a defense budget effectively double the US.

Now it’s gloves-off time. Let the party start.